How the attack works
PingOne has no accounts that are administrators by nature: access to the admin console and the management API comes from role assignments. A role such as Environment Admin or Identity Data Admin is assigned to a user, a group, a worker application or a gateway, at the level of the organization, an environment, a population or an application. Ping's API reference states that the actor assigning a role must hold the same or broader role assignments, so the attacker starts from an identity that is already an administrator and copies that power to an identity that will survive the cleanup: a second user, a group they can join, or a worker application whose client credentials they hold.
PingOne records every assignment as a ROLE_ASSIGNMENT.CREATED audit activity and every new or edited custom role as ROLE.CREATED or ROLE.UPDATED. The activity names the actor (actors.user or actors.client) and the target, and its description carries the role and the scope. The same data is in the admin console under Directory, Administrator Roles, Role Activity Log.
Log source: the rules read PingOne audit activities. Send them to the SIEM with a PingOne webhook that includes the role event types, or with a connector that polls the Audit Activities API, for every environment and above all the Administrators environment.
What an attacker needs
- Control of a PingOne user or worker application that already holds the role to be assigned, or a role that Ping lists as able to assign it (Environment Admin can assign all roles except Organization Admin).
- For a custom role, the Organization Admin or Custom Roles Admin role, or a custom role with equivalent permissions.
Impact
A second, attacker-controlled administrator of the environment or organization. From Environment Admin the attacker controls applications, sign-on policies, external identity providers, keys and worker applications, which decides who can sign in to every application that trusts PingOne. An assignment to a worker application is a credential that is not subject to interactive MFA.
Detection rules
PingOne Custom Administrator Role Created or Changed
Detects a role being created or updated in PingOne (audit activities ROLE.CREATED and ROLE.UPDATED). Built-in roles cannot be modified, so these events concern custom administrator roles; adding permissions to a role that is already assigned raises the privileges of everyone who holds it.
title: PingOne Custom Administrator Role Created or Changed
id: 1478192b-bf50-4027-ae96-fde70b959ef9
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a role being created or updated in PingOne (audit activities
ROLE.CREATED and ROLE.UPDATED). Built-in roles cannot be modified, so these
events concern custom administrator roles; adding permissions to a role that
is already assigned raises the privileges of everyone who holds it.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003/
- https://developer.pingidentity.com/pingone-api/platform/reference/audit-reporting-events.html
- https://docs.pingidentity.com/pingone/directory/p1_roles.html
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-11
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1098.003
logsource:
product: pingone
service: audit
detection:
selection:
action.type:
- ROLE.CREATED
- ROLE.UPDATED
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Role design work by the team that owns delegated administration; compare with the change record.
level: medium
False positives
- Role design work by the team that owns delegated administration; compare with the change record.
PingOne Administrator Role Assignment Created
Detects a new administrator role assignment in PingOne (audit activity ROLE_ASSIGNMENT.CREATED) for a user, group, worker application or gateway. The documented event fields do not include the role name as a separate field: read it, and the scope, from the activity description during triage.
title: PingOne Administrator Role Assignment Created
id: d76f9628-2212-4100-86ec-82b0aaa3aaad
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a new administrator role assignment in PingOne (audit activity
ROLE_ASSIGNMENT.CREATED) for a user, group, worker application or gateway.
The documented event fields do not include the role name as a separate field:
read it, and the scope, from the activity description during triage.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003/
- https://developer.pingidentity.com/pingone-api/platform/reference/audit-reporting-events.html
- https://docs.pingidentity.com/pingone/directory/p1_viewing_admin_role_events.html
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-11
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1098.003
logsource:
product: pingone
service: audit
detection:
selection:
action.type: ROLE_ASSIGNMENT.CREATED
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Planned onboarding of administrators and role changes through an approved request.
- New environments or populations, where PingOne assigns roles to the creator automatically. Add a filter on actors.user.name or actors.client.name for provisioning identities you have reviewed.
level: medium
False positives
- Planned onboarding of administrators and role changes through an approved request.
- New environments or populations, where PingOne assigns roles to the creator automatically. Add a filter on actors.user.name or actors.client.name for provisioning identities you have reviewed.
Detection logic
Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.
Role assigned to an identity that then performs administrative activities it has not performed before
A role assignment matters when the role is used. An identity that receives a role and, within hours, produces administrative activities it did not produce in the previous month, such as reading secrets, editing applications or identity providers or assigning further roles, is using the power it has just received. A removal of the same assignment soon after makes the case stronger, because it hides the grant from the next review.
- Find
ROLE_ASSIGNMENT.CREATEDand note the target, the entry ofresourceswith itsresources.idandresources.type, and the actor (actors.user.id, oractors.client.idwhen no user is the actor). - Within 24 hours, collect the activities whose actor (
actors.user.idoractors.client.id) is the target, and keep theaction.typevalues the target did not produce in the 30 days before the assignment. - Give priority to
SECRET.READ,ROLE_ASSIGNMENT.CREATED,APPLICATION.UPDATED,IDENTITY_PROVIDER.UPDATED,SIGN_ON_POLICY_ASSIGNMENT.UPDATEDandSUBSCRIPTION.UPDATED, and to activities that carrytags.adminIdentityEvent, which Ping documents as marking the action of an administrator on other administrators. - Check whether a
ROLE_ASSIGNMENT.DELETEDfor the same target followed. An assignment that is used and removed within hours did not come through the normal process.
EventsROLE_ASSIGNMENT.CREATEDROLE_ASSIGNMENT.DELETEDSECRET.READAPPLICATION.UPDATEDIDENTITY_PROVIDER.UPDATEDSIGN_ON_POLICY_ASSIGNMENT.UPDATEDSUBSCRIPTION.UPDATED
LimitsA new administrator starting work produces the same pattern, so compare with onboarding records. An assignment to a group is used by its members, whom the assignment activity does not name. Ping's event list does not state which entry of the resources array is the assignee, so check the join against a known assignment first. The 24 hours and 30 days are starting points.
Triage
- Read the activity's description for the role and the scope, and identify the actor (actors.user.name or actors.client.name) and the target user, group or application.
- Confirm the change with the actor through a separate channel. An assignment made by a worker application (actors.client without actors.user) needs an owner who can explain it.
- If the target is a worker application, list who can read its client secret and check SECRET.READ and SECRET.UPDATED activities around the same time.
- If unexplained, remove the assignment, review what the actor and the target did afterwards, and rotate the credentials of both.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Remove the role assignment. If the target is a group, remove the members that were added to it. If it is a worker application, also replace its client secret.
- For a changed custom role, set its permissions back to the reviewed set. Everyone who holds the role received the added permissions.
- Disable the actor until the change is explained. For a user, end its sessions and reset its credentials. For a worker application, replace its client secret.
- Search the Role Activity Log for other assignments by the same actor in every environment, the Administrators environment first, and remove them.
- Review and reverse what the target did with the role, such as changes to applications, sign-on policies, external identity providers, keys and worker applications.
Mitigation
- Keep administrators in the Administrators environment and assign roles to a small number of static groups, so that a new direct assignment stands out.
- Scope roles to the environment, population or application that is needed instead of the organization.
- Give worker applications only the roles they need and create them without the creator's roles (the
assignActorRolesoption of the API). - Send role events from every environment to the SIEM and review the Role Activity Log on a fixed schedule.
Frequently asked questions
Does the alert name the role that was assigned?
Not as a separate field. The documented event fields do not include the role name. Read the role and its scope from the description of the `ROLE_ASSIGNMENT.CREATED` activity, or in the admin console under Directory, Administrator Roles, Role Activity Log.
Why is an assignment to a worker application treated as more dangerous?
A worker application authenticates with client credentials instead of an interactive sign-on. A role assigned to it is therefore a credential that is not subject to interactive MFA and that works for whoever holds the client secret. List who can read that secret and check `SECRET.READ` and `SECRET.UPDATED` activities around the same time.
Why does creating an environment produce role assignment alerts?
When a new environment or population is created, PingOne assigns roles to the creator automatically, and each one is a `ROLE_ASSIGNMENT.CREATED` activity. After you have reviewed the identities that provision environments, add a filter on `actors.user.name` or `actors.client.name` for them.
Can an administrator hand out a role broader than their own?
Ping's API reference states that the actor assigning a role must hold the same or broader role assignments, and Environment Admin can assign all roles except Organization Admin. The attacker therefore starts from an identity that is already an administrator and copies that power to one that survives the cleanup. That second identity is what the alert is about.