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Owner Added to an Application or Service Principal detection rules

An attacker makes an account they control an owner of an app registration or service principal. Owners can add secrets and certificates, so the attacker can later authenticate as the application with its permissions.

Platform
Microsoft Entra ID
Severity
High
Log source
Microsoft Entra ID audit logs
Last updated
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft SentinelIBM QRadar
What an attacker needs
Ownership of the application already, an application management role, or an application with a permission such as Application.ReadWrite.All.
Impact
A durable way to add credentials to the application and act with its permissions, which for privileged applications means tenant-wide data access or tenant takeover.
Response
Remove the unauthorized owner from the application registration and its service principal, and remove every secret and certificate added since the owner was added.
Mitigation
Keep owners of privileged applications to named administrators who already hold equivalent privileges, and review application and service principal owners regularly.
Audit activities
Add owner to applicationAdd owner to service principal

How the attack works

Owners of an application registration or a service principal (enterprise application) can manage it without holding any directory role: they can change its configuration, add other owners and, most importantly, add client secrets or certificates. If the application holds Microsoft Graph application permissions or a directory role, ownership is an indirect but complete path to those privileges.

Attackers who temporarily hold Application Administrator, Cloud Application Administrator or an application with Application.ReadWrite.All add a low-profile account as owner so they keep control after the admin access is gone. Existing owners, including stale or inactive ones, can do the same. The change is logged by Core Directory as Add owner to application or Add owner to service principal, with the new owner and the object in TargetResources.

What an attacker needs

  • Ownership of the object already, an application management role, or an application with Application.ReadWrite.All or Directory.ReadWrite.All.
  • A target application whose permissions or roles are worth inheriting.

Impact

A durable way to add credentials to the application and act with its permissions, which for applications holding privileged Graph permissions or directory roles means tenant-wide data access or tenant takeover. Owner assignments are rarely reviewed, so the access often outlives the incident that created it.

Detection rules

Owner Added to an Application or Service Principal

Detects a new owner on an application registration or a service principal. Owners can add credentials to the object, so review every new owner of an application that holds directory roles or Graph application permissions.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceMicrosoft Entra ID audit logs
title: Owner Added to an Application or Service Principal
id: 7fdced4d-4199-4848-b28e-3f11cd0d6538
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects a new owner on an application registration or a service principal.
  Owners can add credentials to the object, so review every new owner of an
  application that holds directory roles or Graph application permissions.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-audit-activities
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-10
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1098.003
logsource:
  product: azure
  service: auditlogs
detection:
  selection:
    OperationName:
      - Add owner to application
      - Add owner to service principal
  filter_failed:
    Result: failure
  condition: selection and not filter_failed
falsepositives:
  - Developers registering applications (the creator often becomes an owner) and handovers between teams; exclude non-production applications by their object ID in TargetResources if volume is high.
level: medium

False positives

  • Developers registering applications (the creator often becomes an owner) and handovers between teams; exclude non-production applications by their object ID in TargetResources if volume is high.

Detection logic

Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.

Owner added, then a credential added to the same object by the new owner

Detection hypothesisSequence of events

Ownership matters to an attacker because an owner can add a client secret or certificate. An owner who is added and then adds a credential to the same application or service principal within hours has used that right at once, which is the step that turns ownership into access as the application.

  1. Audit log: Add owner to application or Add owner to service principal. Take the object and the new owner from TargetResources.
  2. Audit log, within the next 24 hours: Add service principal credentials or Update application - Certificates and secrets management for the same object, with the new owner in InitiatedBy.
  3. Alert on the pair, and raise the priority when the application holds directory roles or Microsoft Graph application permissions.

EventsAdd owner to applicationAdd owner to service principalAdd service principal credentialsUpdate application - Certificates and secrets management

LimitsA developer who takes over an application and rotates its secret produces the same pair, so confirm it with the team that runs the application. An application and its service principal are two objects with their own owners and credentials, so match the pair on the same object. The 24 hours are a starting point.

Triage

  • Identify the application or service principal and the new owner in TargetResources, and the actor in InitiatedBy.
  • Check what the application can do (directory roles, Graph application permissions, Azure roles) to size the impact.
  • Look for credential additions or sign-ins as the application after the ownership change.
  • If unauthorized, remove the owner, remove any credentials added since and review the application's activity.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Remove the unauthorized owner from the application registration and from its service principal. The two objects have their own owners, so check both.
  2. Remove every client secret and certificate that was added to the application since the owner was added. Removing the owner does not remove the credentials the owner created.
  3. Revoke the sessions and reset the credentials of the account that was made owner and of the actor who added it. Disable the owner account if nobody in the organization knows it.
  4. Review the sign-ins of the service principal and the audit log for what was done as the application after the ownership change, and undo those changes.
  5. Look for the same account as owner of other applications, and for other owners the same actor added.

Mitigation

  • Keep owners of privileged applications to named administrators who already hold equivalent privileges; remove ownership from regular users and inactive accounts.
  • Review application and service principal owners regularly, starting with applications that hold directory roles or Graph application permissions.
  • Limit Application.ReadWrite.All and application administrator roles, and alert on credential changes to privileged applications.

Frequently asked questions

Is removing the rogue owner enough to end the access?

No. An owner can add client secrets or certificates to the application, and those keep working after the owner is gone. Check which credentials were added since the ownership change, remove them, and review the sign-ins of the application.

Why does an owner matter when the account holds no directory role?

Owners manage the application without any directory role. They can change its configuration, add other owners and add credentials. If the application holds Microsoft Graph application permissions or a directory role, ownership is an indirect but complete path to those privileges.

How do we keep this rule usable when developers register applications every day?

The creator of an application often becomes its owner, and teams hand applications over, so the event is common. Review every new owner of an application that holds directory roles or Graph application permissions. If the volume is high, exclude non-production applications by their object ID in TargetResources.

References

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