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Security Event Log Cleared detection rules

An attacker with administrative rights clears the Windows Security log on a domain controller or server to erase evidence. Windows records the clearing itself as event 1102, which is rarely legitimate.

Platform
Active Directory
Severity
Medium
Log source
Windows Security event log
Last updated
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft SentinelIBM QRadar
What an attacker needs
Local administrator rights, or the Manage auditing and security log user right, on the target host.
Impact
Loss of the local audit trail for the period before the clearing, which hampers detection and investigation and usually hides a more serious action.
Response
Isolate the host, disable or reset the account that cleared the log, and preserve the events that were already forwarded before anything is changed.
Mitigation
Forward Security events from domain controllers and Tier 0 servers to a SIEM in near real time, so clearing the local log does not remove the evidence.
Event ID
1102

How the attack works

The Security event log holds the authentication, account management and directory change events that identity detections depend on. Clearing it requires the "Manage auditing and security log" user right (SeSecurityPrivilege), which local administrators hold, and it can be done from Event Viewer, the event log APIs or the command line.

When the Security log is cleared, the Event Log service writes event 1102 ("The audit log was cleared") into the new log, including the account and logon session that cleared it. Attackers clear the log after actions they want to hide, such as credential dumping or privilege changes on a domain controller. Events already forwarded to a SIEM survive, which is why a 1102 with a gap in forwarded events right before it is so telling.

What an attacker needs

  • Local administrator rights, or the "Manage auditing and security log" user right, on the target host.

Impact

Loss of the local audit trail for the period before the clearing, hampering detection and investigation. On its own it does not grant access, but it usually hides a more serious action.

Detection rules

Windows Security Event Log Cleared

Detects event 1102, written by the Event Log service when the Windows Security log is cleared, with the account and logon session that cleared it. Clearing the log is rarely needed and commonly follows actions an attacker wants to hide.

LevelHighStatusExperimentalLog sourceWindows Security event log
title: Windows Security Event Log Cleared
id: 23d518d1-be87-413c-8fea-3894bf87a7b4
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects event 1102, written by the Event Log service when the Windows Security
  log is cleared, with the account and logon session that cleared it. Clearing
  the log is rarely needed and commonly follows actions an attacker wants to
  hide.
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1685/005/
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-1102
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-10
tags:
  - attack.defense-impairment
  - attack.t1685.005
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 1102
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Documented maintenance or lab and golden-image builds where logs are cleared deliberately. Exclude those hosts by name rather than excluding accounts.
level: high

False positives

  • Documented maintenance or lab and golden-image builds where logs are cleared deliberately. Exclude those hosts by name rather than excluding accounts.

Detection logic

Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.

Event logging service stopped on a domain controller without a restart of Windows

Detection hypothesisSequence of eventsNeeds a baseline

Instead of clearing the log, an attacker can stop the Windows Event Log service so that nothing is recorded while they act, and start it again afterwards. Event 1100 is written when the service shuts down, and also at every normal shutdown, which is then followed by event 4608 when Windows starts again. A 1100 whose next Security event is not a 4608 means the service was stopped and started while Windows kept running.

  1. From the forwarded Security log of every domain controller and Tier 0 server, take event 1100 (the event logging service has shut down) with Computer and the time.
  2. Find the next Security event from the same Computer. After a normal restart it is event 4608 (Windows is starting up), logged when the auditing subsystem initializes.
  3. Report every 1100 that is followed by other events without a 4608 in between, with the length of the gap, and every 1100 after which the host sends nothing more for longer than its normal restart time, a value to measure per host.
  4. For a finding, review the authentication events that other domain controllers logged for that host and its accounts during the gap.

Events11004608

LimitsA crash or emergency reset writes no 1100 and a forwarding outage looks like silence, so compare with the host's System log and the collector's own records. A planned restart of the service during maintenance looks the same and needs a change record. 4608 needs Audit Security State Change.

Triage

  • Identify the account and logon session that cleared the log (SubjectUserName, SubjectLogonId in the event's user data) and the host.
  • Correlate the logon session with 4624 to find the source of the session; interactive or remote sessions of unexpected accounts are suspicious.
  • Review events forwarded from the same host just before the clearing for the activity the attacker wanted to hide.
  • Confirm with the system owner; legitimate clearing should be rare and documented.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Isolate the host and disable or reset the account that cleared the log. Clearing takes administrator rights or the Manage auditing and security log user right, so that account is compromised or misused.
  2. Preserve what is left before anything is changed, namely the events that were already forwarded from the host, its other event logs and an image of the system for analysis.
  3. Rebuild the missing period from other sources, such as authentication events on domain controllers for that host and account, and the logs of the systems it connected to.
  4. If the host is a domain controller, work on the assumption that the cleared period hides credential theft or privilege changes until the reconstruction shows otherwise.
  5. Before the host goes back into service, confirm that event forwarding works and that new Security events arrive.

Mitigation

  • Forward Security events from domain controllers and Tier 0 servers to a SIEM or Windows Event Collector in near real time so clearing the local log does not remove the evidence.
  • Restrict the "Manage auditing and security log" user right to the accounts that need it, and limit local administrators on servers.
  • Size the Security log so that it does not need routine manual clearing.

Frequently asked questions

Does clearing the Security log also remove the events my SIEM already has?

No. Events that were forwarded before the clearing survive in the SIEM or on the Windows Event Collector. Only the local copy is lost. This is why near real-time forwarding from domain controllers and Tier 0 servers matters, and why a gap in forwarded events right before a 1102 is telling.

Does event 1102 itself survive when the log is cleared?

Yes. The Event Log service writes event 1102 into the new log, with the account and logon session that cleared it. The event says that the log was cleared and by whom, not what it contained. The events forwarded before the clearing are the only record of that.

Who is able to clear the Security log?

An account with the Manage auditing and security log user right (SeSecurityPrivilege), which local administrators hold. Restrict that right to the accounts that need it and limit local administrators on servers, so that few accounts can produce this event.

When is a cleared Security log legitimate?

Rarely. Documented maintenance and lab or golden-image builds clear logs on purpose. Exclude those hosts by name and do not exclude accounts. A Security log that is sized correctly does not need routine manual clearing.

References

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