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IAM Identity Center Permission Set or Assignment Changed detection rules

An attacker with Identity Center admin rights adds policies to a permission set or assigns one to a user they control, gaining that access in every AWS account it covers.

Platform
AWS
Severity
High
Log source
AWS CloudTrail
Last updated
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft SentinelIBM QRadar
What an attacker needs
Identity Center administration rights in the management account or the delegated administrator account, and an Identity Center user or group the attacker controls.
Impact
The permissions of the modified or assigned permission set, often AdministratorAccess, in every account it reaches.
Response
Delete the unapproved account assignment or revert and provision the permission set again, and deny the user by its Identity Store user ID to block existing sessions.
Mitigation
Limit Identity Center administration to a small group in the management account, and manage permission sets as code with an alert on any change made outside the pipeline.
CloudTrail events
CreateAccountAssignmentDeleteAccountAssignmentDetachManagedPolicyFromPermissionSetDetachCustomerManagedPolicyReferenceFromPermissionSetDeleteInlinePolicyFromPermissionSetDeletePermissionSetCreatePermissionSetUpdatePermissionSetProvisionPermissionSetAttachManagedPolicyToPermissionSetAttachCustomerManagedPolicyReferenceToPermissionSetPutInlinePolicyToPermissionSetand 2 more in the rules below

How the attack works

In IAM Identity Center, a permission set is a template of policies that is provisioned as an IAM role (AWSReservedSSO_<name>_<id>) in each account it is assigned to. Changing the set (AttachManagedPolicyToPermissionSet, AttachCustomerManagedPolicyReferenceToPermissionSet, PutInlinePolicyToPermissionSet, or replacing or removing its permissions boundary) changes access for every user and group assigned to it, after ProvisionPermissionSet pushes it to the accounts. CreateAccountAssignment gives a user or group a permission set in an account. The rest of the family is logged in the same way: CreatePermissionSet and UpdatePermissionSet for the set itself, and DeleteAccountAssignment, DetachManagedPolicyFromPermissionSet and DeleteInlinePolicyFromPermissionSet for removals.

An attacker who controls the management account or the Identity Center delegated administrator can use these calls to grant an Identity Center user they own administrator access across the organization, or quietly widen a permission set that their user already has. CloudTrail records them with event source sso.amazonaws.com, the caller in userIdentity, and the permission set, principal and target account in requestParameters.

What an attacker needs

  • Credentials with sso:* style permissions in the Organizations management account or the Identity Center delegated administrator account.
  • An Identity Center user or group the attacker controls, or a permission set already assigned to one.

Impact

The permissions of the modified or assigned permission set, often AdministratorAccess, in every account it reaches. The access comes from the Identity Center assignment, so it has to be removed there, not by editing the role in a member account.

Detection rules

IAM Identity Center Account Assignment Created

Detects CreateAccountAssignment calls, which give an Identity Center user or group a permission set in an AWS account. Review the permission set, the principal and the target account in requestParameters. It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode, because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceAWS CloudTrail
title: IAM Identity Center Account Assignment Created
id: 14fdfbf1-191a-4b4c-8d6d-1779234c0cb7
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects CreateAccountAssignment calls, which give an Identity Center user or
  group a permission set in an AWS account. Review the permission set, the
  principal and the target account in requestParameters.
  It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode,
  because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
references:
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/singlesignon/latest/userguide/sso-info-in-cloudtrail.html
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/singlesignon/latest/APIReference/API_CreateAccountAssignment.html
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-10
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1098.003
logsource:
  product: aws
  service: cloudtrail
detection:
  selection:
    eventSource: sso.amazonaws.com
    eventName: CreateAccountAssignment
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Access requests fulfilled by the identity team or an access-management integration; allow-list its role and review assignments of administrator permission sets individually.
level: medium

False positives

  • Access requests fulfilled by the identity team or an access-management integration; allow-list its role and review assignments of administrator permission sets individually.

IAM Identity Center Assignment Deleted or Policy Removed from a Permission Set

Detects the removing side of permission set administration: DeleteAccountAssignment, DetachManagedPolicyFromPermissionSet, DetachCustomerManagedPolicyReferenceFromPermissionSet, DeleteInlinePolicyFromPermissionSet and DeletePermissionSet. An attacker uses these calls to take access away from administrators, to remove an inline policy that restricts a permission set, or to delete an assignment they created once it has served its purpose. AWS lists all five among the IAM Identity Center events in CloudTrail. The rule cannot tell a removed restriction from a removed grant: read the permission set and the policy or principal in requestParameters. It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode, because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.

LevelLowStatusExperimentalLog sourceAWS CloudTrail
title: IAM Identity Center Assignment Deleted or Policy Removed from a Permission Set
id: 20f4b9be-e493-461b-a0e2-60787f7bd8b6
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects the removing side of permission set administration:
  DeleteAccountAssignment, DetachManagedPolicyFromPermissionSet,
  DetachCustomerManagedPolicyReferenceFromPermissionSet,
  DeleteInlinePolicyFromPermissionSet and DeletePermissionSet. An attacker
  uses these calls to take access away from administrators, to remove an
  inline policy that restricts a permission set, or to delete an assignment
  they created once it has served its purpose. AWS lists all five among the
  IAM Identity Center events in CloudTrail. The rule cannot tell a removed
  restriction from a removed grant: read the permission set and the policy or
  principal in requestParameters.
  It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode,
  because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
references:
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/singlesignon/latest/userguide/sso-info-in-cloudtrail.html
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/singlesignon/latest/APIReference/API_DeleteAccountAssignment.html
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/singlesignon/latest/APIReference/API_DeleteInlinePolicyFromPermissionSet.html
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1098.003
logsource:
  product: aws
  service: cloudtrail
detection:
  selection:
    eventSource: sso.amazonaws.com
    eventName:
      - DeleteAccountAssignment
      - DetachManagedPolicyFromPermissionSet
      - DetachCustomerManagedPolicyReferenceFromPermissionSet
      - DeleteInlinePolicyFromPermissionSet
      - DeletePermissionSet
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Offboarding, access reviews and access-management integrations that remove assignments when access expires, and clean-up of unused permission sets by the identity team. Add those callers to a filter_* selection on userIdentity.arn.
level: low

False positives

  • Offboarding, access reviews and access-management integrations that remove assignments when access expires, and clean-up of unused permission sets by the identity team. Add those callers to a filter_* selection on userIdentity.arn.

IAM Identity Center Permission Set Created, Updated or Provisioned

Detects CreatePermissionSet, UpdatePermissionSet and ProvisionPermissionSet calls. A new permission set is the template an attacker fills with policies and assigns to a user or group they control. UpdatePermissionSet changes the attributes of an existing set, and ProvisionPermissionSet pushes a changed set to the accounts it is assigned to, which is the moment a policy change takes effect. AWS lists all three among the IAM Identity Center events in CloudTrail. Read the permission set in requestParameters, and look for the policy changes and account assignments by the same caller around it. It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode, because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.

LevelLowStatusExperimentalLog sourceAWS CloudTrail
title: IAM Identity Center Permission Set Created, Updated or Provisioned
id: cd15b832-2e31-420c-b3f2-2b4d5e109d55
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects CreatePermissionSet, UpdatePermissionSet and ProvisionPermissionSet
  calls. A new permission set is the template an attacker fills with policies
  and assigns to a user or group they control. UpdatePermissionSet changes the
  attributes of an existing set, and ProvisionPermissionSet pushes a changed
  set to the accounts it is assigned to, which is the moment a policy change
  takes effect. AWS lists all three among the IAM Identity Center events in
  CloudTrail. Read the permission set in requestParameters, and look for the
  policy changes and account assignments by the same caller around it.
  It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode,
  because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
references:
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/singlesignon/latest/userguide/sso-info-in-cloudtrail.html
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/singlesignon/latest/APIReference/API_CreatePermissionSet.html
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/singlesignon/latest/APIReference/API_ProvisionPermissionSet.html
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1098.003
logsource:
  product: aws
  service: cloudtrail
detection:
  selection:
    eventSource: sso.amazonaws.com
    eventName:
      - CreatePermissionSet
      - UpdatePermissionSet
      - ProvisionPermissionSet
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Permission sets created and provisioned by the identity team or infrastructure-as-code pipelines, which provision after every change. Add those callers to a filter_* selection on userIdentity.arn and alert on every other identity.
level: low

False positives

  • Permission sets created and provisioned by the identity team or infrastructure-as-code pipelines, which provision after every change. Add those callers to a filter_* selection on userIdentity.arn and alert on every other identity.

IAM Identity Center Permission Set Policy Changed

Detects changes that can widen an IAM Identity Center permission set: an AWS managed or customer managed policy attached, the inline policy replaced, or the permissions boundary replaced or removed. It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode, because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceAWS CloudTrail
title: IAM Identity Center Permission Set Policy Changed
id: 41ed03cc-464b-43eb-8388-37ce4a58f681
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects changes that can widen an IAM Identity Center permission set: an AWS
  managed or customer managed policy attached, the inline policy replaced, or
  the permissions boundary replaced or removed.
  It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode,
  because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
references:
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/singlesignon/latest/userguide/sso-info-in-cloudtrail.html
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-10
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1098.003
logsource:
  product: aws
  service: cloudtrail
detection:
  selection:
    eventSource: sso.amazonaws.com
    eventName:
      - AttachManagedPolicyToPermissionSet
      - AttachCustomerManagedPolicyReferenceToPermissionSet
      - PutInlinePolicyToPermissionSet
      - PutPermissionsBoundaryToPermissionSet
      - DeletePermissionsBoundaryFromPermissionSet
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Permission set changes deployed by the identity team or infrastructure-as-code pipelines; allow-list those callers.
level: medium

False positives

  • Permission set changes deployed by the identity team or infrastructure-as-code pipelines; allow-list those callers.

Detection logic

Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.

Account assignment created and deleted again shortly after

Detection hypothesisSequence of events

An attacker who needs a permission set in an account for one task assigns it to their user, uses it and deletes the assignment, so that a later review of assignments shows nothing. A grant and its removal for the same principal within a short time is rarely administration.

  1. A CreateAccountAssignment event from sso.amazonaws.com. Note the PrincipalId, PermissionSetArn and TargetId parameters of the request.
  2. Within 4 hours a DeleteAccountAssignment event from sso.amazonaws.com with the same three values.
  3. Between the two events, review what the role of that permission set did in the target account, because that is the window in which the assignment was used.

EventsCreateAccountAssignmentDeleteAccountAssignment

LimitsProducts for temporary elevated access create and delete assignments on purpose, and their caller has to be excluded. The 4 hours are a starting point. Role sessions opened through the assignment keep working until they expire, so the activity can continue after the second event.

Triage

  • Identify the permission set (requestParameters.permissionSetArn), the policy or document added, and the principal and account for assignments (principalId, principalType, targetId).
  • Check whether the assigned principal is a new or unexpected Identity Center user, and whether the caller is the usual administration pipeline.
  • If not approved, revert the permission set, delete the assignment, and review sign-ins of the affected users in the AWS access portal.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Remove the access where it comes from. Delete the unapproved account assignment in IAM Identity Center, or revert the permission set and provision it again. A change to the role in a member account does not remove it.
  2. Block the sessions that already exist. Role sessions a user opened through the permission set keep working until they expire, so deny the user by its Identity Store user ID in a service control policy or in the permission set, and keep that deny for at least 12 hours.
  3. If the Identity Center user that received the access is not a known person, disable its sign-in and end its AWS access portal session.
  4. Contain the administrator identity that made the change, in the management account or in the delegated administrator account.
  5. Review what the role of the affected permission set did in each account it reaches, and compare all permission sets and assignments with the state in your pipeline.

Mitigation

  • Limit Identity Center administration to a small group in the management account, and delegate administration with care.
  • Do not assign permission sets that contain AdministratorAccess broadly; use separate, time-bound or approval-based access for administrators.
  • Manage permission sets as code and alert on any change made outside the pipeline.

Frequently asked questions

Why does changing the role in the member account not fix this?

The role named `AWSReservedSSO_<name>_<id>` is provisioned from the permission set. The access comes from the Identity Center assignment and from the permission set, so it has to be removed there. A change made to the role inside one member account does not change the assignment or the permission set behind it.

Does deleting the assignment end the sessions the user already has?

Not at once. Deleting the assignment stops the user from getting new role sessions, but sessions that were already opened last until they expire. AWS advises keeping a deny for the user in place for at least 12 hours, after which the roles the user has assumed have expired. The deny is a policy with a condition on the Identity Store user ID, in a service control policy or in the permission set.

Do these rules see a user being added to a group that already has an assignment?

No. Group membership is changed in the Identity Store. The public API call is `CreateGroupMembership` under `identitystore.amazonaws.com`, and console actions are recorded under `sso-directory.amazonaws.com`. The rules match `sso.amazonaws.com` events for assignments and permission set policies, so the membership of groups that hold administrator permission sets needs its own monitoring.

When does a change to a permission set take effect in the accounts?

After `ProvisionPermissionSet` pushes the changed set to the accounts it is assigned to. From then on the change applies to every user and group that holds the permission set in those accounts, not only to the user of the attacker.

References

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