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Email Monitor or Mail Routing Created by an Admin in Google Workspace detection rules

An attacker with admin rights in Google Workspace creates an email monitor on a user, adds a routing destination or changes a Gmail routing setting, and receives copies of mail without touching the mailbox.

Platform
Google Cloud
Severity
High
Log source
Google Cloud Audit Logs
Last updated
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft SentinelIBM QRadar
What an attacker needs
An admin account that can use the Email Audit API or change Gmail routing, and for a monitor a mailbox in the same domain to receive the copies.
Impact
The attacker receives a copy of every message the target sends and receives while the monitor or routing rule exists, and the target sees nothing.
Response
Delete the monitor or the routing rule, secure the admin account and the destination mailbox, and treat the affected users' mail as disclosed.
Mitigation
Keep the administrators who can audit or route mail few, and check every email monitor against a request from legal or compliance.
API methods
google.admin.AdminService.createEmailMonitorgoogle.admin.AdminService.createGmailSettinggoogle.admin.AdminService.changeGmailSettinggoogle.admin.AdminService.changeEmailSettinggoogle.admin.AdminService.mailRoutingDestinationAdded

How the attack works

Google Workspace gives administrators several ways to copy or reroute mail without signing in to a mailbox. The Email Audit API creates an email monitor, in which a destination user receives blind copies of all incoming and outgoing messages of a source user for a date range, optionally with saved drafts and archived chats. An individual mail routing destination can be added for a user. In the Admin console, Gmail routing settings and recipient address maps forward, redirect or copy messages for one address or for the whole organization.

These features exist for lawful auditing, for people who leave and for mail system migrations. An attacker who holds an admin account uses them to read the mail of an executive, a finance team or the security team. Google states that the blind copy of a monitor is not visible in the message headers the source user can see, and nothing changes in the user's own Gmail settings. The destination of a monitor has to be a mailbox in the same domain, so the attacker needs one, either a compromised account or one they created. A routing setting has no such limit. It can add recipients, replace the recipient or change the route to a different mail server.

The Admin audit log records CREATE_EMAIL_MONITOR with the monitored user, the destination, the date range and the level for incoming mail, outgoing mail, drafts and chats, and MAIL_ROUTING_DESTINATION_ADDED with the user and the new destination. Changes in the Gmail settings of the Admin console are written as CREATE_GMAIL_SETTING, CHANGE_GMAIL_SETTING and CHANGE_EMAIL_SETTING with the name of the setting. Google does not publish the list of setting names, so those three events cannot be narrowed to routing. Organizations that share Workspace data with Google Cloud receive all of them in Cloud Audit Logs at organization level as Admin Activity entries of admin.googleapis.com.

What an attacker needs

  • An admin account. Google states that any domain administrator can create, retrieve, update and delete an email monitor through the Email Audit API. Gmail routing in the Admin console needs the Gmail Settings privilege.
  • For a monitor, a mailbox in the same domain that the attacker can read.

Impact

The attacker receives a copy of every message the target sends and receives, for as long as the monitor or the routing rule exists, and with a monitor also drafts and archived chats if those levels are set. The target sees nothing. A routing setting at the top of the organization can do the same for every mailbox at once. The access does not depend on the target's password or second factor, so resetting them changes nothing.

Detection rules

Email Monitor Created for a User in Google Workspace

Detects the creation of an email monitor in a Google Workspace account (Admin audit event CREATE_EMAIL_MONITOR, rendered as "Created an email monitor for {USER_EMAIL} to {EMAIL_MONITOR_DEST_EMAIL} that will expire on {END_DATE_TIME}"). A monitor is created through the Email Audit API. For the chosen date range the destination user receives blind copies of the incoming and outgoing messages of the source user, and optionally saved drafts and archived chats. Google states that the blind copy is not visible in the message headers the source user can see. An attacker with an admin account uses a monitor to read a chosen mailbox without signing in to it. The monitored user is in the event parameter USER_EMAIL in protoPayload.metadata, the receiving mailbox in EMAIL_MONITOR_DEST_EMAIL, the period in BEGIN_DATE_TIME and END_DATE_TIME, and what is copied in the EMAIL_MONITOR_LEVEL parameters for incoming mail, outgoing mail, drafts and chats. The admin is in principalEmail. The entry reaches Cloud Audit Logs as an Admin Activity entry at organization level, which is always written once Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reaches the SIEM only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.

LevelHighStatusExperimentalLog sourceGoogle Cloud Audit Logs
title: Email Monitor Created for a User in Google Workspace
id: 6886014d-26b0-4c43-943b-0ab685ed48b2
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects the creation of an email monitor in a Google Workspace account
  (Admin audit event CREATE_EMAIL_MONITOR, rendered as "Created an email
  monitor for {USER_EMAIL} to {EMAIL_MONITOR_DEST_EMAIL} that will expire on
  {END_DATE_TIME}"). A monitor is created through the Email Audit API. For
  the chosen date range the destination user receives blind copies of the
  incoming and outgoing messages of the source user, and optionally saved
  drafts and archived chats. Google states that the blind copy is not
  visible in the message headers the source user can see. An attacker with
  an admin account uses a monitor to read a chosen mailbox without signing
  in to it. The monitored user is in the event parameter USER_EMAIL in
  protoPayload.metadata, the receiving mailbox in EMAIL_MONITOR_DEST_EMAIL,
  the period in BEGIN_DATE_TIME and END_DATE_TIME, and what is copied in
  the EMAIL_MONITOR_LEVEL parameters for incoming mail, outgoing mail,
  drafts and chats. The admin is in principalEmail. The entry reaches Cloud
  Audit Logs as an Admin Activity entry at organization level, which is
  always written once Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is
  enabled, and reaches the SIEM only when the organization-level logs are
  routed to it.
references:
  - https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging
  - https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-user-settings
  - https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/email-audit/monitor-email
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/003/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.collection
  - attack.t1114.003
logsource:
  product: gcp
  service: gcp.audit
detection:
  selection:
    protoPayload.serviceName: admin.googleapis.com
    protoPayload.methodName: google.admin.AdminService.createEmailMonitor
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Lawful monitoring requested by legal, compliance or human resources, and archiving products that use the Email Audit API. Both are rare and known in advance. Verify each event against the request, including the monitored user and the destination mailbox.
level: high

False positives

  • Lawful monitoring requested by legal, compliance or human resources, and archiving products that use the Email Audit API. Both are rare and known in advance. Verify each event against the request, including the monitored user and the destination mailbox.

Gmail Setting Created or Changed by an Admin in Google Workspace

Detects three Admin audit events for the Gmail settings of a Google Workspace account: a Gmail setting added (CREATE_GMAIL_SETTING, rendered as "New gmail setting {SETTING_NAME} was added"), a Gmail setting modified (CHANGE_GMAIL_SETTING) and an email setting of the organization changed (CHANGE_EMAIL_SETTING, with OLD_VALUE and NEW_VALUE). Routing settings and recipient address maps, with which an admin forwards, redirects or copies mail for one address or for the whole organization, are Gmail settings of the Admin console. Google's reference names the changed setting in SETTING_NAME but does not list the possible names, so the rule cannot be limited to routing. It matches on the events alone, fires for every Gmail setting an admin adds or changes, such as spam and compliance settings, and is set to a low level for that reason. Read SETTING_NAME, USER_DEFINED_SETTING_NAME, SETTING_DESCRIPTION and ORG_UNIT_NAME in protoPayload.metadata, then open the setting in the Admin console. The admin is in principalEmail. The entries reach Cloud Audit Logs as Admin Activity entries at organization level, which are always written once Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reach the SIEM only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.

LevelLowStatusExperimentalLog sourceGoogle Cloud Audit Logs
title: Gmail Setting Created or Changed by an Admin in Google Workspace
id: 0b81eb68-fce9-43d3-b6df-b4e469093cc2
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects three Admin audit events for the Gmail settings of a Google
  Workspace account: a Gmail setting added (CREATE_GMAIL_SETTING, rendered
  as "New gmail setting {SETTING_NAME} was added"), a Gmail setting modified
  (CHANGE_GMAIL_SETTING) and an email setting of the organization changed
  (CHANGE_EMAIL_SETTING, with OLD_VALUE and NEW_VALUE). Routing settings and
  recipient address maps, with which an admin forwards, redirects or copies
  mail for one address or for the whole organization, are Gmail settings of
  the Admin console. Google's reference names the changed setting in
  SETTING_NAME but does not list the possible names, so the rule cannot be
  limited to routing. It matches on the events alone, fires for every Gmail
  setting an admin adds or changes, such as spam and compliance settings,
  and is set to a low level for that reason. Read SETTING_NAME,
  USER_DEFINED_SETTING_NAME, SETTING_DESCRIPTION and ORG_UNIT_NAME in
  protoPayload.metadata, then open the setting in the Admin console. The
  admin is in principalEmail. The entries reach Cloud Audit Logs as Admin
  Activity entries at organization level, which are always written once
  Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reach the
  SIEM only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.
references:
  - https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging
  - https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-gmail-settings
  - https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/gmail/advanced/redirect-or-forward-gmail-messages-to-another-user
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/003/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.collection
  - attack.t1114.003
logsource:
  product: gcp
  service: gcp.audit
detection:
  selection:
    protoPayload.serviceName: admin.googleapis.com
    protoPayload.methodName:
      - google.admin.AdminService.createGmailSetting
      - google.admin.AdminService.changeGmailSetting
      - google.admin.AdminService.changeEmailSetting
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Every change of a Gmail setting by the administrators who run the mail service, which is the normal use of these events. Exclude those administrators by principalEmail in a filter_* selection, or once you know the setting names your organization produces for routing, add a selection on them, and review changes by anyone else.
level: low

False positives

  • Every change of a Gmail setting by the administrators who run the mail service, which is the normal use of these events. Exclude those administrators by principalEmail in a filter_* selection, or once you know the setting names your organization produces for routing, add a selection on them, and review changes by anyone else.

Mail Routing Destination Added for a User in Google Workspace

Detects an individual mail routing destination being added for a user of a Google Workspace account (Admin audit event MAIL_ROUTING_DESTINATION_ADDED, rendered as "User {USER_EMAIL} has received the following individual mail routing destination: {NEW_VALUE}"). A routing destination on a single user sends that user's mail to another place, which an attacker with an admin account can use to receive it. The user is in the event parameter USER_EMAIL in protoPayload.metadata and the new destination in NEW_VALUE. Google's reference gives the event, its message and these two parameters and says no more about the feature, so check in the Admin console what the user's mail routing looks like now. Removing a destination is a different event (MAIL_ROUTING_DESTINATION_REMOVED) and does not match. The admin is in principalEmail. The entry reaches Cloud Audit Logs as an Admin Activity entry at organization level, which is always written once Google Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reaches the SIEM only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceGoogle Cloud Audit Logs
title: Mail Routing Destination Added for a User in Google Workspace
id: afd2b117-aa4f-45d6-9b04-453ed9ec7db5
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects an individual mail routing destination being added for a user of
  a Google Workspace account (Admin audit event
  MAIL_ROUTING_DESTINATION_ADDED, rendered as "User {USER_EMAIL} has
  received the following individual mail routing destination:
  {NEW_VALUE}"). A routing destination on a single user sends that user's
  mail to another place, which an attacker with an admin account can use to
  receive it. The user is in the event parameter USER_EMAIL in
  protoPayload.metadata and the new destination in NEW_VALUE. Google's
  reference gives the event, its message and these two parameters and says
  no more about the feature, so check in the Admin console what the user's
  mail routing looks like now. Removing a destination is a different event
  (MAIL_ROUTING_DESTINATION_REMOVED) and does not match. The admin is in
  principalEmail. The entry reaches Cloud Audit Logs as an Admin Activity
  entry at organization level, which is always written once Google
  Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is enabled, and reaches the SIEM
  only when the organization-level logs are routed to it.
references:
  - https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging
  - https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-user-settings
  - https://knowledge.workspace.google.com/admin/gmail/advanced/email-routing-and-delivery-options-for-google-workspace
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/003/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.collection
  - attack.t1114.003
logsource:
  product: gcp
  service: gcp.audit
detection:
  selection:
    protoPayload.serviceName: admin.googleapis.com
    protoPayload.methodName: google.admin.AdminService.mailRoutingDestinationAdded
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Mail migrations and coexistence with another mail system, in which administrators route the mail of users to a second server. These come in planned batches. Outside a migration, verify the destination in NEW_VALUE with the admin who added it.
level: medium

False positives

  • Mail migrations and coexistence with another mail system, in which administrators route the mail of users to a second server. These come in planned batches. Outside a migration, verify the destination in NEW_VALUE with the admin who added it.

Triage

  • For a monitor, read the event parameters in protoPayload.metadata. USER_EMAIL is the monitored user, EMAIL_MONITOR_DEST_EMAIL the mailbox that receives the copies, BEGIN_DATE_TIME and END_DATE_TIME the period, and the four EMAIL_MONITOR_LEVEL parameters what is copied.
  • Ask legal or compliance whether the monitor was requested. A monitor on an executive, on finance or on the security team that nobody requested is an incident.
  • Look at the destination mailbox. Check who owns it, when it was created, who signed in to it and whether it forwards mail on.
  • For a routing destination, read USER_EMAIL and NEW_VALUE, and check whether the destination is outside your domains.
  • For a Gmail setting event, read SETTING_NAME, USER_DEFINED_SETTING_NAME, SETTING_DESCRIPTION and ORG_UNIT_NAME, then open the Gmail settings in the Admin console and read what the setting does now.
  • Identify the admin who made the change (principalEmail), confirm it with that person through a second channel and check the recent sign-ins of that account.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Delete the email monitor, remove the routing destination or delete the routing setting, and confirm in the Admin console that mail for the affected users is delivered only where it should be.
  2. Secure the admin account that made the change. Reset its password, reset its sign-in cookies so that existing sessions end, and review its 2-Step Verification methods and admin roles.
  3. Secure the destination mailbox. Suspend it if it was created for the purpose, or reset its password and sign-in cookies, and remove forwarding and delegation set on it.
  4. Treat every message of the affected users since the start of the monitor or the rule as disclosed, including password reset links and one-time codes that arrived by mail, and act on what they contained.
  5. Look for other monitors, routing destinations and Gmail setting changes by the same admin, and compare all routing settings with your record.

Mitigation

  • Keep the number of administrators who can use the Email Audit API or hold the Gmail Settings privilege small, and keep super admins few.
  • Keep a record of approved email monitors, with the legal or compliance reason for each, and of the routing settings and address maps that should exist.
  • Review the Routing and Compliance settings of Gmail in the Admin console regularly and compare them with that record.
  • Alert on every email monitor. Lawful monitoring is rare and planned, so each event can be checked against a request.
  • Share Workspace data with Google Cloud and route the organization-level audit logs to the SIEM.

Frequently asked questions

Can a user see that an email monitor was created on their mailbox?

Not in the mailbox. Google states that the destination user receives a blind copy of each message and that this association is not visible in the message headers accessible in the source user's account. The monitor is also not a Gmail setting of the user. The Admin audit log entry for its creation is where it shows.

Can an email monitor send copies to an address outside the organization?

Not directly. Google states that the destination user must have an active email account in the monitored domain, the same domain as the administrator and the source user. An attacker therefore needs a mailbox inside the organization to receive the copies, and may then forward from it. Check the destination mailbox for forwarding and for unfamiliar sign-ins.

Why is the rule for Gmail settings only at a low level?

Because it cannot tell a routing rule from any other Gmail setting. Google writes the same three events for every setting an admin adds or changes for Gmail and names the setting in `SETTING_NAME`, but it does not publish the possible names. The rule therefore fires on every such change. Read the setting name and description in the entry and open the setting in the Admin console.

Does resetting the monitored user's password stop the copies?

No. A monitor and a routing rule act on mail delivery and belong to the organization's configuration. They do not use the user's password, sessions or second factor. The copies continue until the monitor ends or is deleted, or until the routing destination or setting is removed.

References

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