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AWS Organizations Delegated Administrator Registered detection rules

An attacker in the management account registers a member account they control as delegated administrator for an AWS service, and keeps organization-wide rights for that service after the management account is cleaned up.

Platform
AWS
Severity
High
Log source
AWS CloudTrail
Last updated
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft SentinelIBM QRadar
What an attacker needs
Credentials in the management account allowed to call organizations:RegisterDelegatedAdministrator, and a member account of the organization that the attacker controls.
Impact
Administrative rights for one AWS service across the whole organization, held by a member account and independent of credentials in the management account.
Response
Deregister the account as delegated administrator from the management account, then contain the caller and review what the registered account did.
Mitigation
Limit who can call Organizations write actions in the management account, and compare delegated administrators and trusted services with an approved list.
CloudTrail events
RegisterDelegatedAdministratorEnableAWSServiceAccess

How the attack works

Many AWS services that integrate with AWS Organizations let the management account name member accounts as delegated administrators, which can then manage all of the organization's accounts used in that service. RegisterDelegatedAdministrator does this for one account and one service principal, and can be called only from the management account. Trusted access, switched on with EnableAWSServiceAccess, is the related step for the service itself: it lets the service view the structure of the organization, create a service-linked role in all accounts and act on behalf of the organization.

What the registration is worth depends on the service. AWS documents that a delegated administrator for CloudFormation StackSets can create and manage StackSets with service-managed permissions and deploy to all accounts or to specific organizational units, and that the delegated administrator for IAM can manage root credentials and perform privileged root actions in member accounts when centralized root access is enabled. An attacker who holds the management account for a short time registers an account they control and keeps that reach from outside it. CloudTrail records both calls under organizations.amazonaws.com, in the management account and only in US East (N. Virginia), with the member account in requestParameters.accountId and the service in requestParameters.servicePrincipal.

What an attacker needs

  • Credentials in the management account allowed to call organizations:RegisterDelegatedAdministrator, and organizations:EnableAWSServiceAccess when trusted access for the service is not yet enabled.
  • A member account of the organization that the attacker controls. The principals in that account still need IAM permissions for the service, which an attacker who controls the account can grant.

Impact

Administrative rights for one AWS service across the organization, held by a member account. Depending on the service this means deploying resources, including IAM roles, into every account, acting as root in member accounts, or controlling the organization's security tooling. The access does not depend on credentials in the management account, so rotating those does not remove it.

Detection rules

AWS Organizations Delegated Administrator Registered

Detects RegisterDelegatedAdministrator calls, which enable a member account to administer the Organizations features of an AWS service across the organization. The call can be made only from the management account, and AWS Organizations records its events only in US East (N. Virginia). Read requestParameters.accountId and servicePrincipal to see which account received the delegation and for which service. It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode, because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceAWS CloudTrail
title: AWS Organizations Delegated Administrator Registered
id: 86dba68c-51e2-4262-a8ed-00535e7c740a
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects RegisterDelegatedAdministrator calls, which enable a member account
  to administer the Organizations features of an AWS service across the
  organization. The call can be made only from the management account, and
  AWS Organizations records its events only in US East (N. Virginia). Read
  requestParameters.accountId and servicePrincipal to see which account
  received the delegation and for which service.
  It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode,
  because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
references:
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/organizations/latest/APIReference/API_RegisterDelegatedAdministrator.html
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/organizations/latest/userguide/orgs_integrate_delegated_admin.html
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/organizations/latest/userguide/orgs_cloudtrail-integration.html
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-16
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1098.003
logsource:
  product: aws
  service: cloudtrail
detection:
  selection:
    eventSource: organizations.amazonaws.com
    eventName: RegisterDelegatedAdministrator
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - The setup of security and management services by the cloud platform team, landing zone automation and service consoles that register the delegated administrator for you; confirm that the account and the service are on the approved list.
level: medium

False positives

  • The setup of security and management services by the cloud platform team, landing zone automation and service consoles that register the delegated administrator for you; confirm that the account and the service are on the approved list.

AWS Organizations Trusted Access Enabled for a Service

Detects EnableAWSServiceAccess calls, which give the AWS service named in requestParameters.servicePrincipal permission to view the structure of the organization, create a service-linked role in all of its accounts and act on behalf of the organization. The call can be made only from the management account and is often the step before a delegated administrator is registered for the same service. AWS Organizations records its events only in US East (N. Virginia). It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode, because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.

LevelLowStatusExperimentalLog sourceAWS CloudTrail
title: AWS Organizations Trusted Access Enabled for a Service
id: 12927e33-aba7-4946-adab-248c511188f1
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects EnableAWSServiceAccess calls, which give the AWS service named in
  requestParameters.servicePrincipal permission to view the structure of the
  organization, create a service-linked role in all of its accounts and act
  on behalf of the organization. The call can be made only from the
  management account and is often the step before a delegated administrator
  is registered for the same service. AWS Organizations records its events
  only in US East (N. Virginia).
  It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode,
  because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
references:
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/organizations/latest/APIReference/API_EnableAWSServiceAccess.html
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/organizations/latest/userguide/orgs_integrate_services.html
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/organizations/latest/userguide/orgs_cloudtrail-integration.html
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-16
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1098.003
logsource:
  product: aws
  service: cloudtrail
detection:
  selection:
    eventSource: organizations.amazonaws.com
    eventName: EnableAWSServiceAccess
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Every integration of an AWS service with the organization, whether it is enabled by the cloud platform team, by landing zone automation or by the console of the service itself. Useful mainly as context for a delegated administrator registration, or for services you do not use.
level: low

False positives

  • Every integration of an AWS service with the organization, whether it is enabled by the cloud platform team, by landing zone automation or by the console of the service itself. Useful mainly as context for a delegated administrator registration, or for services you do not use.

Triage

  • Identify the caller (userIdentity.arn) and read requestParameters.accountId and servicePrincipal. Check whether the account is one of your security or infrastructure accounts and whether you use the service.
  • Look for an EnableAWSServiceAccess call for the same service principal shortly before the registration.
  • Check whether the registered account is new to the organization, by looking for CreateAccount, InviteAccountToOrganization and AcceptHandshake events.
  • Review what the registered account did in that service after the registration.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Deregister the account as delegated administrator from the management account, after you have read what the removal does to the service.
  2. Disable trusted access for the service if it was enabled by the same caller and you do not use the integration.
  3. Contain the principal that made the call in the management account by deactivating its access keys or revoking its role sessions.
  4. Review what the registered account did across the organization through the service, and remove what it deployed or changed in the member accounts.
  5. Treat the registered member account as compromised, and compare the delegated administrators and trusted services of the organization with the approved list.

Mitigation

  • Keep the management account for organization administration only and limit who can call Organizations write actions there. Service control policies do not affect the management account, so the permissions of its principals are the control.
  • Keep an approved list of delegated administrators and of services with trusted access, and compare the organization with it on a schedule.
  • Collect Organizations events from US East (N. Virginia) in the management account and alert on these calls in near real time.
  • Protect every delegated administrator account as you protect the management account, because for its service it holds the same reach.

Frequently asked questions

What can a delegated administrator do in the organization?

It depends on the service. AWS describes delegated administrators as member accounts that can manage all of the organization's accounts used in the service, and the registration also grants read-only access to AWS Organizations data. For CloudFormation StackSets this includes deploying to all accounts. For IAM with centralized root access it includes privileged root actions in member accounts.

Does the registration alone give the people in that account access?

Not by itself. AWS documents that the account still requires IAM permissions to access and administer the service. The registration lifts the limit at the organization level, and the principals in the account then need policies for the service. An attacker who controls the member account can write those policies, so the registration is the step that matters.

Where are these events recorded?

In the management account, because both calls can be made only from there, and only in US East (N. Virginia), where AWS Organizations records all of its CloudTrail events. A SIEM that collects other Regions or only the member accounts does not receive them.

Why is the rule on trusted access set to a lower level?

EnableAWSServiceAccess is called whenever an AWS service is integrated with the organization, and AWS recommends enabling trusted access through the console of the service, which makes the call for you. The event is common during the setup of security and management services. It is useful as context for a registration, and on its own it mainly shows that a new service can act across the organization.

References

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