How the attack works
An identity domain holds applications as well as users. A confidential application is a client that authenticates with a client ID and a client secret, which Oracle describes as equivalent to a credential that the application uses to communicate with IAM. With the client credentials grant the application presents its own credentials and receives an access token that is not tied to any user. When the application is created, an administrator can add app roles to it. Oracle's own example is the Identity Domain Administrator role, with the remark that all REST API tasks available to the identity domain administrator then become accessible to the application. A new application is added in a deactivated state and has to be activated before it can be used.
For an attacker this is a way to keep access that does not depend on a person. They create an application, or change one that already exists, grant it an administrator role and keep the client secret. Resetting the passwords of every user, and enforcing MFA for all of them, does not touch it: the application signs in with its own secret and never passes through the sign-on policy for users. A related change is the grant. In the identity domain API a grant gives an application, or an app role of one, to a grantee that can be a user, a group or another application. No public incident report describes this at the audit event level for OCI. The page follows what Oracle documents about applications, grants and their events.
Identity domains write these changes to the Audit log with an event id in data.additionalDetails.eventId. Oracle documents admin.app.create.success, admin.app.update.success, admin.app.activated.success and admin.grant.create.success, and its report query reads the acting user from data.additionalDetails.actorName and the target from data.additionalDetails.adminResourceName. The events do not say which grant types, scopes or app roles an application has, so every alert ends with reading the application itself. The grant of an administrator role has its own rule on the page about administrator access. Collection needs the _Audit log group of every compartment that holds an identity domain. Tenancies without identity domains do not produce these events.
What an attacker needs
- The identity domain administrator role, or the application administrator role, which Oracle lists as able to create, update, activate, deactivate and delete applications and to grant access to them.
- To give the application an administrator app role, the right to assign that role, which Oracle describes as part of the identity domain administrator's delegated administration.
Impact
A non-human identity in the domain whose secret only the attacker knows. With an administrator app role it can do through the REST API whatever that role allows, up to everything an identity domain administrator can do: create users, reset passwords, change policies and grant roles. The access lasts until someone deactivates the application, removes its roles or regenerates its secret, and it is not affected by user password resets or MFA.
Detection rules
OCI Identity Domain Application Created or Activated
Detects the identity domain event ids admin.app.create.success and admin.app.activated.success in the OCI Audit log. Oracle states that a new application is added in a deactivated state and has to be activated before it can be used, so the two events mark the start of a new application identity. A confidential application authenticates with a client ID and a client secret and can be given app roles, including Identity Domain Administrator. The events do not show grant types, scopes or roles: read the application named in data.additionalDetails.adminResourceName, and the actor in data.additionalDetails.actorName.
title: OCI Identity Domain Application Created or Activated
id: 620973fc-7ebc-449e-8545-fae68be8fa45
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects the identity domain event ids admin.app.create.success and
admin.app.activated.success in the OCI Audit log. Oracle states that a new
application is added in a deactivated state and has to be activated before
it can be used, so the two events mark the start of a new application
identity. A confidential application authenticates with a client ID and a
client secret and can be given app roles, including Identity Domain
Administrator. The events do not show grant types, scopes or roles: read
the application named in data.additionalDetails.adminResourceName, and the
actor in data.additionalDetails.actorName.
references:
- https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Identity/api-getstarted/usingauditeventapis.htm
- https://docs.oracle.com/en/learn/generating-iam-reports-from-oci-audit/index.html
- https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Identity/applications/add-confidential-application.htm
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1098.001
logsource:
product: oci
service: audit
detection:
selection:
data.additionalDetails.eventId:
- admin.app.create.success
- admin.app.activated.success
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Application owners and the identity team integrating a new application, and automation that registers applications in the domain. Allow-list those actors and review every application that holds an administrator app role.
level: medium
False positives
- Application owners and the identity team integrating a new application, and automation that registers applications in the domain. Allow-list those actors and review every application that holds an administrator app role.
OCI Identity Domain Application Updated
Detects the identity domain event id admin.app.update.success in the OCI Audit log. An update can change what an existing application is allowed to do, for example its grant types, redirect URLs, scopes or app roles, which lets an attacker turn an application that is already trusted into a way in without creating a new one. Oracle documents the event id and the target name in data.additionalDetails.adminResourceName, but not which setting changed, so the rule matches on the event alone and its level is low. Read the application's current configuration and compare it with what its owner expects.
title: OCI Identity Domain Application Updated
id: 61918c30-cabb-4574-a2a4-b22f5307d95d
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects the identity domain event id admin.app.update.success in the OCI
Audit log. An update can change what an existing application is allowed to
do, for example its grant types, redirect URLs, scopes or app roles, which
lets an attacker turn an application that is already trusted into a way
in without creating a new one. Oracle documents the event id and the
target name in data.additionalDetails.adminResourceName, but not which
setting changed, so the rule matches on the event alone and its level is
low. Read the application's current configuration and compare it with what
its owner expects.
references:
- https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Identity/api-getstarted/usingauditeventapis.htm
- https://docs.oracle.com/en/learn/generating-iam-reports-from-oci-audit/index.html
- https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Identity/applications/add-confidential-application.htm
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1098.001
logsource:
product: oci
service: audit
detection:
selection:
data.additionalDetails.eventId: admin.app.update.success
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Routine maintenance of integrated applications, such as a changed redirect URL, a renewed certificate or an edited description. Expect regular volume in a domain with many applications. Allow-list the application owners and use the rule for hunting and for applications that hold administrator roles.
level: low
False positives
- Routine maintenance of integrated applications, such as a changed redirect URL, a renewed certificate or an edited description. Expect regular volume in a domain with many applications. Allow-list the application owners and use the rule for hunting and for applications that hold administrator roles.
OCI Identity Domain Grant Created
Detects the identity domain event id admin.grant.create.success in the OCI Audit log. Oracle's IAM report tutorial reads this id from the Audit log, and the audit log report of an identity domain lists the event as Application granted. In the identity domain API a grant gives an application, or an app role of one, to a grantee that Oracle documents as a user, a group, an application or a dynamic resource group. A grant to an application lets that client application access the granted one. Oracle does not document which Audit fields carry the granted object and the grantee for this id, so the rule matches on the event alone and its level is low. Start from data.additionalDetails.adminResourceName and data.additionalDetails.actorName and read the grant in the domain.
title: OCI Identity Domain Grant Created
id: 562b8a1d-cdaa-4d47-b90d-0b6f0e3901d9
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects the identity domain event id admin.grant.create.success in the OCI
Audit log. Oracle's IAM report tutorial reads this id from the Audit log,
and the audit log report of an identity domain lists the event as
Application granted. In the identity domain API a grant gives an
application, or an app role of one, to a grantee that Oracle documents as a
user, a group, an application or a dynamic resource group. A grant to an
application lets that client application access the granted one. Oracle
does not document which Audit fields carry the granted object and the
grantee for this id, so the rule matches on the event alone and its level
is low. Start from data.additionalDetails.adminResourceName and
data.additionalDetails.actorName and read the grant in the domain.
references:
- https://docs.oracle.com/en/learn/generating-iam-reports-from-oci-audit/index.html
- https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Identity/reports/audit-log.htm
- https://docs.oracle.com/en/cloud/paas/iam-domains-rest-api/op-admin-v1-grants-post.html
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1098.001
logsource:
product: oci
service: audit
detection:
selection:
data.additionalDetails.eventId: admin.grant.create.success
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Assignment of applications to users and groups during onboarding, which is the everyday use of grants. Expect regular volume. Allow-list provisioning actors and review grants whose grantee is an application or whose target is an administrative application.
level: low
False positives
- Assignment of applications to users and groups during onboarding, which is the everyday use of grants. Expect regular volume. Allow-list provisioning actors and review grants whose grantee is an application or whose target is an administrative application.
Detection logic
Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.
Application created and an administrator role granted to it shortly after
A new application that receives an administrator app role within a short time of its creation is a new administrator of the domain that is not a person. The role grant is recorded as an app role assignment whose beneficiary is the application, so joining the two events on the application's name finds it.
- The Audit log records
admin.app.create.successindata.additionalDetails.eventId. Take the application name fromdata.additionalDetails.adminResourceName. - Within 24 hours the Audit log records
admin.approle.add.member.successwhosedata.additionalDetails.adminRefResourceName(the beneficiary in Oracle's report query) is that application name. - Read the role in
data.additionalDetails.adminResourceNameof the second event. Identity Domain Administrator and the other administrator roles are the ones to act on. - Check
data.additionalDetails.actorNameof both events and whetheradmin.app.activated.successfollowed for the same application.
Eventsadmin.app.create.successadmin.approle.add.member.successadmin.app.activated.success
LimitsOracle documents these fields for role assignments to users and groups, and publishes no sample where the beneficiary is an application, so confirm the join with one test application. Roles selected while the application is created may be recorded only as part of the creation. The 24 hours are a starting point.
Triage
- Read the application's name in data.additionalDetails.adminResourceName, the actor in data.additionalDetails.actorName and the domain in data.additionalDetails.domainDisplayName. The Default domain holds the tenancy administrators.
- Open the application in the domain and read what the event does not show, namely its type, the allowed grant types, the scopes and the app roles assigned to it.
- Check whether the application holds Identity Domain Administrator or another administrator role, and when that role was granted.
- For a grant, identify what was granted and to whom. Oracle's report query for role assignments reads the beneficiary from data.additionalDetails.adminRefResourceName.
- Look for a change record and an owner. An application created by an administrator account outside working hours, with no owner and an administrator role, is the case to act on.
- Search the Audit log for actions whose actor is the application after it was activated.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Deactivate the application at once, since Oracle requires an application to be activated before it can be used, and keep it for the investigation before you delete it.
- Remove the app roles and grants that were given to it, and remove grants it received on other applications.
- Review the Audit events for what the application did while it was active and undo the changes, with priority on users, administrator role grants, policies and identity providers.
- If an existing application was changed and not created, regenerate its client secret after the legitimate owner is ready to receive the new one.
- Contain the administrator account that created or changed the application, and remove its administrator role until its owner is verified.
Mitigation
- Limit the identity domain administrator and application administrator roles to a few named people, and review who holds them on a schedule.
- Keep an inventory of the applications in every identity domain with an owner for each, and deactivate or delete applications nobody owns.
- Review which applications hold app roles, administrator roles above all, and remove roles that the application's purpose does not need.
- Treat a client secret as a credential. Store it in a vault, rotate it, and regenerate it whenever someone who knew it leaves.
Frequently asked questions
Why does an application in an identity domain matter as much as a user?
A confidential application authenticates with a client ID and a client secret, which Oracle describes as equivalent to a credential. With an administrator app role it can call the same REST APIs as an administrator. It does not sign in through the sign-on policy for users, so MFA and user password resets do not affect it. Whoever keeps the secret keeps the access.
Do the events show which permissions the application received?
No. The event ids say that an application was created, updated or activated, or that a grant was created, and Oracle's report query reads the target name from `data.additionalDetails.adminResourceName`. Grant types, scopes and app roles are not part of the documented event fields. Read the application in the domain to see what it can do.
Which events on this page are the strongest signal?
The creation and the activation of an application, because Oracle states that a new application is added in a deactivated state and must be activated before use. Update and grant events are frequent in a domain that manages many applications, so their rules have a low level and serve triage and hunting.
Is there a public incident where attackers used an OCI identity domain application this way?
No public incident report describes this at the audit event level for OCI. The page is derived from Oracle's documentation of confidential applications, app roles, grants and their event ids. The same pattern, a credential on an application identity, is well known from other identity platforms.
References
- MITRE ATT&CK T1098.001: Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials
- Oracle Cloud Infrastructure: Adding a confidential application
- Oracle Cloud Infrastructure: Regenerating a client secret for confidential applications
- Oracle Cloud Infrastructure: Using the Audit Event APIs (identity domain event ids)
- Oracle: Generate IAM reports from OCI Audit (identity domain event ids in Audit)
- Oracle Cloud Infrastructure: Audit log report of an identity domain (application events)
- IAM Identity Domains REST API: Grants (add a grantee to an app role)
- Oracle Cloud Infrastructure: Understanding administrator roles