How the attack works
Every AWS account has contact data that decides who AWS talks to and who can recover the account. The primary email address is the email address of the root user. The alternate contacts, of the types SECURITY, BILLING and OPERATIONS, receive AWS's notices in those areas, and the primary contact holds the name and address of the account owner. All of them can be changed through the AWS Account Management API. PutAlternateContact and DeleteAlternateContact set or remove an alternate contact, PutContactInformation replaces the primary contact, and the pair StartPrimaryEmailUpdate and AcceptPrimaryEmailUpdate changes the primary email address of a member account.
The last pair is the dangerous one. AWS documents that it can only be called from the management account or the delegated administrator account of an organization, for a member account, and that the new address is the root user email address of that account. An attacker who controls such a principal can therefore point the root user of any member account to a mailbox they own, which is the address that root password recovery relies on. The contact operations are quieter: with the security contact replaced or deleted, AWS's notices about abuse or exposed credentials reach the attacker or nobody.
AWS states that CloudTrail logs all Account Management API operations, under the event source account.amazonaws.com, and publishes example records for PutAlternateContact and DeleteAlternateContact in which requestParameters.alternateContactType holds the contact type. No incident report was used for this page: it follows what AWS documents about these operations.
What an attacker needs
- For the root user email, credentials for a principal in the management account or the delegated administrator account for Account Management, in an organization with all features and trusted access for that service enabled.
- For the contacts, credentials for a principal allowed account:PutAlternateContact, account:DeleteAlternateContact or account:PutContactInformation in the account, or in the management account for a member account.
Impact
With the root user email address of a member account under their control, the attacker holds the address that the root user's password recovery depends on, and the owner no longer receives mail for the root user. With the alternate contacts changed, security, billing and operations notices from AWS go elsewhere, which gives the attacker more time before anyone reacts.
Detection rules
AWS Account Contact Information Changed
Detects PutAlternateContact, DeleteAlternateContact and PutContactInformation calls to the AWS Account Management API. The first two set or remove an alternate contact of the type BILLING, OPERATIONS or SECURITY, and the third replaces the primary contact information of the account. AWS names the alternate contact operations among the calls that generate CloudTrail entries and states that all Account Management API operations are logged. Contacts decide who hears from AWS about the account, so a change by anyone but the team that manages accounts deserves a look. The rule covers every contact type: the security contact has a stricter rule of its own on this page. It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode, because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
title: AWS Account Contact Information Changed
id: c5faaf57-48a4-47e6-a538-aaef5676c5bb
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects PutAlternateContact, DeleteAlternateContact and
PutContactInformation calls to the AWS Account Management API. The first
two set or remove an alternate contact of the type BILLING, OPERATIONS or
SECURITY, and the third replaces the primary contact information of the
account. AWS names the alternate contact operations among the calls that
generate CloudTrail entries and states that all Account Management API
operations are logged. Contacts decide who hears from AWS about the
account, so a change by anyone but the team that manages accounts deserves
a look. The rule covers every contact type: the security contact has a
stricter rule of its own on this page.
It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode,
because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
references:
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/accounts/latest/reference/monitoring-cloudtrail.html
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/accounts/latest/APIReference/API_PutContactInformation.html
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1098
logsource:
product: aws
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection:
eventSource: account.amazonaws.com
eventName:
- PutAlternateContact
- DeleteAlternateContact
- PutContactInformation
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Account baselines and landing zone automation that set contacts on new accounts, and finance or operations teams that update their own contact. Add the automation role to a filter_* selection on userIdentity.arn.
level: low
False positives
- Account baselines and landing zone automation that set contacts on new accounts, and finance or operations teams that update their own contact. Add the automation role to a filter_* selection on userIdentity.arn.
Root User Email Address Update Started or Accepted for a Member Account
Detects StartPrimaryEmailUpdate and AcceptPrimaryEmailUpdate calls to the AWS Account Management API. The first starts the change of the primary email address of an account, which AWS describes as the root user email address, and the second accepts it. AWS documents that the operation can only be called from the management account or the delegated administrator account of an organization, for a member account. Whoever controls the new address controls the mailbox that the root user of that account depends on. AWS states that CloudTrail logs all Account Management API operations and publishes no example record for these two, so the rule matches the event names only: read the account ID from the request (the AccountId parameter of the API). It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode, because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
title: Root User Email Address Update Started or Accepted for a Member Account
id: 63aa2c97-c8c6-4a4c-8a38-823463095ea5
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects StartPrimaryEmailUpdate and AcceptPrimaryEmailUpdate calls to the
AWS Account Management API. The first starts the change of the primary
email address of an account, which AWS describes as the root user email
address, and the second accepts it. AWS documents that the operation can
only be called from the management account or the delegated administrator
account of an organization, for a member account. Whoever controls the
new address controls the mailbox that the root user of that account
depends on. AWS states that CloudTrail logs all Account Management API
operations and publishes no example record for these two, so the rule
matches the event names only: read the account ID from the request (the
AccountId parameter of the API).
It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode,
because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
references:
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/accounts/latest/APIReference/API_StartPrimaryEmailUpdate.html
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/accounts/latest/reference/monitoring-cloudtrail.html
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1098
logsource:
product: aws
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection:
eventSource: account.amazonaws.com
eventName:
- StartPrimaryEmailUpdate
- AcceptPrimaryEmailUpdate
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Planned changes of root user addresses, for example a move of all accounts to a new mail domain or a new naming scheme, done by the team that manages the organization. These are rare and planned, so confirm each one.
level: high
False positives
- Planned changes of root user addresses, for example a move of all accounts to a new mail domain or a new naming scheme, done by the team that manages the organization. These are rare and planned, so confirm each one.
Security Alternate Contact of an AWS Account Changed or Deleted
Detects PutAlternateContact and DeleteAlternateContact calls to the AWS Account Management API whose contact type is SECURITY. The security alternate contact is the address that receives AWS's notices on security matters for the account. Replacing it sends those notices to a new address, and deleting it leaves the account without one. AWS publishes example records for both events, with the contact type in requestParameters.alternateContactType and, for PutAlternateContact, the new name and email address in the request. It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode, because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
title: Security Alternate Contact of an AWS Account Changed or Deleted
id: dfec17d9-bedc-4c18-aa93-1b7fcfc9c9c9
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects PutAlternateContact and DeleteAlternateContact calls to the AWS
Account Management API whose contact type is SECURITY. The security
alternate contact is the address that receives AWS's notices on security
matters for the account. Replacing it sends those notices to a new
address, and deleting it leaves the account without one. AWS publishes
example records for both events, with the contact type in
requestParameters.alternateContactType and, for PutAlternateContact, the
new name and email address in the request.
It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode,
because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
references:
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/accounts/latest/reference/monitoring-cloudtrail.html
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1098
logsource:
product: aws
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection:
eventSource: account.amazonaws.com
eventName:
- PutAlternateContact
- DeleteAlternateContact
requestParameters.alternateContactType: SECURITY
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Account baselines that set the same security contact on every account, usually run by the landing zone automation. Add that role to a filter_* selection on userIdentity.arn and alert on every other caller.
level: medium
False positives
- Account baselines that set the same security contact on every account, usually run by the landing zone automation. Add that role to a filter_* selection on userIdentity.arn and alert on every other caller.
Triage
- Identify the caller (userIdentity.arn), the source IP address and the user agent. Is it the team that manages your accounts?
- For the root user email, read the account ID and the new address in the request, and check whether the address belongs to your company's domain.
- For a contact change, read requestParameters.alternateContactType and the new name and email address, and compare them with your standard contacts.
- Check whether the same principal changed the contacts or the email address of several accounts.
- Look for root user activity in the affected account after the change, such as a password recovery or a root console sign-in.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Change the root user email address and the contacts back to addresses the organization controls.
- Contain the principal that made the change, and review everything else it did in the management or delegated administrator account.
- Treat the root user of the affected account as exposed. Reset its password, check its MFA devices and access keys, and review root activity in CloudTrail.
- Check the old and the new mailbox for AWS notices that arrived in the meantime, and act on them.
Mitigation
- Deny account:StartPrimaryEmailUpdate and account:AcceptPrimaryEmailUpdate with a service control policy or an identity policy for everyone except a small number of organization administrators.
- Keep the security alternate contact on a monitored distribution list, and manage the contacts of all accounts centrally from the management account.
- Remove root user credentials from member accounts through the centralized root access management that AWS offers for organizations, so that the root user of a member account has no password to take over.
- Use the management account and the delegated administrator account only for administration, and protect their principals with MFA.
Frequently asked questions
Can the root user email of any account be changed this way?
AWS documents that `StartPrimaryEmailUpdate` can only be called from the management account or the delegated administrator account of an organization, for a member account, and that the management account cannot name itself. The organization must have all features enabled and trusted access for Account Management. The root user email of the management account is therefore not changed through this API.
Why is the security alternate contact worth a rule of its own?
The alternate contacts decide who receives AWS's notices, and the `SECURITY` type is the one for security matters. When it is replaced or deleted, warnings about the account can go to an address the attacker reads or to nobody. AWS's example records show the contact type in `requestParameters.alternateContactType`, so a rule can single it out.
Where do I see these events for member accounts?
The event is logged in the account that makes the call. A change made from the management account or the delegated administrator account for a member account is recorded there, with the member account in the request. A change made inside the member account is recorded in that account.
Has this been seen in attacks?
No public incident report describes this at the audit event level, and none was used for this page. The page follows what AWS documents these operations to do. The events are rare administrative changes, so each one can be confirmed with the team that manages the accounts.