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Partner Delegated Administration Abuse detection rules

A service provider with delegated administration rights can act as an administrator in a customer tenant. An attacker who compromises the partner, or adds a partner relationship of their own, inherits that access.

Platform
Microsoft Entra ID
Severity
High
Log source
Microsoft Entra ID audit logs, Microsoft Entra ID sign-in logs
Last updated
MITRE ATT&CK technique
T1199Trusted Relationship
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft SentinelIBM QRadar
What an attacker needs
A compromised account among the staff of a partner whose relationship carries administrative roles, or administrator rights in the customer tenant to approve a new one.
Impact
Administrative access to the customer tenant from outside it, up to Global Administrator, that remains until the relationship or its roles are removed.
Response
Remove the relationship nobody approved on the Partner relationships page, or remove a real partner's roles until it confirms the account is contained.
Mitigation
Review the Partner relationships page regularly, and ask partners to replace DAP with GDAP limited to the roles they need and the shortest practical duration.
Audit activity
Add partner to company

How the attack works

Microsoft partners such as resellers and managed service providers administer their customers' tenants through delegated administration. With the older delegated admin privileges (DAP), the partner's Admin Agents group holds the Global Administrator role in the customer tenant and its Helpdesk Agents group holds the Helpdesk Administrator role. With granular delegated admin privileges (GDAP), the customer approves a relationship that grants chosen roles for a limited time. In both models, people who have no account in the customer's directory can sign in to it with administrative rights.

That makes the partner a trusted relationship in the sense of ATT&CK. An attacker who compromises an account in the partner's tenant can use the existing relationship to reach the customer, and every other customer of that partner, without attacking any of them directly. An attacker who already has administrator rights in a customer tenant can also approve a relationship with a partner tenant they control and keep it as a way back in.

The access is easy to overlook. Microsoft notes that customers cannot find partners that hold a Microsoft Entra role through the Microsoft Entra admin center, PowerShell or Microsoft Graph; the Partner relationships page of the Microsoft 365 admin center is the place that lists them. Two log signals exist. The audit log records Add partner to company when a partner is added to the tenant, and the sign-in log marks sign-ins by a provider's staff with the cross-tenant access type serviceProvider. Microsoft's audit activity reference lists no activity specific to the approval of a GDAP relationship, so review the Partner relationships page as well.

What an attacker needs

  • An existing partner relationship that carries administrative roles, and a compromised account among the partner's staff who can use it.
  • Or administrator rights in the customer tenant, used to approve a relationship with a partner tenant the attacker controls.

Impact

Administrative access to the customer tenant from outside it, up to Global Administrator with DAP or a broad GDAP role set. One compromised partner exposes all of its customers at once, and the access remains until the relationship or its roles are removed.

Detection rules

Partner Added to the Tenant

Detects the audit log activity "Add partner to company", written when a partner is added to the tenant. A partner relationship can carry delegated administration rights, so every new one should match a contract or a purchase. Microsoft's audit activity reference lists no activity specific to the approval of a granular delegated admin privileges (GDAP) relationship; this rule covers the documented Core Directory activity only.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceMicrosoft Entra ID audit logs
title: Partner Added to the Tenant
id: 60c7ef75-ed67-4abf-a87d-5ef3071ed57d
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects the audit log activity "Add partner to company", written when a
  partner is added to the tenant. A partner relationship can carry delegated
  administration rights, so every new one should match a contract or a
  purchase. Microsoft's audit activity reference lists no activity specific to
  the approval of a granular delegated admin privileges (GDAP) relationship;
  this rule covers the documented Core Directory activity only.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-audit-activities
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/partner-center/customers/customers-revoke-admin-privileges
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-14
tags:
  - attack.initial-access
  - attack.t1199
logsource:
  product: azure
  service: auditlogs
detection:
  selection:
    OperationName: Add partner to company
  filter_failed:
    Result: failure
  condition: selection and not filter_failed
falsepositives:
  - A new reseller, license provider or managed service provider being onboarded. Confirm the partner and the approver with procurement.
level: medium

False positives

  • A new reseller, license provider or managed service provider being onboarded. Confirm the partner and the approver with procurement.

Successful Sign-In by a Service Provider

Detects a successful sign-in whose cross-tenant access type is serviceProvider, the value Microsoft Entra ID records when a Cloud Service Provider or similar administrator signs in to the tenant on behalf of the customer. In a tenant that a partner manages daily this is routine and needs a filter on the known partner tenant; in any other tenant each occurrence deserves a look.

LevelLowStatusExperimentalLog sourceMicrosoft Entra ID sign-in logs
title: Successful Sign-In by a Service Provider
id: df9382f8-9675-4a34-9286-67ed3f19afc2
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects a successful sign-in whose cross-tenant access type is
  serviceProvider, the value Microsoft Entra ID records when a Cloud Service
  Provider or similar administrator signs in to the tenant on behalf of the
  customer. In a tenant that a partner manages daily this is routine and
  needs a filter on the known partner tenant; in any other tenant each
  occurrence deserves a look.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/concept-sign-in-log-activity-details
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/reference/tables/signinlogs
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-14
tags:
  - attack.initial-access
  - attack.t1199
logsource:
  product: azure
  service: signinlogs
detection:
  selection:
    CrossTenantAccessType: serviceProvider
    ResultType: '0'  # string column: "0" is success
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Planned work by your managed service provider or reseller. Once the partner is documented, add a filter on its tenant ID (HomeTenantId) and keep the alert for every other tenant.
level: low

False positives

  • Planned work by your managed service provider or reseller. Once the partner is documented, add a filter on its tenant ID (HomeTenantId) and keep the alert for every other tenant.

Triage

  • For a new partner, read the event details for the partner that was added and for who approved it (InitiatedBy), and check that a contract or purchase explains it.
  • For a sign-in, identify the partner tenant (HomeTenantId) and the resource, and check for an open support request or planned work at that time.
  • Review what the partner's user did after the sign-in in the audit log.
  • If the access is not expected, remove the relationship or its roles on the Partner relationships page, review the changes made through it and contact the partner's security contact.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Cut the access on the Partner relationships page of the Microsoft 365 admin center. Remove a relationship nobody approved entirely. For a real partner whose staff account was compromised, remove the roles until the partner confirms the account is contained.
  2. If an administrator of your tenant approved the rogue relationship, revoke the sessions and reset the credentials of that account, because the attacker used it.
  3. Review the audit log for everything done after the service provider sign-ins and undo it. Look for new accounts, role assignments, application credentials and policy changes that would give the attacker another way in.
  4. Tell the security contact of the partner which of their accounts signed in and when, and ask which other customers and access that account has.
  5. Confirm that the Partner relationships page lists only partners you work with, each with the roles it needs, and that no further service provider sign-ins arrive from the removed tenant.

Mitigation

  • Review the Partner relationships page (Microsoft 365 admin center, Settings) regularly. Remove partners you no longer work with and remove the roles of partners that only resell licenses.
  • Ask partners to replace DAP with GDAP relationships limited to the roles they need and to the shortest practical duration, and do not include Global Administrator.
  • Alert on service provider sign-ins from partner tenants you do not expect and on every new partner relationship.
  • Include partner access in access reviews. Ask the partner who is in the groups that hold roles in your tenant and how those accounts are protected.

Frequently asked questions

Where can we see which partners hold administrative roles in our tenant?

On the Partner relationships page of the Microsoft 365 admin center. Microsoft notes that customers cannot find partners that hold a Microsoft Entra role through the Microsoft Entra admin center, PowerShell or Microsoft Graph. This is why the access is easy to overlook.

Does the rule see a GDAP relationship being approved?

That is not documented. Microsoft's audit activity reference lists no activity specific to the approval of a granular delegated admin privileges (GDAP) relationship. The rule covers the documented Core Directory activity `Add partner to company` only, so review the Partner relationships page as well.

How do DAP and GDAP differ in what the partner can do?

With the older delegated admin privileges (DAP), the partner's Admin Agents group holds Global Administrator in the customer tenant and its Helpdesk Agents group holds Helpdesk Administrator. With granular delegated admin privileges (GDAP), the customer approves a relationship that grants chosen roles for a limited time. A narrow GDAP relationship limits what a compromised partner account can reach.

How do we keep the sign-in rule quiet when a partner manages our tenant every day?

Add a filter on the tenant ID of the documented partner (HomeTenantId) and keep the alert for every other tenant. Sign-ins by the known partner are then routine, and a service provider sign-in from any other tenant still raises an alert.

References

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