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Privileged Directory Role Assigned detection rules

An attacker assigns Global Administrator or another privileged Microsoft Entra role to an account, group or service principal they control, directly, as an eligible PIM assignment or as a permanent assignment outside PIM.

Platform
Microsoft Entra ID
Severity
High
Log source
Microsoft Entra ID audit logs
Last updated
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft SentinelIBM QRadar
What an attacker needs
Control of an identity with the right to manage directory role assignments, or of an application with RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory.
Impact
Tenant-level privileges for an attacker-controlled identity, such as creating users, resetting passwords and changing Conditional Access and federation.
Response
Remove the assignment, whether active or eligible, revoke the sessions of the account that received it, and disable the new member if it is a service principal.
Mitigation
Use PIM for all privileged roles with eligible, time-bound assignments, MFA and approval on activation, and alerts for assignments made outside PIM.
Audit activities
Add member to role in PIM completed (permanent)Add member to role in PIM completed (timebound)Add eligible member to role in PIM completed (permanent)Add eligible member to role in PIM completed (timebound)Add member to roleAdd eligible member to roleAdd scoped member to roleAdd member to role outside of PIM (permanent)Add role assignment to role definitionAdd EligibleRoleAssignment to RoleDefinitionAdd member to role completed (PIM activation)

How the attack works

Microsoft Entra roles such as Global Administrator, Privileged Role Administrator, Privileged Authentication Administrator, Application Administrator and Hybrid Identity Administrator control the tenant. Anyone who can manage role assignments (Privileged Role Administrator, Global Administrator, or an application with RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory) can grant them. Attackers use this right to promote an account they already control, to make a backdoor account eligible in PIM so it looks dormant, or to give a service principal a role so it keeps access without MFA.

Direct assignments are logged by Core Directory as Add member to role (or Add eligible member to role); assignments made through PIM add activities such as Add member to role in PIM completed (permanent) and Add member to role outside of PIM (permanent). The role appears in TargetResources as the Role.DisplayName modified property, and Microsoft's Sentinel content also reads a Role.WellKnownObjectName property (for example TenantAdmins for Global Administrator). The rules match the display name, the legacy name Company Administrator and those well-known names. A further rule reads the same activities for the other built-in roles that Microsoft labels as privileged, and one reads two assignment activities that Microsoft lists without describing them. Another reads PIM for Groups, where membership or ownership of a group that holds a role is assigned under the GroupManagement category. One more rule reads the SharePoint Administrator role, which carries no privileged label but gives global permissions within SharePoint Online.

What an attacker needs

  • Control of an identity with the right to manage directory role assignments, or of an application with RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory.

Impact

Tenant-level privileges for an attacker-controlled identity: creating users, resetting passwords, changing Conditional Access and federation, granting application permissions and, for Global Administrator, elevating into every Azure subscription.

Detection rules

Member or Owner Assigned to a Group Through PIM for Groups

Detects an active or eligible membership or ownership assignment made in PIM for Groups. A group that holds a Microsoft Entra role passes the role on to its members, and an owner can add members, so an assignment to such a group is a role assignment that the rules for the RoleManagement category do not see. Microsoft lists the PIM assignment activities a second time under the GroupManagement category, and this rule reads the completed assignments there. Microsoft documents the activity names and the category but not the fields of these events, so the rule cannot tell which group is concerned or whether it holds a role. Read the group and the new member in TargetResources. The activity "Add member to role completed (PIM activation)" is not matched, because it is written at every routine activation.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceMicrosoft Entra ID audit logs
title: Member or Owner Assigned to a Group Through PIM for Groups
id: 0fcc7575-c22c-4300-8d46-c7690b05b213
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects an active or eligible membership or ownership assignment made in
  PIM for Groups. A group that holds a Microsoft Entra role passes the role on
  to its members, and an owner can add members, so an assignment to such a
  group is a role assignment that the rules for the RoleManagement category do
  not see. Microsoft lists the PIM assignment activities a second time under
  the GroupManagement category, and this rule reads the completed assignments
  there. Microsoft documents the activity names and the category but not the
  fields of these events, so the rule cannot tell which group is concerned or
  whether it holds a role. Read the group and the new member in
  TargetResources. The activity "Add member to role completed (PIM
  activation)" is not matched, because it is written at every routine
  activation.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-audit-activities
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/privileged-identity-management/concept-pim-for-groups
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/privileged-identity-management/groups-audit
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1098.003
logsource:
  product: azure
  service: auditlogs
detection:
  selection:
    Category: GroupManagement
    OperationName:
      - Add member to role in PIM completed (permanent)
      - Add member to role in PIM completed (timebound)
      - Add eligible member to role in PIM completed (permanent)
      - Add eligible member to role in PIM completed (timebound)
  filter_failed:
    Result: failure
  condition: selection and not filter_failed
falsepositives:
  - Planned onboarding of administrators into groups managed by PIM. Match each assignment to a request.
  - Groups in PIM that give access to something other than a directory role, such as an Azure role or an application. Keep a list of the groups that hold Microsoft Entra roles and raise the priority for those.
level: medium

False positives

  • Planned onboarding of administrators into groups managed by PIM. Match each assignment to a request.
  • Groups in PIM that give access to something other than a directory role, such as an Azure role or an application. Keep a list of the groups that hold Microsoft Entra roles and raise the priority for those.

Other Microsoft Entra Role Labeled Privileged Assigned

Detects an active or eligible assignment of a built-in role that Microsoft's role reference labels as privileged and that the first rule on this page does not list. Among them are the roles that reset passwords or authentication methods (Authentication Administrator, Helpdesk Administrator, Password Administrator, Entra SOC Identity Responder), that manage devices and what runs on them (Intune Administrator, Cloud Device Administrator), that write to the directory, its governance or its provisioning (Directory Writers, Identity Governance Administrator, Lifecycle Workflows Administrator, Attribute Provisioning Administrator, Tenant Governance Administrator) and that manage agent identities (Agent ID Administrator). The labeled roles that only read (Global Reader, Security Reader, AI Reader, Attribute Provisioning Reader) are left out. Directory Synchronization Accounts is added although it carries no label: Microsoft says the role is assigned automatically to the Microsoft Entra Connect service and is not intended or supported for any other use, so an assignment to anything else needs an explanation. The role is matched in TargetResources by its display name.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceMicrosoft Entra ID audit logs
title: Other Microsoft Entra Role Labeled Privileged Assigned
id: a00ca51a-8fc4-4f9a-ab35-941b348cf28f
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects an active or eligible assignment of a built-in role that Microsoft's
  role reference labels as privileged and that the first rule on this page
  does not list. Among them are the roles that reset passwords or
  authentication methods (Authentication Administrator, Helpdesk
  Administrator, Password Administrator, Entra SOC Identity Responder), that
  manage devices and what runs on them (Intune Administrator, Cloud Device
  Administrator), that write to the directory, its governance or its
  provisioning (Directory Writers, Identity Governance Administrator,
  Lifecycle Workflows Administrator, Attribute Provisioning Administrator,
  Tenant Governance Administrator) and that manage agent identities (Agent ID
  Administrator). The labeled roles that only read (Global Reader, Security
  Reader, AI Reader, Attribute Provisioning Reader) are left out. Directory
  Synchronization Accounts is added although it carries no label: Microsoft
  says the role is assigned automatically to the Microsoft Entra Connect
  service and is not intended or supported for any other use, so an assignment
  to anything else needs an explanation. The role is matched in
  TargetResources by its display name.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/role-based-access-control/permissions-reference
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-audit-activities
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-accounts
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1098.003
logsource:
  product: azure
  service: auditlogs
detection:
  selection_activity:
    Category: RoleManagement
    OperationName:
      - Add member to role
      - Add eligible member to role
      - Add scoped member to role
      - Add member to role outside of PIM (permanent)
      - Add member to role in PIM completed (permanent)
      - Add member to role in PIM completed (timebound)
      - Add eligible member to role in PIM completed (permanent)
      - Add eligible member to role in PIM completed (timebound)
  selection_role:
    TargetResources|contains:
      - Authentication Administrator
      - Helpdesk Administrator
      - Password Administrator
      - Entra SOC Identity Responder
      - Intune Administrator
      - Cloud Device Administrator
      - Directory Writers
      - Identity Governance Administrator
      - Lifecycle Workflows Administrator
      - Attribute Provisioning Administrator
      - Tenant Governance Administrator
      - Agent ID Administrator
      - Application Developer
      - Security Operator
      - Authentication Extensibility Administrator
      - Authentication Extensibility Password Administrator
      - B2C IEF Keyset Administrator
      - AI Administrator
      - Yammer Administrator
      - Partner Tier1 Support
      - Directory Synchronization Accounts
  filter_failed:
    Result: failure
  condition: all of selection_* and not filter_failed
falsepositives:
  - Planned onboarding of help desk, device management and governance staff. Match each event to a request.
  - Authentication Administrator also matches Privileged Authentication Administrator, which the first rule on this page already reports, so one assignment of that role raises both rules.
  - Microsoft Entra Connect receives Directory Synchronization Accounts for its own account when synchronization is installed or reconfigured.
  - The list follows the privileged label in Microsoft's role reference as it stood in November 2026. Microsoft changes the label over time, so review the list against the reference and against your own tiering.
level: medium

False positives

  • Planned onboarding of help desk, device management and governance staff. Match each event to a request.
  • Authentication Administrator also matches Privileged Authentication Administrator, which the first rule on this page already reports, so one assignment of that role raises both rules.
  • Microsoft Entra Connect receives Directory Synchronization Accounts for its own account when synchronization is installed or reconfigured.
  • The list follows the privileged label in Microsoft's role reference as it stood in November 2026. Microsoft changes the label over time, so review the list against the reference and against your own tiering.

Privileged Microsoft Entra Role Assigned

Detects an active or eligible assignment of a high-impact Microsoft Entra role, made directly, through PIM or outside PIM. The role is matched in TargetResources in three forms: its display name (Role.DisplayName modified property, or the role's own display name in PIM events); Company Administrator, the legacy name Microsoft Graph still uses for the Global Administrator directory role; and, for Global Administrator, Privileged Role Administrator, Privileged Authentication Administrator and User Administrator, the well-known object name that Microsoft's Sentinel content reads from the Role.WellKnownObjectName modified property (TenantAdmins, PrivilegedRoleAdmins, PrivilegedAuthenticationAdmins, UserAccountAdmins).

LevelHighStatusExperimentalLog sourceMicrosoft Entra ID audit logs
title: Privileged Microsoft Entra Role Assigned
id: ef465032-c925-47f4-889c-27a558c1f916
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects an active or eligible assignment of a high-impact Microsoft Entra
  role, made directly, through PIM or outside PIM. The role is matched in
  TargetResources in three forms: its display name (Role.DisplayName modified
  property, or the role's own display name in PIM events); Company
  Administrator, the legacy name Microsoft Graph still uses for the Global
  Administrator directory role; and, for Global Administrator, Privileged Role
  Administrator, Privileged Authentication Administrator and User
  Administrator, the well-known object name that Microsoft's Sentinel content
  reads from the Role.WellKnownObjectName modified property (TenantAdmins,
  PrivilegedRoleAdmins, PrivilegedAuthenticationAdmins, UserAccountAdmins).
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-accounts
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-audit-activities
  - https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Microsoft%20Entra%20ID/Analytic%20Rules/UseraddedtoPrivilgedGroups.yaml
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/resources/directoryrole
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-10
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1098.003
logsource:
  product: azure
  service: auditlogs
detection:
  selection_activity:
    Category: RoleManagement
    OperationName:
      - Add member to role
      - Add eligible member to role
      - Add scoped member to role
      - Add member to role outside of PIM (permanent)
      - Add member to role in PIM completed (permanent)
      - Add member to role in PIM completed (timebound)
      - Add eligible member to role in PIM completed (permanent)
      - Add eligible member to role in PIM completed (timebound)
  selection_role:
    TargetResources|contains:
      - Global Administrator
      - Company Administrator
      - TenantAdmins
      - Privileged Role Administrator
      - PrivilegedRoleAdmins
      - Privileged Authentication Administrator
      - PrivilegedAuthenticationAdmins
      - Application Administrator
      - Hybrid Identity Administrator
      - Security Administrator
      - Conditional Access Administrator
      - Authentication Policy Administrator
      - Domain Name Administrator
      - External Identity Provider Administrator
      - Partner Tier2 Support
      - User Administrator
      - UserAccountAdmins
  filter_failed:
    Result: failure
  condition: all of selection_* and not filter_failed
falsepositives:
  - Planned administrator onboarding and PIM eligibility grants; match each event to a request. In PIM-enabled tenants role activations can also appear as role additions, so confirm the initiator before excluding PIM's own service activity.
  - The role list is a starting point ("Application Administrator" also matches Cloud Application Administrator); align it with the roles you treat as Tier 0, including privileged custom roles.
level: high

False positives

  • Planned administrator onboarding and PIM eligibility grants; match each event to a request. In PIM-enabled tenants role activations can also appear as role additions, so confirm the initiator before excluding PIM's own service activity.
  • The role list is a starting point ("Application Administrator" also matches Cloud Application Administrator); align it with the roles you treat as Tier 0, including privileged custom roles.

Role Assignment Added to a Role Definition

Detects two role assignment activities of the RoleManagement category that the other rules on this page do not read: "Add role assignment to role definition" and "Add EligibleRoleAssignment to RoleDefinition". Microsoft lists both names in its audit activity reference and documents nothing else about them, neither when each is written nor which fields carry the role and the member. The rule therefore matches the names alone, for every role, and is rated low. Read the role and the member in TargetResources, and treat an event like a match of the first rule on this page when the role is one you consider privileged, a custom role included.

LevelLowStatusExperimentalLog sourceMicrosoft Entra ID audit logs
title: Role Assignment Added to a Role Definition
id: 1a203223-a56b-493a-9452-0a141ace85bd
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects two role assignment activities of the RoleManagement category that
  the other rules on this page do not read: "Add role assignment to role
  definition" and "Add EligibleRoleAssignment to RoleDefinition". Microsoft
  lists both names in its audit activity reference and documents nothing else
  about them, neither when each is written nor which fields carry the role and
  the member. The rule therefore matches the names alone, for every role, and
  is rated low. Read the role and the member in TargetResources, and treat an
  event like a match of the first rule on this page when the role is one you
  consider privileged, a custom role included.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-audit-activities
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-accounts
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1098.003
logsource:
  product: azure
  service: auditlogs
detection:
  selection:
    Category: RoleManagement
    OperationName:
      - Add role assignment to role definition
      - Add EligibleRoleAssignment to RoleDefinition
  filter_failed:
    Result: failure
  condition: selection and not filter_failed
falsepositives:
  - Every role assignment that the tenant records with these activity names, for any role. Measure how often they occur in your tenant, then add a filter for the roles you care about once you have seen where the event carries the role.
level: low

False positives

  • Every role assignment that the tenant records with these activity names, for any role. Measure how often they occur in your tenant, then add a filter for the roles you care about once you have seen where the event carries the role.

SharePoint Administrator Role Assigned

Detects an active or eligible assignment of the Microsoft Entra role SharePoint Administrator, made directly, through PIM or outside PIM. Microsoft's role reference says that users with this role have global permissions within SharePoint Online, as well as the ability to create and manage all Microsoft 365 groups. The role carries no privileged label, so the other rules on this page do not list it, yet it gives control over the sites and files of the whole organization. The role is matched in TargetResources by its display name and by the name Microsoft Graph uses, SharePoint Service Administrator. The Exchange Administrator role is read by a rule of the Exchange library page on management role assignments.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceMicrosoft Entra ID audit logs
title: SharePoint Administrator Role Assigned
id: 87dd8d51-7c16-4dd5-8ee0-025959890ab7
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects an active or eligible assignment of the Microsoft Entra role
  SharePoint Administrator, made directly, through PIM or outside PIM.
  Microsoft's role reference says that users with this role have global
  permissions within SharePoint Online, as well as the ability to create and
  manage all Microsoft 365 groups. The role carries no privileged label, so
  the other rules on this page do not list it, yet it gives control over the
  sites and files of the whole organization. The role is matched in
  TargetResources by its display name and by the name Microsoft Graph uses,
  SharePoint Service Administrator. The Exchange Administrator role is read by
  a rule of the Exchange library page on management role assignments.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/role-based-access-control/permissions-reference
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-audit-activities
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1098.003
logsource:
  product: azure
  service: auditlogs
detection:
  selection_activity:
    Category: RoleManagement
    OperationName:
      - Add member to role
      - Add eligible member to role
      - Add scoped member to role
      - Add member to role outside of PIM (permanent)
      - Add member to role in PIM completed (permanent)
      - Add member to role in PIM completed (timebound)
      - Add eligible member to role in PIM completed (permanent)
      - Add eligible member to role in PIM completed (timebound)
  selection_role:
    TargetResources|contains:
      - SharePoint Administrator
      - SharePoint Service Administrator
  filter_failed:
    Result: failure
  condition: all of selection_* and not filter_failed
falsepositives:
  - Planned onboarding of collaboration administrators. Match each assignment to a request.
  - Other service administrator roles are not matched. Add the ones you treat as privileged in your own tiering.
level: medium

False positives

  • Planned onboarding of collaboration administrators. Match each assignment to a request.
  • Other service administrator roles are not matched. Add the ones you treat as privileged in your own tiering.

Global or Privileged Role Administrator Activated in PIM

Detects a completed PIM activation of Global Administrator, Privileged Role Administrator or Privileged Authentication Administrator. Activations are expected from a short list of people; an activation by anyone else, or at an unusual time, may mean a dormant eligible assignment is being used. The role is matched in TargetResources by display name, including Company Administrator, the legacy name Microsoft Graph still uses for the Global Administrator directory role.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceMicrosoft Entra ID audit logs
title: Global or Privileged Role Administrator Activated in PIM
id: 5bffbe89-ae1d-4bd9-b9b9-9f6a4f533467
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects a completed PIM activation of Global Administrator, Privileged Role
  Administrator or Privileged Authentication Administrator. Activations are
  expected from a short list of people; an activation by anyone else, or at
  an unusual time, may mean a dormant eligible assignment is being used. The
  role is matched in TargetResources by display name, including Company
  Administrator, the legacy name Microsoft Graph still uses for the Global
  Administrator directory role.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-audit-activities
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/privileged-identity-management/pim-how-to-use-audit-log
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-10
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1098.003
logsource:
  product: azure
  service: auditlogs
detection:
  selection:
    Category: RoleManagement
    OperationName: Add member to role completed (PIM activation)
    TargetResources|contains:
      - Global Administrator
      - Company Administrator
      - Privileged Role Administrator
      - Privileged Authentication Administrator
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Routine activations by the administrators who hold these eligible assignments; filter their accounts in InitiatedBy and keep alerting on everyone else.
level: medium

False positives

  • Routine activations by the administrators who hold these eligible assignments; filter their accounts in InitiatedBy and keep alerting on everyone else.

Detection logic

Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.

Privileged role assigned to an account that was created shortly before

Detection hypothesisSequence of events

Administrators are normally existing staff who receive a role. An account that is created and given a privileged role within hours is the pattern of a backdoor account. Microsoft's guidance for privileged accounts describes this correlation between user creation and role assignment.

  1. A user is created: service Core Directory, category UserManagement, activity Add user, with the new account in TargetResources.
  2. Within 24 hours a role is assigned to the same account: category RoleManagement, activity Add member to role or one of the other assignment activities the rules on this page read, with the account in TargetResources and the role in the Role.DisplayName modified property.
  3. Raise the priority when the same actor in InitiatedBy made both changes, and when the account is deleted again soon after.

EventsAdd userAdd member to roleAdd eligible member to role

LimitsA new administrator who is onboarded with a dedicated admin account matches as well, so confirm the request. The 24 hours are a starting point. An attacker who promotes an existing account is covered by the single-event rules.

Member or owner added directly to a group that holds a directory role

Detection hypothesisNeeds your own lists

A group that is assigned a role passes the role to every member, and an owner can add members. Adding an account to such a group, or making it an owner, grants the role without any role assignment event. Only a list of the groups that hold roles gives these ordinary group events their meaning.

  1. Keep a list of the groups that hold Microsoft Entra roles, active or eligible.
  2. Audit log, category GroupManagement: activity Add member to group or Add owner to group, with the group and the added account in TargetResources.
  3. Alert when the group is on the list, and treat the event like a role assignment: check the actor in InitiatedBy and the request behind it.

EventsAdd member to groupAdd owner to group

LimitsThe list has to be kept current, because a group that receives a role tomorrow is not on it today. Membership that is assigned through PIM for Groups is written under other activity names and is read by a rule on this page.

Privileged role activated in PIM from a device that is not a privileged access workstation

Detection hypothesisJoins two logsNeeds your own lists

Where administrators must work from privileged access workstations, an activation of a privileged role from any other device is either a broken process or someone else using the account. Microsoft's guidance for privileged accounts lists elevation outside these workstations as a high risk to monitor, by correlating the PIM activation with the device details of the sign-in.

  1. Keep a list of the device IDs of your privileged access workstations.
  2. Audit log: Add member to role completed (PIM activation), with the activating account in InitiatedBy and the role in TargetResources.
  3. Sign-in log, the 60 minutes before the activation: the sign-ins of that account and their DeviceDetail (deviceId, isCompliant, isManaged, trustType).
  4. Alert when none of those sign-ins came from a device on the list, or when they came from a device that is not compliant or not managed.

EventsAdd member to role completed (PIM activation)

LimitsIt works only where privileged access workstations are required and their device IDs are known. Microsoft fills the device ID only for devices registered in Microsoft Entra ID, and activations through automation have no device. The 60 minutes are a starting point.

Triage

  • Identify the role (TargetResources Role.DisplayName), the new member (TargetResources) and the actor (InitiatedBy); assignments made by an application need extra scrutiny.
  • Confirm a change record or PIM request exists; permanent assignments outside PIM in a PIM-managed tenant are suspicious by themselves.
  • Review the new member's recent sign-ins and the actor's other changes in the same session.
  • If unauthorized, remove the assignment, revoke the member's sessions and investigate how the actor obtained role management rights.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Remove the assignment, active or eligible, and revoke the sessions of the account that received it. If the new member is a service principal, disable it. If it is a group, check its members and owners.
  2. Revoke the sessions and reset the credentials of the identity that made the assignment, and find out how it obtained the right to manage roles.
  3. Review everything the new member did while it held the role, such as new users, password resets, Conditional Access and federation changes, permission grants and application credentials, and undo it.
  4. For Global Administrator, check whether the account elevated its access to Azure subscriptions and remove that access.
  5. Compare all holders of privileged roles, eligible assignments included, with the list of approved administrators.

Mitigation

  • Use PIM for all privileged roles with eligible, time-bound assignments, MFA and approval on activation, and alerts for assignments made outside PIM.
  • Keep Privileged Role Administrator and Global Administrator to a few cloud-only, phishing-resistant accounts.
  • Do not give directory roles or RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory to service principals unless there is no alternative.
  • Review privileged role assignments regularly with access reviews.

Frequently asked questions

Does the rule catch an eligible assignment that was never activated?

It is written to. The rule matches eligible assignments as well as active ones, made directly, through PIM or outside PIM. Attackers make a backdoor account eligible so that it looks dormant. A second rule matches the later activation of Global Administrator, Privileged Role Administrator or Privileged Authentication Administrator.

Why does the rule look for Company Administrator and TenantAdmins?

Company Administrator is the legacy name Microsoft Graph still uses for the Global Administrator directory role. TenantAdmins is the well-known object name that Microsoft's Sentinel content reads from the `Role.WellKnownObjectName` property. Matching these forms next to the display name keeps the rule working across the different shapes of the event.

Will the rule see a role that is not in its list?

Not that rule. Its list is a starting point. A second rule on this page covers the other built-in roles that Microsoft labels as privileged, apart from the roles that only read, and a third covers SharePoint Administrator. A privileged custom role, or a built-in role outside these lists, matches none of them. Align the lists with your own tiering, and note that "Application Administrator" also matches Cloud Application Administrator.

Does the rule see a user added to a group that holds a privileged role?

Only when the membership is assigned through PIM for Groups. Microsoft lists those assignments under the GroupManagement category, and a rule on this page reads them, although it cannot tell whether the group holds a role. A user who is added to such a group directly gets the role through an ordinary group membership change, which is a different audit activity that no rule here matches. Monitor the membership and the owners of such groups separately.

References

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