How the attack works
Windows LAPS rotates the local Administrator password of each managed computer and backs it up to the computer's own object in Active Directory: in clear text in msLAPS-Password, or encrypted in msLAPS-EncryptedPassword (with older values in msLAPS-EncryptedPasswordHistory). On domain controllers it can manage the Directory Services Restore Mode password in msLAPS-EncryptedDSRMPassword. Reading the attributes needs an explicit permission on the OU, and an encrypted password can only be decrypted by the principal named in the ADPasswordEncryptionPrincipal policy (Domain Admins when it is not configured).
An attacker who compromises an account that was given read permission, or that is an authorized decryptor, collects the passwords of many computers in one directory query and logs on to them as local administrator. The encrypted attributes belong to the property set ms-LAPS-Encrypted-Password-Attributes (f3531ec6-6330-4f8e-8d39-7a671fbac605). When the OU has an audit entry for them (the Set-LapsADAuditing cmdlet creates one) and "Audit Directory Service Access" is enabled, the domain controller logs each access in event 4662 with that GUID in Properties.
What an attacker needs
- Read permission on the LAPS password attributes of the target computers, directly or through a group, or control of the computer objects or their OU.
- For encrypted passwords, membership in the authorized decryptor principal.
Impact
Local administrator access to every computer whose password was read, and from there the credentials of the accounts that log on to those computers. A DSRM password read from a domain controller object gives a local administrator on that domain controller.
Detection rules
Windows LAPS Encrypted Password Attributes Accessed by a Non-Computer Account
Detects event 4662 on a computer object whose Properties include the ms-LAPS-Encrypted-Password-Attributes property set (f3531ec6-6330-4f8e-8d39-7a671fbac605), which holds msLAPS-EncryptedPassword, msLAPS-EncryptedPasswordHistory and the DSRM password attributes, by an account that is not a computer account. Managed computers update these attributes on their own object; anyone else touching them is retrieving a local Administrator or DSRM password. Requires Audit Directory Service Access and an audit entry for the LAPS attributes on the OU (Set-LapsADAuditing). The clear-text msLAPS-Password attribute and legacy Microsoft LAPS (ms-Mcs-AdmPwd) are not part of this property set: to cover them, add the schemaIDGUID of the attribute, read from your own schema, to the selection. Accesses made with a computer account are excluded by the filter.
title: Windows LAPS Encrypted Password Attributes Accessed by a Non-Computer Account
id: 4bf8f10a-ca2c-413b-817d-eb07a0568129
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects event 4662 on a computer object whose Properties include the
ms-LAPS-Encrypted-Password-Attributes property set
(f3531ec6-6330-4f8e-8d39-7a671fbac605), which holds
msLAPS-EncryptedPassword, msLAPS-EncryptedPasswordHistory and the DSRM
password attributes, by an account that is not a computer account. Managed
computers update these attributes on their own object; anyone else touching
them is retrieving a local Administrator or DSRM password. Requires Audit
Directory Service Access and an audit entry for the LAPS attributes on the OU
(Set-LapsADAuditing). The clear-text msLAPS-Password attribute and legacy
Microsoft LAPS (ms-Mcs-AdmPwd) are not part of this property set: to cover
them, add the schemaIDGUID of the attribute, read from your own schema, to the
selection. Accesses made with a computer account are excluded by the filter.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/laps/laps-technical-reference
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/laps/set-lapsadauditing
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4662
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-11
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1555
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4662
Properties|contains: 'f3531ec6-6330-4f8e-8d39-7a671fbac605'
filter_computer_accounts:
SubjectUserName|endswith: '$'
condition: selection and not filter_computer_accounts
falsepositives:
- Helpdesk and administrators retrieving a password for support, and privileged access tools that read LAPS passwords with a service account. Baseline the approved readers and exclude service accounts by exact SubjectUserName; keep alerting on bulk reads and on reads of domain controller objects.
level: medium
False positives
- Helpdesk and administrators retrieving a password for support, and privileged access tools that read LAPS passwords with a service account. Baseline the approved readers and exclude service accounts by exact SubjectUserName; keep alerting on bulk reads and on reads of domain controller objects.
One Account Read the LAPS Password Attributes of Many Computers
Counts, per reading account, the distinct computer objects for which a domain controller logged event 4662 on the Windows LAPS encrypted password attributes. A support lookup touches one computer; collecting the local Administrator passwords of an OU in one directory query touches many. One account that reads the attributes of 10 or more computers within 15 minutes is collecting passwords rather than answering a ticket. The threshold and the window are starting points to tune against your own baseline. Requires Audit Directory Service Access and an audit entry for the LAPS attributes on the OU (Set-LapsADAuditing).
Fires when one SubjectUserName has at least 10 different ObjectName values within 15 minutes.
title: Windows LAPS Encrypted Password Attributes Accessed (Bulk Read Base Event)
id: 2aeac1cc-5515-4a7c-8185-8db864685833
name: laps_encrypted_password_attributes_accessed
status: experimental
description: >-
Base event of the threshold rule in this file. Event 4662 whose Properties
include the ms-LAPS-Encrypted-Password-Attributes property set
(f3531ec6-6330-4f8e-8d39-7a671fbac605), by an account that is not a computer
account.
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4662
Properties|contains: 'f3531ec6-6330-4f8e-8d39-7a671fbac605'
filter_computer_accounts:
SubjectUserName|endswith: '$'
condition: selection and not filter_computer_accounts
level: low
---
title: One Account Read the LAPS Password Attributes of Many Computers
id: 02138b97-0743-4e26-8514-37ead508d5cc
status: experimental
description: >-
Counts, per reading account, the distinct computer objects for which a
domain controller logged event 4662 on the Windows LAPS encrypted password
attributes. A support lookup touches one computer; collecting the local
Administrator passwords of an OU in one directory query touches many. One
account that reads the attributes of 10 or more computers within 15 minutes
is collecting passwords rather than answering a ticket. The threshold and
the window are starting points to tune against your own baseline. Requires
Audit Directory Service Access and an audit entry for the LAPS attributes on
the OU (Set-LapsADAuditing).
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/laps/laps-technical-reference
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/laps/set-lapsadauditing
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4662
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1555
correlation:
type: value_count
rules:
- laps_encrypted_password_attributes_accessed
group-by:
- SubjectUserName
timespan: 15m
condition:
field: ObjectName
gte: 10
falsepositives:
- Privileged access management or password vault products that read LAPS passwords of many computers on a schedule with a service account. Their runs repeat at the same times from the same account; exclude that account by SubjectUserName once confirmed.
- Administrative scripts that report on LAPS status across an OU and read the password attributes as part of it.
- The values of 10 computers and 15 minutes are starting points, not tested limits. Measure how many computers an approved reader normally reads and adjust both.
level: high
False positives
- Privileged access management or password vault products that read LAPS passwords of many computers on a schedule with a service account. Their runs repeat at the same times from the same account; exclude that account by SubjectUserName once confirmed.
- Administrative scripts that report on LAPS status across an OU and read the password attributes as part of it.
- The values of 10 computers and 15 minutes are starting points, not tested limits. Measure how many computers an approved reader normally reads and adjust both.
Triage
- Identify the reader (SubjectUserName) and the computer whose password was read (ObjectName), and check whether the reader is an approved password reader for that OU.
- Count the computer objects one account read in a short window; a helpdesk lookup touches one computer, bulk collection touches many.
- Correlate SubjectLogonId with 4624 to find the source host, then look for local Administrator logons (4624 with a TargetUserSid ending in -500) on the computers that were read.
- If not explained, rotate the passwords of the affected computers and remove the reader's permission.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Disable or reset the account that read the passwords, end its sessions and isolate the host it worked from.
- Rotate the LAPS password of every computer whose password attributes that account read, servers first. If a domain controller object was among them, have its Directory Services Restore Mode password rotated as well.
- Where one of those computers shows a local Administrator session after the read, isolate it and reset the credentials of the accounts that signed in to it since.
- Take the account out of the groups that grant read permission or decryption rights on those OUs, and keep it out until its compromise is resolved.
- Confirm that every affected computer has a new password and that no further bulk reads follow.
Mitigation
- Grant read permission on LAPS passwords per OU to small, dedicated groups and review the result with
Find-LapsADExtendedRights. - Enable password encryption and keep the authorized decryptors limited to administrators of the matching tier.
- Do not give helpdesk or workstation administrators permissions on OUs that contain servers or domain controllers.
- Configure auditing on OUs with managed computers (
Set-LapsADAuditing) and enable "Audit Directory Service Access" on domain controllers.
Frequently asked questions
Does event 4662 on the LAPS attributes mean the reader got the password in clear text?
Not always. The event records an access to the encrypted password attributes. Decrypting the value also takes membership in the principal named by the ADPasswordEncryptionPrincipal policy, which is Domain Admins when the policy is not configured. A reader outside that principal obtained only the encrypted value, but the event still shows an account collecting what it was allowed to read.
Does this rule cover legacy Microsoft LAPS or passwords stored in clear text?
No. It matches the property set ms-LAPS-Encrypted-Password-Attributes, which holds the encrypted password, its history and the DSRM password attributes. The clear-text msLAPS-Password attribute and the legacy ms-Mcs-AdmPwd attribute are outside that set. To cover them, add the schemaIDGUID of the attribute, read from your own schema, to the selection of the rule.
Why does the rule stay silent although LAPS is deployed?
The domain controller writes event 4662 only when Audit Directory Service Access is enabled and the OU with the managed computers has an audit entry for the LAPS attributes, which the Set-LapsADAuditing cmdlet creates. Reads made with a computer account are excluded by the filter as well.
How do I separate a helpdesk lookup from password collection?
Count the computer objects one account reads in a short window. A support case touches one computer and matches a ticket. Collection touches many computers in one session, often including servers or domain controller objects that the reader has no reason to manage.
References
- MITRE ATT&CK T1555: Credentials from Password Stores
- Windows LAPS schema extensions reference (attributes and the ms-LAPS-Encrypted-Password-Attributes property set)
- Get started with Windows LAPS and Windows Server Active Directory (read permission and authorized decryptors)
- Set-LapsADAuditing
- Event 4662: An operation was performed on an object