How the attack works
Microsoft Entra ID lets users manage their own sign-in methods ("security info") and lets authentication administrators register methods for others. An attacker who has a user's password, or a session token stolen through adversary-in-the-middle phishing, adds a method they control: an Authenticator app on their own phone, a phone number, a FIDO2 key or a passkey. Accounts that have never registered MFA are the easiest targets, because the first registration may need nothing more than the password.
The new method becomes a durable second factor for the attacker. Resetting the password does not remove it, and MFA prompts that should protect the account now succeed from the attacker's device. Every registration and change of the default method is written to the audit log under the Authentication Methods service, with the user who acted in InitiatedBy and the account in TargetResources. Windows Hello for Business credentials, device-bound passkeys, platform credentials and passwordless phone sign-in are registered through the Device Registration Service under activity names of their own, and a separate rule on this page reads them. With Microsoft Entra ID P2, ID Protection also raises the risk detection "Suspicious credential addition" when a method is added under suspicious circumstances.
What an attacker needs
- The user's password or a valid session, or an administrator role that can manage authentication methods (Authentication Administrator, Privileged Authentication Administrator).
- Registration of security info not restricted to trusted locations or devices.
Impact
Persistent, MFA-satisfying access to the account that outlives password changes, and in some tenants the ability to perform self-service password reset with the attacker's method.
Detection rules
Administrator Registered or Updated an Authentication Method for a User
Detects an administrator registering or updating an authentication method on another user's account. An attacker holding an authentication administrator role can add a phone number or other method to a target account and then satisfy its MFA prompts.
title: Administrator Registered or Updated an Authentication Method for a User
id: 27aa992c-36e0-4368-a7ee-6c0861e40123
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects an administrator registering or updating an authentication method on
another user's account. An attacker holding an authentication administrator
role can add a phone number or other method to a target account and then
satisfy its MFA prompts.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-audit-activities
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/005/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-10
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1098.005
logsource:
product: azure
service: auditlogs
detection:
selection:
OperationName:
- Admin registered security info
- Admin updated security info
Result: success
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Help desk staff registering methods during onboarding or recovery; confirm against tickets and limit the alert to privileged target accounts if volume is high.
level: medium
False positives
- Help desk staff registering methods during onboarding or recovery; confirm against tickets and limit the alert to privileged target accounts if volume is high.
Device-Bound Sign-In Credential Registered for a User
Detects the registration of a credential that is bound to a device and signs the user in without a password: a Windows Hello for Business credential, a device-bound passkey, a platform credential or a passwordless phone sign-in credential. Microsoft lists these four activities for the Device Registration Service, in the UserManagement category. They are not among the security info activities the other rules on this page read. A credential of this kind satisfies MFA on its own and stays valid after a password reset, so an attacker who registers one on a device they control keeps access to the account. Microsoft documents the activity names only. Every regular setup of Windows Hello for Business, of a passkey or of phone sign-in writes the same event, so the rule is rated low and is a building block: alert on it for privileged accounts, and when the registration follows a risky sign-in or comes from a device you do not manage.
title: Device-Bound Sign-In Credential Registered for a User
id: 4ed084c1-229e-4339-a329-a95544409a7a
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects the registration of a credential that is bound to a device and
signs the user in without a password: a Windows Hello for Business
credential, a device-bound passkey, a platform credential or a passwordless
phone sign-in credential. Microsoft lists these four activities for the
Device Registration Service, in the UserManagement category. They are not
among the security info activities the other rules on this page read. A
credential of this kind satisfies MFA on its own and stays valid after a
password reset, so an attacker who registers one on a device they control
keeps access to the account. Microsoft documents the activity names only.
Every regular setup of Windows Hello for Business, of a passkey or of phone
sign-in writes the same event, so the rule is rated low and is a building
block: alert on it for privileged accounts, and when the registration
follows a risky sign-in or comes from a device you do not manage.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-audit-activities
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-accounts
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/005/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1098.005
logsource:
product: azure
service: auditlogs
detection:
selection:
OperationName:
- Add Windows Hello for Business credential
- Add Passkey (device-bound)
- Add platform credential
- Add passwordless phone sign-in credential
filter_failed:
Result: failure
condition: selection and not filter_failed
falsepositives:
- Users who set up Windows Hello for Business on a new or rebuilt computer, register a passkey or turn on phone sign-in. This is the normal case and can be frequent during a device rollout.
- Scope the alert to privileged accounts, to accounts with an open risk detection and to registrations outside a rollout.
level: low
False positives
- Users who set up Windows Hello for Business on a new or rebuilt computer, register a passkey or turn on phone sign-in. This is the normal case and can be frequent during a device rollout.
- Scope the alert to privileged accounts, to accounts with an open risk detection and to registrations outside a rollout.
ID Protection Detected a Suspicious Credential Addition
Detects the Microsoft Entra ID Protection risk detection "Suspicious credential addition" (riskEventType suspiciousCredentialAddition). Microsoft raises it when a new authentication method is added to an account under suspicious circumstances, and says the activity might indicate that an attacker has accessed the account and registered a new credential. The audit rules on this page see every registration. This detection is Microsoft's own judgment on which of them looks like an attacker, so it is rated high. It is a user risk detection, calculated in real time, and needs Microsoft Entra ID P2. Risk detections reach a SIEM through the UserRiskEvents diagnostic setting of Microsoft Entra ID.
title: ID Protection Detected a Suspicious Credential Addition
id: 5383e134-abd0-4322-9784-d786f1aa0816
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects the Microsoft Entra ID Protection risk detection "Suspicious
credential addition" (riskEventType suspiciousCredentialAddition). Microsoft
raises it when a new authentication method is added to an account under
suspicious circumstances, and says the activity might indicate that an
attacker has accessed the account and registered a new credential. The audit
rules on this page see every registration. This detection is Microsoft's own
judgment on which of them looks like an attacker, so it is rated high. It is
a user risk detection, calculated in real time, and needs Microsoft Entra ID
P2. Risk detections reach a SIEM through the UserRiskEvents diagnostic
setting of Microsoft Entra ID.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/howto-identity-protection-investigate-risk
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/reference/tables/aaduserriskevents
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/005/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1098.005
logsource:
product: azure
service: riskdetection
detection:
selection:
RiskEventType: suspiciousCredentialAddition
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- None documented by Microsoft. A user who registers a method while travelling or from a new device may be flagged, so confirm the registration with the user through a channel other than the account itself.
level: high
False positives
- None documented by Microsoft. A user who registers a method while travelling or from a new device may be flagged, so confirm the registration with the user through a channel other than the account itself.
User Registered or Changed an Authentication Method
Detects a user registering, updating or changing the default of their own authentication method (security info). Common during onboarding; valuable when it follows a risky or unfamiliar sign-in for the same user.
title: User Registered or Changed an Authentication Method
id: 907b4486-c976-409e-a211-e32e32aa8113
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a user registering, updating or changing the default of their own
authentication method (security info). Common during onboarding; valuable
when it follows a risky or unfamiliar sign-in for the same user.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-audit-activities
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/005/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-10
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1098.005
logsource:
product: azure
service: auditlogs
detection:
selection:
OperationName:
- User registered security info
- User updated security info
- User changed default security info
Result: success
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- New hires and users replacing a phone; correlate with sign-in risk and location, or filter out registrations made from your corporate network ranges.
level: low
False positives
- New hires and users replacing a phone; correlate with sign-in risk and location, or filter out registrations made from your corporate network ranges.
Detection logic
Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.
Authentication method registered shortly after a risky sign-in
An attacker who gets into an account registers a method of their own as soon as they can, because the stolen session will not last. A registration within an hour of a sign-in that ID Protection rated risky is far more likely to be the attacker's than a registration on an ordinary day.
- Sign-in log: a successful sign-in (
ResultType0) withRiskLevelDuringSignInmedium or high. Keep theUserPrincipalName. - Risk detection log, as an alternative first step: any detection for the user, identified by
UserPrincipalName. - Audit log, within 60 minutes:
User registered security info, or one of the device-bound credential activities such asAdd Windows Hello for Business credential, for the same account inTargetResources.
EventsUser registered security infoAdd Windows Hello for Business credentialAdd Passkey (device-bound)
LimitsRisk levels and risk detail need Microsoft Entra ID P2. A user who signs in from a new place and is then asked to register a method matches as well, so confirm the registration with the user through another channel. The 60 minutes are a starting point.
New method registered and an existing method deleted soon after
After adding their own method, an attacker removes the user's method so that the owner can no longer approve sign-ins or recover the account. A registration and a deletion on the same account within a day swaps the account's second factor.
- Audit log:
User registered security infoorAdmin registered security info, with the account inTargetResources. - Within 24 hours:
User deleted security infoorAdmin deleted security infofor the same account. - Read both events to see which method was added and which was removed, and whether the same actor in
InitiatedBydid both.
EventsUser registered security infoAdmin registered security infoUser deleted security infoAdmin deleted security info
LimitsA user who replaces a phone registers the new one and deletes the old one, which is the same pair. Confirm with the user. The 24 hours are a starting point.
Triage
- Check which method was registered (TargetResources, AdditionalDetails) and from where; compare the IP address of the registration with the user's sign-in history.
- Ask the user whether they added the method; registrations right after a risky or unfamiliar sign-in are the strongest signal.
- For admin registrations, confirm the administrator and the ticket; an admin adding methods to a privileged account needs a clear reason.
- If malicious, delete the method, revoke sessions, reset the password and review activity since the registration.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Delete the method the attacker registered, and go through every other method on the account with the user. Remove the ones the user does not recognize.
- Reset the password and revoke the sessions only after the unknown methods are gone. In some tenants a method the attacker still holds is enough for self-service password reset.
- If an administrator registered the method, revoke the sessions and reset the credentials of that administrator account and remove its authentication administrator role.
- Review the sign-ins that were satisfied with the new method and what the account did afterwards, such as inbox rules, application consents and further registrations.
- Confirm with the user which method is the default and that the account now holds only methods the user owns.
Mitigation
- Make sure every user registers MFA promptly, and use Temporary Access Pass for onboarding instead of leaving accounts unregistered.
- Protect the "Register security information" user action with Conditional Access (trusted location, compliant device or existing strong authentication).
- Prefer phishing-resistant methods and disable weak ones in the authentication methods policy.
- When responding to a compromise, review and remove unknown methods in addition to resetting the password and revoking sessions.
Frequently asked questions
In which order should the account be cleaned up?
Remove the unknown method first. It stays on the account after a password reset, and in some tenants it is enough for self-service password reset, so an attacker who still holds it can get back in. Then reset the password and revoke the sessions.
How can an attacker register a method without passing MFA first?
Accounts that have never registered MFA are the easiest targets, because the first registration may need nothing more than the password. A session stolen through adversary-in-the-middle phishing is another way in. An attacker with an authentication administrator role can register a method for another user.
Why is the rule for user registrations rated low?
New hires and users who replace a phone register methods every day. The event becomes valuable when it follows a risky or unfamiliar sign-in for the same user. Correlate it with sign-in risk and location, or leave out registrations made from your corporate network ranges.
When is a registration by an administrator suspicious?
Help desk staff register methods during onboarding and recovery, and each case should have a ticket. An administrator who adds a method to a privileged account needs a clear reason. An attacker with an authentication administrator role can add a phone number to a target account and then satisfy its MFA prompts.
References
- MITRE ATT&CK T1098.005: Device Registration
- Microsoft Entra audit log activities (Authentication Methods)
- Reporting options for Microsoft Entra password management (combined registration events)
- What are risk detections? (Suspicious credential addition)
- Microsoft Graph signIn resource type (riskLevelDuringSignIn)