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Subscription Moved or Management Group Hierarchy Changed detection rules

Someone moves an Azure subscription to another management group, or changes the management group hierarchy or its settings. The move changes which policies and inherited role assignments apply to the subscription.

Platform
Azure
Severity
Medium
Log source
Azure Activity log
Last updated
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft SentinelIBM QRadar
What an attacker needs
Write permissions in the management group hierarchy, such as Owner or Management Group Contributor, on the subscription and on both parent management groups.
Impact
The subscription leaves the policies and inherited role assignments of its old management group and takes on those of the new one.
Response
Move the subscription back, contain the caller and review what was done in the subscription while the other policies applied.
Mitigation
Limit write permissions on management groups to a few identities and export the Activity log of the root management group to your SIEM.
Operations
MICROSOFT.MANAGEMENT/MANAGEMENTGROUPS/WRITEMICROSOFT.MANAGEMENT/MANAGEMENTGROUPS/DELETEMICROSOFT.MANAGEMENT/MANAGEMENTGROUPS/SETTINGS/WRITEMICROSOFT.MANAGEMENT/MANAGEMENTGROUPS/SETTINGS/DELETEMICROSOFT.MANAGEMENT/MANAGEMENTGROUPS/SUBSCRIPTIONS/WRITEMICROSOFT.MANAGEMENT/MANAGEMENTGROUPS/SUBSCRIPTIONS/DELETE
Threat groups
None listed in MITRE ATT&CK for this technique

How the attack works

Management groups are the level above subscriptions. Azure Policy assignments and role assignments made on a management group are inherited by everything below it, which is how most organizations enforce guardrails such as allowed regions, required logging and denied public access. Microsoft documents that a subscription that moves to a management group inherits all user access and policies from the new parent. It follows that the same move takes the subscription out from under the policies and role assignments of the old parent. The hierarchy also has tenant-wide settings, among them the default management group that new subscriptions are placed in, which is the root management group unless the setting says otherwise.

An attacker who controls a subscription and has rights in the hierarchy can move the subscription to a management group with weaker policies, do there what a deny policy would have blocked, and move it back. A change of the default management group decides which guardrails new subscriptions start with. These are control-plane operations at management group scope: Microsoft.Management/managementGroups/subscriptions/write associates a subscription with a management group, and Microsoft.Management/managementGroups/settings/write changes the hierarchy settings. Microsoft documents that management groups are supported in the Azure Activity log, and that a diagnostic setting on a management group, created through the REST API, exports its Activity log entries. Microsoft does not state that a subscription-level diagnostic setting contains these events, so do not rely on one for them. No public incident report was found that describes a subscription move at the level of the audit event.

What an attacker needs

  • Write permission in the hierarchy. Microsoft names Owner, Contributor and Management Group Contributor as the roles with write permissions on a management group, and documents that a move needs permissions on the item that moves, on the target parent and on the current parent, with an exception when a parent is the root management group.
  • For the hierarchy settings: the Hierarchy Settings Administrator role or the same operations on the root management group.
  • A target management group whose policies are weaker than those of the current one.

Impact

The subscription loses the deny and audit policies and the inherited role assignments of its old parent and takes on those of the new one. Guardrails that the organization relies on stop applying to it without any policy being edited, and identities with roles on the new parent gain access to the subscription. A changed default management group weakens every subscription created afterwards.

Detection rules

Management Group Created, Changed or Deleted

Detects a successful create or update of a management group (Microsoft.Management/managementGroups/write) or its deletion (managementGroups/delete). An update can give the group another parent, which changes the policies and role assignments that everything below it inherits, and a new group is a place to move subscriptions to. The rule matches on the operation names. The event does not say whether the parent changed, and renaming a group produces the same event, so the level is low and the rule is meant for review. These are events at management group scope, and Microsoft documents their export through a diagnostic setting on the management group.

LevelLowStatusExperimentalLog sourceAzure Activity log
title: Management Group Created, Changed or Deleted
id: f6ca3999-52f1-4fe6-baa1-747e6c31229e
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects a successful create or update of a management group
  (Microsoft.Management/managementGroups/write) or its deletion
  (managementGroups/delete). An update can give the group another parent,
  which changes the policies and role assignments that everything below it
  inherits, and a new group is a place to move subscriptions to. The rule
  matches on the operation names. The event does not say whether the parent
  changed, and renaming a group produces the same event, so the level is low
  and the rule is meant for review. These are events at management group scope,
  and Microsoft documents their export through a diagnostic setting on the
  management group.
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1666/
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/governance/management-groups/manage
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/permissions/management-and-governance
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.defense-impairment
  - attack.t1666
logsource:
  product: azure
  service: activitylogs
detection:
  selection:
    OperationNameValue:
      - MICROSOFT.MANAGEMENT/MANAGEMENTGROUPS/WRITE
      - MICROSOFT.MANAGEMENT/MANAGEMENTGROUPS/DELETE
    ActivityStatusValue:
      - Success
      - Succeeded
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Platform teams and landing zone automation that build and maintain the hierarchy. Exclude their identities in a filter_ selection by Caller once confirmed.
level: low

False positives

  • Platform teams and landing zone automation that build and maintain the hierarchy. Exclude their identities in a filter_ selection by Caller once confirmed.

Management Group Hierarchy Settings Changed

Detects a successful create, update or delete of the hierarchy settings of the management group hierarchy (Microsoft.Management/managementGroups/settings/write and settings/delete). The settings are tenant-wide. One of them defines the default management group in which new subscriptions are placed, and with it the policies they start under. The rule matches on the operation names and the event does not say which setting changed, so read the settings after the rule fires. The settings change rarely. These are events at management group scope, and Microsoft documents their export through a diagnostic setting on the management group.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceAzure Activity log
title: Management Group Hierarchy Settings Changed
id: 4a859b5a-08d8-40a5-b015-d707202109bc
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects a successful create, update or delete of the hierarchy settings of
  the management group hierarchy
  (Microsoft.Management/managementGroups/settings/write and
  settings/delete). The settings are tenant-wide. One of them defines the
  default management group in which new subscriptions are placed, and with it
  the policies they start under. The rule matches on the operation names and
  the event does not say which setting changed, so read the settings after
  the rule fires. The settings change rarely. These are events at management
  group scope, and Microsoft documents their export through a diagnostic
  setting on the management group.
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1666/
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/governance/management-groups/how-to/protect-resource-hierarchy
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/permissions/management-and-governance
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.defense-impairment
  - attack.t1666
logsource:
  product: azure
  service: activitylogs
detection:
  selection:
    OperationNameValue:
      - MICROSOFT.MANAGEMENT/MANAGEMENTGROUPS/SETTINGS/WRITE
      - MICROSOFT.MANAGEMENT/MANAGEMENTGROUPS/SETTINGS/DELETE
    ActivityStatusValue:
      - Success
      - Succeeded
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - The initial setup of the hierarchy and planned governance changes by the platform team. Match each change to a change record.
level: medium

False positives

  • The initial setup of the hierarchy and planned governance changes by the platform team. Match each change to a change record.

Subscription Associated With or Removed From a Management Group

Detects a successful association of a subscription with a management group (Microsoft.Management/managementGroups/subscriptions/write) or its removal from one (managementGroups/subscriptions/delete). Microsoft documents that a subscription that moves to a management group inherits all user access and policies from the new parent, so the move changes which Azure Policy assignments and inherited role assignments apply to the subscription. The resource ID of the event names the management group and the subscription. These are events at management group scope. Microsoft documents their export through a diagnostic setting on the management group, which is created with the REST API, so check that such a setting exists before relying on the rule.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceAzure Activity log
title: Subscription Associated With or Removed From a Management Group
id: a03225cd-a496-41eb-8f87-76bb43db4c79
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects a successful association of a subscription with a management group
  (Microsoft.Management/managementGroups/subscriptions/write) or its removal
  from one (managementGroups/subscriptions/delete). Microsoft documents that a
  subscription that moves to a management group inherits all user access and
  policies from the new parent, so the move changes which Azure Policy
  assignments and inherited role assignments apply to the subscription. The
  resource ID of the event names the management group and the subscription.
  These are events at management group scope. Microsoft documents their export
  through a diagnostic setting on the management group, which is created with
  the REST API, so check that such a setting exists before relying on the rule.
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1666/
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/governance/management-groups/manage
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/governance/management-groups/overview
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/permissions/management-and-governance
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.defense-impairment
  - attack.t1666
logsource:
  product: azure
  service: activitylogs
detection:
  selection:
    OperationNameValue:
      - MICROSOFT.MANAGEMENT/MANAGEMENTGROUPS/SUBSCRIPTIONS/WRITE
      - MICROSOFT.MANAGEMENT/MANAGEMENTGROUPS/SUBSCRIPTIONS/DELETE
    ActivityStatusValue:
      - Success
      - Succeeded
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Planned reorganizations and landing zone automation that place new subscriptions in their management group. Exclude the automation identities in a filter_ selection by Caller once confirmed, and match other moves to a change record.
level: medium

False positives

  • Planned reorganizations and landing zone automation that place new subscriptions in their management group. Exclude the automation identities in a filter_ selection by Caller once confirmed, and match other moves to a change record.

Detection logic

Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.

Subscription moved to another management group and moved back shortly after

Detection hypothesisSequence of events

A reorganization moves a subscription once. A subscription that leaves its management group and returns within hours was somewhere else just long enough for something to be done without the usual policies. The pair of moves is the signal, and what happened between them is the finding.

  1. In the Activity log of the management groups, find MICROSOFT.MANAGEMENT/MANAGEMENTGROUPS/SUBSCRIPTIONS/WRITE with status Success. The resource ID names the management group and the subscription. Keep both and the Caller.
  2. Within 24 hours, find a second MICROSOFT.MANAGEMENT/MANAGEMENTGROUPS/SUBSCRIPTIONS/WRITE for the same subscription whose resource ID names the management group it came from.
  3. Review the Activity log of the subscription between the two events, with priority for resource creation, role assignments, diagnostic setting changes and network changes.

EventsMICROSOFT.MANAGEMENT/MANAGEMENTGROUPS/SUBSCRIPTIONS/WRITE

LimitsIt needs the management group events in the SIEM and a record of each subscription's usual parent. A move that was a mistake and is corrected looks the same. The 24 hours are a starting point, and an attacker who leaves the subscription in the weaker group is covered by the single-event rule, not by this pattern.

Triage

  • Identify the Caller, the caller's IP address and the management group. The resource ID of a subscription event names the management group and the subscription.
  • Find the subscription's previous parent and compare the policy assignments and role assignments of the two management groups.
  • Check for a change request. Reorganizations and landing zone deployments move subscriptions on purpose.
  • Review the Activity log of the subscription after the move for operations that a policy of the old parent would have denied.
  • Look for a second move that puts the subscription back, and for changes to the hierarchy settings by the same caller.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Move the subscription back to its approved management group and confirm that the expected policy assignments apply again.
  2. Contain the caller. Revoke its sessions, rotate its credentials and remove its write permissions in the hierarchy.
  3. Review everything that was created or changed in the subscription while it was under the other management group, and remove what the policies would have blocked.
  4. Review the role assignments the subscription inherited from the temporary parent, and what those identities did in the subscription.
  5. Set the hierarchy settings back if they were changed, and check where subscriptions created since then were placed.

Mitigation

  • Keep Owner, Contributor and Management Group Contributor on management groups, especially on the root, to a few identities, assigned through Privileged Identity Management.
  • Create a diagnostic setting on the root management group that sends its Activity log events to your SIEM, so that hierarchy changes do not stay in the portal only.
  • Set the default management group for new subscriptions to a group with your baseline policies, and limit the Hierarchy Settings Administrator role.
  • Avoid direct Owner assignments on subscriptions for identities that also have Contributor on other management groups, because Microsoft documents that this combination allows a move.
  • Record which management group each subscription belongs to, and compare it with the hierarchy regularly.

Frequently asked questions

Does a subscription-level Activity log export contain these events?

Do not rely on it. They are events at management group scope. Microsoft documents that management groups are supported in the Azure Activity log and that a diagnostic setting on a management group, created through the Azure Resource Manager REST API, sends those entries to a Log Analytics workspace, a storage account or an event hub. Microsoft does not state that a subscription-level setting contains them.

Why does moving a subscription weaken its security?

Policies and role assignments on a management group are inherited by the subscriptions below it. Microsoft documents that a subscription that moves inherits all user access and policies from its new parent. The policies of the old parent no longer apply after the move, so a deny policy can be left behind without editing or deleting it.

What do the hierarchy settings control?

They are tenant-wide settings of the management group hierarchy. One of them defines the default management group, which is where a new subscription is placed. Microsoft documents that by default a new subscription becomes a member of the root management group. A change of that setting decides which policies new subscriptions start under.

Is there a public incident that moved a subscription to avoid policies?

No public incident report was found that describes it at the level of the audit event. The page is based on what Microsoft documents about inheritance in the management group hierarchy, and MITRE ATT&CK lists the modification of cloud resource hierarchies as a technique.

References

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