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User Added to the OCI Administrators Group or Granted a Domain Administrator Role detection rules

An attacker with rights over users and groups adds an account to the tenancy Administrators group, or grants it an identity domain administrator role, and keeps full control after the first foothold is lost.

Platform
Oracle Cloud Infrastructure
Severity
High
Log source
Oracle Cloud Infrastructure Audit
Last updated
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft SentinelIBM QRadar
What an attacker needs
Rights to use users and groups in the tenancy without a condition that excludes the Administrators group, or an identity domain administrator or user administrator role.
Impact
Full management of every resource, policy, user and credential in the tenancy, or control of the users, groups, MFA settings and identity providers of an identity domain.
Response
Remove the membership or the role grant at once, then reset the passwords of both the account that was added and the account that added it.
Mitigation
Write delegated user administration policies with a condition that excludes the Administrators group, and keep Administrators small and reserved for emergencies.
Identity domain events
admin.approle.add.member.successadmin.group.add.member.success
Event type
com.oraclecloud.identityControlPlane.AddUserToGroup

How the attack works

Every tenancy has an Administrators group in the Default identity domain, and a built-in policy that lets it manage all resources in the tenancy. Membership is the whole control: anyone added to the group has full access to every service. Adding a member needs use groups together with use users in the tenancy, and Oracle documents no built-in protection for the group beyond the rule that it must keep at least one member, so a delegated user administrator without the condition target.group.name != 'Administrators' can promote any account. In tenancies with identity domains, administrator roles are a second route: the identity domain administrator has superuser privileges for a domain, and the user administrator manages users, groups and group memberships. Secondary domains have a Domain_Administrators group whose members receive the identity domain administrator role automatically, and domains converted from Identity Cloud Service have IDCS_Administrators.

Both routes reach the Audit log. The IAM control plane records com.oraclecloud.identityControlPlane.AddUserToGroup, and Oracle's reference event carries the group name in data.resourceName and the user and group OCIDs in data.additionalDetails. Identity domains also write their own event ids to data.additionalDetails.eventId: admin.group.add.member.success for a membership and admin.approle.add.member.success for a role grant, where adminResourceName is the group or role and adminRefResourceName the member or beneficiary.

Collection: ship the _Audit log group of the root compartment (subcompartments included) to the SIEM through a service connector and a stream, and include the home region. The identity domain event ids exist only in tenancies with identity domains; older tenancies show the control plane event.

What an attacker needs

  • A principal with use users and use groups (or manage on both) in the tenancy without a condition that excludes the Administrators group, a member of Administrators, or an identity domain administrator or user administrator of the Default domain.
  • For a role grant: the identity domain administrator role in that domain.

Impact

A new member of Administrators can manage every resource, policy, user and credential in the tenancy. An identity domain administrator controls users, groups, applications, MFA settings and identity providers of the domain, and in the Default domain that includes the accounts and groups the tenancy policies refer to.

Detection rules

OCI Identity Domain Administrator Role Granted

Detects the identity domain event admin.approle.add.member.success for one of the predefined administrator roles. data.additionalDetails.adminResourceName is the role (Oracle's report query labels it Application Role Name), adminRefResourceName the user or group that received it. Oracle's API examples show the role display names Identity Domain Administrator and User Administrator; the other four names are inferred from the administrator role list. Confirm the values your domain records with the App Role Assignments query of Oracle's IAM report tutorial, and extend the list with application roles you treat as privileged.

LevelHighStatusExperimentalLog sourceOracle Cloud Infrastructure Audit
title: OCI Identity Domain Administrator Role Granted
id: e1e6e96e-37a2-4751-80fe-d395b0ff07e8
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects the identity domain event admin.approle.add.member.success for one
  of the predefined administrator roles. data.additionalDetails.adminResourceName
  is the role (Oracle's report query labels it Application Role Name),
  adminRefResourceName the user or group that received it. Oracle's API
  examples show the role display names Identity Domain Administrator and User
  Administrator; the other four names are inferred from the administrator role
  list. Confirm the values your domain records with the App Role Assignments
  query of Oracle's IAM report tutorial, and extend the list with application
  roles you treat as privileged.
references:
  - https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Identity/roles/understand-administrator-roles.htm
  - https://docs.oracle.com/en/learn/generating-iam-reports-from-oci-audit/index.html
  - https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Identity/api-getstarted/WorkingWithApps.htm
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-11
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1098.003
logsource:
  product: oci
  service: audit
detection:
  selection:
    data.additionalDetails.eventId: admin.approle.add.member.success
    data.additionalDetails.adminResourceName:
      - Identity Domain Administrator
      - Security Administrator
      - User Administrator
      - User Manager
      - Help Desk Administrator
      - Application Administrator
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Delegated administration set up by the identity team. Expect few events; confirm each grant and keep an allow-list of the accounts that may assign roles.
level: high

False positives

  • Delegated administration set up by the identity team. Expect few events; confirm each grant and keep an allow-list of the accounts that may assign roles.

User Added to an OCI Administrators Group

Detects a user being added to one of the default administrator groups of OCI IAM: Administrators (Default domain, full access to the tenancy), Domain_Administrators (secondary domains, members receive the identity domain administrator role) and IDCS_Administrators (domains converted from Identity Cloud Service). The group name is in data.resourceName for the IAM control plane event AddUserToGroup, as Oracle's reference event shows. For the identity domain event admin.group.add.member.success Oracle publishes no sample: the second selection is inferred from the AuditEvent schema, where adminResourceName is the naming attribute of the resource the event happened on (the group) and adminRefResourceName the referenced resource (the member). Confirm it with one test membership change before relying on that selection.

LevelHighStatusExperimentalLog sourceOracle Cloud Infrastructure Audit
title: User Added to an OCI Administrators Group
id: 39d7faed-234e-41a6-ae1d-109f3f443a88
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects a user being added to one of the default administrator groups of
  OCI IAM: Administrators (Default domain, full access to the tenancy),
  Domain_Administrators (secondary domains, members receive the identity
  domain administrator role) and IDCS_Administrators (domains converted from
  Identity Cloud Service). The group name is in data.resourceName for the IAM
  control plane event AddUserToGroup, as Oracle's reference event shows. For
  the identity domain event admin.group.add.member.success Oracle publishes
  no sample: the second selection is inferred from the AuditEvent schema,
  where adminResourceName is the naming attribute of the resource the event
  happened on (the group) and adminRefResourceName the referenced resource
  (the member). Confirm it with one test membership change before relying on
  that selection.
references:
  - https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Events/Reference/eventsproducers.htm
  - https://docs.oracle.com/en/learn/generating-iam-reports-from-oci-audit/index.html
  - https://docs.oracle.com/en/cloud/paas/iam-domains-rest-api/op-admin-v1-auditevents-id-get.html
  - https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/Identity/conversion/groups.htm
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-11
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1098.003
logsource:
  product: oci
  service: audit
detection:
  selection_control_plane:
    eventType: com.oraclecloud.identityControlPlane.AddUserToGroup
    data.resourceName:
      - Administrators
      - Domain_Administrators
      - IDCS_Administrators
  selection_identity_domain:
    data.additionalDetails.eventId: admin.group.add.member.success
    data.additionalDetails.adminResourceName:
      - Administrators
      - Domain_Administrators
      - IDCS_Administrators
  condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - Planned changes to tenancy or domain administrators, which should be rare. Confirm each one with the acting administrator.
  - A custom group that reuses one of these names in a secondary identity domain. Add your other tenancy-wide admin groups to the rule and tune by domain.
level: high

False positives

  • Planned changes to tenancy or domain administrators, which should be rare. Confirm each one with the acting administrator.
  • A custom group that reuses one of these names in a secondary identity domain. Add your other tenancy-wide admin groups to the rule and tune by domain.

Detection logic

Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.

Administrator group membership or role granted and removed again within a few hours

Detection hypothesisSequence of events

An attacker who needs administrator rights for one task, and who wants the member list to look unchanged at the next review, adds an account to an administrator group or role, uses it and removes it again. A grant and its removal for the same account within a few hours, with activity by that account in between, is that pattern, and a review of the current members never shows it.

  1. The Audit log records AddUserToGroup with an administrator group in data.resourceName and the user OCID in data.additionalDetails.userId, or admin.approle.add.member.success with an administrator role in adminResourceName and the beneficiary in adminRefResourceName (under data.additionalDetails).
  2. Within 4 hours the Audit log records RemoveUserFromGroup for the same group and the same data.additionalDetails.userId, or admin.approle.remove.member.success for the same role and the same data.additionalDetails.adminRefResourceName.
  3. Between the two, list the events whose caller is the added account: data.identity.principalId equal to the user OCID, or data.additionalDetails.actorName equal to the beneficiary. Policy, group, user and credential changes in that window are the ones to act on.
  4. Compare the account that made the grant with the account that removed it (data.identity.principalName or data.additionalDetails.actorName). The same actor on both is the strongest case.

EventsAddUserToGroupRemoveUserFromGroupadmin.approle.add.member.successadmin.approle.remove.member.success

LimitsJust-in-time elevation and break-glass tests add and remove members on purpose, so compare with your access requests. Memberships that come from an identity provider group mapping do not produce these events. Oracle publishes no sample of the identity domain events for this pairing, so confirm the fields with one test grant. The 4 hours are a starting point.

Triage

  • Identify the added account (data.additionalDetails.adminRefResourceName, or the userId in data.additionalDetails) and the actor (data.identity.principalName or data.additionalDetails.actorName). Check when the added account was created and last used.
  • Check the identity domain (data.additionalDetails.domainDisplayName or domainName). The tenancy Administrators group lives in the Default domain; a group with the same name in another domain is only as strong as the policies that name it.
  • Confirm the change with the acting administrator through a separate channel.
  • If not approved, remove the membership or role, reset the added account's password and credentials, and review Audit events by both accounts since the change.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Remove the membership or the role grant at once, and check the other administrator groups and roles (Domain_Administrators, IDCS_Administrators and the predefined administrator roles) for members that were added in the same period.
  2. Contain both accounts, the one that was added and the one that added it. Reset their passwords, delete API keys and auth tokens their owners do not recognize, and enroll MFA again together with the owners.
  3. Undo what the new administrator did, such as policies it created or changed, dynamic groups, identity providers, sign-on policy changes and credentials it added to other users.
  4. Find out which right the actor used, a policy over users and groups or an administrator role, and remove it from that account until its owner is verified.
  5. Review the members of Administrators and of each administrator role again after the clean-up, and confirm that the Audit log shows no further change.

Mitigation

  • Write delegated user administration policies with where target.group.name != 'Administrators' on both use users and use groups, as Oracle's security guide and the CIS OCI Foundations Benchmark recommend.
  • Keep Administrators small and reserved for emergencies, and grant the identity domain administrator role to named accounts only.
  • Require MFA for every administrator through the "Security Policy for OCI Console" sign-on policy.
  • Review the members of Administrators and of each administrator role on a schedule, and alert on every change.

Frequently asked questions

Which of the two kinds of event will my tenancy produce?

That depends on the tenancy. The IAM control plane records `AddUserToGroup` with the group name in `data.resourceName`. Tenancies with identity domains also write the event ids `admin.group.add.member.success` and `admin.approle.add.member.success` to `data.additionalDetails.eventId`. Older tenancies without identity domains show the control plane event only.

Is the Administrators group protected against delegated user administrators?

Not by default. Oracle documents no built-in protection for the group beyond the rule that it must keep at least one member. A delegated administrator with `use users` and `use groups` in the tenancy can add any account to it, unless the policy carries the condition `target.group.name != 'Administrators'`.

Which part of the group rule should I test before I rely on it?

The selection for the identity domain event `admin.group.add.member.success`. Oracle publishes no sample of that event, so the field that holds the group name is inferred from the AuditEvent schema. Make one test membership change and confirm that the event carries the group name where the rule expects it. The control plane selection follows the reference event Oracle publishes.

Does a group named Administrators in another identity domain give tenancy administration?

Not by itself. The tenancy Administrators group lives in the Default domain. A group with the same name in another domain is only as strong as the policies that name it. The rule matches by group name, so check the domain in `data.additionalDetails.domainDisplayName` or `domainName` when it fires.

References

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