How the attack works
In IAM Identity Center, a permission set is a template of policies that is provisioned as an IAM role (AWSReservedSSO_<name>_<id>) in each account it is assigned to. Changing the set (AttachManagedPolicyToPermissionSet, AttachCustomerManagedPolicyReferenceToPermissionSet, PutInlinePolicyToPermissionSet, or replacing or removing its permissions boundary) changes access for every user and group assigned to it, after ProvisionPermissionSet pushes it to the accounts. CreateAccountAssignment gives a user or group a permission set in an account. The rest of the family is logged in the same way: CreatePermissionSet and UpdatePermissionSet for the set itself, and DeleteAccountAssignment, DetachManagedPolicyFromPermissionSet and DeleteInlinePolicyFromPermissionSet for removals.
An attacker who controls the management account or the Identity Center delegated administrator can use these calls to grant an Identity Center user they own administrator access across the organization, or quietly widen a permission set that their user already has. CloudTrail records them with event source sso.amazonaws.com, the caller in userIdentity, and the permission set, principal and target account in requestParameters.
What an attacker needs
- Credentials with
sso:*style permissions in the Organizations management account or the Identity Center delegated administrator account. - An Identity Center user or group the attacker controls, or a permission set already assigned to one.
Impact
The permissions of the modified or assigned permission set, often AdministratorAccess, in every account it reaches. The access comes from the Identity Center assignment, so it has to be removed there, not by editing the role in a member account.
Detection rules
IAM Identity Center Account Assignment Created
Detects CreateAccountAssignment calls, which give an Identity Center user or group a permission set in an AWS account. Review the permission set, the principal and the target account in requestParameters. It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode, because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
title: IAM Identity Center Account Assignment Created
id: 14fdfbf1-191a-4b4c-8d6d-1779234c0cb7
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects CreateAccountAssignment calls, which give an Identity Center user or
group a permission set in an AWS account. Review the permission set, the
principal and the target account in requestParameters.
It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode,
because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
references:
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/singlesignon/latest/userguide/sso-info-in-cloudtrail.html
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/singlesignon/latest/APIReference/API_CreateAccountAssignment.html
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-10
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1098.003
logsource:
product: aws
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection:
eventSource: sso.amazonaws.com
eventName: CreateAccountAssignment
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Access requests fulfilled by the identity team or an access-management integration; allow-list its role and review assignments of administrator permission sets individually.
level: medium
False positives
- Access requests fulfilled by the identity team or an access-management integration; allow-list its role and review assignments of administrator permission sets individually.
IAM Identity Center Assignment Deleted or Policy Removed from a Permission Set
Detects the removing side of permission set administration: DeleteAccountAssignment, DetachManagedPolicyFromPermissionSet, DetachCustomerManagedPolicyReferenceFromPermissionSet, DeleteInlinePolicyFromPermissionSet and DeletePermissionSet. An attacker uses these calls to take access away from administrators, to remove an inline policy that restricts a permission set, or to delete an assignment they created once it has served its purpose. AWS lists all five among the IAM Identity Center events in CloudTrail. The rule cannot tell a removed restriction from a removed grant: read the permission set and the policy or principal in requestParameters. It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode, because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
title: IAM Identity Center Assignment Deleted or Policy Removed from a Permission Set
id: 20f4b9be-e493-461b-a0e2-60787f7bd8b6
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects the removing side of permission set administration:
DeleteAccountAssignment, DetachManagedPolicyFromPermissionSet,
DetachCustomerManagedPolicyReferenceFromPermissionSet,
DeleteInlinePolicyFromPermissionSet and DeletePermissionSet. An attacker
uses these calls to take access away from administrators, to remove an
inline policy that restricts a permission set, or to delete an assignment
they created once it has served its purpose. AWS lists all five among the
IAM Identity Center events in CloudTrail. The rule cannot tell a removed
restriction from a removed grant: read the permission set and the policy or
principal in requestParameters.
It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode,
because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
references:
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/singlesignon/latest/userguide/sso-info-in-cloudtrail.html
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/singlesignon/latest/APIReference/API_DeleteAccountAssignment.html
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/singlesignon/latest/APIReference/API_DeleteInlinePolicyFromPermissionSet.html
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1098.003
logsource:
product: aws
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection:
eventSource: sso.amazonaws.com
eventName:
- DeleteAccountAssignment
- DetachManagedPolicyFromPermissionSet
- DetachCustomerManagedPolicyReferenceFromPermissionSet
- DeleteInlinePolicyFromPermissionSet
- DeletePermissionSet
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Offboarding, access reviews and access-management integrations that remove assignments when access expires, and clean-up of unused permission sets by the identity team. Add those callers to a filter_* selection on userIdentity.arn.
level: low
False positives
- Offboarding, access reviews and access-management integrations that remove assignments when access expires, and clean-up of unused permission sets by the identity team. Add those callers to a filter_* selection on userIdentity.arn.
IAM Identity Center Permission Set Created, Updated or Provisioned
Detects CreatePermissionSet, UpdatePermissionSet and ProvisionPermissionSet calls. A new permission set is the template an attacker fills with policies and assigns to a user or group they control. UpdatePermissionSet changes the attributes of an existing set, and ProvisionPermissionSet pushes a changed set to the accounts it is assigned to, which is the moment a policy change takes effect. AWS lists all three among the IAM Identity Center events in CloudTrail. Read the permission set in requestParameters, and look for the policy changes and account assignments by the same caller around it. It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode, because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
title: IAM Identity Center Permission Set Created, Updated or Provisioned
id: cd15b832-2e31-420c-b3f2-2b4d5e109d55
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects CreatePermissionSet, UpdatePermissionSet and ProvisionPermissionSet
calls. A new permission set is the template an attacker fills with policies
and assigns to a user or group they control. UpdatePermissionSet changes the
attributes of an existing set, and ProvisionPermissionSet pushes a changed
set to the accounts it is assigned to, which is the moment a policy change
takes effect. AWS lists all three among the IAM Identity Center events in
CloudTrail. Read the permission set in requestParameters, and look for the
policy changes and account assignments by the same caller around it.
It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode,
because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
references:
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/singlesignon/latest/userguide/sso-info-in-cloudtrail.html
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/singlesignon/latest/APIReference/API_CreatePermissionSet.html
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/singlesignon/latest/APIReference/API_ProvisionPermissionSet.html
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1098.003
logsource:
product: aws
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection:
eventSource: sso.amazonaws.com
eventName:
- CreatePermissionSet
- UpdatePermissionSet
- ProvisionPermissionSet
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Permission sets created and provisioned by the identity team or infrastructure-as-code pipelines, which provision after every change. Add those callers to a filter_* selection on userIdentity.arn and alert on every other identity.
level: low
False positives
- Permission sets created and provisioned by the identity team or infrastructure-as-code pipelines, which provision after every change. Add those callers to a filter_* selection on userIdentity.arn and alert on every other identity.
IAM Identity Center Permission Set Policy Changed
Detects changes that can widen an IAM Identity Center permission set: an AWS managed or customer managed policy attached, the inline policy replaced, or the permissions boundary replaced or removed. It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode, because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
title: IAM Identity Center Permission Set Policy Changed
id: 41ed03cc-464b-43eb-8388-37ce4a58f681
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects changes that can widen an IAM Identity Center permission set: an AWS
managed or customer managed policy attached, the inline policy replaced, or
the permissions boundary replaced or removed.
It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode,
because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
references:
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/singlesignon/latest/userguide/sso-info-in-cloudtrail.html
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-10
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1098.003
logsource:
product: aws
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection:
eventSource: sso.amazonaws.com
eventName:
- AttachManagedPolicyToPermissionSet
- AttachCustomerManagedPolicyReferenceToPermissionSet
- PutInlinePolicyToPermissionSet
- PutPermissionsBoundaryToPermissionSet
- DeletePermissionsBoundaryFromPermissionSet
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Permission set changes deployed by the identity team or infrastructure-as-code pipelines; allow-list those callers.
level: medium
False positives
- Permission set changes deployed by the identity team or infrastructure-as-code pipelines; allow-list those callers.
Detection logic
Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.
Account assignment created and deleted again shortly after
An attacker who needs a permission set in an account for one task assigns it to their user, uses it and deletes the assignment, so that a later review of assignments shows nothing. A grant and its removal for the same principal within a short time is rarely administration.
- A
CreateAccountAssignmentevent fromsso.amazonaws.com. Note the PrincipalId, PermissionSetArn and TargetId parameters of the request. - Within 4 hours a
DeleteAccountAssignmentevent fromsso.amazonaws.comwith the same three values. - Between the two events, review what the role of that permission set did in the target account, because that is the window in which the assignment was used.
EventsCreateAccountAssignmentDeleteAccountAssignment
LimitsProducts for temporary elevated access create and delete assignments on purpose, and their caller has to be excluded. The 4 hours are a starting point. Role sessions opened through the assignment keep working until they expire, so the activity can continue after the second event.
Triage
- Identify the permission set (requestParameters.permissionSetArn), the policy or document added, and the principal and account for assignments (principalId, principalType, targetId).
- Check whether the assigned principal is a new or unexpected Identity Center user, and whether the caller is the usual administration pipeline.
- If not approved, revert the permission set, delete the assignment, and review sign-ins of the affected users in the AWS access portal.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Remove the access where it comes from. Delete the unapproved account assignment in IAM Identity Center, or revert the permission set and provision it again. A change to the role in a member account does not remove it.
- Block the sessions that already exist. Role sessions a user opened through the permission set keep working until they expire, so deny the user by its Identity Store user ID in a service control policy or in the permission set, and keep that deny for at least 12 hours.
- If the Identity Center user that received the access is not a known person, disable its sign-in and end its AWS access portal session.
- Contain the administrator identity that made the change, in the management account or in the delegated administrator account.
- Review what the role of the affected permission set did in each account it reaches, and compare all permission sets and assignments with the state in your pipeline.
Mitigation
- Limit Identity Center administration to a small group in the management account, and delegate administration with care.
- Do not assign permission sets that contain AdministratorAccess broadly; use separate, time-bound or approval-based access for administrators.
- Manage permission sets as code and alert on any change made outside the pipeline.
Frequently asked questions
Why does changing the role in the member account not fix this?
The role named `AWSReservedSSO_<name>_<id>` is provisioned from the permission set. The access comes from the Identity Center assignment and from the permission set, so it has to be removed there. A change made to the role inside one member account does not change the assignment or the permission set behind it.
Does deleting the assignment end the sessions the user already has?
Not at once. Deleting the assignment stops the user from getting new role sessions, but sessions that were already opened last until they expire. AWS advises keeping a deny for the user in place for at least 12 hours, after which the roles the user has assumed have expired. The deny is a policy with a condition on the Identity Store user ID, in a service control policy or in the permission set.
Do these rules see a user being added to a group that already has an assignment?
No. Group membership is changed in the Identity Store. The public API call is `CreateGroupMembership` under `identitystore.amazonaws.com`, and console actions are recorded under `sso-directory.amazonaws.com`. The rules match `sso.amazonaws.com` events for assignments and permission set policies, so the membership of groups that hold administrator permission sets needs its own monitoring.
When does a change to a permission set take effect in the accounts?
After `ProvisionPermissionSet` pushes the changed set to the accounts it is assigned to. From then on the change applies to every user and group that holds the permission set in those accounts, not only to the user of the attacker.