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High-Risk Sign-In Succeeded detection rules

Microsoft Entra ID Protection rated a sign-in as high risk (for example a known attacker IP, an anonymizing network or unfamiliar sign-in properties), yet the sign-in completed. Requires Microsoft Entra ID P2 for risk levels in the logs.

Platform
Microsoft Entra ID
Severity
Medium
Log source
Microsoft Entra ID sign-in logs, Microsoft Entra ID Protection risk detections
Last updated
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft Sentinel
What an attacker needs
Valid credentials or a session for the account, and no sign-in risk policy that blocks or forces remediation for it.
Impact
An interactive session as the user with access to everything the account can reach, and a starting point for MFA registration or privilege escalation.
Response
Revoke the sessions and refresh tokens of the user first, then remove the authentication methods registered after the sign-in before a new password is set.
Mitigation
Enforce sign-in risk policies in Conditional Access that require MFA or block at medium and high risk, and keep exclusions to break-glass accounts only.
Risk detection types
investigationsThreatIntelligencemaliciousIPAddressnationStateIP

How the attack works

Microsoft Entra ID Protection scores every interactive sign-in in real time and records the result in RiskLevelDuringSignIn (none, low, medium, high). A high level means Microsoft is highly confident that someone other than the user is signing in, based on signals such as threat intelligence on the source IP, anonymizing networks, unfamiliar sign-in properties or token anomalies. When a sign-in risk policy requires MFA, the user can remediate the risk and the sign-in's RiskState becomes remediated; without such a policy, or for excluded accounts, a risky sign-in simply succeeds.

A successful sign-in at high risk, or at medium or high risk that was never remediated, is therefore one of the most direct signs of an account takeover. Risk levels are only populated for tenants with Microsoft Entra ID P2; other tenants see the value hidden. Where the risk detection log is collected, two more rules read the detections that tie a sign-in to threat intelligence: "Verified threat actor IP", "Microsoft Entra threat intelligence" and "Malicious IP address". They name a reason for the risk, which the risk level in the sign-in log does not.

What an attacker needs

  • Valid credentials or a session for the account (phished, sprayed, bought or replayed).
  • No sign-in risk policy that blocks or forces remediation for the account.

Impact

An interactive session as the user, with access to everything the account can reach, and a starting point for MFA registration, consent phishing or privilege escalation.

Detection rules

Successful Sign-In Rated High Risk by ID Protection

Detects a successful interactive sign-in with RiskLevelDuringSignIn high. Requires Microsoft Entra ID P2; without it the level is reported as hidden and the rule never matches.

LevelHighStatusExperimentalLog sourceMicrosoft Entra ID sign-in logs
title: Successful Sign-In Rated High Risk by ID Protection
id: b5e2d791-5e92-4504-aafc-d6de6086eb0b
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects a successful interactive sign-in with RiskLevelDuringSignIn high.
  Requires Microsoft Entra ID P2; without it the level is reported as hidden
  and the rule never matches.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/resources/signin?view=graph-rest-1.0
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/reference/tables/signinlogs
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-10
tags:
  - attack.initial-access
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
  product: azure
  service: signinlogs
detection:
  selection:
    RiskLevelDuringSignIn: high
    ResultType: '0'  # string column: "0" is success
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Users on anonymizing VPNs or travelling; confirm with the user and check whether the risk was remediated with MFA (RiskState remediated).
level: high

False positives

  • Users on anonymizing VPNs or travelling; confirm with the user and check whether the risk was remediated with MFA (RiskState remediated).

Risky Sign-In Succeeded Without Remediation

Detects a successful sign-in rated medium or high risk whose RiskState is still atRisk, meaning no MFA challenge or other remediation cleared it. Typical for accounts excluded from, or not covered by, sign-in risk policies. Requires Microsoft Entra ID P2.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceMicrosoft Entra ID sign-in logs
title: Risky Sign-In Succeeded Without Remediation
id: 0f1eda2a-696a-4ae6-90b4-1066c411c4ad
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects a successful sign-in rated medium or high risk whose RiskState is
  still atRisk, meaning no MFA challenge or other remediation cleared it.
  Typical for accounts excluded from, or not covered by, sign-in risk
  policies. Requires Microsoft Entra ID P2.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/howto-identity-protection-remediate-unblock
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/resources/signin?view=graph-rest-1.0
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-10
tags:
  - attack.initial-access
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
  product: azure
  service: signinlogs
detection:
  selection:
    RiskLevelDuringSignIn:
      - medium
      - high
    RiskState: atRisk
    ResultType: '0'  # string column: "0" is success
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Accounts intentionally excluded from risk policies (service and break-glass accounts) and users on anonymizing VPNs; review the exclusions rather than filtering the alert.
level: medium

False positives

  • Accounts intentionally excluded from risk policies (service and break-glass accounts) and users on anonymizing VPNs; review the exclusions rather than filtering the alert.

ID Protection Tied a Sign-In to Threat Intelligence or a Malicious IP Address

Detects two Microsoft Entra ID Protection risk detections that rest on what Microsoft knows about the source of a sign-in or about attack patterns. "Microsoft Entra threat intelligence" (riskEventType investigationsThreatIntelligence) indicates user activity that is unusual for the user or consistent with known attack patterns, based on Microsoft's internal and external threat intelligence. "Malicious IP address" (riskEventType maliciousIPAddress) indicates a sign-in from an address that Microsoft considers malicious because of high failure rates with invalid credentials from that address or other IP reputation sources. The threat intelligence detection is available without Microsoft Entra ID P2 and is calculated in real time or offline. The malicious IP address detection needs P2 and is calculated offline, so it arrives after the sign-in. Neither record says whether the sign-in succeeded. Risk detections reach a SIEM through the UserRiskEvents diagnostic setting of Microsoft Entra ID.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceMicrosoft Entra ID Protection risk detections
title: ID Protection Tied a Sign-In to Threat Intelligence or a Malicious IP Address
id: bbb718a7-0bff-4421-a0c3-1cc719452e8a
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects two Microsoft Entra ID Protection risk detections that rest on what
  Microsoft knows about the source of a sign-in or about attack patterns.
  "Microsoft Entra threat intelligence" (riskEventType
  investigationsThreatIntelligence) indicates user activity that is unusual
  for the user or consistent with known attack patterns, based on Microsoft's
  internal and external threat intelligence. "Malicious IP address"
  (riskEventType maliciousIPAddress) indicates a sign-in from an address that
  Microsoft considers malicious because of high failure rates with invalid
  credentials from that address or other IP reputation sources. The threat
  intelligence detection is available without Microsoft Entra ID P2 and is
  calculated in real time or offline. The malicious IP address detection needs
  P2 and is calculated offline, so it arrives after the sign-in. Neither
  record says whether the sign-in succeeded. Risk detections reach a SIEM
  through the UserRiskEvents diagnostic setting of Microsoft Entra ID.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/howto-identity-protection-investigate-risk
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/reference/tables/aaduserriskevents
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.initial-access
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
  product: azure
  service: riskdetection
detection:
  selection:
    RiskEventType:
      - investigationsThreatIntelligence
      - maliciousIPAddress
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - A user who signs in from the flagged address as part of their normal work, for example through a shared proxy or a cloud provider that others have misused. Microsoft advises confirming the sign-in as safe in that case.
  - An address of a cloud service provider from which your own enterprise applications run. Microsoft's investigation guide asks to rule this out.
level: medium

False positives

  • A user who signs in from the flagged address as part of their normal work, for example through a shared proxy or a cloud provider that others have misused. Microsoft advises confirming the sign-in as safe in that case.
  • An address of a cloud service provider from which your own enterprise applications run. Microsoft's investigation guide asks to rule this out.

ID Protection Detected a Sign-In From a Verified Threat Actor IP

Detects the Microsoft Entra ID Protection risk detection "Verified threat actor IP" (riskEventType nationStateIP). Microsoft raises it for sign-in activity that is consistent with known IP addresses associated with nation state actors or cyber crime groups, based on data from the Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center. The sign-in rules on this page read the risk level and cannot say why a sign-in was rated risky. This rule names one reason, and the one that leaves least room for a harmless explanation. The detection is calculated in real time and needs Microsoft Entra ID P2. The record does not say whether the sign-in succeeded, so look up the sign-in before you decide how far the actor came. Risk detections reach a SIEM through the UserRiskEvents diagnostic setting of Microsoft Entra ID.

LevelHighStatusExperimentalLog sourceMicrosoft Entra ID Protection risk detections
title: ID Protection Detected a Sign-In From a Verified Threat Actor IP
id: 1b815c71-ce63-428a-85d0-794db95d8b33
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects the Microsoft Entra ID Protection risk detection "Verified threat
  actor IP" (riskEventType nationStateIP). Microsoft raises it for sign-in
  activity that is consistent with known IP addresses associated with nation
  state actors or cyber crime groups, based on data from the Microsoft Threat
  Intelligence Center. The sign-in rules on this page read the risk level and
  cannot say why a sign-in was rated risky. This rule names one reason, and
  the one that leaves least room for a harmless explanation. The detection is
  calculated in real time and needs Microsoft Entra ID P2. The record does not
  say whether the sign-in succeeded, so look up the sign-in before you decide
  how far the actor came. Risk detections reach a SIEM through the
  UserRiskEvents diagnostic setting of Microsoft Entra ID.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/howto-identity-protection-investigate-risk
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/reference/tables/aaduserriskevents
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.initial-access
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
  product: azure
  service: riskdetection
detection:
  selection:
    RiskEventType: nationStateIP
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - None documented by Microsoft. An address can be shared, for example by a hosting provider or a proxy service, so confirm with the user whether the sign-in was theirs before you treat the account as taken over.
level: high

False positives

  • None documented by Microsoft. An address can be shared, for example by a hosting provider or a proxy service, so confirm with the user whether the sign-in was theirs before you treat the account as taken over.

Detection logic

Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.

Threat intelligence risk detection joined to a successful sign-in

Detection hypothesisJoins two logs

A risk detection says that Microsoft tied activity of a user to a threat actor's address or to a known attack pattern. It does not say whether the sign-in went through. Joining the detection to the sign-in log shows which of these users the actor actually reached.

  1. Risk detection log: a detection with RiskEventType nationStateIP, maliciousIPAddress or investigationsThreatIntelligence. Keep the UserPrincipalName and the IpAddress.
  2. Sign-in log, one hour before and after the detection: sign-ins of the same UserPrincipalName from the same IPAddress.
  3. Alert at the highest priority when one of them has ResultType 0, and look at what the session did next.
  4. Search the sign-in log for other users with sign-ins from the same IPAddress.

EventsnationStateIPmaliciousIPAddressinvestigationsThreatIntelligence

LimitsOffline detections arrive after the sign-in, sometimes by hours, so the join has to look back. A detection without an address cannot be joined this way. The one hour window is a starting point.

Triage

  • Open the risky sign-in in ID Protection and read the risk detections (RiskEventTypes_V2), the IP address, location and client.
  • Check whether MFA was performed (AuthenticationRequirement, AuthenticationDetails) and which Conditional Access policies applied.
  • Ask the user to confirm the sign-in; review activity after it (new MFA methods, inbox rules, consent grants, file downloads).
  • If compromise is confirmed, mark the user as compromised, reset the password, revoke sessions and remove any persistence the attacker added.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Revoke the sessions and refresh tokens of the user first, so that the session the risky sign-in created ends before anything else is changed.
  2. Go through every authentication method on the account with the user and remove the ones registered after the sign-in. Only then let the user set a new password, so that the attacker cannot take part in the reset.
  3. Remove inbox and forwarding rules, application consents and devices that appeared after the sign-in.
  4. Find out why the sign-in was allowed. Check which sign-in risk policy should have applied and which exclusion or missing policy let the account through, and close that gap.
  5. Search the sign-in log for other accounts with sign-ins from the same IP address and handle them in the same way.

Mitigation

  • Enforce sign-in risk policies in Conditional Access (require MFA or block at medium and high risk) and user risk policies that require a secure password change.
  • Require MFA for all users so that risky sign-ins can be challenged and remediated.
  • Keep exclusions from risk policies to break-glass accounts only.

Frequently asked questions

Why do these rules never match in my tenant?

Risk levels are written to the sign-in log only for tenants with Microsoft Entra ID P2. Other tenants see the value `hidden` in RiskLevelDuringSignIn, so neither sign-in rule can match. Check the license before you conclude that there were no risky sign-ins.

How do the two sign-in log rules on this page differ?

The first matches every successful sign-in rated high risk, whether or not the risk was remediated. The second matches a successful sign-in at medium or high risk whose RiskState is still atRisk, which means no MFA challenge or other remediation cleared it. That is typical for accounts that risk policies exclude or do not cover.

Is a high-risk sign-in harmless once the user passed MFA?

Not necessarily. When a sign-in risk policy requires MFA, completing it sets RiskState to remediated. That shows a second factor was presented, so check which method was used and when it was registered, and confirm the sign-in with the user.

What produces a high risk level for a real user?

Typically a sign-in through an anonymizing VPN or while travelling. Confirm with the user, and check whether the risk was remediated with MFA. Avoid a broad filter for such cases, because anonymizing networks are also one of the signals of an attack.

References

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