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AWS Config Recording Stopped or Security Hub Disabled detection rules

An attacker stops or deletes the AWS Config recorder, or disables Security Hub CSPM, so that the resource changes that follow are not recorded and no control check or finding reports them.

Platform
AWS
Severity
Medium
Log source
AWS CloudTrail
Last updated
MITRE ATT&CK technique
T1685Disable or Modify Tools
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft SentinelIBM QRadar
What an attacker needs
Credentials for a principal allowed to call the AWS Config recorder and delivery channel actions or securityhub:DisableSecurityHub in the account.
Impact
No configuration history, compliance evaluation or Security Hub CSPM findings for the affected account and Region while the services are off.
Response
Start or recreate the recorder and enable Security Hub CSPM again in every affected Region, then contain the principal that made the calls.
Mitigation
Deny the recorder, delivery channel and DisableSecurityHub actions with a service control policy, and manage Security Hub CSPM from a delegated administrator.
CloudTrail events
CreateArchiveRuleUpdateArchiveRuleDeleteAnalyzerPutConfigurationRecorderPutDeliveryChannelStopConfigurationRecorderDeleteConfigurationRecorderDeleteDeliveryChannelDisableSecurityHubDisableSecurityHubV2DisassociateFromAdministratorAccountDisassociateMembersand 1 more in the rules below

How the attack works

AWS Config records the configuration changes of resources with a configuration recorder and delivers them through a delivery channel. StopConfigurationRecorder stops the recording, DeleteConfigurationRecorder deletes the recorder, and DeleteDeliveryChannel, which AWS allows only after the recorder has been stopped, removes the delivery. PutConfigurationRecorder and PutDeliveryChannel are the quieter way: they change what is recorded and where it is delivered while the recorder keeps running. Security Hub CSPM collects findings and runs control checks, and it uses AWS Config rules for most of its controls. DisableSecurityHub switches it off for the account in the current Region, removes the administrator and member associations and disables the enabled standards.

Attackers who reach administrative rights do this before they change resources such as security groups, bucket policies or IAM settings, so that the configuration timeline has a gap and no rule or control reports the change. Both services are regional, so the calls are repeated in every Region the attacker plans to use. CloudTrail records them under config.amazonaws.com and securityhub.amazonaws.com, with the caller in userIdentity and the Region in awsRegion. The trail and the threat detector have their own pages in this library, and this page covers the configuration record and the findings hub. IAM Access Analyzer belongs to the same group of controls: deleting an analyzer (DeleteAnalyzer) ends its findings about resources shared outside the account or organization, and an archive rule (CreateArchiveRule, UpdateArchiveRule) automatically archives new findings that meet its criteria. AWS logs all Access Analyzer actions under access-analyzer.amazonaws.com, and the page has two rules for them.

What an attacker needs

  • Credentials for a principal allowed to call config:StopConfigurationRecorder, DeleteConfigurationRecorder, DeleteDeliveryChannel, PutConfigurationRecorder or PutDeliveryChannel, or securityhub:DisableSecurityHub and the member disassociation actions.

Impact

No configuration history and no compliance evaluation for the period in which the recorder is off, and no Security Hub CSPM findings or control results for the affected account and Region. Investigations lose the record of what a resource looked like before and after a change, and the security team loses the place where findings of other services arrive.

Detection rules

IAM Access Analyzer Archive Rule Created or Updated

Detects CreateArchiveRule and UpdateArchiveRule calls to IAM Access Analyzer. An archive rule automatically archives new findings that meet the criteria defined in it, so that they no longer show as active. Teams use archive rules for access they have reviewed and accept. A rule with broad criteria, or one that names an outside account, hides the finding that a later sharing change would produce, while the analyzer still looks healthy. AWS states that all IAM Access Analyzer actions are logged by CloudTrail and names CreateArchiveRule among them. It publishes no example record for these calls, so the rule matches the event names only and its level is low: read the filter of the request and decide whether it describes access you know. It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode, because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.

LevelLowStatusExperimentalLog sourceAWS CloudTrail
title: IAM Access Analyzer Archive Rule Created or Updated
id: 8e733bcc-ad3f-4c0c-96cb-58004b2dccb6
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects CreateArchiveRule and UpdateArchiveRule calls to IAM Access
  Analyzer. An archive rule automatically archives new findings that meet
  the criteria defined in it, so that they no longer show as active. Teams
  use archive rules for access they have reviewed and accept. A rule with
  broad criteria, or one that names an outside account, hides the finding
  that a later sharing change would produce, while the analyzer still looks
  healthy. AWS states that all IAM Access Analyzer actions are logged by
  CloudTrail and names CreateArchiveRule among them. It publishes no
  example record for these calls, so the rule matches the event names only
  and its level is low: read the filter of the request and decide whether
  it describes access you know.
  It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode,
  because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
references:
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/logging-using-cloudtrail.html
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/access-analyzer/latest/APIReference/API_CreateArchiveRule.html
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1685/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.defense-impairment
  - attack.t1685
logsource:
  product: aws
  service: cloudtrail
detection:
  selection:
    eventSource: access-analyzer.amazonaws.com
    eventName:
      - CreateArchiveRule
      - UpdateArchiveRule
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Security teams that maintain archive rules for reviewed cross-account access. Add their roles to a filter_* selection on userIdentity.arn and review archive rules created by anyone else.
level: low

False positives

  • Security teams that maintain archive rules for reviewed cross-account access. Add their roles to a filter_* selection on userIdentity.arn and review archive rules created by anyone else.

IAM Access Analyzer Deleted

Detects DeleteAnalyzer calls to IAM Access Analyzer. An analyzer reports the resources of an account or organization that are shared with outside principals, and deleting it ends those findings. Someone who is about to open buckets, keys, roles or secrets to another account has a reason to remove it first. AWS states that all IAM Access Analyzer actions are logged by CloudTrail, with the event source access-analyzer.amazonaws.com as in its example record for CreateAnalyzer. It publishes no example for DeleteAnalyzer, so the rule matches the event name only. Analyzers are regional: check awsRegion and whether analyzers in other Regions were deleted as well. It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode, because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceAWS CloudTrail
title: IAM Access Analyzer Deleted
id: 67434ce2-3e8e-4812-94b9-5979febaf393
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects DeleteAnalyzer calls to IAM Access Analyzer. An analyzer reports
  the resources of an account or organization that are shared with outside
  principals, and deleting it ends those findings. Someone who is about to
  open buckets, keys, roles or secrets to another account has a reason to
  remove it first. AWS states that all IAM Access Analyzer actions are
  logged by CloudTrail, with the event source access-analyzer.amazonaws.com
  as in its example record for CreateAnalyzer. It publishes no example for
  DeleteAnalyzer, so the rule matches the event name only. Analyzers are
  regional: check awsRegion and whether analyzers in other Regions were
  deleted as well.
  It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode,
  because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
references:
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/logging-using-cloudtrail.html
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/access-analyzer/latest/APIReference/API_DeleteAnalyzer.html
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1685/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.defense-impairment
  - attack.t1685
logsource:
  product: aws
  service: cloudtrail
detection:
  selection:
    eventSource: access-analyzer.amazonaws.com
    eventName: DeleteAnalyzer
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Replacement of an account analyzer by an organization analyzer, teardown of test accounts, and infrastructure-as-code runs that recreate the analyzer. Confirm that an analyzer covers the account again afterwards.
level: medium

False positives

  • Replacement of an account analyzer by an organization analyzer, teardown of test accounts, and infrastructure-as-code runs that recreate the analyzer. Confirm that an analyzer covers the account again afterwards.

AWS Config Recorder or Delivery Channel Changed

Detects PutConfigurationRecorder and PutDeliveryChannel calls. Both can reduce what AWS Config keeps without stopping it, for example by narrowing the recorded resource types or by pointing the delivery at another bucket. The CIS metric filter for AWS Config configuration changes that AWS publishes includes both calls. Compare requestParameters with the previous recorder and delivery channel settings. It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode, because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.

LevelLowStatusExperimentalLog sourceAWS CloudTrail
title: AWS Config Recorder or Delivery Channel Changed
id: 736c93a2-7fca-43cf-9795-2c6cada71d48
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects PutConfigurationRecorder and PutDeliveryChannel calls. Both can
  reduce what AWS Config keeps without stopping it, for example by narrowing
  the recorded resource types or by pointing the delivery at another bucket.
  The CIS metric filter for AWS Config configuration changes that AWS
  publishes includes both calls. Compare requestParameters with the previous
  recorder and delivery channel settings.
  It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode,
  because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
references:
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/securityhub/latest/userguide/cloudwatch-controls.html
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/config/latest/developerguide/log-api-calls.html
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-16
tags:
  - attack.defense-impairment
  - attack.t1685
logsource:
  product: aws
  service: cloudtrail
detection:
  selection:
    eventSource: config.amazonaws.com
    eventName:
      - PutConfigurationRecorder
      - PutDeliveryChannel
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Account baselines applied by landing zone automation and infrastructure-as-code pipelines, which set the recorder and the delivery channel again on every run; allow-list those roles after confirming that the new settings do not reduce coverage.
level: low

False positives

  • Account baselines applied by landing zone automation and infrastructure-as-code pipelines, which set the recorder and the delivery channel again on every run; allow-list those roles after confirming that the new settings do not reduce coverage.

AWS Config Recorder Stopped or Deleted

Detects StopConfigurationRecorder, DeleteConfigurationRecorder and DeleteDeliveryChannel calls. The first two end the recording of resource configuration changes in a Region, and the third removes the delivery of what was recorded, which AWS allows only after the recorder has been stopped. Changes made to resources while the recorder is off leave no configuration item. It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode, because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceAWS CloudTrail
title: AWS Config Recorder Stopped or Deleted
id: cfff3126-e443-424f-8aa5-04a6f2632002
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects StopConfigurationRecorder, DeleteConfigurationRecorder and
  DeleteDeliveryChannel calls. The first two end the recording of resource
  configuration changes in a Region, and the third removes the delivery of
  what was recorded, which AWS allows only after the recorder has been
  stopped. Changes made to resources while the recorder is off leave no
  configuration item.
  It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode,
  because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
references:
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/config/latest/APIReference/API_StopConfigurationRecorder.html
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/config/latest/APIReference/API_DeleteConfigurationRecorder.html
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/config/latest/APIReference/API_DeleteDeliveryChannel.html
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/securityhub/latest/userguide/cloudwatch-controls.html
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-16
tags:
  - attack.defense-impairment
  - attack.t1685
logsource:
  product: aws
  service: cloudtrail
detection:
  selection:
    eventSource: config.amazonaws.com
    eventName:
      - StopConfigurationRecorder
      - DeleteConfigurationRecorder
      - DeleteDeliveryChannel
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Planned removal of AWS Config from unused Regions, and landing zone or infrastructure-as-code runs that replace the recorder; confirm the change record and that a recorder is recording again.
level: medium

False positives

  • Planned removal of AWS Config from unused Regions, and landing zone or infrastructure-as-code runs that replace the recorder; confirm the change record and that a recorder is recording again.

Security Hub Disabled

Detects DisableSecurityHub calls, which disable Security Hub CSPM for the account in the current Region, and DisableSecurityHubV2 calls, which disable the Security Hub service for a Region. With DisableSecurityHub the enabled standards are disabled, the administrator and member associations are removed, and existing findings and settings are deleted after 90 days. The call is made per Region, so look for the same principal repeating it in other Regions. It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode, because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceAWS CloudTrail
title: Security Hub Disabled
id: 7ded9ba6-c660-4c03-b7d8-2fe4e3145352
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects DisableSecurityHub calls, which disable Security Hub CSPM for the
  account in the current Region, and DisableSecurityHubV2 calls, which
  disable the Security Hub service for a Region. With DisableSecurityHub the
  enabled standards are disabled, the administrator and member associations
  are removed, and existing findings and settings are deleted after 90 days.
  The call is made per Region, so look for the same principal repeating it
  in other Regions.
  It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode,
  because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
references:
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/securityhub/1.0/APIReference/API_DisableSecurityHub.html
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/securityhub/1.0/APIReference/API_DisableSecurityHubV2.html
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/eventbridge/latest/ref/events-ref-securityhub.html
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-16
tags:
  - attack.defense-impairment
  - attack.t1685
logsource:
  product: aws
  service: cloudtrail
detection:
  selection:
    eventSource: securityhub.amazonaws.com
    eventName:
      - DisableSecurityHub
      - DisableSecurityHubV2
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Planned removal of Security Hub from unused Regions or from accounts that are being closed; confirm the change record with the security team.
level: medium

False positives

  • Planned removal of Security Hub from unused Regions or from accounts that are being closed; confirm the change record with the security team.

Security Hub Account Detached from Its Administrator

Detects Security Hub CSPM calls that cut the link between a member account and the administrator account that receives its findings: a member disassociating itself (DisassociateFromAdministratorAccount, which AWS documents for accounts that are not part of an organization), or the administrator disassociating or deleting members (DisassociateMembers, DeleteMembers). Security Hub CSPM stays enabled in the member account, but its findings no longer reach the central view. It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode, because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceAWS CloudTrail
title: Security Hub Account Detached from Its Administrator
id: 94bcccdb-c73c-4b16-9cb5-97adcca4f171
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects Security Hub CSPM calls that cut the link between a member account
  and the administrator account that receives its findings: a member
  disassociating itself (DisassociateFromAdministratorAccount, which AWS
  documents for accounts that are not part of an organization), or the
  administrator disassociating or deleting members (DisassociateMembers,
  DeleteMembers). Security Hub CSPM stays enabled in the member account, but
  its findings no longer reach the central view.
  It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode,
  because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
references:
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/securityhub/1.0/APIReference/API_DisassociateFromAdministratorAccount.html
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/securityhub/1.0/APIReference/API_DisassociateMembers.html
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/securityhub/1.0/APIReference/API_DeleteMembers.html
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-16
tags:
  - attack.defense-impairment
  - attack.t1685
logsource:
  product: aws
  service: cloudtrail
detection:
  selection:
    eventSource: securityhub.amazonaws.com
    eventName:
      - DisassociateFromAdministratorAccount
      - DisassociateMembers
      - DeleteMembers
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Accounts leaving the organization or being closed, and a planned change of the Security Hub administrator account; confirm with the account inventory and the security team.
level: medium

False positives

  • Accounts leaving the organization or being closed, and a planned change of the Security Hub administrator account; confirm with the account inventory and the security team.

Triage

  • Identify the caller (userIdentity.arn), the Region (awsRegion) and the recorder, delivery channel or member accounts in requestParameters, and check for an approved change.
  • Look for the same principal making the same call in other Regions within a short time.
  • For PutConfigurationRecorder and PutDeliveryChannel, compare the new settings in requestParameters with the previous ones, with attention to the recorded resource types and the delivery bucket.
  • Review what the same principal changed after the call, and whether CloudTrail or GuardDuty were touched in the same session.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Turn recording back on in every Region where the call was made. Start the stopped recorder, or create the recorder and the delivery channel again with their previous settings.
  2. Enable Security Hub CSPM again, associate the account with its administrator account, and enable the standards that were in use.
  3. Contain the principal that made the calls by deactivating its access keys or revoking its role sessions, before it can switch the services off again.
  4. Rebuild the gap from CloudTrail. Review the resource changes the same principal and others made while the recorder was off, because AWS Config holds no record of them.
  5. Confirm that configuration items are delivered again and that new findings from each restored Region reach the administrator account.

Mitigation

  • Deny the AWS Config recorder and delivery channel actions and securityhub:DisableSecurityHub with a service control policy, except for a security break-glass role.
  • Manage Security Hub CSPM from a delegated administrator account for the whole organization, so that member accounts are enabled and associated centrally.
  • Alert on the state as well as on the API call, for example on a recorder that is not recording or an account that no longer reports findings.
  • Keep CloudTrail and threat detection independent of both services, so that switching these two off does not remove the record of who did it.

Frequently asked questions

Is the recorded configuration history lost when the recorder is deleted?

No. AWS documents that deleting the configuration recorder does not delete the configuration information that was previously recorded. It can still be read through the API, but it is not shown in the AWS Config console until a new recorder exists. What is lost is the record of every change made while no recorder was running.

What is lost when Security Hub CSPM is disabled?

AWS documents that existing findings, insights and configuration settings are deleted after 90 days and cannot be recovered, that the enabled standards are disabled and that the administrator and member associations are removed. AWS says that findings you want to keep must be exported before the service is disabled, so findings that were never exported are gone once the 90 days have passed.

Why do I have to check each Region separately?

Both services work per Region. DisableSecurityHub disables Security Hub CSPM only in the current Region, and AWS states that disabling it everywhere takes one request per Region. A configuration recorder also belongs to one Region. Each call is its own CloudTrail event with the Region in awsRegion, and the same principal repeating the call across Regions is a strong sign of intent.

Which related changes do these rules not match?

Changes that leave both services running. Disabling single standards or controls in Security Hub CSPM, suppressing findings and deleting individual AWS Config rules reduce what is checked without stopping the recorder or the service, and the rules on this page do not match them. Review those settings whenever one of the rules fires.

References

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