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Windows LAPS Password Recovered From Microsoft Entra ID detection rules

Windows LAPS backs up each device's local administrator password to Microsoft Entra ID. An attacker with a role or permission that can read it recovers the password and signs in to the device as local administrator.

Platform
Microsoft Entra ID
Severity
High
Log source
Microsoft Entra ID audit logs
Last updated
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft SentinelIBM QRadar
What an attacker needs
A role or application permission that can recover Windows LAPS passwords from Microsoft Entra ID, and a way to reach the device and log on with a local account.
Impact
Local administrator access to every device whose password was recovered, and from there the credentials, tokens and data of the people who use those devices.
Response
Block sign-in for the identity that recovered the passwords and revoke its sessions, then rotate the local administrator password of every device it touched.
Mitigation
Keep the roles that can recover passwords small and managed with Privileged Identity Management, and scope recovery with administrative units or custom roles.
Audit activity
Recover device local administrator password

How the attack works

Windows Local Administrator Password Solution (Windows LAPS) rotates the password of a local administrator account on each managed Windows device. Devices that are joined or hybrid joined to Microsoft Entra ID can back that password up to their device object in the directory, where administrators read it when they need to sign in to a device locally. Microsoft calls reading it back recovery.

Recovery needs the microsoft.directory/deviceLocalCredentials/password/read permission. By default the built-in roles Global Administrator, Cloud Device Administrator and Intune Administrator hold it, a custom role can hold it, and an application can read passwords with the Microsoft Graph permission DeviceLocalCredential.Read.All. An attacker who compromises one of those identities reads the passwords of the devices that interest them, or of every device, and uses each one to log on as local administrator.

Microsoft Entra ID records every recovery in the audit log of the Device Registration Service as Recover device local administrator password, with the actor in InitiatedBy and the device in TargetResources. A recovery now and then is normal support work. The signal is in who recovered the password, of which device, and how many devices one actor touched.

What an attacker needs

  • Windows LAPS enabled for the tenant, with devices that back their password up to Microsoft Entra ID.
  • A compromised identity that can recover passwords, which means a role with microsoft.directory/deviceLocalCredentials/password/read or an application with DeviceLocalCredential.Read.All.
  • A way to reach the device and log on with a local account.

Impact

Local administrator access to every device whose password was recovered, and from there the credentials, tokens and data of the people who use those devices. Passwords recovered in bulk give the attacker a way into a large part of the device estate until each password is rotated.

Detection rules

Local Administrator Password of a Device Recovered

Detects the recovery of a device's Windows LAPS local administrator password from Microsoft Entra ID. The Device Registration Service writes the activity "Recover device local administrator password" each time the password is read in the admin center or through Microsoft Graph. Support staff do this as part of their work, so the rule is a building block. Scope it to actors that do not normally support devices, to sensitive devices, or count the devices per actor before alerting on it.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceMicrosoft Entra ID audit logs
title: Local Administrator Password of a Device Recovered
id: 95a695d5-6f87-4b0b-ba76-3c31404e1287
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects the recovery of a device's Windows LAPS local administrator
  password from Microsoft Entra ID. The Device Registration Service writes
  the activity "Recover device local administrator password" each time the
  password is read in the admin center or through Microsoft Graph. Support
  staff do this as part of their work, so the rule is a building block. Scope
  it to actors that do not normally support devices, to sensitive devices, or
  count the devices per actor before alerting on it.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/devices/howto-manage-local-admin-passwords
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-audit-activities
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-14
tags:
  - attack.credential-access
  - attack.t1555
logsource:
  product: azure
  service: auditlogs
detection:
  selection:
    OperationName: Recover device local administrator password
  filter_failed:
    Result: failure
  condition: selection and not filter_failed
falsepositives:
  - Help desk and device administrators who recover a password for a support case. Exclude the documented support identities in a filter on InitiatedBy and keep the alert for everyone else and for sensitive devices.
  - Reporting or support tools that read passwords through Microsoft Graph. Confirm that each one needs the password and not only its metadata.
level: medium

False positives

  • Help desk and device administrators who recover a password for a support case. Exclude the documented support identities in a filter on InitiatedBy and keep the alert for everyone else and for sensitive devices.
  • Reporting or support tools that read passwords through Microsoft Graph. Confirm that each one needs the password and not only its metadata.

Triage

  • Identify the actor (InitiatedBy) and the device (TargetResources). Does the actor support that device, and is there a ticket for it?
  • Count the recoveries by the same actor in the period. A support case touches one device, collection touches many.
  • Check the kind of device. Privileged access workstations, servers and the devices of administrators deserve a faster response.
  • Look at the actor's sign-ins before the recovery for unfamiliar IP addresses or risk, and at local administrator logons on the device after it.
  • If the recovery is not explained, rotate the local administrator password of the affected devices, revoke the actor's sessions and review what else the actor read or changed.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Block sign-in for the identity that recovered the passwords and revoke its sessions. If the actor is an application, disable its service principal.
  2. List every device whose password the actor recovered from the audit log and rotate the local administrator password of each one, the most sensitive devices first.
  3. Look for local administrator logons on those devices after the recovery. Isolate and investigate a device where one took place, and treat the credentials and tokens of the people who use it as exposed.
  4. Remove the role or the DeviceLocalCredential.Read.All permission from identities that do not need to read passwords.
  5. Confirm that the rotation took place on every device, and watch the audit log for further recoveries.

Mitigation

  • Keep the roles that can recover passwords small and manage them with Privileged Identity Management. Microsoft describes them as highly privileged.
  • Scope recovery with administrative units or custom roles, so that a support team can read only the passwords of the devices it supports.
  • Protect the built-in roles that can recover passwords with a Conditional Access policy that requires strong authentication.
  • Review the applications that hold DeviceLocalCredential.Read.All. For reporting, DeviceLocalCredential.ReadBasic.All returns the metadata without the password.
  • Configure the Windows LAPS post-authentication actions, so that a password is rotated shortly after it has been used.

Frequently asked questions

Does the audit log record a password that is read through Microsoft Graph?

Yes. The Device Registration Service writes `Recover device local administrator password` each time the password is read, in the admin center or through Microsoft Graph. The actor is in InitiatedBy, so an application that reads passwords shows up as well.

How do we tell support work from password collection?

Count the devices per actor. A support case touches one device and has a ticket, while collection touches many in a short time. Also look at the kind of device, because privileged access workstations, servers and the devices of administrators are rarely part of routine support.

How long does a recovered password stay usable?

Until Windows LAPS rotates it. Post-authentication actions can rotate a password shortly after it has been used, but a password that was read and not yet used stays valid until the next rotation. After a recovery nobody can explain, rotate the password of the affected devices yourself.

Does this rule cover Windows LAPS passwords stored in Active Directory?

No. It reads the Microsoft Entra audit log, which records recoveries of passwords that devices back up to Microsoft Entra ID. Where Windows LAPS is configured to back passwords up to Active Directory instead, reading them leaves no event in this log and needs its own monitoring in the domain.

References

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