How the attack works
IAM users and the root user can each register up to eight MFA devices of any type, and one device is enough to sign in. CreateVirtualMFADevice creates a virtual device (an authenticator app) in the account, and EnableMFADevice enables a device and associates it with a user. From then on IAM accepts the codes of that device as the second factor of the identity.
An attacker who reaches a console session, or a principal allowed to call these actions for other users, can register a device they hold. Because up to eight devices can exist side by side, the owner's device keeps working and nothing breaks, while the attacker can now complete sign-ins and obtain MFA-authenticated sessions that satisfy policies requiring MFA. Registering a device on an identity that had none also makes a taken-over identity look protected. CloudTrail records both calls under iam.amazonaws.com, with the caller in userIdentity, the device in requestParameters.serialNumber and the user in requestParameters.userName. A registration for the root user carries userIdentity.type Root.
What an attacker needs
- A console session of the IAM user or the root user, or credentials for a principal allowed to call iam:CreateVirtualMFADevice and iam:EnableMFADevice for the target user.
- To use the device at sign-in, the identity's password or the right to reset it.
Impact
The attacker holds a second factor that IAM accepts for the identity. With the password they complete console sign-ins, and with the identity's access keys they can request MFA-authenticated sessions. For an administrator or the root user this makes a takeover durable, and it stays unnoticed for as long as nobody reviews the list of registered devices.
Detection rules
MFA Device Enabled for an IAM Identity
Detects EnableMFADevice calls, which enable an MFA device and associate it with an IAM user or the root user. From that call on, IAM accepts the device as a second factor of the identity. Triage by comparing the caller (userIdentity.arn) with requestParameters.userName, by checking whether the identity already had a device, and by confirming the registration with the owner. It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode, because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
title: MFA Device Enabled for an IAM Identity
id: 0d92ba70-58be-42db-bd3c-849e1927a4fb
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects EnableMFADevice calls, which enable an MFA device and associate it
with an IAM user or the root user. From that call on, IAM accepts the device
as a second factor of the identity. Triage by comparing the caller
(userIdentity.arn) with requestParameters.userName, by checking whether the
identity already had a device, and by confirming the registration with the
owner.
It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode,
because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
references:
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_EnableMFADevice.html
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_credentials_mfa.html
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/005/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-16
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1098.005
logsource:
product: aws
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection:
eventSource: iam.amazonaws.com
eventName: EnableMFADevice
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Onboarding, users who replace a lost or old device, and MFA enrollment by the identity team. Expect the owner to confirm the registration; limit the rule to privileged users if the volume is high.
level: low
False positives
- Onboarding, users who replace a lost or old device, and MFA enrollment by the identity team. Expect the owner to confirm the registration; limit the rule to privileged users if the volume is high.
MFA Device Enabled for the Root User
Detects EnableMFADevice calls made as the account root user (userIdentity.type Root), which register an MFA device for the root user. AWS shows this event in its console sign-in event reference under "Root user, MFA changed". The root user can hold up to eight devices, so a new one does not replace the device the owners already use. Outside the first setup of an account or a planned device replacement, confirm with the account owners who registered it. It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode, because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
title: MFA Device Enabled for the Root User
id: 0bcc7a75-3c51-4f9b-90dc-317dd6b2102a
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects EnableMFADevice calls made as the account root user
(userIdentity.type Root), which register an MFA device for the root user.
AWS shows this event in its console sign-in event reference under "Root
user, MFA changed". The root user can hold up to eight devices, so a new one
does not replace the device the owners already use. Outside the first setup
of an account or a planned device replacement, confirm with the account
owners who registered it.
It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode,
because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
references:
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudtrail-event-reference-aws-console-sign-in-events.html
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_EnableMFADevice.html
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_credentials_mfa.html
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-16
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1098.005
logsource:
product: aws
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection:
eventSource: iam.amazonaws.com
eventName: EnableMFADevice
userIdentity.type: Root
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- First setup of a new account and planned replacement of the root MFA device by the account owners; confirm the change record and that the owners hold every registered device.
level: medium
False positives
- First setup of a new account and planned replacement of the root MFA device by the account owners; confirm the change record and that the owners hold every registered device.
Virtual MFA Device Created
Detects CreateVirtualMFADevice calls, which create a new virtual MFA device in the account. The device protects nothing until EnableMFADevice associates it with a user, so this event is the first of the two steps of a virtual device registration and names the caller who started it. Use it together with the rules on EnableMFADevice, and look for a device that was created by one principal and enabled for another. It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode, because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
title: Virtual MFA Device Created
id: cd61125a-19d9-4f88-96b5-406c4ef25eba
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects CreateVirtualMFADevice calls, which create a new virtual MFA device
in the account. The device protects nothing until EnableMFADevice associates
it with a user, so this event is the first of the two steps of a virtual
device registration and names the caller who started it. Use it together
with the rules on EnableMFADevice, and look for a device that was created
by one principal and enabled for another.
It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode,
because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
references:
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_CreateVirtualMFADevice.html
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_EnableMFADevice.html
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-16
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1098.005
logsource:
product: aws
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection:
eventSource: iam.amazonaws.com
eventName: CreateVirtualMFADevice
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Every legitimate enrollment of an authenticator app, including enrollments that a user starts in the console and does not finish. Useful mainly as context for the rules on EnableMFADevice.
level: low
False positives
- Every legitimate enrollment of an authenticator app, including enrollments that a user starts in the console and does not finish. Useful mainly as context for the rules on EnableMFADevice.
Triage
- Compare the caller (userIdentity.arn) with requestParameters.userName. A device registered for someone else's user, or for the root user, is the key signal.
- Check whether the identity already had a device. A second device on a protected identity is unusual, and a first device registered right after a sign-in from a new address deserves the same attention.
- Look at the session that made the call, with its source address, its user agent and the ConsoleLogin event before it.
- Look for DeactivateMFADevice, UpdateLoginProfile or CreateAccessKey for the same user around the same time.
- Confirm with the owner, through a channel other than the account itself, whether they registered the device.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Deactivate the device that the owner does not hold, and delete it if it is a virtual device.
- Reset the console password of the identity, revoke its active console sessions and deactivate access keys that were created around the change.
- Register a new device together with the owner if the owner's device was removed, after you have verified the owner through a channel other than the account itself.
- Contain the principal that registered the device by deactivating its access keys or revoking its role sessions, and review what it and the affected identity did afterwards.
- If the root user was affected, change its password, check its access keys and the contact details of the account, and confirm that every remaining root MFA device is held by the owners.
Mitigation
- Restrict iam:CreateVirtualMFADevice and iam:EnableMFADevice on other users to identity administrators, and let users manage only their own device.
- Register MFA for the root user and for every IAM user with a console password, so that no identity is left for someone else to enroll first.
- Move people to IAM Identity Center or federation, so that few IAM users have a password and MFA devices to tamper with.
- In AWS Organizations, centralize root access and delete member account root credentials, and keep the management account's root user on phishing-resistant MFA.
- Review the MFA devices of privileged users and of the root user on a schedule, and confirm each device with its owner.
Frequently asked questions
Why is a new MFA device a risk when MFA is meant to protect the identity?
MFA proves that the person signing in holds a registered device. It does not prove who registered the device. A device that an attacker registers is as valid as the owner's, so the attacker passes every MFA check with it. The identity shows MFA as enabled the whole time, which is why a registration that nobody ordered is the thing to look for.
Does the owner notice when a second device is added?
Usually not. AWS allows up to eight MFA devices for the root user and for each IAM user, and one device is enough to sign in. The owner's device keeps working after another one is added, so nothing fails for the owner. The added device shows only in the list of devices of the identity and in the CloudTrail event.
Which events show the registration of a device?
A virtual device produces two calls. CreateVirtualMFADevice creates the device in the account, and EnableMFADevice enables it and associates it with the user. CreateVirtualMFADevice applies to virtual devices only. EnableMFADevice is the call that gives the identity a new second factor, so the rules on that call matter most.
What is the usual harmless cause of these alerts?
Onboarding, users who replace a phone, and administrators who enroll MFA for an account. In the harmless case the owner confirms the registration and the session that made the call is the owner's usual one. A device registered by another principal, from a new address, or shortly before a password reset or a new access key does not fit that pattern.
References
- MITRE ATT&CK T1098.005: Device Registration
- IAM API Reference: EnableMFADevice
- IAM API Reference: CreateVirtualMFADevice
- AWS multi-factor authentication in IAM
- AWS Management Console sign-in events (root user, MFA changed)
- AWS: Allows MFA-authenticated IAM users to manage their own MFA device
- Manage passwords for IAM users (revoke active console sessions)