How the attack works
Many AWS services work across an organization through trusted access. Once it is enabled for a service, the service can create its service-linked role in the member accounts and act there, and a delegated administrator account can manage the service for the whole organization. DisableAWSServiceAccess ends that integration for one service. AWS documents what follows: the service can no longer create its role in new accounts, it can no longer perform tasks in the member accounts unless roles there permit them explicitly, and it no longer aggregates data from the member accounts to the management account or to a delegated administrator. DeregisterDelegatedAdministrator removes a member account as delegated administrator for a service.
For a service that watches or manages the organization, this switches off organization-wide coverage with one call per service. Datadog Security Labs reported an intrusion in May 2025 in which an actor with a leaked access key of a management account disabled trusted access for IAM Access Analyzer, AWS Account Management, CloudFormation StackSets, AWS Systems Manager and tag policies. Organizations events are recorded only in US East (N. Virginia) and in the account that made the call, which for both calls is the management account. The event source is organizations.amazonaws.com, and the service principal is in the request parameters.
What an attacker needs
- Credentials in the Organizations management account that are allowed organizations:DisableAWSServiceAccess or organizations:DeregisterDelegatedAdministrator. Both calls can be made only from the management account.
Impact
The affected service loses its reach into the member accounts. Findings and data no longer arrive in the central account, new accounts are no longer covered, and management services can no longer deploy or administer centrally. AWS documents that some services clean up the data and resources of the integration when it is disabled, so enabling trusted access again does not always bring back what was there.
Detection rules
AWS Organizations Delegated Administrator Deregistered
Detects DeregisterDelegatedAdministrator calls in AWS Organizations, which remove a member account as delegated administrator for an AWS service. The account loses its organization-wide rights for that service, and AWS warns that deregistering can have unintended impacts on the functionality of the service. For a security service this takes the central administration away, and it is also the first half of moving the role to another account. The call can be made only from the management account. The rule matches the event name only: read the account and the service principal in the request parameters. It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode, because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
title: AWS Organizations Delegated Administrator Deregistered
id: 75f4de25-4bbf-48f3-917c-1adfcb8c5607
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects DeregisterDelegatedAdministrator calls in AWS Organizations, which
remove a member account as delegated administrator for an AWS service.
The account loses its organization-wide rights for that service, and AWS
warns that deregistering can have unintended impacts on the functionality
of the service. For a security service this takes the central
administration away, and it is also the first half of moving the role to
another account. The call can be made only from the management account.
The rule matches the event name only: read the account and the service
principal in the request parameters.
It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode,
because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
references:
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/organizations/latest/APIReference/API_DeregisterDelegatedAdministrator.html
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/organizations/latest/userguide/orgs_cloudtrail-integration.html
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1685/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685
logsource:
product: aws
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection:
eventSource: organizations.amazonaws.com
eventName: DeregisterDelegatedAdministrator
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- A planned move of a delegated administrator to another account and the closure of an account that held the role. Confirm the change record and that a new delegated administrator is registered where the service needs one.
level: medium
False positives
- A planned move of a delegated administrator to another account and the closure of an account that held the role. Confirm the change record and that a new delegated administrator is registered where the service needs one.
AWS Organizations Trusted Access Disabled for a Service
Detects DisableAWSServiceAccess calls in AWS Organizations, which end the integration of an AWS service with the organization. AWS documents that the service can then no longer create its service-linked role in new accounts or perform tasks in the member accounts, including the aggregation of data to the management account or a delegated administrator. The call can be made only from the management account, and AWS recommends disabling an integration through the console or the commands of the service itself instead. The rule matches the event name only: read the service principal in the request parameters and check the caller in userIdentity.arn. It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode, because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
title: AWS Organizations Trusted Access Disabled for a Service
id: d2d9a7d9-7b3a-4f73-b12e-363c2e09117d
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects DisableAWSServiceAccess calls in AWS Organizations, which end the
integration of an AWS service with the organization. AWS documents that
the service can then no longer create its service-linked role in new
accounts or perform tasks in the member accounts, including the
aggregation of data to the management account or a delegated
administrator. The call can be made only from the management account, and
AWS recommends disabling an integration through the console or the
commands of the service itself instead. The rule matches the event name
only: read the service principal in the request parameters and check the
caller in userIdentity.arn.
It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode,
because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
references:
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/organizations/latest/APIReference/API_DisableAWSServiceAccess.html
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/organizations/latest/userguide/orgs_cloudtrail-integration.html
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1685/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685
logsource:
product: aws
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection:
eventSource: organizations.amazonaws.com
eventName: DisableAWSServiceAccess
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- The planned retirement of a service integration by the cloud platform team. Confirm the change record and that only the named service was affected.
level: high
False positives
- The planned retirement of a service integration by the cloud platform team. Confirm the change record and that only the named service was affected.
Detection logic
Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.
Delegated administrator removed and a different account registered for the same service
Removing the delegated administrator of a security service and registering another account in its place moves the control of that service, and its view of every member account, to an account the attacker chooses. Each call alone looks like housekeeping.
- A
DeregisterDelegatedAdministratorevent fromorganizations.amazonaws.com. Note the AccountId and ServicePrincipal parameters of the request. - Within 24 hours a
RegisterDelegatedAdministratorevent with the same ServicePrincipal and a different AccountId. - Check whether the new account is one of your security or management accounts, who controls it and when it joined the organization.
EventsDeregisterDelegatedAdministratorRegisterDelegatedAdministrator
LimitsA planned move of a delegated administrator to a new security account is the same pair of events and needs a change record to tell apart. The 24 hours are a starting point. AWS publishes no example record of these two events, so check on your own events where the account and the service appear.
Triage
- Identify the caller (userIdentity.arn) and the service principal in the request parameters, and check for an approved change. AWS recommends disabling the integration through the console or the commands of the service itself, so a direct call needs an explanation.
- Count the services the same caller disabled within a short time. One service being retired is a project. Several services at once is an attack on visibility.
- For DeregisterDelegatedAdministrator, read the account and the service in the request, and look for a RegisterDelegatedAdministrator call that names a different account for the same service.
- Review what else the caller did in the management account around the same time, such as new users, access keys, policy changes and Identity Center changes.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Contain the principal that made the calls by deactivating its access keys or revoking its role sessions. It holds rights over the whole organization.
- Enable trusted access again for each affected service, through the console or the commands of that service so that it sets up what it needs, and register its delegated administrator again.
- Check each service for data and configuration that was removed when the integration ended, and restore the organization-wide setup of the service.
- Review the period in which the service had no coverage, using the CloudTrail events of the member accounts.
- Confirm that findings and data from the member accounts arrive in the central account again, and that new accounts are covered.
Mitigation
- Keep the management account for organization administration only, with few identities and no long-term access keys.
- Restrict organizations:DisableAWSServiceAccess and organizations:DeregisterDelegatedAdministrator to a break-glass role with identity policies. Service control policies do not apply to the management account, so they cannot enforce this there.
- Keep a list of the services with trusted access and of their delegated administrators (ListAWSServiceAccessForOrganization, ListDelegatedAdministrators) and compare it with the live state on a schedule.
- Collect CloudTrail from US East (N. Virginia) for the management account and alert on these events in near real time.
Frequently asked questions
What happens to a service when trusted access is disabled?
AWS documents three effects. The service can no longer create its service-linked role in new accounts of the organization. It can no longer perform tasks in the member accounts unless IAM policies attached to roles there permit them explicitly, which includes the aggregation of data to the management account or a delegated administrator. Some services then clean up the data or resources of the integration, and others leave them in place.
In which account and Region are these events logged?
AWS Organizations records its events only in US East (N. Virginia), in the account that made the call. Both calls on this page can be made only from the management account, so that is where the events are. A SIEM that does not collect that Region of the management account does not see them.
Can a service control policy prevent these calls?
No. Both calls are made from the management account, and service control policies do not affect users and roles in the management account. Limit the two permissions with identity policies there, keep the number of identities in the management account small, and alert on the events.
References
- MITRE ATT&CK T1685: Disable or Modify Tools
- AWS Organizations API Reference: DisableAWSServiceAccess
- AWS Organizations API Reference: DeregisterDelegatedAdministrator
- Logging API calls with AWS CloudTrail for AWS Organizations
- Using AWS Organizations with other AWS services (trusted access)
- Service control policies (SCPs do not affect the management account)
- Datadog Security Labs: Tales from the cloud trenches: The Attacker doth persist too much, methinks
- Revoke IAM role temporary security credentials