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Sign-In With Valid Credentials Blocked by Conditional Access detection rules

Conditional Access is evaluated only after the first factor succeeded, so a sign-in it blocks came from someone who holds a working password or token. Blocks from one address for many users point to stolen credentials.

Platform
Microsoft Entra ID
Severity
Medium
Log source
Microsoft Entra ID sign-in logs
Last updated
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft Sentinel
What an attacker needs
A valid password or token for the account, and a sign-in that a Conditional Access policy refuses because of its location, device, client or risk.
Impact
No access yet, but the credential works in someone else's hands and can be tried again through any path that the policies do not cover.
Response
Reset the password and revoke the sessions of every account whose blocked sign-in was not the user's own, then look for sign-ins that did succeed.
Mitigation
Require MFA for every user and close policy exclusions and legacy protocols, so that a known password is not enough on any path.

How the attack works

Microsoft Entra ID enforces Conditional Access policies after first-factor authentication is completed. A sign-in that fails with error 53003 (BlockedByConditionalAccess, the access policy does not allow token issuance) has therefore already presented a credential that was accepted. In an interactive sign-in that is usually the correct password, sometimes a token from an existing session. The policy refused the sign-in because of where it came from, the device or client it used, or the risk attached to it.

Most of these events are harmless. People travel, use a private device or open an application the organization blocks. The same event is also what a stolen password looks like when the defenses work: the attacker's sign-in passes the password check and is refused because it comes from a blocked country or an unmanaged device. Microsoft's operations guidance describes a Conditional Access failure on a privileged account as a possible indication that an attacker is trying to get into the account. The block does not change the fact that the credential is known. The attacker keeps it and looks for a path the policies treat differently, such as another application, a legacy protocol or an excluded account.

One blocked sign-in cannot tell the two cases apart, and a rule on every error 53003 would drown a large tenant. The rules on this page look at three narrower shapes. The first counts the distinct users for whom one IP address was blocked within an hour, which is how it looks when someone works through a list of valid credentials. The second matches a blocked sign-in that ID Protection rated as medium or high risk. The third counts the distinct applications in which one user was blocked within an hour, which is how it looks when someone with a working password tries application after application to find one the policies do not cover. The sign-in log does not record whether a user holds a privileged role, so a rule for administrators needs a list of accounts that you maintain.

What an attacker needs

  • A valid password or token for the account, obtained for example through phishing, password spraying or a breach of another service where the password was reused.
  • A Conditional Access policy that blocks the attacker's sign-in. Without it the same sign-in would have gone on to MFA or succeeded.

Impact

No access yet, because the sign-in was blocked. What the event reveals is that a credential of the account works in someone else's hands. Until it is changed, the attacker can try again through any application, protocol, location or device that the policies treat differently, and one gap is enough to turn the blocked sign-in into a session.

Detection rules

One IP Address Blocked by Conditional Access for Many Users

Counts, per source IP address, the distinct users whose Microsoft Entra sign-in failed with error 53003 (BlockedByConditionalAccess). Conditional Access is enforced after first-factor authentication is completed, so each of these sign-ins presented a credential that was accepted. One address that is blocked for 5 or more different users within one hour has the shape of someone working through a list of valid credentials. Microsoft recommends monitoring failures blocked by Conditional Access against a baseline. The threshold and the window are starting points to tune, and an attacker who changes address for every account stays below any count per address. The rule is meant for the interactive sign-in log. Non-interactive sign-ins are made by a client on behalf of the user without an authentication factor, so the same error there says nothing about a password.

Fires when one IPAddress has at least 5 different UserPrincipalName values within 1 hour.

Threshold ruleLevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceMicrosoft Entra ID sign-in logs
title: Sign-In Blocked by Conditional Access (Base Event)
id: c9fe66b0-88b3-4b13-9b56-3ca3f18c181b
name: entra_sign_in_blocked_by_conditional_access
status: experimental
description: >-
  Base event of the threshold rule in this file. A Microsoft Entra sign-in
  that failed with error 53003 (BlockedByConditionalAccess): first-factor
  authentication was completed and a Conditional Access policy did not allow
  token issuance.
logsource:
  product: azure
  service: signinlogs
detection:
  selection:
    ResultType: '53003'  # string column: BlockedByConditionalAccess
  condition: selection
level: low
---
title: One IP Address Blocked by Conditional Access for Many Users
id: 8a3060ae-2998-4ddc-ab5a-34d588bd7a84
status: experimental
description: >-
  Counts, per source IP address, the distinct users whose Microsoft Entra
  sign-in failed with error 53003 (BlockedByConditionalAccess). Conditional
  Access is enforced after first-factor authentication is completed, so each
  of these sign-ins presented a credential that was accepted. One address
  that is blocked for 5 or more different users within one hour has the shape
  of someone working through a list of valid credentials. Microsoft
  recommends monitoring failures blocked by Conditional Access against a
  baseline. The threshold and the window are starting points to tune, and an
  attacker who changes address for every account stays below any count per
  address. The rule is meant for the interactive sign-in log. Non-interactive
  sign-ins are made by a client on behalf of the user without an
  authentication factor, so the same error there says nothing about a
  password.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity-platform/reference-error-codes
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/conditional-access/overview
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/concept-noninteractive-sign-ins
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-16
tags:
  - attack.initial-access
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.t1078.004
correlation:
  type: value_count
  rules:
    - entra_sign_in_blocked_by_conditional_access
  group-by:
    - IPAddress
  timespan: 1h
  condition:
    field: UserPrincipalName
    gte: 5
falsepositives:
  - A new or changed Conditional Access policy that blocks many users at once, for example a block on an application or a location that people still use. Check the audit log for a policy change before the burst.
  - Addresses that many employees share, such as office egress points, VPN and secure web gateway exits, where a policy blocks an application or a kind of device for everyone. Exclude your trusted named locations or give them a higher threshold.
  - Shared public addresses of mobile carriers, hotels and guest networks used by several of your users at the same time.
  - The values of 5 users and one hour are starting points, not tested limits. Measure how many distinct users are normally blocked per address and adjust both.
level: medium

False positives

  • A new or changed Conditional Access policy that blocks many users at once, for example a block on an application or a location that people still use. Check the audit log for a policy change before the burst.
  • Addresses that many employees share, such as office egress points, VPN and secure web gateway exits, where a policy blocks an application or a kind of device for everyone. Exclude your trusted named locations or give them a higher threshold.
  • Shared public addresses of mobile carriers, hotels and guest networks used by several of your users at the same time.
  • The values of 5 users and one hour are starting points, not tested limits. Measure how many distinct users are normally blocked per address and adjust both.

One User Blocked by Conditional Access in Many Applications

Counts, per user, the distinct applications (AppId) for which a Microsoft Entra sign-in failed with error 53003 (BlockedByConditionalAccess). Conditional Access is enforced after first-factor authentication is completed, so each of these sign-ins presented a credential that was accepted. Someone who holds a working password and is refused by a policy tries other applications and clients to find one the policies do not cover. One user blocked in 5 or more different applications within one hour has that shape. Microsoft's operations guidance treats many interrupted or blocked sign-ins for one account as a sign that its password may be known. The threshold and the window are starting points to tune. The rule is meant for the interactive sign-in log.

Fires when one UserPrincipalName has at least 5 different AppId values within 1 hour.

Threshold ruleLevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceMicrosoft Entra ID sign-in logs
title: Sign-In Blocked by Conditional Access, Counted per User and Application (Base Event)
id: 1a302312-34cf-4777-ad8a-c82e8e515729
name: entra_ca_block_per_user_and_application
status: experimental
description: >-
  Base event of the threshold rule in this file. A Microsoft Entra sign-in
  that failed with error 53003 (BlockedByConditionalAccess) after first-factor
  authentication was completed, with the application the user tried in AppId.
logsource:
  product: azure
  service: signinlogs
detection:
  selection:
    ResultType: '53003'  # string column: BlockedByConditionalAccess
  condition: selection
level: low
---
title: One User Blocked by Conditional Access in Many Applications
id: 6b983531-51bd-4262-9c44-2240362bb9b9
status: experimental
description: >-
  Counts, per user, the distinct applications (AppId) for which a Microsoft
  Entra sign-in failed with error 53003 (BlockedByConditionalAccess).
  Conditional Access is enforced after first-factor authentication is
  completed, so each of these sign-ins presented a credential that was
  accepted. Someone who holds a working password and is refused by a policy
  tries other applications and clients to find one the policies do not cover.
  One user blocked in 5 or more different applications within one hour has
  that shape. Microsoft's operations guidance treats many interrupted or
  blocked sign-ins for one account as a sign that its password may be known.
  The threshold and the window are starting points to tune. The rule is meant
  for the interactive sign-in log.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity-platform/reference-error-codes
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/conditional-access/overview
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/reference/tables/signinlogs
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.initial-access
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.t1078.004
correlation:
  type: value_count
  rules:
    - entra_ca_block_per_user_and_application
  group-by:
    - UserPrincipalName
  timespan: 1h
  condition:
    field: AppId
    gte: 5
falsepositives:
  - A user on a personal or unmanaged device that a policy blocks, who opens several Microsoft 365 applications one after the other. Read the device and the location of the blocked sign-ins before you treat the password as known.
  - A new policy that blocks a client or a location the user still relies on. Check the audit log for a policy change before the burst.
  - The values of 5 applications and one hour are starting points, not tested limits. Measure how many distinct applications a blocked user normally reaches and adjust both.
level: medium

False positives

  • A user on a personal or unmanaged device that a policy blocks, who opens several Microsoft 365 applications one after the other. Read the device and the location of the blocked sign-ins before you treat the password as known.
  • A new policy that blocks a client or a location the user still relies on. Check the audit log for a policy change before the burst.
  • The values of 5 applications and one hour are starting points, not tested limits. Measure how many distinct applications a blocked user normally reaches and adjust both.

Risky Sign-In Blocked by Conditional Access

Detects a sign-in that failed with error 53003 (BlockedByConditionalAccess) and that Microsoft Entra ID Protection rated as medium or high risk during the sign-in. Conditional Access is enforced after first-factor authentication is completed, so the sign-in presented a credential that was accepted, and the risk rating says that it probably did not come from the account's owner. The policy held, but the credential should be treated as known to someone else. The risk level needs Microsoft Entra ID P2. The rule cannot be limited to privileged accounts without a list, because the sign-in log does not record roles.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceMicrosoft Entra ID sign-in logs
title: Risky Sign-In Blocked by Conditional Access
id: 97d44640-e3a2-411b-a8ee-f597c93a5622
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects a sign-in that failed with error 53003 (BlockedByConditionalAccess)
  and that Microsoft Entra ID Protection rated as medium or high risk during
  the sign-in. Conditional Access is enforced after first-factor
  authentication is completed, so the sign-in presented a credential that was
  accepted, and the risk rating says that it probably did not come from the
  account's owner. The policy held, but the credential should be treated as
  known to someone else. The risk level needs Microsoft Entra ID P2. The rule
  cannot be limited to privileged accounts without a list, because the
  sign-in log does not record roles.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity-platform/reference-error-codes
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/conditional-access/overview
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-accounts
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/reference/tables/signinlogs
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-16
tags:
  - attack.initial-access
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
  product: azure
  service: signinlogs
detection:
  selection:
    ResultType: '53003'  # string column: BlockedByConditionalAccess
    RiskLevelDuringSignIn:
      - medium
      - high
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Users who travel or use an anonymizing VPN and are blocked by a location or risk policy. Confirm with the user. If the sign-in was theirs, no password reset is needed.
level: medium

False positives

  • Users who travel or use an anonymizing VPN and are blocked by a location or risk policy. Confirm with the user. If the sign-in was theirs, no password reset is needed.

Triage

  • Open the sign-in and read its Conditional Access details. Which policy blocked it, and because of what (location, device, client application or risk)?
  • Compare the IP address, location, device and client with the user's history. A user at home on a private device looks different from a first sign-in from another country.
  • Search the sign-in log for the same IP address. Count the users it tried, and check whether any sign-in from that address succeeded (result 0).
  • Search for the same user around that time. Look for successful sign-ins from unfamiliar addresses, to other applications or with legacy clients.
  • Ask the user whether the sign-in was theirs. If it was not, the password is known to someone else, whatever the policy did.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Reset the password and revoke the sessions of every account whose blocked sign-in was not the user's own. The block does not make the credential safe again.
  2. Review the authentication methods of those accounts and remove any the user does not recognize.
  3. Check each of those accounts for sign-ins that did succeed from the same source or in the same period, and treat a success as a compromise.
  4. Find out how the credential was lost, such as a phishing message or a reused password, and deal with that cause for the affected users.
  5. Review the paths around the policy that blocked the sign-in, which are its exclusions, the applications it does not cover and legacy protocols.

Mitigation

  • Require MFA for every user, with phishing-resistant methods for administrators, so that a known password alone never completes a sign-in.
  • Block legacy authentication and keep the exclusions of Conditional Access policies small. These are the paths an attacker with a valid password tries next.
  • Apply block and MFA policies to all resources and not to a list of applications, so that a credential refused for one application is not accepted for another.
  • With Microsoft Entra ID P2, use a user risk policy, so that an account whose credentials are probably known has to change its password.

Frequently asked questions

Does error 53003 mean the password was correct?

It means the first factor was accepted. Microsoft documents that Conditional Access policies are enforced after first-factor authentication is completed, and error 53003 is the code for a sign-in the policies blocked. In an interactive sign-in that first factor is usually the password. It can also be a token from an existing session, so read the authentication details of the event before you tell a user that their password is known.

Why is there no rule for every blocked sign-in?

Most blocks are users on the wrong device, network or application. In a large tenant that is a constant stream, and a rule on each event would be ignored. Microsoft advises defining a baseline threshold for these failures. This page narrows the event to one address blocked for many users, one user blocked in many applications and blocked sign-ins that carry risk.

How do we cover privileged accounts?

Microsoft rates a Conditional Access failure on a privileged account as high and as a possible sign that an attacker is trying to get in. The sign-in log does not say whether a user holds a role, so this needs a list. Keep a watchlist of administrator and emergency access accounts in your SIEM and alert on every error 53003 for those accounts.

Can the threshold rule miss an attack?

Yes. The rule for addresses counts the distinct users blocked from one IP address, with 5 users within one hour as a starting point. An attacker who uses a different address for each account stays below any count per address, and a single targeted account never reaches it. Tune both values against your own baseline.

References

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