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Password Guessing Against One Account in Google Workspace detection rules

An attacker tries many passwords for one chosen Google Workspace account, such as a super admin. The Login audit log shows a run of failed sign-ins for that account, and the same identity opens Google Cloud.

Platform
Google Cloud
Severity
Medium
Log source
Google Cloud Audit Logs
Last updated
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft SentinelIBM QRadar
What an attacker needs
The email address of the target and an account that signs in with a Google password, which is always the case for super admins at the Admin console.
Impact
A valid password for an account the attacker chose, which without 2-Step Verification is a session as the user in Workspace and in Google Cloud.
Response
If a sign-in succeeded or reached the second step, reset the password and sign-in cookies and review the account's 2-Step Verification methods.
Mitigation
Enforce 2-Step Verification for every user, with security keys or passkeys for administrators, so that a guessed password is not enough.
API method
google.login.LoginService.loginFailure

How the attack works

Password guessing goes after one account the attacker has picked, such as an administrator, an executive or an address that appeared in a breach. The attacker tries one password after another on Google's sign-in page, built from common passwords and from what is known about the person. A Google Workspace or Cloud Identity account is also the identity that signs in to Google Cloud, so a guessed password is worth more than a mailbox.

Where the organization uses single sign-on, users enter their password at the identity provider and wrong guesses show up there. Google states that super administrators who sign in at admin.google.com must use their Google password even in a domain with single sign-on, so the most valuable accounts stay exposed to guessing against Google itself.

The Login audit log records login_failure when a login attempt was unsuccessful. Its parameter login_type names the kind of credential, with google_password for a Google account password, and login_challenge_method lists the challenges of the attempt. Organizations that share Workspace data with Google Cloud receive the event in Cloud Audit Logs at organization level as a Data Access entry of login.googleapis.com, with the account in principalEmail and the source address in requestMetadata.callerIp, as in the example entry Google publishes. One failed sign-in means nothing. The rule on this page counts them per account, whatever address they come from, and its values are starting points to tune.

What an attacker needs

  • The email address of the target account.
  • An account that signs in with a Google password. Accounts without 2-Step Verification turn one correct guess into access.

Impact

A valid password for an account the attacker chose on purpose, often a privileged one. Without 2-Step Verification that is a session as the user, in Workspace and in Google Cloud. With it the attacker holds the first factor and turns to ways around the second, such as talking a helpdesk into issuing backup codes.

Detection rules

Many Failed Password Sign-Ins for One Account in Google Workspace

Counts, per account (principalEmail), the failed sign-ins of a Google Workspace or Cloud Identity account that used a Google account password (Login audit event login_failure with the login_type google_password). Ten or more for one account within 15 minutes are more than a forgotten password and fit password guessing against that account. The count does not depend on the source address, so attempts spread over many addresses are counted as well. The source of each attempt is in requestMetadata.callerIp and the challenge methods of the attempt in the event parameter login_challenge_method in protoPayload.metadata. Google describes the event only as an unsuccessful login attempt, and an attempt can fail at a challenge that follows the password. The rule finds the login type by searching the serialized event parameters for the value google_password. Users who sign in through an identity provider enter their password there, and a wrong password at the identity provider does not produce this event. The count and the window are starting points to tune. The entries reach Cloud Audit Logs as Data Access entries of login.googleapis.com at organization level only when Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reach the SIEM only when the organization-level Data Access logs are routed to it.

Fires when one protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail has at least 10 matching events within 15 minutes.

Threshold ruleLevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceGoogle Cloud Audit Logs
title: Failed Google Password Sign-In in Google Workspace (Guessing Base Event)
id: 02110839-a700-40d7-8c87-ca52fc450fd8
name: workspace_failed_google_password_sign_in_one_account
status: experimental
description: >-
  Base event of the threshold rule in this file. A Login audit entry for an
  unsuccessful login attempt (login_failure) whose event parameters contain
  google_password, the documented value of login_type for a Google account
  password, as it arrives in Cloud Audit Logs under login.googleapis.com.
logsource:
  product: gcp
  service: gcp.audit
detection:
  selection:
    protoPayload.serviceName: login.googleapis.com
    protoPayload.methodName: google.login.LoginService.loginFailure
    protoPayload.metadata.event|contains: google_password
  condition: selection
level: low
---
title: Many Failed Password Sign-Ins for One Account in Google Workspace
id: dbf39012-f297-48f3-aa2a-e782582b6305
status: experimental
description: >-
  Counts, per account (principalEmail), the failed sign-ins of a Google
  Workspace or Cloud Identity account that used a Google account password
  (Login audit event login_failure with the login_type google_password).
  Ten or more for one account within 15 minutes are more than a forgotten
  password and fit password guessing against that account. The count does
  not depend on the source address, so attempts spread over many addresses
  are counted as well. The source of each attempt is in
  requestMetadata.callerIp and the challenge methods of the attempt in the
  event parameter login_challenge_method in protoPayload.metadata. Google
  describes the event only as an unsuccessful login attempt, and an attempt
  can fail at a challenge that follows the password. The rule finds the
  login type by searching the serialized event parameters for the value
  google_password. Users who sign in through an identity provider enter
  their password there, and a wrong password at the identity provider does
  not produce this event. The count and the window are starting points to
  tune. The entries reach Cloud Audit Logs as Data Access entries of
  login.googleapis.com at organization level only when Google Workspace
  data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reach the SIEM only when
  the organization-level Data Access logs are routed to it.
references:
  - https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging
  - https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/login
  - https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/apps/super-administrator-sso
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/001/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.credential-access
  - attack.t1110.001
correlation:
  type: event_count
  rules:
    - workspace_failed_google_password_sign_in_one_account
  group-by:
    - protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail
  timespan: 15m
  condition:
    gte: 10
falsepositives:
  - A device, mail client or script that keeps submitting an old password after the user changed it. The failures then come from the user's own address at a steady rate.
  - A user who has forgotten the password and tries many variants before asking for a reset.
  - The values of 10 failures and 15 minutes are starting points, not tested limits. Use a lower count for super admins and other privileged accounts, measure what is normal in your organization and adjust both.
level: medium

False positives

  • A device, mail client or script that keeps submitting an old password after the user changed it. The failures then come from the user's own address at a steady rate.
  • A user who has forgotten the password and tries many variants before asking for a reset.
  • The values of 10 failures and 15 minutes are starting points, not tested limits. Use a lower count for super admins and other privileged accounts, measure what is normal in your organization and adjust both.

Detection logic

Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.

Run of failed sign-ins for one account followed by a success

Detection hypothesisSequence of eventsNeeds a baseline

Failures alone show an attempt. A successful sign-in for the same account that follows the run, from an address that produced failures or that the user has never used, shows that the guessing worked.

  1. A run of google.login.LoginService.loginFailure entries of login.googleapis.com for one authenticationInfo.principalEmail, as the threshold rule of this page counts them. Collect the requestMetadata.callerIp values.
  2. Within 60 minutes of the last failure, a google.login.LoginService.loginSuccess entry for the same account.
  3. Raise it with high priority when the callerIp of the success is one of the failing addresses, or is not among the addresses the account signed in from in the past 30 days.

Eventsgoogle.login.LoginService.loginFailuregoogle.login.LoginService.loginSuccess

LimitsA user who mistypes a password several times and then gets it right matches, which is why the address matters. An attacker who signs in days later or from a different address than the guessing is found only by the baseline step. The 60 minutes and 30 days are starting points.

Triage

  • Identify the account in principalEmail. Failures for a super admin, an executive or an account with IAM roles in Google Cloud deserve attention at a much lower count than for an ordinary user.
  • Read the source addresses in requestMetadata.callerIp. Many addresses, hosting providers or countries the user never signs in from point to an attack. The user's own device and usual network point to a saved password that is out of date.
  • Read login_challenge_method in the event parameters in protoPayload.metadata. An attempt that lists more than the password may have got past it and failed at a later challenge.
  • Search for a google.login.LoginService.loginSuccess entry for the same account from one of those addresses, and for suspicious login events Google raised for the account.
  • Ask the user whether they changed their password recently and which devices and applications still hold the old one.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. If a sign-in succeeded or reached a second-step challenge, treat the password as known. Reset it, reset the sign-in cookies of the account and review its 2-Step Verification methods and backup codes.
  2. Review what the account did since the first sign-in from the attacker, in Workspace and in Google Cloud, including mail forwarding, app access, admin actions and role bindings, and undo what was not the owner.
  3. Make sure 2-Step Verification is enforced for the account before it is used again, and move privileged accounts to security keys or passkeys.
  4. If nothing succeeded but the attempts continue against a valuable account, give it a long random password and keep the threshold rule on a lower count for that account.
  5. Tell the helpdesk that the account is under attack, so that a caller who asks for a password reset or backup codes for it is verified with extra care.

Mitigation

  • Enforce 2-Step Verification for every user, with security keys or passkeys for administrators, so that a guessed password is not enough to sign in.
  • Require strong passwords and prevent the reuse of old ones in the password settings of the Admin console. Google's strength check refuses common passwords and passwords known to be compromised.
  • Use single sign-on with your identity provider for users where you can, and apply its lockout and risk controls there.
  • Keep super admin accounts separate from daily accounts and few in number, because they always sign in to the Admin console with a Google password.
  • Share Workspace data with Google Cloud and route the organization-level audit logs to the SIEM, including the Data Access log that carries the Login audit events.

Frequently asked questions

Which failed sign-ins does the rule count?

Entries of the Login audit event `login_failure` whose event parameters contain `google_password`, the value of `login_type` for a Google account password. Google documents four other values, `saml`, `reauth`, `exchange` and `unknown`, and failures of those types are not counted. The count is per account and does not depend on the source address, so guessing that is spread over many addresses is counted as well.

Why does an organization with single sign-on see few of these events?

Because its users type their password at the identity provider, and a wrong password is refused there before Google is involved. Watch the identity provider's sign-in log for those accounts. Super administrators are the exception. Google states that at admin.google.com they must sign in with their Google password, so failed sign-ins for them still appear in this log.

Does a failed sign-in event prove that the password was wrong?

No. Google describes the event only as a login attempt that was unsuccessful. The parameter that once gave the reason, `login_failure_type`, is marked deprecated. The entry lists the challenge methods of the attempt in `login_challenge_method`, and an attempt can fail at a challenge that comes after the password. Read that list before concluding which step failed.

Which log has to reach the SIEM for this rule to work?

The Login audit log. With Google Workspace data sharing enabled it arrives in Cloud Audit Logs at organization level as Data Access entries of `login.googleapis.com`. A SIEM that receives only the organization's Admin Activity logs has none of the sign-in events. Route the organization-level Data Access log as well.

References

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