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AWS Organizations Trusted Access Disabled or Delegated Administrator Removed detection rules

An attacker in the Organizations management account disables trusted access for security and management services, or removes their delegated administrator, so that those services lose their reach into the member accounts.

Platform
AWS
Severity
High
Log source
AWS CloudTrail
Last updated
MITRE ATT&CK technique
T1685Disable or Modify Tools
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft SentinelIBM QRadar
What an attacker needs
Credentials in the Organizations management account that are allowed to disable trusted access or to deregister a delegated administrator.
Impact
The affected security or management service loses its reach into the member accounts, and their findings and data no longer arrive in the central account.
Response
Contain the principal that made the calls, then enable trusted access again through the service itself and register its delegated administrator again.
Mitigation
Keep the management account for organization administration only, and restrict both calls to a break-glass role with identity policies.
CloudTrail events
DeregisterDelegatedAdministratorDisableAWSServiceAccess

How the attack works

Many AWS services work across an organization through trusted access. Once it is enabled for a service, the service can create its service-linked role in the member accounts and act there, and a delegated administrator account can manage the service for the whole organization. DisableAWSServiceAccess ends that integration for one service. AWS documents what follows: the service can no longer create its role in new accounts, it can no longer perform tasks in the member accounts unless roles there permit them explicitly, and it no longer aggregates data from the member accounts to the management account or to a delegated administrator. DeregisterDelegatedAdministrator removes a member account as delegated administrator for a service.

For a service that watches or manages the organization, this switches off organization-wide coverage with one call per service. Datadog Security Labs reported an intrusion in May 2025 in which an actor with a leaked access key of a management account disabled trusted access for IAM Access Analyzer, AWS Account Management, CloudFormation StackSets, AWS Systems Manager and tag policies. Organizations events are recorded only in US East (N. Virginia) and in the account that made the call, which for both calls is the management account. The event source is organizations.amazonaws.com, and the service principal is in the request parameters.

What an attacker needs

  • Credentials in the Organizations management account that are allowed organizations:DisableAWSServiceAccess or organizations:DeregisterDelegatedAdministrator. Both calls can be made only from the management account.

Impact

The affected service loses its reach into the member accounts. Findings and data no longer arrive in the central account, new accounts are no longer covered, and management services can no longer deploy or administer centrally. AWS documents that some services clean up the data and resources of the integration when it is disabled, so enabling trusted access again does not always bring back what was there.

Detection rules

AWS Organizations Delegated Administrator Deregistered

Detects DeregisterDelegatedAdministrator calls in AWS Organizations, which remove a member account as delegated administrator for an AWS service. The account loses its organization-wide rights for that service, and AWS warns that deregistering can have unintended impacts on the functionality of the service. For a security service this takes the central administration away, and it is also the first half of moving the role to another account. The call can be made only from the management account. The rule matches the event name only: read the account and the service principal in the request parameters. It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode, because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceAWS CloudTrail
title: AWS Organizations Delegated Administrator Deregistered
id: 75f4de25-4bbf-48f3-917c-1adfcb8c5607
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects DeregisterDelegatedAdministrator calls in AWS Organizations, which
  remove a member account as delegated administrator for an AWS service.
  The account loses its organization-wide rights for that service, and AWS
  warns that deregistering can have unintended impacts on the functionality
  of the service. For a security service this takes the central
  administration away, and it is also the first half of moving the role to
  another account. The call can be made only from the management account.
  The rule matches the event name only: read the account and the service
  principal in the request parameters.
  It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode,
  because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
references:
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/organizations/latest/APIReference/API_DeregisterDelegatedAdministrator.html
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/organizations/latest/userguide/orgs_cloudtrail-integration.html
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1685/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.defense-impairment
  - attack.t1685
logsource:
  product: aws
  service: cloudtrail
detection:
  selection:
    eventSource: organizations.amazonaws.com
    eventName: DeregisterDelegatedAdministrator
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - A planned move of a delegated administrator to another account and the closure of an account that held the role. Confirm the change record and that a new delegated administrator is registered where the service needs one.
level: medium

False positives

  • A planned move of a delegated administrator to another account and the closure of an account that held the role. Confirm the change record and that a new delegated administrator is registered where the service needs one.

AWS Organizations Trusted Access Disabled for a Service

Detects DisableAWSServiceAccess calls in AWS Organizations, which end the integration of an AWS service with the organization. AWS documents that the service can then no longer create its service-linked role in new accounts or perform tasks in the member accounts, including the aggregation of data to the management account or a delegated administrator. The call can be made only from the management account, and AWS recommends disabling an integration through the console or the commands of the service itself instead. The rule matches the event name only: read the service principal in the request parameters and check the caller in userIdentity.arn. It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode, because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.

LevelHighStatusExperimentalLog sourceAWS CloudTrail
title: AWS Organizations Trusted Access Disabled for a Service
id: d2d9a7d9-7b3a-4f73-b12e-363c2e09117d
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects DisableAWSServiceAccess calls in AWS Organizations, which end the
  integration of an AWS service with the organization. AWS documents that
  the service can then no longer create its service-linked role in new
  accounts or perform tasks in the member accounts, including the
  aggregation of data to the management account or a delegated
  administrator. The call can be made only from the management account, and
  AWS recommends disabling an integration through the console or the
  commands of the service itself instead. The rule matches the event name
  only: read the service principal in the request parameters and check the
  caller in userIdentity.arn.
  It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode,
  because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
references:
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/organizations/latest/APIReference/API_DisableAWSServiceAccess.html
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/organizations/latest/userguide/orgs_cloudtrail-integration.html
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1685/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.defense-impairment
  - attack.t1685
logsource:
  product: aws
  service: cloudtrail
detection:
  selection:
    eventSource: organizations.amazonaws.com
    eventName: DisableAWSServiceAccess
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - The planned retirement of a service integration by the cloud platform team. Confirm the change record and that only the named service was affected.
level: high

False positives

  • The planned retirement of a service integration by the cloud platform team. Confirm the change record and that only the named service was affected.

Detection logic

Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.

Delegated administrator removed and a different account registered for the same service

Detection hypothesisSequence of eventsNeeds your own lists

Removing the delegated administrator of a security service and registering another account in its place moves the control of that service, and its view of every member account, to an account the attacker chooses. Each call alone looks like housekeeping.

  1. A DeregisterDelegatedAdministrator event from organizations.amazonaws.com. Note the AccountId and ServicePrincipal parameters of the request.
  2. Within 24 hours a RegisterDelegatedAdministrator event with the same ServicePrincipal and a different AccountId.
  3. Check whether the new account is one of your security or management accounts, who controls it and when it joined the organization.

EventsDeregisterDelegatedAdministratorRegisterDelegatedAdministrator

LimitsA planned move of a delegated administrator to a new security account is the same pair of events and needs a change record to tell apart. The 24 hours are a starting point. AWS publishes no example record of these two events, so check on your own events where the account and the service appear.

Triage

  • Identify the caller (userIdentity.arn) and the service principal in the request parameters, and check for an approved change. AWS recommends disabling the integration through the console or the commands of the service itself, so a direct call needs an explanation.
  • Count the services the same caller disabled within a short time. One service being retired is a project. Several services at once is an attack on visibility.
  • For DeregisterDelegatedAdministrator, read the account and the service in the request, and look for a RegisterDelegatedAdministrator call that names a different account for the same service.
  • Review what else the caller did in the management account around the same time, such as new users, access keys, policy changes and Identity Center changes.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Contain the principal that made the calls by deactivating its access keys or revoking its role sessions. It holds rights over the whole organization.
  2. Enable trusted access again for each affected service, through the console or the commands of that service so that it sets up what it needs, and register its delegated administrator again.
  3. Check each service for data and configuration that was removed when the integration ended, and restore the organization-wide setup of the service.
  4. Review the period in which the service had no coverage, using the CloudTrail events of the member accounts.
  5. Confirm that findings and data from the member accounts arrive in the central account again, and that new accounts are covered.

Mitigation

  • Keep the management account for organization administration only, with few identities and no long-term access keys.
  • Restrict organizations:DisableAWSServiceAccess and organizations:DeregisterDelegatedAdministrator to a break-glass role with identity policies. Service control policies do not apply to the management account, so they cannot enforce this there.
  • Keep a list of the services with trusted access and of their delegated administrators (ListAWSServiceAccessForOrganization, ListDelegatedAdministrators) and compare it with the live state on a schedule.
  • Collect CloudTrail from US East (N. Virginia) for the management account and alert on these events in near real time.

Frequently asked questions

What happens to a service when trusted access is disabled?

AWS documents three effects. The service can no longer create its service-linked role in new accounts of the organization. It can no longer perform tasks in the member accounts unless IAM policies attached to roles there permit them explicitly, which includes the aggregation of data to the management account or a delegated administrator. Some services then clean up the data or resources of the integration, and others leave them in place.

In which account and Region are these events logged?

AWS Organizations records its events only in US East (N. Virginia), in the account that made the call. Both calls on this page can be made only from the management account, so that is where the events are. A SIEM that does not collect that Region of the management account does not see them.

Can a service control policy prevent these calls?

No. Both calls are made from the management account, and service control policies do not affect users and roles in the management account. Limit the two permissions with identity policies there, keep the number of identities in the management account small, and alert on the events.

References

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