How the attack works
A Vault user is the way to everything the Digital Vault stores, so its logon is worth guessing at. The attacker tries likely passwords for a known user name, or tries the names of accounts that used to exist. CyberArk limits this with Trusted Network Areas, the locations on the network from which a user can access the Vault. Each has a maximum number of violations, such as logons with an incorrect password or outside the permitted hours, after which the area is deactivated for that user until an administrator activates it again. The Vault parameter MaxAccessViolations sets that number for the 'All' network area and defaults to 5, and UserLockoutPeriodInMinutes can release a suspended user after a set time without an administrator.
The Vault records the attempts, and CyberArk's security fundamentals tell customers to monitor and alert on excessive authentication failures. Audit action code 4 is the failed authentication: the code table names it User Authentication Failure and flags it as an unauthorized operation, and CyberArk's sample audit record for code 4 has the description Authentication failed and carries the user who tried to log on as the issuer. The list of codes recommended for monitoring on the same page names code 4 User Authentication, without the word Failure. The rules here follow the code table and the sample record. Code 309 is a logon attempt with a user the Vault does not know, codes 103 and 104 are logons refused because the user has expired or is disabled, code 102 is a logon outside the user's permitted hours and code 5 is Unauthorized Station.
What must be collected. The rules read the Vault's audit records forwarded by syslog in CEF format (SIEM integration, configured in DBParm.ini). The CEF header's Device Event Class ID carries the Vault audit action code and the extension key suser carries the issuer. SyslogMessageCodeFilter must not exclude codes 4, 5, 102, 103, 104 and 309. By default all codes are sent.
What an attacker needs
- The name of a Vault user, and network access to an interface that passes logons to the Vault from a location inside one of that user's Trusted Network Areas.
- For the undefined, disabled and expired cases, only a name: the Vault records the attempt and refuses it.
Impact
A correct guess gives the attacker the Vault user and with it every Safe and account that user can reach: passwords with Retrieve accounts, sessions with Use accounts, and the Vault's users and policy if the user is an administrator. A wrong series deactivates the area for that user until an administrator activates it again, so the attempts can also keep the people who run the Vault out of it.
Detection rules
Many Authentication Failures for One CyberArk Vault User
Counts, per issuer, the failed authentications to the CyberArk Digital Vault (audit action code 4). The code table names the code User Authentication Failure and flags it as an unauthorized operation, and CyberArk's sample audit record for code 4 has the description Authentication failed, severity Error and the user who tried to log on as the issuer. The list of codes recommended for monitoring on the same page names code 4 User Authentication, without the word Failure; this rule follows the code table and the sample record, so check one failed logon in your own audit first. Five or more failures for one user within 10 minutes are more than a typing mistake. The count is low on purpose: by default the Vault suspends the 'All' network area for a user after 5 access violations (MaxAccessViolations), and CyberArk does not document which code later attempts produce. Keep the count at or below your violation limit and treat both values as starting points. deviceEventClassId is the CEF header's Device Event Class ID, which CyberArk's syslog translator fills with the Vault audit action code; suser is the issuer.
Fires when one suser has at least 5 matching events within 10 minutes.
title: CyberArk Vault User Authentication Failure (Password Guessing Base Event)
id: 46b38757-8201-4c93-9a99-625d38d90541
name: cyberark_vault_user_authentication_failure
status: experimental
description: >-
Base event of the threshold rule in this file. Audit action code 4 of the
CyberArk Digital Vault, which the code table names User Authentication
Failure and flags as an unauthorized operation.
logsource:
product: cyberark
service: vault
detection:
selection:
deviceEventClassId: '4'
condition: selection
level: low
---
title: Many Authentication Failures for One CyberArk Vault User
id: 2010795d-4bc5-4f8a-a69e-abce2df3f6b8
status: experimental
description: >-
Counts, per issuer, the failed authentications to the CyberArk Digital Vault
(audit action code 4). The code table names the code User Authentication
Failure and flags it as an unauthorized operation, and CyberArk's sample
audit record for code 4 has the description Authentication failed, severity
Error and the user who tried to log on as the issuer. The list of codes
recommended for monitoring on the same page names code 4 User
Authentication, without the word Failure; this rule follows the code table
and the sample record, so check one failed logon in your own audit first.
Five or more failures for one user within 10 minutes are more than a typing
mistake. The count is low on purpose: by default the Vault suspends the
'All' network area for a user after 5 access violations
(MaxAccessViolations), and CyberArk does not document which code later
attempts produce. Keep the count at or below your violation limit and treat
both values as starting points. deviceEventClassId is the CEF header's
Device Event Class ID, which CyberArk's syslog translator fills with the
Vault audit action code; suser is the issuer.
references:
- https://docs.cyberark.com/pam-self-hosted/latest/en/content/pasref/vault%20audit%20action%20codes.htm
- https://docs.cyberark.com/pam-self-hosted/latest/en/content/pasimp/create-custom-xsl-translator-file.htm
- https://docs.cyberark.com/pam-self-hosted/latest/en/content/pasref/dbparm.ini.htm
- https://docs.cyberark.com/pam-self-hosted/latest/en/content/security/security%20fundamentals-introduction.htm
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/001/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1110.001
correlation:
type: event_count
rules:
- cyberark_vault_user_authentication_failure
group-by:
- suser
timespan: 10m
condition:
gte: 5
falsepositives:
- A user who forgot or mistyped a password, above all after a password change. Confirm with the user before the Trusted Network Area is activated again.
- A script, integration or component that keeps trying an old password. Regular failures at fixed intervals point to this. Fix the stored credential instead of excluding the user.
- The values of 5 failures and 10 minutes are starting points, not tested limits. Adjust them to the violation limit that applies to your users.
level: medium
False positives
- A user who forgot or mistyped a password, above all after a password change. Confirm with the user before the Trusted Network Area is activated again.
- A script, integration or component that keeps trying an old password. Regular failures at fixed intervals point to this. Fix the stored credential instead of excluding the user.
- The values of 5 failures and 10 minutes are starting points, not tested limits. Adjust them to the violation limit that applies to your users.
CyberArk Vault Logon Attempt by an Undefined, Disabled or Expired User
Detects a logon attempt to the CyberArk Digital Vault with a user that is not defined (audit action code 309, Undefined User Logon), has expired (code 103, Logon Failed, User Has Expired) or is disabled (code 104, Logon Failed, User Is Disabled). The code table flags all three as unauthorized operations. Nobody should be using such a name, so each record means that someone tries names of accounts that were closed or never existed. The code table gives the network area for codes 103 and 104 and no user field for code 309, so the rule matches the codes alone: read the user and the station in the record. deviceEventClassId is the CEF header's Device Event Class ID, which CyberArk's syslog translator fills with the Vault audit action code.
title: CyberArk Vault Logon Attempt by an Undefined, Disabled or Expired User
id: a1917600-3bd2-4b34-ad37-f04ff7f0032f
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a logon attempt to the CyberArk Digital Vault with a user that is
not defined (audit action code 309, Undefined User Logon), has expired (code
103, Logon Failed, User Has Expired) or is disabled (code 104, Logon Failed,
User Is Disabled). The code table flags all three as unauthorized
operations. Nobody should be using such a name, so each record means that
someone tries names of accounts that were closed or never existed. The code
table gives the network area for codes 103 and 104 and no user field for
code 309, so the rule matches the codes alone: read the user and the station
in the record. deviceEventClassId is the CEF header's Device Event Class ID,
which CyberArk's syslog translator fills with the Vault audit action code.
references:
- https://docs.cyberark.com/pam-self-hosted/latest/en/content/pasref/vault%20audit%20action%20codes.htm
- https://docs.cyberark.com/pam-self-hosted/latest/en/content/pasimp/users-groups-add-users-pa.htm
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/001/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1110.001
logsource:
product: cyberark
service: vault
detection:
selection:
deviceEventClassId:
- '103'
- '104'
- '309'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- A person whose account was disabled or has expired and who tries to log on before asking for it to be enabled again.
- A mistyped user name, and scripts or integrations that still use an account that was closed. Find the script and remove the stored credential.
level: medium
False positives
- A person whose account was disabled or has expired and who tries to log on before asking for it to be enabled again.
- A mistyped user name, and scripts or integrations that still use an account that was closed. Find the script and remove the stored credential.
CyberArk Vault Access From an Unauthorized Station or Outside Permitted Logon Hours
Detects two records the CyberArk Digital Vault writes when an existing user is tried from a place or at a time its settings do not allow: audit action code 5 (Unauthorized Station) and code 102 (Logon Failed, User Time Limit Restriction). The code table flags both as unauthorized operations and gives the network area in Info1. It gives no description beyond the names. Trusted Network Areas are the locations on the network from which a user can access the Vault, and CyberArk counts a logon outside the permitted hours as a violation. Someone who holds a user's name or password and tries it from their own location, or outside the user's hours, is the case the rule is for. deviceEventClassId is the CEF header's Device Event Class ID, which CyberArk's syslog translator fills with the Vault audit action code.
title: CyberArk Vault Access From an Unauthorized Station or Outside Permitted Logon Hours
id: 2da9f18f-0624-4f0a-a937-4d9000baffc2
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects two records the CyberArk Digital Vault writes when an existing user
is tried from a place or at a time its settings do not allow: audit action
code 5 (Unauthorized Station) and code 102 (Logon Failed, User Time Limit
Restriction). The code table flags both as unauthorized operations and gives
the network area in Info1. It gives no description beyond the names. Trusted
Network Areas are the locations on the network from which a user can access
the Vault, and CyberArk counts a logon outside the permitted hours as a
violation. Someone who holds a user's name or password and tries it from
their own location, or outside the user's hours, is the case the rule is
for. deviceEventClassId is the CEF header's Device Event Class ID, which
CyberArk's syslog translator fills with the Vault audit action code.
references:
- https://docs.cyberark.com/pam-self-hosted/latest/en/content/pasref/vault%20audit%20action%20codes.htm
- https://docs.cyberark.com/pam-self-hosted/latest/en/content/pasimp/trusted-network-areas.htm
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/001/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1110.001
logsource:
product: cyberark
service: vault
detection:
selection:
deviceEventClassId:
- '5'
- '102'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Users who work from a new network or outside their usual hours, for example on call or while travelling. Adjust the user's Trusted Network Areas or logon hours when the change is approved.
level: low
False positives
- Users who work from a new network or outside their usual hours, for example on call or while travelling. Adjust the user's Trusted Network Areas or logon hours when the change is approved.
Detection logic
Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.
Burst of authentication failures followed by a logon of the same Vault user
Guessing that works ends with a logon. A series of failed authentications for one Vault user that is followed by a successful logon of that user, from the same station or soon after an administrator activated the user's Trusted Network Area again, is the point at which an attempt turned into access.
- Count code 4 (User Authentication Failure) per issuer, the
suserkey. Keep the users that reach your count, for a start 3 or more within 10 minutes. - Look for code 7 (Logon) with the same
suserwithin the next 60 minutes. - Compare the Station field of the failures with the Station of the logon. CyberArk's sample CEF translator sends Station as
src. The same station on both sides is the guessing pattern. - Look for code 318 (Activate/Deactivate Trusted Network Areas) between the failures and the logon. An activation in that gap means an administrator released the user and the attempts could go on.
Events47318
LimitsA user who mistypes a password and then gets it right produces the same sequence, so the count and the two time spans are starting points to tune, and the station comparison needs the key your translator writes. A guess that is right within the first tries stays below the count. A slow series that never reaches it is not seen either.
Triage
- Read the issuer (suser) and the Station in the audit record. CyberArk documents Station as the address the operation came from, and for web portal sessions as the address of the real client machine.
- Count the failures for that user and from that station over the last day. Regular failures at fixed intervals point to a script or component with an old password, while a burst from an unusual station points to guessing. Failures for many users from one station point to spraying.
- Look for a logon (code 7) of the same user after the failures, and compare its station with the station of the failures.
- For codes 309, 103 and 104, find out whose name was tried (a former administrator, a removed integration or a name that never existed) and whether the same station tried other names.
- Check whether the user's Trusted Network Area was activated again afterwards (code 318), by whom and at whose request.
- Give priority to members of Vault Admins, to users with Vault authorizations and to members of Safes that hold Tier 0 accounts.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Block the station the attempts came from, at the network or at the web portal in front of the Vault, before any Trusted Network Area is activated again.
- If a logon followed the failures, treat the Vault user as compromised. Disable it, end its sessions, and reset its password and second factor before it is enabled again.
- List what that user did after the logon, above all retrievals (codes 295 and 428), sessions, and changes to users, Safe members and the Master Policy, and start a password change for every account it retrieved or used.
- Activate Trusted Network Areas again only after the owner of each user has confirmed which failures were their own.
- Reset the passwords of targeted administrators and of members of Tier 0 Safes even when no logon was seen, and watch those users and the station for new attempts over the following days.
Mitigation
- Require multi-factor authentication for all users and administrators of the Vault, as CyberArk's security fundamentals do, so that a guessed password is not enough.
- Give each user only the Trusted Network Areas it needs, and keep the number of permitted violations low (
MaxAccessViolationsfor the 'All' area and the violation limit of each Trusted Network Area). - Decide on purpose whether suspended users are released automatically.
UserLockoutPeriodInMinutessets the minutes after which a suspended user can log on again, and an automatic release gives a guesser a new series of tries that nobody has to approve. - Delete Vault users that are no longer used, and look into every attempt to log on with a disabled or expired user.
- Forward the Vault audit to your SIEM and alert on bursts of authentication failures and on logon attempts by undefined, disabled or expired users.
Frequently asked questions
Is audit action code 4 a failed or a successful authentication?
A failed one, as far as CyberArk's documentation shows. The code table names code 4 User Authentication Failure and flags it as an unauthorized operation, and the sample audit record for code 4 has the description Authentication failed with severity Error. The list of codes recommended for monitoring on the same page names it User Authentication, without the word Failure. A logon is code 7. Compare one failed and one successful logon in your own audit before you rely on the count.
Why is the failure count of the threshold rule only five?
By default the Vault allows 5 access violations in the 'All' network area before it suspends that area for the user (`MaxAccessViolations`). CyberArk does not document which code later attempts on a suspended user produce, so a count above your violation limit may never be reached. Keep the count at or below the limit that applies to your users, and treat the 10 minutes as a starting point.
Does the threshold rule see password spraying across many Vault users?
No. It counts failures for one user. Spraying is one station that fails for many users, which needs a count of users per station. The station is in the audit record, but the key that carries it differs between translator files, so the rules here do not use it. Build that count in your SIEM on the key your translator writes, which is `src` in CyberArk's sample CEF translator.
Why does a logon attempt with a disabled or expired user matter?
Nobody should be using such a user. An attempt means that someone still holds its name and perhaps its password: a former administrator, a forgotten script, or an attacker with an old list of credentials. The Vault refuses the logon and records code 103 or 104, or code 309 when the user is not defined at all. Find the source of each attempt and delete users that are no longer needed.
References
- MITRE ATT&CK T1110.001: Brute Force, Password Guessing
- CyberArk Docs: Vault Audit Action Codes
- CyberArk Docs: Create a Custom XSL Translator File (sample audit record and its fields)
- CyberArk Docs: Apply trusted network configurations (Trusted Network Areas)
- CyberArk Docs: DBParm.ini (MaxAccessViolations, UserLockoutPeriodInMinutes)
- CyberArk Docs: Security Fundamentals
- CyberArk Docs: Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) Applications