How the attack works
The advanced audit policy decides which security events Windows generates, subcategory by subcategory (for example Directory Service Changes, Security Group Management, Kerberos Service Ticket Operations). It is normally set through Group Policy, but a local administrator can change it directly on a host, and a GPO editor can change it for every computer in scope.
Attackers remove success or failure auditing for the subcategories that would record their next steps, act, and sometimes restore the policy afterwards. Each change raises event 4719 ("System audit policy was changed"), which Windows logs regardless of the Audit Policy Change setting. The event names the subcategory by GUID and lists the change (Success removed, Failure removed, Success added, Failure added). Microsoft documents the Subject fields as the account that made the change; its example event shows the local system (S-1-5-18, logged with the computer account name). Windows also has a per-user audit policy, which can exclude a single account from auditing without touching the system policy. A change to it is logged as event 4912, which a third rule on this page matches.
What an attacker needs
- Local administrator rights on the target host, or edit rights on a GPO that configures audit policy for it.
Impact
Blind spots in the audit trail: changes to accounts, groups, ACLs or Kerberos activity on the affected host are no longer logged. It is a defense evasion step that usually precedes or accompanies a more serious action on a domain controller.
Detection rules
System Audit Policy Changed by an Account Session
Detects event 4719 (system audit policy changed) where the subject is not the computer itself. Microsoft documents the subject as the account that made the change, and its example shows the local system, logged with the computer account name (for example DC01$) as SubjectUserName. The rule assumes that policy applied by the system, such as a Group Policy refresh, is logged that way and that a change made in an administrator's session (for example with auditpol) shows that administrator. Microsoft does not document either case, so validate this in a lab before alerting on it. Event 4719 is logged regardless of the Audit Policy Change setting.
title: System Audit Policy Changed by an Account Session
id: e4ef5f4a-b978-45e4-b151-34198ab3cf3b
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects event 4719 (system audit policy changed) where the subject is not the
computer itself. Microsoft documents the subject as the account that made the
change, and its example shows the local system, logged with the computer
account name (for example DC01$) as SubjectUserName. The rule assumes that
policy applied by the system, such as a Group Policy refresh, is logged that
way and that a change made in an administrator's session (for example with
auditpol) shows that administrator. Microsoft does not document either case,
so validate this in a lab before alerting on it. Event 4719 is logged
regardless of the Audit Policy Change setting.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1685/001/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4719
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-10
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4719
filter_system:
SubjectUserName|endswith: '$'
condition: selection and not filter_system
falsepositives:
- Administrators adjusting audit policy locally during troubleshooting or onboarding of a monitoring tool. Confirm with a change record; changes on domain controllers deserve review either way.
- Changes made from a SYSTEM context (for example by a tool running as a service) are excluded by filter_system; the subcategory rule of this attack still covers the identity-critical subcategories.
level: medium
False positives
- Administrators adjusting audit policy locally during troubleshooting or onboarding of a monitoring tool. Confirm with a change record; changes on domain controllers deserve review either way.
- Changes made from a SYSTEM context (for example by a tool running as a service) are excluded by filter_system; the subcategory rule of this attack still covers the identity-critical subcategories.
Audit Policy Changed for an Identity-Critical Subcategory
Detects event 4719 for the audit subcategories that identity detections rely on: Audit Policy Change, Directory Service Access and Changes, Security Group, User and Computer Account Management, Credential Validation, Kerberos Authentication Service and Service Ticket Operations, Logon, Special Logon, Authentication Policy Change and Certification Services. Matched on the subcategory GUID, whatever the subject, so changes pushed through Group Policy are included.
title: Audit Policy Changed for an Identity-Critical Subcategory
id: 1517d801-1e01-401a-b9a4-15490b165af5
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects event 4719 for the audit subcategories that identity detections rely
on: Audit Policy Change, Directory Service Access and Changes, Security Group,
User and Computer Account Management, Credential Validation, Kerberos
Authentication Service and Service Ticket Operations, Logon, Special Logon,
Authentication Policy Change and Certification Services. Matched on the
subcategory GUID, whatever the subject, so changes pushed through Group Policy
are included.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1685/001/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4719
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthz/auditing-constants
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-10
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4719
SubcategoryGuid|contains:
- '0cce922f-69ae-11d9-bed3-505054503030'
- '0cce923b-69ae-11d9-bed3-505054503030'
- '0cce923c-69ae-11d9-bed3-505054503030'
- '0cce9237-69ae-11d9-bed3-505054503030'
- '0cce9235-69ae-11d9-bed3-505054503030'
- '0cce9236-69ae-11d9-bed3-505054503030'
- '0cce923f-69ae-11d9-bed3-505054503030'
- '0cce9240-69ae-11d9-bed3-505054503030'
- '0cce9242-69ae-11d9-bed3-505054503030'
- '0cce9215-69ae-11d9-bed3-505054503030'
- '0cce921b-69ae-11d9-bed3-505054503030'
- '0cce9230-69ae-11d9-bed3-505054503030'
- '0cce9221-69ae-11d9-bed3-505054503030'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Planned audit policy rollouts through Group Policy. Some Windows Server builds have been reported to log 4719 on every policy refresh even without a real change; if so, baseline the volume per domain controller and alert on the subject or on AuditPolicyChanges containing a removal.
level: high
False positives
- Planned audit policy rollouts through Group Policy. Some Windows Server builds have been reported to log 4719 on every policy refresh even without a real change; if so, baseline the volume per domain controller and alert on the subject or on AuditPolicyChanges containing a removal.
Per-User Audit Policy Changed
Detects event 4912 (per user audit policy was changed). Per-user audit policy adds to or takes away from the system audit policy for one account. An include entry generates audits for that account even where the system policy does not, and an exclude entry suppresses them regardless of the system policy. Microsoft documents that an exclusion is ignored for members of the local Administrators group, so it hides ordinary and service accounts, not administrators. An exclusion leaves the system audit policy, and with it event 4719, unchanged, so a review of the system policy shows nothing. The event names the account that made the change, the account the policy applies to (TargetUserSid), the subcategory by GUID and the change, which is one of success or failure include or exclude, added or removed. Microsoft documents that the event is logged regardless of the Audit Policy Change setting and recommends monitoring it always, because where the feature is not in use the event shows it being used outside standard procedures. The rule does not test the kind of change, so a per-user inclusion, which adds auditing, matches as well.
title: Per-User Audit Policy Changed
id: 60561607-4fcd-496b-a616-59f90f06a822
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects event 4912 (per user audit policy was changed). Per-user audit
policy adds to or takes away from the system audit policy for one account.
An include entry generates audits for that account even where the system
policy does not, and an exclude entry suppresses them regardless of the
system policy. Microsoft documents that an exclusion is ignored for members
of the local Administrators group, so it hides ordinary and service
accounts, not administrators. An exclusion leaves the system audit policy,
and with it event 4719, unchanged, so a review of the system policy shows
nothing. The event names the account
that made the change, the account the policy applies to (TargetUserSid),
the subcategory by GUID and the change, which is one of success or failure
include or exclude, added or removed. Microsoft documents that the event is
logged regardless of the Audit Policy Change setting and recommends
monitoring it always, because where the feature is not in use the event
shows it being used outside standard procedures. The rule does not test the
kind of change, so a per-user inclusion, which adds auditing, matches as
well.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4912
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-audit-policy-change
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/auditpol-set
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1685/001/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4912
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- An organization that uses per-user audit policy on purpose, for example to audit selected administrators more closely. Such changes are rare and should have a change record. Review who the policy applies to and whether the change excludes or includes a subcategory.
level: medium
False positives
- An organization that uses per-user audit policy on purpose, for example to audit selected administrators more closely. Such changes are rare and should have a change record. Review who the policy applies to and whether the change excludes or includes a subcategory.
Triage
- Identify the subcategory (SubcategoryGuid, SubcategoryId) and the change (AuditPolicyChanges); removals of success or failure auditing on identity-related subcategories are the priority.
- Check the subject, which Microsoft documents as the account that made the change. When it is the local system (S-1-5-18), also review recent changes to the GPOs that set audit policy for the host; a named account points to a change made in that account's session.
- Correlate the subject's logon session (SubjectLogonId) with 4624 and look for activity in the window when auditing was reduced.
- Restore the baseline audit policy and confirm it with
auditpol /get /category:*.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Remove the access that made the change. Disable the account that changed the policy on the host, or, where the change came through Group Policy, revert the policy object and remove the edit rights of the account that changed it.
- Check every computer in scope of a changed policy object, not only the host that raised the alert, and confirm that each one has the baseline policy again.
- Treat the time between the removal and the restoration as unlogged for the affected subcategories on that host. Reconstruct it from other domain controllers, from logs the host does not control, and by comparing accounts, groups and access control lists with a known-good state.
- Confirm that events of the restored subcategories arrive in the log collection again.
Mitigation
- Manage audit policy centrally through Group Policy and enable "Audit: Force audit policy subcategory settings (Windows Vista or later) to override audit policy category settings".
- Limit local administrators on domain controllers and Tier 0 servers, and restrict who can edit the GPOs that set audit policy.
- Forward 4719 from all domain controllers and periodically compare the effective audit policy with the baseline.
Frequently asked questions
Can an attacker suppress event 4719 by turning off Audit Policy Change first?
No. Windows logs event 4719 for every change of the system audit policy regardless of the Audit Policy Change setting. The event is only useful if it leaves the host, so forward 4719 from all domain controllers and alert on it centrally.
Why does event 4719 name the domain controller itself as the subject?
Microsoft documents the subject as the account that made the change, and its example shows the local system, logged with the computer account name. The rules here assume that policy applied by the system, such as a Group Policy refresh, is logged that way. In that case the person behind the change is found in the history of the policy object, not in the event. Microsoft does not document either case, so validate it in a lab.
Why do 4719 events appear at every Group Policy refresh although nothing changed?
Some Windows Server builds have been reported to log event 4719 on every policy refresh even without a real change. If your domain controllers do this, baseline the volume per domain controller and alert on the subject, or on AuditPolicyChanges that contain a removal, instead of on every event.