1. Resources
  2. Detection rules
  3. Reseller Access Changed or Transfer Token Generated in Google Workspace

Reseller Access Changed or Transfer Token Generated in Google Workspace detection rules

An attacker with a super admin session turns on reseller access to the Admin console or generates a transfer token, which lets an outside reseller organization manage the users and subscriptions of the Google Workspace account.

Platform
Google Cloud
Severity
High
Log source
Google Cloud Audit Logs
Last updated
MITRE ATT&CK technique
T1199Trusted Relationship
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft SentinelIBM QRadar
What an attacker needs
A super admin account, plus a reseller organization the attacker controls or has compromised, since both settings act for a reseller.
Impact
Staff of an outside organization can manage users, groups and subscriptions of the account, and a completed transfer cannot be reversed.
Response
Turn reseller access off, contact Google Support and your reseller about an unapproved transfer token and secure the super admin account.
Mitigation
Decide deliberately whether resellers need Admin console access and protect the few super admin accounts with security keys.
API methods
google.admin.AdminService.changeResellerAccessgoogle.admin.AdminService.generatePingoogle.admin.AdminService.generateTransferToken

How the attack works

A Google Workspace or Cloud Identity account can be managed by a reseller. Google states that a reseller whose subscriptions the organization uses can access the Admin console and submit support cases unless the organization removes that access, and its table of reseller rights includes adding, updating and deleting user accounts, groups and organizational units. An organization that buys from several resellers gives all of them this access with one switch. Management of a subscription moves to a reseller through a transfer. The customer generates an authorization for one reseller, which Google's reseller documentation calls a transfer token that is specific to the reseller and valid for 30 days. Google states that transfers are nonreversible and that the new reseller can access the Admin console unless access is removed.

This is administration by a third party, and the customer's own controls do not cover the reseller's staff or their accounts. An attacker with a super admin session can turn reseller access on again where the organization had turned it off, or generate a transfer token so that another reseller organization takes over. Nothing is added to the customer's list of administrators, which is where a review would look.

The Admin audit log records CHANGE_RESELLER_ACCESS with the old and the new value and GENERATE_TRANSFER_TOKEN, which has no parameters. The same log records GENERATE_PIN when an administrator generates the PIN that identifies them to Google phone support. Organizations that share Workspace data with Google Cloud receive the events in Cloud Audit Logs at organization level as Admin Activity entries of admin.googleapis.com.

What an attacker needs

  • A super admin account. Google requires one for the Reseller management page.
  • A reseller organization that the attacker controls or has compromised. Reseller access applies to the resellers the organization buys from, and a transfer token is tied to one reseller.

Impact

The staff of an outside organization can add, update and delete users, groups and organizational units in the account and manage its subscriptions. After a transfer, billing and subscription management sit with the new reseller, and Google states that the transfer cannot be reversed. The access does not depend on any account in the customer's own directory.

Detection rules

Reseller Access to the Admin Console Changed in Google Workspace

Detects a change of reseller access to the Admin console of a Google Workspace or Cloud Identity account (Admin audit event CHANGE_RESELLER_ACCESS, rendered as "Reseller access changed from {OLD_VALUE} to {NEW_VALUE}"). With access on, the resellers the organization buys from can use Admin console services that Google lists, including adding, updating and deleting user accounts, groups and organizational units. The switch applies to all resellers at once. The rule fires on a change in EITHER direction, because the method name does not carry it and Google's reference does not list the values. Read OLD_VALUE and NEW_VALUE in protoPayload.metadata. The super admin who made the change is in principalEmail. The entry reaches Cloud Audit Logs as an Admin Activity entry at organization level, which is always written once Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reaches the SIEM only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceGoogle Cloud Audit Logs
title: Reseller Access to the Admin Console Changed in Google Workspace
id: 689a6c6f-fd31-46bd-b22d-44e42fcc77ad
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects a change of reseller access to the Admin console of a Google
  Workspace or Cloud Identity account (Admin audit event
  CHANGE_RESELLER_ACCESS, rendered as "Reseller access changed from
  {OLD_VALUE} to {NEW_VALUE}"). With access on, the resellers the
  organization buys from can use Admin console services that Google lists,
  including adding, updating and deleting user accounts, groups and
  organizational units. The switch applies to all resellers at once. The
  rule fires on a change in EITHER direction, because the method name does
  not carry it and Google's reference does not list the values. Read
  OLD_VALUE and NEW_VALUE in protoPayload.metadata. The super admin who
  made the change is in principalEmail. The entry reaches Cloud Audit Logs
  as an Admin Activity entry at organization level, which is always written
  once Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and
  reaches the SIEM only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.
references:
  - https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging
  - https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-domain-settings
  - https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/billing/change-a-resellers-access-to-your-admin-console
  - https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/billing/reseller-access-to-your-admin-console
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.initial-access
  - attack.t1199
logsource:
  product: gcp
  service: gcp.audit
detection:
  selection:
    protoPayload.serviceName: admin.googleapis.com
    protoPayload.methodName: google.admin.AdminService.changeResellerAccess
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - A super admin who turns reseller access off as a hardening step, or on again so that the reseller can work on a support case. The setting changes rarely, so verify every event with the super admin who made it.
level: medium

False positives

  • A super admin who turns reseller access off as a hardening step, or on again so that the reseller can work on a support case. The setting changes rarely, so verify every event with the super admin who made it.

Customer Support PIN Generated in Google Workspace

Detects the generation of a customer support PIN in a Google Workspace or Cloud Identity account (Admin audit event GENERATE_PIN, rendered as "Customer support PIN generated"). Google states that the phone support PIN verifies to its support team that the caller is an administrator on the account and that it is valid for 60 minutes. Someone who holds an admin session can use it to speak to Google Support for the organization. The event has no parameters, so the rule matches on the method alone. Most events are administrators who call support, which is why the level is low. Match each one with a support case. The admin is in principalEmail. The entry reaches Cloud Audit Logs as an Admin Activity entry at organization level, which is always written once Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reaches the SIEM only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.

LevelLowStatusExperimentalLog sourceGoogle Cloud Audit Logs
title: Customer Support PIN Generated in Google Workspace
id: 6a5b3c54-9493-4b71-a1ad-602e561545ec
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects the generation of a customer support PIN in a Google Workspace or
  Cloud Identity account (Admin audit event GENERATE_PIN, rendered as
  "Customer support PIN generated"). Google states that the phone support
  PIN verifies to its support team that the caller is an administrator on
  the account and that it is valid for 60 minutes. Someone who holds an
  admin session can use it to speak to Google Support for the
  organization. The event has no parameters, so the rule matches on the
  method alone. Most events are administrators who call support, which is
  why the level is low. Match each one with a support case. The admin is in
  principalEmail. The entry reaches Cloud Audit Logs as an Admin Activity
  entry at organization level, which is always written once Google
  Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reaches the SIEM
  only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.
references:
  - https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging
  - https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-domain-settings
  - https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/support/find-your-google-workspace-phone-support-pin
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.initial-access
  - attack.t1199
logsource:
  product: gcp
  service: gcp.audit
detection:
  selection:
    protoPayload.serviceName: admin.googleapis.com
    protoPayload.methodName: google.admin.AdminService.generatePin
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Administrators who contact Google phone support, which is the normal source of this event. The PIN is shown in the contact support panel of the Admin console. Use the rule as a record and compare it with your support cases.
level: low

False positives

  • Administrators who contact Google phone support, which is the normal source of this event. The PIN is shown in the contact support panel of the Admin console. Use the rule as a record and compare it with your support cases.

Transfer Token Generated in Google Workspace

Detects the generation of a transfer token for a Google Workspace or Cloud Identity account (Admin audit event GENERATE_TRANSFER_TOKEN, rendered as "Transfer token generated"). Google's reseller documentation describes a transfer token as a token the customer generates for one reseller, valid for 30 days, with which that reseller transfers the customer's subscriptions to its own management. Google states that transfers are nonreversible and that the new reseller can access the Admin console unless access is removed. The event has no parameters, so the rule matches on the method alone and the reseller the token was made for is not in the log. The super admin who generated it is in principalEmail. The entry reaches Cloud Audit Logs as an Admin Activity entry at organization level, which is always written once Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reaches the SIEM only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.

LevelHighStatusExperimentalLog sourceGoogle Cloud Audit Logs
title: Transfer Token Generated in Google Workspace
id: 71fdd23b-84f0-4578-9e08-eff4d93648ec
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects the generation of a transfer token for a Google Workspace or
  Cloud Identity account (Admin audit event GENERATE_TRANSFER_TOKEN,
  rendered as "Transfer token generated"). Google's reseller documentation
  describes a transfer token as a token the customer generates for one
  reseller, valid for 30 days, with which that reseller transfers the
  customer's subscriptions to its own management. Google states that
  transfers are nonreversible and that the new reseller can access the
  Admin console unless access is removed. The event has no parameters, so
  the rule matches on the method alone and the reseller the token was made
  for is not in the log. The super admin who generated it is in
  principalEmail. The entry reaches Cloud Audit Logs as an Admin Activity
  entry at organization level, which is always written once Google
  Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reaches the SIEM
  only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.
references:
  - https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging
  - https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-domain-settings
  - https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/billing/transfer-subscriptions-between-google-and-resellers
  - https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reseller/v1/how-tos/manage_subscriptions
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.initial-access
  - attack.t1199
logsource:
  product: gcp
  service: gcp.audit
detection:
  selection:
    protoPayload.serviceName: admin.googleapis.com
    protoPayload.methodName: google.admin.AdminService.generateTransferToken
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - A planned change of reseller, or a move of the subscription from Google to a reseller. Google allows at most two transfers to resellers in a calendar year, so the event is rare. Confirm each one with the super admins and the team that buys the licenses.
level: high

False positives

  • A planned change of reseller, or a move of the subscription from Google to a reseller. Google allows at most two transfers to resellers in a calendar year, so the event is rare. Confirm each one with the super admins and the team that buys the licenses.

Triage

  • For a reseller access change, read OLD_VALUE and NEW_VALUE in the event parameters in protoPayload.metadata to see whether access was turned on or off.
  • For a transfer token, ask the super admins and the purchasing team whether a change of reseller is planned. The event has no parameters, so the reseller it was made for is not in the log.
  • Identify the super admin behind the event (principalEmail), confirm it with that person through a second channel and check the recent sign-ins of that account.
  • Open the Reseller management page and list the resellers and the subscriptions they manage. Super admins also get an email with the details of a transfer.
  • Search the Admin audit log for user, group and organizational unit changes made after the event by identities outside your own administrator list.
  • For a support PIN, confirm that the administrator contacted Google phone support at that time.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Turn reseller access off on the Reseller management page if it was not meant to be on.
  2. If a transfer token was generated without approval, contact Google Support and your current reseller at once, because the token is valid for 30 days and a completed transfer cannot be reversed.
  3. Secure the super admin account that made the change. Reset its password, reset its sign-in cookies and review its 2-Step Verification methods.
  4. Review and undo the changes made through reseller access, such as new users, password resets, group memberships and organizational unit moves.
  5. Review what else the same super admin changed in the period, including the primary admin, the secondary email and admin roles.

Mitigation

  • Decide deliberately whether resellers need access to the Admin console. Google recommends leaving it on so that resellers can troubleshoot, so if you keep it on, treat the reseller's administrators as administrators of your own account.
  • Keep super admin accounts few, separate from daily accounts and protected with security keys, because only a super admin can open the Reseller management page.
  • Know which resellers manage which subscriptions and review the Reseller management page regularly.
  • Agree with your reseller how their administrators are protected and which of their staff act on your account.
  • Share Workspace data with Google Cloud and route the organization-level audit logs to the SIEM.

Frequently asked questions

What can a reseller do in a customer's Google Workspace account?

Google's help page lists the Admin console services a reseller with access can use. They include user, group and organizational unit management, with the examples add, update or delete a user account, as well as device management, license management and billing for the subscriptions the reseller sold. Google adds that resellers can always manage the subscriptions they sold in their own console, whatever the Admin console setting is.

What is a transfer token in Google Workspace?

Google's reseller documentation describes it as a token that the customer generates and gives to a reseller, specific to that reseller and valid for 30 days. The reseller uses it to transfer the customer's subscriptions to its own management. Google's help for customers calls the step generating a transfer authorization. The audit event is named Generate Transfer Token and has no parameters, so the link between the two rests on the names.

Has this been seen in real attacks?

No public incident report describes these steps at the level of the audit events. The page is built on what Google documents reseller access and transfers to do, namely administration of users and subscriptions by an outside organization. Both events are rare in most organizations, which makes each one worth checking.

Why is the support PIN on this page?

Google states that the phone support PIN verifies to its support team that the caller is an administrator on the account and that it is valid for 60 minutes. Whoever holds it can speak to Google Support as an administrator of the organization, which is another way of acting on the account from outside the Admin console. Most PINs are generated by administrators who are calling support, so the rule is a record to match with a support case.

References

We respect your privacy

We use cookies to keep this site secure and working properly. With your permission, we also use optional cookies to understand usage and improve the experience. Cookie Policy

You can change your choice at any time.