What is a Non-Human Identity?

What is a Non-Human Identity?

A Non-Human Identity, often abbreviated as NHI, is a digital identity used by a system, application, service, workload, automation process, device, bot, or AI agent to access resources without direct human interaction.

In simple terms, a non-human identity is an identity that is not assigned to a person, but still needs to authenticate, receive permissions, and perform actions.

Examples of non-human identities include:

• Service accounts
• API keys
• OAuth tokens
• Application identities
• Machine identities
• Workload identities
• Automation accounts
• CI/CD pipeline identities
• Bot accounts
• Kubernetes service accounts
• Cloud service accounts
• Certificates
• Secrets
• AI agent identities

Microsoft describes non-human identities as software-based agents such as programs, bots, AI agents, or digital tools that access systems automatically. These identities are essential for automation but are often less visible in traditional identity governance processes.

A simple way to explain it:

A human identity logs in because a person needs access. A non-human identity authenticates because a system, application, or automated process needs access.

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Non-Human Identity Definition

A non-human identity is a digital identity used by machines, applications, workloads, services, scripts, bots, APIs, or AI agents to authenticate and access systems, data, or infrastructure.

Non-human identities are used everywhere in modern IT environments. They allow systems to communicate with each other, automate business processes, deploy applications, read data, write data, trigger workflows, and operate cloud infrastructure.

For example:

• A backup service uses a service account to access servers.
• A web application uses an API key to connect to a payment provider.
• A CI/CD pipeline uses a token to deploy code to cloud infrastructure.
• A Kubernetes pod uses a service account to access the Kubernetes API.
• An AI agent uses delegated access to retrieve information and perform actions.
• A monitoring tool uses credentials to collect logs and system metrics.

Google Cloud describes service accounts as identities intended for workloads, such as applications, that need to access resources or perform actions without end-user involvement.

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Why are Non-Human Identities Important?

Non-human identities are important because modern businesses depend heavily on automation, cloud services, APIs, SaaS applications, DevOps pipelines, microservices, containers, integrations, and now AI agents.

Almost every digital business process depends on some form of non-human identity.

For example:

• Applications need database access.
• APIs need to communicate with other APIs.
• Cloud workloads need permissions.
• Scripts need credentials.
• Automation tools need access tokens.
• Security tools need read access to systems.
• AI agents need controlled access to data and business applications.

Without non-human identities, modern IT automation would not work.

But from a security perspective, non-human identities create a major challenge: they often have powerful access, operate continuously, and are harder to govern than human users.

CSA's 2026 research on non-human identity and AI security highlights that AI adoption does not create an entirely new identity problem; instead, it magnifies existing NHI challenges around visibility, ownership, governance, and credential lifecycle management.

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Human Identity vs Non-Human Identity

Human and non-human identities both need authentication and authorization, but they behave very differently.

Area	Human Identity	Non-Human Identity
Represents	A person	A system, app, workload, device, bot, or AI agent
Examples	Employee, admin, contractor	Service account, API key, token, workload identity
Login behavior	Interactive login	Automated access
Ownership	Usually tied to HR or a manager	Often tied to an application, team, or unknown owner
Lifecycle	Joiner, mover, leaver process	Created during development, deployment, integration, or automation
Common risk	Phishing, credential theft, privilege abuse	Secret leakage, overprivilege, orphaned accounts, unclear ownership
Monitoring	Usually tied to user behavior	Often harder to distinguish from normal system activity
Access pattern	Business hours or user-driven	Continuous, automated, machine-speed activity

The biggest difference is accountability.

A human identity usually belongs to a known person. A non-human identity may belong to an application, a script, a cloud resource, a third-party integration, or an old project that nobody remembers.

That makes ownership and lifecycle management much harder.

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Common Types of Non-Human Identities

1. Service Accounts

A service account is an account used by an application, service, script, or system process.

Examples:

• A database service account
• A backup service account
• A monitoring tool account
• An application pool identity
• A scheduled task account
• A cloud service account

Service accounts are one of the most common types of non-human identities. They are also one of the riskiest because they often have long-lived credentials and broad permissions.

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2. API Keys

An API key is a credential used by an application or service to authenticate to an API.

Example:

A website uses an API key to send SMS notifications through a third-party provider.

API keys are simple and widely used, but they can become dangerous when they are:

• Hardcoded into source code
• Stored in public repositories
• Shared between teams
• Not rotated
• Overprivileged
• Not tied to a clear owner

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3. OAuth Tokens

An OAuth token is used to authorize access between applications and services.

Example:

A reporting tool receives a token to read data from a SaaS application.

OAuth tokens are useful because they allow delegated access, but they also create risk if they grant broad permissions or remain active after the original business need disappears.

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4. Machine Identities

A machine identity is used by devices, servers, virtual machines, containers, or infrastructure components to authenticate and communicate securely.

Examples:

• TLS certificates
• Cryptographic keys
• Device certificates
• Server identities
• Virtual machine identities

Microsoft describes machine identities as a specialized type of non-human identity used to secure communication between devices, servers, or virtual machines, often relying on certificates or cryptographic keys.

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5. Workload Identities

A workload identity is an identity assigned to a workload, such as an application, container, serverless function, or cloud service.

Example:

A cloud function uses a workload identity to read files from object storage and write logs to a monitoring system.

Workload identities are especially important in cloud-native environments because applications need secure access to cloud resources without using human accounts.

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6. Kubernetes Service Accounts

In Kubernetes, a ServiceAccount provides an identity for processes running inside pods. Kubernetes documentation explains that a service account provides an identity for processes that run in a Pod and maps to a ServiceAccount object.

Example:

A pod running an internal application uses a Kubernetes service account to access the Kubernetes API or other cluster resources.

This is powerful, but risky if the service account has more permissions than the workload actually needs.

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7. CI/CD Pipeline Identities

CI/CD tools need identities to build, test, and deploy software.

Examples:

• A pipeline deploys infrastructure to AWS.
• A GitHub Actions workflow pushes a container image.
• A DevOps job updates Kubernetes resources.
• A deployment script creates cloud resources.

Modern CI/CD platforms increasingly support short-lived identity federation instead of storing long-lived credentials. For example, GitHub Actions can use OpenID Connect tokens to authenticate to cloud providers without storing long-lived cloud secrets.

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8. AI Agent Identities

An AI agent identity is an identity used by an AI-powered agent or autonomous workflow to access systems, retrieve data, or perform actions.

Examples:

• An AI support agent reads customer tickets.
• An AI sales assistant updates CRM records.
• An AI security assistant reviews alerts.
• An AI DevOps agent triggers deployment workflows.
• An AI analyst queries internal knowledge bases.

AI agents make NHI governance more urgent because they may act across multiple systems, make decisions quickly, and require delegated access to business data.

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Real-World Examples of Non-Human Identities

Example 1: Backup Service Account

A company uses backup software to back up file servers and databases.

The backup software needs a service account to access servers and read data.

A secure setup:

• The service account has only the permissions required for backup.
• It cannot log in interactively.
• It has a clear owner.
• Its password is rotated.
• Its activity is monitored.
• It is not a domain administrator unless absolutely required.

A risky setup:

• The backup account is a domain administrator.
• The password never expires.
• The password is shared between teams.
• The account is used on many systems.
• No one knows who owns it.

This is a common real-world NHI risk. Backup accounts often need broad access, so they must be carefully governed.

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Example 2: API Key in Source Code

A developer builds an application that integrates with a payment API.

To make the integration work quickly, the developer stores the API key directly in the source code.

Later, the code is pushed to a repository.

If that repository is exposed, the API key may be stolen.

An attacker could use the key to:

• Access payment-related data
• Trigger unauthorized transactions
• Abuse the third-party service
• Create financial or operational damage

This is why secret leakage is one of the most important NHI risks. OWASP's Non-Human Identities Top 10 for 2025 includes Secret Leakage among the most critical NHI risks.

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Example 3: CI/CD Pipeline with Cloud Admin Access

A DevOps team creates a CI/CD pipeline to deploy cloud infrastructure.

For convenience, the pipeline receives broad administrator permissions.

This works operationally, but creates serious risk.

If the pipeline token is compromised, an attacker may be able to:

• Create cloud resources
• Delete infrastructure
• Modify IAM policies
• Access secrets
• Deploy malicious code
• Disable logging
• Exfiltrate data

A better approach is to use short-lived credentials and least-privilege permissions. AWS recommends using temporary credentials provided by IAM roles and federated principals instead of long-term IAM user access keys.

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Example 4: Orphaned Service Account

A company creates a service account for a project.

Six months later, the project is cancelled.

The application is removed, but the service account remains active.

No one owns it. No one monitors it. No one rotates the password.

This account is now an orphaned non-human identity.

If attackers discover the credentials, they may use the account without triggering obvious suspicion because the identity already exists and may still have valid access.

OWASP's NHI Top 10 includes Improper Offboarding as one of the top NHI risks, which directly relates to this problem.

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Example 5: AI Agent with Excessive Access

A company deploys an AI agent to help employees search internal documents.

To make the implementation easier, the AI agent is given broad access to shared drives, internal wikis, ticketing systems, and customer records.

The agent can now access more information than many employees.

Risks include:

• Sensitive data exposure
• Unauthorized access to customer information
• Poor auditability
• Unclear ownership
• Inability to distinguish human activity from agent activity
• Excessive permissions granted for convenience

CSA highlights that AI magnifies NHI risks related to visibility, ownership, governance, and credential lifecycle management.

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Common Non-Human Identity Use Cases

Use Case	Example	Security Concern
Application-to-database access	Web app connects to a database	Overprivileged database account
API integration	SaaS tool connects to another SaaS tool	Long-lived API key exposure
Backup automation	Backup tool reads server data	Excessive privileges
Monitoring	Monitoring agent collects logs and metrics	Broad read access across systems
CI/CD deployment	Pipeline deploys cloud resources	Pipeline token compromise
Kubernetes workload access	Pod uses service account	Cluster privilege escalation
Cloud workload access	Serverless function reads storage	Overbroad cloud role
Security automation	SOAR tool performs response actions	Powerful automation permissions
AI agent access	Agent reads documents or updates systems	Unclear identity boundary
Third-party integration	External tool accesses internal systems	Vendor NHI risk

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Common Non-Human Identity Risks

1. Secret Leakage

Secret leakage happens when credentials are exposed in unsafe locations.

Examples:

• Source code repositories
• Configuration files
• CI/CD variables
• Chat messages
• Tickets
• Documentation
• Container images
• Build logs
• Shared folders
• Developer laptops

Once leaked, a secret can be used by attackers to access systems as a legitimate identity.

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2. Overprivileged Non-Human Identities

Many non-human identities receive more access than they need.

This happens because teams often prioritize speed and availability.

Example:

A service account only needs read access to one database, but receives administrator access across multiple databases.

OWASP's NHI Top 10 includes Overprivileged NHI as one of the top risks for 2025.

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3. Improper Offboarding

Non-human identities are often forgotten after projects, applications, or integrations are retired.

Examples:

• Old API keys
• Unused service accounts
• Legacy automation accounts
• Former vendor integrations
• Abandoned cloud roles
• Unused certificates

These identities may still have valid access long after their business purpose has ended.

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4. Lack of Ownership

A human identity usually has an owner: the employee.

A non-human identity often does not.

Questions that are frequently hard to answer:

• Who created this service account?
• Which application uses it?
• What business process depends on it?
• What permissions does it need?
• Who approves changes?
• When should it be removed?

Without ownership, governance becomes almost impossible.

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5. Long-Lived Credentials

Long-lived credentials are dangerous because they remain valid for long periods.

Examples:

• Static API keys
• Permanent access keys
• Passwords that never expire
• Certificates with long validity periods
• Tokens that are not rotated

Short-lived credentials reduce risk because they expire automatically. AWS notes that temporary security credentials have a limited lifetime and cannot be reused after they expire.

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6. Weak Monitoring

Non-human identities often operate in the background.

That makes it difficult to know whether their activity is normal or suspicious.

Example:

A service account usually reads 100 records per day. Suddenly, it reads 1 million records at midnight.

Without behavioral monitoring, this may go unnoticed.

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7. Shared Credentials

Some teams use the same credential across multiple applications or scripts.

This creates several problems:

• No clear accountability
• Harder incident response
• Larger blast radius
• More difficult rotation
• Unknown dependencies

If one system is compromised, every system using the same credential may be exposed.

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8. Third-Party NHI Risk

Third-party tools often require non-human access.

Examples:

• Security scanners
• Monitoring platforms
• Backup providers
• Analytics tools
• Integration platforms
• Managed service providers

If a vendor identity is overprivileged or poorly monitored, it can become a path into the organization.

OWASP includes Vulnerable Third-Party NHI among the top NHI risks for 2025.

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9. Insecure Cloud Deployment Configurations

Cloud environments depend heavily on roles, service accounts, managed identities, and temporary credentials.

Common issues include:

• Overbroad cloud roles
• Default service accounts with excessive permissions
• Long-lived access keys
• Poor trust policies
• Weak workload identity configurations
• Unused roles
• Cross-account access mistakes

OWASP also lists Insecure Cloud Deployment Configurations as one of the top NHI risks.

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10. AI Agent Access Risk

AI agents can act quickly and across many systems.

If their access is not controlled, they may:

• Access sensitive data unnecessarily
• Trigger business actions without proper approval
• Use shared or human-based accounts
• Create unclear audit trails
• Expand access through integrations
• Introduce new identity attack paths

This is why AI agent identity should be treated as part of non-human identity security.

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Non-Human Identity Attack Scenario

Imagine a company that uses a CI/CD pipeline to deploy applications to the cloud.

The pipeline uses a long-lived cloud access key stored as a secret.

The access key has broad permissions because the deployment team wanted to avoid permission issues.

An attacker gains access to the code repository and finds the key.

The attacker uses the key to:

1. Authenticate to the cloud environment.
2. List storage buckets.
3. Read sensitive data.
4. Modify IAM policies.
5. Create a new privileged role.
6. Disable logging.
7. Deploy malicious infrastructure.

From the attacker's perspective, this is extremely valuable because they do not need to compromise a human administrator. They can use a valid non-human identity that already has trusted access.

This is why NHI security is not a secondary issue. It is central to modern identity security.

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Non-Human Identity Best Practices

1. Create an Inventory of Non-Human Identities

You cannot secure what you cannot see.

Organizations should maintain an inventory of:

• Service accounts
• API keys
• Tokens
• Certificates
• Cloud roles
• Workload identities
• Application identities
• Automation accounts
• Bot accounts
• AI agent identities

The inventory should include owner, purpose, permissions, creation date, last usage, credential type, and expiration status.

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2. Assign Ownership

Every non-human identity should have a clear owner.

The owner should be responsible for:

• Approving access
• Reviewing permissions
• Rotating credentials
• Confirming business purpose
• Removing unused identities
• Responding during incidents

Without ownership, non-human identities become invisible technical debt.

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3. Apply Least Privilege

Non-human identities should only have the permissions required for their specific task.

Example:

If a service only needs to read one storage bucket, it should not have access to all storage buckets.

If a pipeline only deploys one application, it should not have administrator access to the entire cloud account.

Least privilege is one of the most important controls for reducing NHI risk.

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4. Prefer Short-Lived Credentials

Use short-lived credentials wherever possible.

Examples:

• Temporary cloud credentials
• Federated workload identities
• OIDC-based CI/CD authentication
• Time-bound tokens
• Managed identities
• Role assumption instead of static keys

GitHub's OIDC guidance explains that workflows can access cloud resources without storing long-lived credentials as secrets, by using OIDC and cloud provider trust relationships.

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5. Rotate Secrets Regularly

If long-lived secrets cannot be avoided, they should be rotated regularly.

Rotation should include:

• API keys
• Passwords
• Tokens
• Certificates
• Client secrets
• Access keys

Rotation should also be tested carefully to avoid breaking applications.

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6. Remove Unused Non-Human Identities

Unused NHIs should be removed or disabled.

Examples:

• Old service accounts
• Inactive API keys
• Unused cloud roles
• Retired application identities
• Expired vendor integrations
• Legacy automation accounts

Improper offboarding is one of the top NHI risks identified by OWASP, so removal and lifecycle management should be treated as core security controls.

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7. Avoid Shared Credentials

Each application, service, workload, or automation process should have its own identity.

Avoid using the same account across many systems.

This improves:

• Accountability
• Monitoring
• Rotation
• Incident response
• Least privilege
• Blast radius reduction

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8. Monitor NHI Behavior

Non-human identities should be monitored for unusual behavior.

Examples of suspicious activity:

• Access from unusual locations
• Access outside normal patterns
• Sudden increase in data access
• Privilege changes
• Failed authentication attempts
• Use after long inactivity
• Access to new systems
• Token use from unexpected environments

Monitoring should focus not only on whether the credential is valid, but whether its behavior makes sense.

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9. Secure CI/CD Pipelines

CI/CD pipelines often hold powerful non-human identities.

Best practices include:

• Avoid long-lived cloud keys.
• Use OIDC-based federation where possible.
• Scope permissions per pipeline.
• Separate build and deployment identities.
• Restrict production deployment access.
• Monitor secret usage.
• Review repository access.
• Protect pipeline variables and secrets.

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10. Govern AI Agent Identities

AI agents should not operate under generic shared accounts.

Each AI agent should have:

• A unique identity
• Clear owner
• Defined purpose
• Least-privilege access
• Human approval for sensitive actions
• Audit logs
• Access expiration
• Data access boundaries
• Monitoring for abnormal activity

As AI agents become more common, they should be governed like other high-impact non-human identities.

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Non-Human Identity Security Checklist

Use this checklist as a practical starting point:

• Do we have an inventory of all non-human identities?
• Does every NHI have a clear owner?
• Does every NHI have a documented business purpose?
• Are service accounts reviewed regularly?
• Are API keys stored securely?
• Are secrets removed from source code?
• Are long-lived credentials avoided where possible?
• Are temporary credentials used for cloud workloads?
• Are unused service accounts disabled or removed?
• Are overprivileged NHIs identified?
• Are third-party integrations reviewed?
• Are CI/CD pipeline permissions limited?
• Are Kubernetes service accounts scoped properly?
• Are cloud roles reviewed for least privilege?
• Are NHI activities monitored?
• Are secret rotation processes documented?
• Are AI agent identities uniquely assigned?
• Are sensitive AI agent actions approved by humans?
• Are NHI risks included in identity security assessments?
• Are NHI-related findings prioritized by business impact?

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How Forestall Helps

Forestall helps organizations identify and reduce identity risks that come from human and non-human identities across complex environments.

For non-human identity security, Forestall can help security teams better understand risks such as service account exposure, excessive privileges, hidden relationships, credential-related findings, and attack paths that may involve non-human identities.

Instead of looking at service accounts, privileges, sessions, misconfigurations, and exposed credentials as isolated issues, Forestall helps connect them into a broader identity security picture:

• Which service accounts are overprivileged?
• Which identities create paths to critical systems?
• Which credentials may increase compromise risk?
• Which identity relationships are hidden or indirect?
• Which risks should be fixed first based on real attack impact?

This helps organizations move from simple identity inventory to actionable identity security posture management.

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Frequently Asked Questions

What does NHI stand for?

NHI stands for Non-Human Identity.

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What is a non-human identity in cybersecurity?

A non-human identity is a digital identity used by an application, service, workload, machine, script, bot, API, or AI agent to authenticate and access systems without direct human interaction.

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Is a service account a non-human identity?

Yes. A service account is one of the most common types of non-human identities. It is usually used by applications, services, scripts, or automated processes.

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Is an API key a non-human identity?

An API key is commonly used as a credential for a non-human identity. It allows an application or service to authenticate to an API.

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Are AI agents non-human identities?

Yes. AI agents can be considered non-human identities when they authenticate, access data, perform actions, or interact with systems on behalf of a workflow or business process.

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Why are non-human identities risky?

Non-human identities are risky because they often have powerful permissions, long-lived credentials, unclear ownership, weak monitoring, and poor lifecycle management.

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What is the biggest non-human identity risk?

One of the biggest risks is overprivilege. If a non-human identity has more access than it needs, a compromised credential can give attackers broad access to systems or data.

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What is secret leakage?

Secret leakage happens when credentials such as API keys, tokens, passwords, certificates, or access keys are exposed in unsafe places like source code, logs, tickets, chat tools, or public repositories.

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How can organizations secure non-human identities?

Organizations can secure non-human identities by creating an inventory, assigning ownership, applying least privilege, using short-lived credentials, rotating secrets, monitoring behavior, removing unused identities, and reviewing access regularly.

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What is the difference between a machine identity and a non-human identity?

A machine identity is a type of non-human identity usually associated with devices, servers, virtual machines, certificates, or infrastructure components. Non-human identity is the broader category that also includes service accounts, API keys, workload identities, bots, automation accounts, and AI agents.

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Conclusion

Non-human identities are now a core part of modern cybersecurity.

They power applications, cloud platforms, automation, DevOps pipelines, APIs, containers, service accounts, machine-to-machine communication, and AI agents.

But because they are often created outside traditional identity governance processes, they can become invisible security risks.

The biggest challenges are visibility, ownership, lifecycle management, credential security, least privilege, and monitoring.

A strong non-human identity security program should help organizations answer:

• What non-human identities exist?
• Who owns them?
• What do they access?
• Are they overprivileged?
• Are their credentials secure?
• Are they still needed?
• Could attackers abuse them?

As automation and AI adoption continue to grow, securing non-human identities will become one of the most important parts of identity security.