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Console Password Created or Reset for an IAM User detection rules

An attacker with iam:CreateLoginProfile or iam:UpdateLoginProfile sets a known console password on another IAM user, turning an API-only identity into a console user or taking over an existing one.

Platform
AWS
Severity
High
Log source
AWS CloudTrail
Last updated
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft SentinelIBM QRadar
What an attacker needs
Permission to call iam:CreateLoginProfile or iam:UpdateLoginProfile on the target user, and a target without an MFA device or without MFA enforced for console sign-in.
Impact
Console access as the target user, which is full account control for an administrator and a durable backdoor that survives access key rotation for an unused service user.
Response
Delete the login profile or reset the password together with its owner, revoke the active console sessions of the user, and contain the caller that set the password.
Mitigation
Restrict iam:CreateLoginProfile and iam:UpdateLoginProfile to identity administrators, and register MFA for every IAM user with console access.
CloudTrail events
CreateLoginProfileUpdateLoginProfile
Threat groups
Storm-0501

How the attack works

An IAM user's console password is its login profile. CreateLoginProfile gives a user that had only access keys (or no credentials) a password; UpdateLoginProfile replaces the password of a user that already has one. A principal allowed to call either on other users can sign in to the console as them, with their permissions, without touching their access keys.

Attackers use this to escalate (setting a password on an administrator or a privileged automation user) and to persist (adding console access to a quiet service user that nobody watches). The legitimate self-service path is ChangePassword, so a login profile change made by a different principal stands out. CloudTrail records the caller in userIdentity and the target in requestParameters.userName; a CreateLoginProfile request without a user name applies to the caller.

What an attacker needs

  • Credentials for a principal allowed to call iam:CreateLoginProfile or iam:UpdateLoginProfile on the target user.
  • A target user without an MFA device, or MFA that is not enforced for console sign-in.

Impact

Console access as the target user. If the target is an administrator the result is full account control; for an unused service user it is a durable backdoor that survives access key rotation.

Detection rules

Console Password Created for an IAM User

Detects CreateLoginProfile calls, which give an IAM user a console password. Triage by comparing the caller (userIdentity.arn) with requestParameters.userName: a password created for a service or administrator user by someone else is the escalation and persistence pattern. It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode, because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceAWS CloudTrail
title: Console Password Created for an IAM User
id: 1f428b12-1d09-47cf-a5bd-6bca52b3abd1
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects CreateLoginProfile calls, which give an IAM user a console password.
  Triage by comparing the caller (userIdentity.arn) with
  requestParameters.userName: a password created for a service or
  administrator user by someone else is the escalation and persistence pattern.
  It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode,
  because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
references:
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_CreateLoginProfile.html
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-10
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1098.001
logsource:
  product: aws
  service: cloudtrail
detection:
  selection:
    eventSource: iam.amazonaws.com
    eventName: CreateLoginProfile
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Onboarding of new IAM users by the identity team, and root password recovery run through an sts:AssumeRoot session; allow-list the provisioning roles.
level: medium

False positives

  • Onboarding of new IAM users by the identity team, and root password recovery run through an sts:AssumeRoot session; allow-list the provisioning roles.

Console Password Reset for an IAM User

Detects UpdateLoginProfile calls, which replace an IAM user's console password (users changing their own password call ChangePassword instead). A reset made by a different principal, followed by a ConsoleLogin as the target user, is an account takeover. It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode, because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceAWS CloudTrail
title: Console Password Reset for an IAM User
id: ae8aa003-9877-4f70-9c45-ca86dd5898ea
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects UpdateLoginProfile calls, which replace an IAM user's console
  password (users changing their own password call ChangePassword instead).
  A reset made by a different principal, followed by a ConsoleLogin as the
  target user, is an account takeover.
  It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode,
  because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
references:
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_UpdateLoginProfile.html
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-10
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1098.001
logsource:
  product: aws
  service: cloudtrail
detection:
  selection:
    eventSource: iam.amazonaws.com
    eventName: UpdateLoginProfile
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Help-desk or identity-team password resets; allow-list those roles and confirm the reset with the user.
level: medium

False positives

  • Help-desk or identity-team password resets; allow-list those roles and confirm the reset with the user.

Detection logic

Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.

Console password set on another user, then a console sign-in as that user

Detection hypothesisSequence of eventsJoins two logsNeeds a baseline

Whoever sets the password of another IAM user does it to sign in as that user. After a genuine reset the owner signs in from the owner's usual address. A takeover shows a sign-in that follows soon after the change from the address of the principal that set the password, from an address the user never used, or without MFA.

  1. A CreateLoginProfile or UpdateLoginProfile event from iam.amazonaws.com whose requestParameters.userName names a user other than the caller. Note that user, the caller in userIdentity.arn and the sourceIPAddress of the call.
  2. Within 24 hours, a ConsoleLogin event from signin.amazonaws.com whose userIdentity.userName is that user and whose responseElements.ConsoleLogin is Success.
  3. Raise the priority when the sign-in has the same sourceIPAddress as the password change, an address the user did not use in the weeks before, or additionalEventData.MFAUsed No.
  4. For a CreateLoginProfile on a user that had no console password before, the sign-in that follows is the first console sign-in of that user: confirm it with the owner of the user in every case.

EventsCreateLoginProfileUpdateLoginProfileConsoleLogin

LimitsAn administrator who resets a password from the same office network as the user produces the same address match. A role session carries no userIdentity.userName, so compare the target with the role session name instead. Users who sign in through an identity provider produce no ConsoleLogin event as an IAM user. The 24 hour window is a starting point.

Triage

  • Compare the caller (userIdentity.arn) with requestParameters.userName; a password set on someone else's user, especially a service or administrator user, is the key signal.
  • Look for a ConsoleLogin by the target user shortly after, and check its source IP address and MFAUsed value.
  • If not approved, delete or reset the login profile, review the target's activity and remove the caller's permission.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Take the console access away from the target user. Delete the login profile if the user should only use the API, or reset the password together with its owner, and revoke the active console sessions of the user so that a session opened with the attacker's password ends.
  2. Deactivate the access keys that were created for the target user during the session, and undo the other changes the session made.
  3. Contain the caller by deactivating its access keys or revoking its role sessions, since it can set the password again.
  4. Review the ConsoleLogin events of the target user since the change and what each session did, with priority on IAM changes.
  5. If the target user keeps a console password, register an MFA device with its owner, and confirm that no further login profile change follows.

Mitigation

  • Restrict iam:CreateLoginProfile and iam:UpdateLoginProfile to identity administrators; deny them for workload roles.
  • Register MFA for every IAM user with console access, so that a reset password alone is not enough to sign in.
  • Prefer IAM Identity Center for people and keep automation users API-only; alert when they gain a console password.

Frequently asked questions

How does this differ from a user changing their own password?

A user who changes their own password calls `ChangePassword`. `CreateLoginProfile` and `UpdateLoginProfile` set the password of a named user and are what an administrator calls. When the caller is a different principal than the target, someone else now knows that user's password. The rules match these two calls and not `ChangePassword`.

Does MFA on the target user stop this takeover?

It stops the sign-in when the user has an MFA device and MFA is enforced for console sign-in, because the new password alone is then not enough. It does not help for a user without a device. Check the `MFAUsed` value of the `ConsoleLogin` event that follows the change.

Why is a new console password on a service user a warning sign by itself?

A service or automation user works with access keys and has no reason to sign in to the console. `CreateLoginProfile` turns such an API-only identity into a console user that nobody watches, and that access survives the rotation of its access keys. Keep automation users API-only and treat a new login profile on one of them as unexplained until its owner confirms it.

References

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