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BitLocker Recovery Key Read From Microsoft Entra ID detection rules

Windows devices back their BitLocker recovery keys up to Microsoft Entra ID. An attacker with a role, an application permission or the device owner's account reads a key and unlocks the drive of a device they hold.

Platform
Microsoft Entra ID
Severity
Medium
Log source
Microsoft Entra ID audit logs
Last updated
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft SentinelIBM QRadar
What an attacker needs
A role, an application permission or the device owner's account that can read BitLocker recovery keys in Microsoft Entra ID, and access to the device or its drive.
Impact
The attacker unlocks the encrypted drive of a device they hold and reads or changes what is stored on it while the system is offline.
Response
Block the identity that read the keys and revoke its sessions, then rotate the recovery key of every device it touched and locate those devices.
Mitigation
Keep the roles that can read keys small and scoped with administrative units, and decide whether device owners may recover keys in self-service.
Audit activity
Read BitLocker key

How the attack works

BitLocker encrypts the drives of Windows devices, and a recovery key unlocks a drive when the normal unlock does not work. Encrypted devices can store their recovery keys in Microsoft Entra ID, where administrators read a key from the device's page with Show Recovery Key when a user is locked out. By default the registered owner of a device can also read the keys of that device in self-service.

Reading a key needs the permission microsoft.directory/bitlockerKeys/key/read. Microsoft lists the built-in roles Cloud Device Administrator, Helpdesk Administrator, Intune Administrator, Security Administrator, Security Reader and Global Reader for it, a custom role can hold it, and an application reads keys through Microsoft Graph with BitlockerKey.Read.All. An attacker who compromises one of those identities, or the account of the device owner, reads the key of a device they have stolen or can otherwise reach. With the key they unlock the drive and read or change what is stored on it.

Microsoft Entra ID records every read as Read BitLocker key in the KeyManagement category of the Device Registration Service, with the actor in InitiatedBy. Microsoft notes that it is uncommon for users to retrieve keys and recommends monitoring and investigating each retrieval.

What an attacker needs

  • Windows devices that back their BitLocker recovery keys up to Microsoft Entra ID.
  • A compromised identity that can read keys: a role with microsoft.directory/bitlockerKeys/key/read, an application with BitlockerKey.Read.All, or the account of the device owner where self-service recovery is allowed.
  • The device, its drive or another way to reach the encrypted volume. The key is of no use without it.

Impact

The encryption of the device no longer protects its data. With the key and the device or its drive, the attacker reads the files and the secrets stored on it, or changes the system while it is offline. Keys read in bulk expose every lost or stolen device of the organization until each key is rotated.

Detection rules

BitLocker Recovery Key of a Device Read

Detects the read of a BitLocker recovery key that a device backed up to Microsoft Entra ID. The Device Registration Service writes the activity "Read BitLocker key" in the KeyManagement category when the key is shown in an admin center or requested through Microsoft Graph. Microsoft notes that it is uncommon for users to retrieve keys and recommends investigating each retrieval. Support staff and device owners read keys for real recovery cases, so check who read the key, for which device and how many keys the same actor read.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceMicrosoft Entra ID audit logs
title: BitLocker Recovery Key of a Device Read
id: 860820e4-a60c-42aa-b3ec-5c9b261a88aa
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects the read of a BitLocker recovery key that a device backed up to
  Microsoft Entra ID. The Device Registration Service writes the activity
  "Read BitLocker key" in the KeyManagement category when the key is shown in
  an admin center or requested through Microsoft Graph. Microsoft notes that
  it is uncommon for users to retrieve keys and recommends investigating each
  retrieval. Support staff and device owners read keys for real recovery
  cases, so check who read the key, for which device and how many keys the
  same actor read.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-devices
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/devices/manage-device-identities
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/bitlockerrecoverykey-get
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-16
tags:
  - attack.credential-access
  - attack.t1555
logsource:
  product: azure
  service: auditlogs
detection:
  selection:
    OperationName: Read BitLocker key
  filter_failed:
    Result: failure
  condition: selection and not filter_failed
falsepositives:
  - Help desk and device administrators who read a key for a user locked out by BitLocker. Exclude the documented support identities in a filter on InitiatedBy and keep the alert for everyone else.
  - Device owners who recover the key of their own device in self-service. Confirm with the user, or restrict self-service recovery so that every read comes from the help desk.
  - Reporting or support tools that read keys through Microsoft Graph. Confirm that each one needs the key and not only its metadata.
level: medium

False positives

  • Help desk and device administrators who read a key for a user locked out by BitLocker. Exclude the documented support identities in a filter on InitiatedBy and keep the alert for everyone else.
  • Device owners who recover the key of their own device in self-service. Confirm with the user, or restrict self-service recovery so that every read comes from the help desk.
  • Reporting or support tools that read keys through Microsoft Graph. Confirm that each one needs the key and not only its metadata.

Detection logic

Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.

Recovery key read by an account that neither owns nor supports the device

Detection hypothesisNeeds your own listsNeeds a baseline

The registered owner of a device reads its key in self-service, and the help desk reads keys during support cases. A key read by an account that is neither, or keys of several devices read by one account in a day, is collection rather than recovery. Only your lists of owners and support staff give the event that meaning.

  1. Audit log: Read BitLocker key, with the actor in InitiatedBy and the device or key in TargetResources.
  2. Look up the registered owner of the device (Microsoft Graph lists it as registeredOwners) and compare it with the actor.
  3. Alert when the actor is not the owner and not on your list of help desk and device administrators.
  4. Raise the priority when the same actor read keys of 3 or more devices within 24 hours.

EventsRead BitLocker key

LimitsThe lists of support staff have to be kept current, and devices without a registered owner always fall to the second check. The count of 3 devices in 24 hours is a starting point. A key read by a compromised help desk account for a single device looks like a support case.

Triage

  • Identify the actor (InitiatedBy) and the device or key (TargetResources). Is the actor the owner of the device, a person who supports it, or neither?
  • Look for the recovery case behind the read, such as a help desk ticket or a user who was locked out by BitLocker at that time.
  • Count the keys the same actor read in the period. A support case touches one device, collection touches many.
  • Check the actor's sign-ins before the read for unfamiliar IP addresses or risk.
  • Ask where the device is. A key read for a device that is reported lost or stolen, or that belongs to an administrator, deserves a faster response.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Block sign-in for the identity that read the keys and revoke its sessions. If the actor is an application, disable its service principal.
  2. List every device whose key the actor read from the audit log, and rotate the BitLocker recovery key of each one that is still managed, for example with the Intune BitLocker key rotation action.
  3. Locate the devices. Where a device is lost, stolen or cannot be reached, treat its data as exposed, and reset the passwords and revoke the sessions of the people who used it.
  4. Remove the role or the BitlockerKey.Read.All permission from identities that do not need to read keys.
  5. Confirm that each rotation completed, and watch the audit log for further reads by the same actor.

Mitigation

  • Keep the roles that can read keys small and manage them with Privileged Identity Management. Microsoft marks the permission as privileged.
  • Scope help desk access with administrative units, or with a custom role that holds only microsoft.directory/bitlockerKeys/key/read, so that a support team reads only the keys of the devices it supports.
  • Decide whether device owners may read their own keys. The device setting "Restrict users from recovering the BitLocker key(s) for their owned devices" sends those requests through the help desk.
  • Review the applications that hold BitlockerKey.Read.All. For reporting, BitlockerKey.ReadBasic.All returns the metadata of a key without the key.
  • Enable recovery password rotation in the BitLocker policy, so that a device replaces its key after the key has been used to unlock the drive.

Frequently asked questions

Does the audit log record a key that is read through Microsoft Graph?

Yes, when the key itself is requested. By default the Graph operation returns only the metadata of a recovery key. Microsoft documents that including the key property with the $select parameter triggers an audit of the operation and generates an audit log entry in the KeyManagement category.

Is a user who reads the key of their own device a problem?

Usually not. By default the owner of a device can recover its keys in self-service, and a person locked out by BitLocker does exactly that. Microsoft still notes that it is uncommon for users to retrieve keys. An attacker who holds both the account and the laptop of a user reads the key the same way, so confirm with the user that the request was theirs.

Is the key useful to an attacker without the device?

Not on its own. A recovery key unlocks one encrypted drive, so the attacker also needs the device, its drive or a copy of the volume. The reads that matter most are therefore those for devices that are lost, stolen or in someone else's hands, and reads of many keys by one actor.

Does this rule cover BitLocker keys stored in Active Directory?

No. It reads the Microsoft Entra audit log, which records reads of keys that devices back up to Microsoft Entra ID. The keys of domain-joined devices that are stored in Active Directory are read from the domain and leave no event in this log.

References

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