How the attack works
Which accounts belong to an AWS organization is changed with a few Organizations calls, and each direction is useful to an attacker. From the management account, CreateAccount creates a new member account. AWS preconfigures it with a role, named OrganizationAccountAccessRole by default, that gives users of the management account administrator permissions in the new account, so whoever controls the management account controls the new account too. InviteAccountToOrganization sends an invitation to an existing account, which can be one the attacker already owns. AWS's Threat Technique Catalog describes both: the new or invited account is billed to the organization, and resources in it may sit outside the detections that cover the known accounts.
The opposite direction starts inside a victim account. An invitation to join an organization is accepted with AcceptHandshake, and AWS documents that only the invited member account can accept it. An attacker who controls a standalone account, or one that has just left its organization, can accept an invitation from an organization they manage. From then on the account is a member of that organization, and its policies and consolidated billing are decided there.
AWS logs all Organizations actions in CloudTrail under organizations.amazonaws.com, only in the US East (N. Virginia) Region, and in the account that takes the action. AWS publishes example records for CreateAccount, for the CreateAccountResult service event that reports the outcome with the new account ID, and for InviteAccountToOrganization. It also documents an AccountJoinedOrganization event that is available only in the management account's event history. No incident report was used for this page: it follows AWS's catalog entry and the Organizations documentation.
What an attacker needs
- For creating or inviting an account, credentials for a principal in the organization's management account with organizations:CreateAccount or organizations:InviteAccountToOrganization.
- For joining a foreign organization, credentials in the victim account with organizations:AcceptHandshake, and an account that is standalone or has left its organization.
Impact
A created or invited account gives the attacker a place inside the organization, paid for by the victim, where existing monitoring may not look. As a member, the account also satisfies resource policies that trust the whole organization through the aws:PrincipalOrgID condition key. An account that joins a foreign organization falls under the policies and billing of that organization, which takes it out of the owner's governance.
Detection rules
Account Invited to Join the AWS Organization
Detects InviteAccountToOrganization calls to AWS Organizations. The call sends an invitation to an existing AWS account, named by account ID or by email address, to become a member of the organization. AWS publishes an example record for the event: the invited party is in requestParameters.target (type and id), and responseElements.handshake describes the invitation. An attacker who controls the management account can invite an account of their own, which then sits inside the organization at the organization's cost. The event is logged in the management account, in the US East (N. Virginia) Region only. It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode, because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
title: Account Invited to Join the AWS Organization
id: 4f0525cf-3eab-4647-b790-8e394657230c
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects InviteAccountToOrganization calls to AWS Organizations. The call
sends an invitation to an existing AWS account, named by account ID or by
email address, to become a member of the organization. AWS publishes an
example record for the event: the invited party is in
requestParameters.target (type and id), and responseElements.handshake
describes the invitation. An attacker who controls the management account
can invite an account of their own, which then sits inside the
organization at the organization's cost. The event is logged in the
management account, in the US East (N. Virginia) Region only.
It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode,
because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
references:
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/organizations/latest/userguide/orgs_cloudtrail-integration.html
- https://aws-samples.github.io/threat-technique-catalog-for-aws/Techniques/T1666.A001.html
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1666/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1666
logsource:
product: aws
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection:
eventSource: organizations.amazonaws.com
eventName: InviteAccountToOrganization
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Planned onboarding of existing accounts, for example after an acquisition or when standalone accounts are brought under central management. These are rare, so confirm each invitation with the cloud platform team.
level: medium
False positives
- Planned onboarding of existing accounts, for example after an acquisition or when standalone accounts are brought under central management. These are rare, so confirm each invitation with the cloud platform team.
Account Joined the AWS Organization (Service Event)
Detects the AccountJoinedOrganization event of AWS Organizations. AWS documents that this event is logged when an account becomes a member, that it is available only in the management account's event history, and that it carries a joinedMethod field (Created for an account made with CreateAccount, INVITED for an account that accepted an invitation) and a joinedTime field. It is the confirmation that an account really joined, which the CreateAccount and InviteAccountToOrganization events do not give. AWS publishes no example record for it, so the rule matches the event name only and assumes the event source of the other Organizations service events. Level low: it reports the result of calls that the other rules on this page already match.
title: Account Joined the AWS Organization (Service Event)
id: 682fcf2f-0814-46e6-b613-932e51e2bbaa
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects the AccountJoinedOrganization event of AWS Organizations. AWS
documents that this event is logged when an account becomes a member,
that it is available only in the management account's event history, and
that it carries a joinedMethod field (Created for an account made with
CreateAccount, INVITED for an account that accepted an invitation) and a
joinedTime field. It is the confirmation that an account really joined,
which the CreateAccount and InviteAccountToOrganization events do not
give. AWS publishes no example record for it, so the rule matches the
event name only and assumes the event source of the other Organizations
service events. Level low: it reports the result of calls that the other
rules on this page already match.
references:
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/organizations/latest/APIReference/API_CreateAccount.html
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/organizations/latest/APIReference/API_AcceptHandshake.html
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/organizations/latest/userguide/orgs_cloudtrail-integration.html
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1666/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1666
logsource:
product: aws
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection:
eventSource: organizations.amazonaws.com
eventName: AccountJoinedOrganization
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Every account that the account vending pipeline creates and every planned onboarding of an existing account. Use the event to keep your account inventory current, and alert when the new account is not expected.
level: low
False positives
- Every account that the account vending pipeline creates and every planned onboarding of an existing account. Use the event to keep your account inventory current, and alert when the new account is not expected.
Member Account Created in AWS Organizations
Detects CreateAccount calls to AWS Organizations. The call creates a new AWS account that is a member of the organization, and AWS preconfigures it with a role (OrganizationAccountAccessRole by default) that gives users of the management account administrator permissions in it. AWS publishes an example record for the event, with the account name and email in requestParameters. The outcome arrives later in a CreateAccountResult service event whose serviceEventDetails.createAccountStatus holds the state and the new account ID. The event is logged in the management account, in the US East (N. Virginia) Region only. It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode, because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
title: Member Account Created in AWS Organizations
id: 8c240c4c-64c2-4ccf-be83-7bc3939c60cc
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects CreateAccount calls to AWS Organizations. The call creates a new
AWS account that is a member of the organization, and AWS preconfigures
it with a role (OrganizationAccountAccessRole by default) that gives users
of the management account administrator permissions in it. AWS publishes
an example record for the event, with the account name and email in
requestParameters. The outcome arrives later in a CreateAccountResult
service event whose serviceEventDetails.createAccountStatus holds the
state and the new account ID. The event is logged in the management
account, in the US East (N. Virginia) Region only.
It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode,
because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
references:
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/organizations/latest/userguide/orgs_cloudtrail-integration.html
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/organizations/latest/APIReference/API_CreateAccount.html
- https://aws-samples.github.io/threat-technique-catalog-for-aws/Techniques/T1666.A001.html
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1666/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1666
logsource:
product: aws
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection:
eventSource: organizations.amazonaws.com
eventName: CreateAccount
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Account vending pipelines and landing zone tools that create accounts on request. They use one role, so add it to a filter_* selection on userIdentity.arn and alert on every other caller.
level: medium
False positives
- Account vending pipelines and landing zone tools that create accounts on request. They use one role, so add it to a filter_* selection on userIdentity.arn and alert on every other caller.
AWS Organizations Invitation or Handshake Accepted
Detects AcceptHandshake calls to AWS Organizations. AWS documents that only a member account can accept an invitation to join an organization (handshake type INVITE), so in an account that is standalone or has just left its organization this event means that the account is joining an organization. If that organization is not yours, the account has been moved under someone else's management. The same call also accepts other handshakes, such as the request to enable all features, so read the handshake in the response to see which kind it was. AWS documents that all Organizations actions are logged, in the account that takes the action and in the US East (N. Virginia) Region only. It publishes no example record for this call, so the rule matches the event name only. It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode, because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
title: AWS Organizations Invitation or Handshake Accepted
id: 8a6426a3-ff0b-4a01-b014-6ec76e11ac94
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects AcceptHandshake calls to AWS Organizations. AWS documents that
only a member account can accept an invitation to join an organization
(handshake type INVITE), so in an account that is standalone or has just
left its organization this event means that the account is joining an
organization. If that organization is not yours, the account has been
moved under someone else's management. The same call also accepts other
handshakes, such as the request to enable all features, so read the
handshake in the response to see which kind it was. AWS documents that
all Organizations actions are logged, in the account that takes the
action and in the US East (N. Virginia) Region only. It publishes no
example record for this call, so the rule matches the event name only.
It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode,
because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
references:
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/organizations/latest/APIReference/API_AcceptHandshake.html
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/organizations/latest/userguide/orgs_cloudtrail-integration.html
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1666/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1666
logsource:
product: aws
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection:
eventSource: organizations.amazonaws.com
eventName: AcceptHandshake
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Accounts that join your own organization after a planned invitation, and member accounts that approve the change to all features. Both are rare and planned, so confirm each event with the cloud platform team.
level: high
False positives
- Accounts that join your own organization after a planned invitation, and member accounts that approve the change to all features. Both are rare and planned, so confirm each event with the cloud platform team.
Detection logic
Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.
Account leaves its organization and accepts an invitation shortly after
An account can belong to one organization at a time. An attacker who wants to move a victim account under their own organization has to take it out of its current one first, so the two calls appear close together in the trail of the same account.
- A
LeaveOrganizationevent fromorganizations.amazonaws.comin a member account. NoterecipientAccountIdand the caller inuserIdentity.arn. - Within 24 hours an
AcceptHandshakeevent fromorganizations.amazonaws.comin the same account. - Check whether a migration between two of your own organizations was planned for this account.
EventsLeaveOrganizationAcceptHandshake
LimitsA planned move of an account between two organizations of the same company looks identical. Once the account has left, its trail may no longer reach your log platform, so the second event can be missing. The 24 hours are a starting point.
Invitation sent to an account that is not in your account inventory
Legitimate invitations go to accounts the company already owns, for example after an acquisition. An invitation to an account ID or email address that nobody in the company knows brings a stranger's account into the organization.
- Collect
InviteAccountToOrganizationevents fromorganizations.amazonaws.com. - Read
requestParameters.target.typeandrequestParameters.target.id, which hold an account ID or an email address. - Compare the value with your account inventory and your company's email domains, and alert when it matches neither.
EventsInviteAccountToOrganization
LimitsIt needs a current account inventory. An account that was acquired but not yet recorded looks the same.
Triage
- Identify the caller (userIdentity.arn), the source IP address and the user agent. Is it the account vending pipeline or an administrator with an approved request?
- For CreateAccount, read the account name and email of the request, and find the CreateAccountResult event that carries the new account ID.
- For InviteAccountToOrganization, read requestParameters.target and check whether the invited account or email belongs to your company.
- For AcceptHandshake, find out which organization sent the invitation, and whether the account left another organization shortly before.
- Review what happened in the new or invited account since the event, starting with who assumed OrganizationAccountAccessRole.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Cancel open invitations that nobody approved, and remove an invited account from the organization.
- Take control of an account that was created without approval. Review and remove its resources, then close it.
- If one of your accounts joined a foreign organization, sign in as its root user, leave that organization, and contact AWS Support if you cannot.
- Contain the principal that made the call, and review everything else it did in the management account.
- Review the bill and CloudTrail of the affected accounts for resources that were created after the change.
Mitigation
- Limit organizations:CreateAccount and organizations:InviteAccountToOrganization to the account vending pipeline and a small number of administrators of the management account.
- Deny organizations:LeaveOrganization in member accounts with a service control policy, so that an account cannot be detached and then joined elsewhere.
- Use the management account only for organization management, and protect its principals with MFA and short sessions.
- Enroll every new account in your logging and security baseline automatically, so that a new account is never unmonitored.
- Review the list of accounts and open invitations of the organization on a schedule, and compare it with your account inventory.
Frequently asked questions
Where are these events logged?
AWS logs Organizations activity only in the US East (N. Virginia) Region, and in the account that takes the action. Creating or inviting an account is logged in the management account. Accepting an invitation is logged in the invited account. An account that is not yet in your organization may not send its trail to your log platform, so the acceptance can be invisible to you.
Why does a newly created account matter if it is empty?
AWS preconfigures a new member account with a role that gives users of the management account administrator permissions in it. Whoever created the account can use it at once. Its costs go to the organization, and it may not yet be covered by the logging, guardrails and detections that were set up for the existing accounts.
How do I learn the ID of the account that was created?
The `CreateAccount` event only shows that the request started. AWS writes a `CreateAccountResult` service event when the background workflow ends, with the state and, on success, the account ID in `serviceEventDetails.createAccountStatus`. AWS also documents an `AccountJoinedOrganization` event in the management account's event history.
Has this been used in attacks?
AWS describes creating and inviting accounts in its Threat Technique Catalog as a way to modify the cloud resource hierarchy. No public incident report describes it at the audit event level, and none was used for this page.