How the attack works
Multi Admin Approval is the Intune control that makes one compromised administrator insufficient. An access policy names a protected resource type (apps, scripts, compliance policies, configuration policies, device actions such as wipe, retire and delete, role-based access control, tenant configuration) and a group of approvers; a change to that resource is applied only after a different administrator approves it. The same enforcement applies to application-authenticated Microsoft Graph calls, and each policy can exclude named enterprise applications from it.
Because the policies stand between an attacker and fleet-wide actions, they are an obvious target. Changes to access policies themselves need a second approval, so an attempt shows up either as a request or, if the attacker controls two accounts or an approver, as a completed deletion, a changed approver group or a new exclusion. Any of them removes the gate for one resource type. The rule reads the Intune audit log, which reaches a SIEM only after an Intune diagnostic setting (category AuditLogs) sends it to a Log Analytics workspace or an event hub.
What an attacker needs
- Control of an identity that can manage access policies: the Intune Administrator role or a custom Intune role with the Multi Admin Approval permissions (create, update or delete access policy).
- A second identity in the approver group, or an approver who accepts the request.
Impact
The protected resource type goes back to single-administrator control. The next step is usually the action the policy was blocking: a script or app deployment, an Intune role change, or wiping devices. An exclusion for an enterprise application lets whoever holds that application's credentials change the protected resources without approval.
Detection rules
Intune Multi Admin Approval Access Policy Changed or Deleted
Detects a successful update or deletion of a Multi Admin Approval access policy (operationApprovalPolicy in Microsoft Graph) in the Intune audit log, including changes to its approver group and its excluded applications. Microsoft does not publish the list of OperationName values, so the rule matches the Graph resource type inside the name and leaves out the creation of new policies. Confirmed from the sample events of Splunk Threat Research: a name is an action followed by a Graph resource type, for example Patch DeviceManagementConfigurationPolicy. Inferred: that access policy events carry the resource type name OperationApprovalPolicy; no Microsoft or Splunk sample shows one, so confirm the name in your tenant before relying on the rule.
title: Intune Multi Admin Approval Access Policy Changed or Deleted
id: 95f93cc1-0db3-48a0-ac46-0cf3b63e99f6
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a successful update or deletion of a Multi Admin Approval access
policy (operationApprovalPolicy in Microsoft Graph) in the Intune audit log,
including changes to its approver group and its excluded applications.
Microsoft does not publish the list of OperationName values, so the rule
matches the Graph resource type inside the name and leaves out the creation
of new policies. Confirmed from the sample events of Splunk Threat Research:
a name is an action followed by a Graph resource type, for example Patch
DeviceManagementConfigurationPolicy. Inferred: that access policy events
carry the resource type name OperationApprovalPolicy; no Microsoft or Splunk
sample shows one, so confirm the name in your tenant before relying on the
rule.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/intune/fundamentals/role-based-access-control/multi-admin-approval
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/resources/intune-rbac-operationapprovalpolicy?view=graph-rest-beta
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/intune/governance/integrate-azure-monitor
- https://research.splunk.com/cloud/3c49e5ed-625c-408c-a2c7-8e2b524efb2c/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-11
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1484
logsource:
product: intune
service: audit
detection:
selection:
OperationName|contains: OperationApprovalPolicy
ResultType: Success
filter_create:
OperationName|startswith: Create
condition: selection and not filter_create
falsepositives:
- Planned maintenance of access policies, for example the documented recovery from a lockout caused by a role-based access control policy; confirm with the Intune owners.
level: high
False positives
- Planned maintenance of access policies, for example the documented recovery from a lockout caused by a role-based access control policy; confirm with the Intune owners.
Detection logic
Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.
Access policy changed or deleted, then the protected action by the same actor
An access policy is removed or weakened for a reason. When the reason is an attack, the action the policy was blocking follows within hours: a script or app assignment, a role change or a wipe. A change to an access policy followed by a change to the resource type it protected, by the requester or the approver, is the gate being opened and used.
- Intune audit log: the update or deletion of an access policy that the rule on this page matches. Keep
Identity, the policy name fromPropertiesand the resource type it protected. Take the approver from the Multi Admin Approval request list. - Intune audit log within 24 hours: successful records (
ResultTypeSuccess) by the sameIdentityor by the approver on that resource type, such as those the rules on the script, app, wipe, role and compliance policy pages match. - Alert when such a record follows, and treat a deletion followed by device wipes or a script assignment as an incident in progress.
LimitsPlanned maintenance of access policies, for example after a lockout, can be followed by planned changes. Changes made by an application on the exclusion list of another policy carry another Identity. Microsoft does not publish the Intune operation names, so this hypothesis inherits the inferred names of the rules it reuses. The 24 hours are a starting point.
Triage
- Identify the actor (Identity, and Actor in Properties) and the policy (TargetDisplayNames in Properties), and find the approver of the request in the Multi Admin Approval request list.
- Read the modified properties in Properties.Targets to see what changed, such as the approver group, the policy type or the excluded applications.
- Look for the follow-up in the Intune audit log, such as new scripts, app assignments, role assignments or device wipes by the same actor or by an excluded application.
- If unauthorized, restore the policy, revoke the sessions of the requester and the approver, and review everything changed in the protected area since.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Treat both the requester and the approver as compromised until shown otherwise. Reset their credentials and authentication methods, and remove them from the approver group and from roles with the Multi Admin Approval permissions.
- Line up two trusted administrators for the restore. A change to an access policy needs a second approval, so restoring the policy is itself a request that someone must approve.
- Remove application exclusions that were added, and replace the credentials of the excluded application. Whoever holds them could change the protected resources without approval.
- Check the approver group for members added before the change, and remove the ones nobody can explain.
- Reverse what was done in the protected area while the gate was open, such as scripts and app assignments, Intune role changes and device actions.
- Confirm that an access policy exists again for every resource type you protect, and that each has the approver group you expect.
Mitigation
- Keep the Multi Admin Approval permissions and the approver groups to a few named administrators, and make the approver groups role-assignable so their membership cannot be changed by group or helpdesk administrators.
- Require phishing-resistant authentication and a compliant privileged workstation for these accounts through Conditional Access.
- Review the access policies and their application exclusions on a schedule; Microsoft caps exclusions at 50 applications per policy and warns that each one is a gap.
- Alert on every change to an access policy and treat an unexpected one as an incident in progress.
Frequently asked questions
How can an attacker change an access policy when the change itself needs approval?
Changes to access policies need a second approval, so one compromised account is not enough. An attacker who controls two accounts, or an approver who accepts the request, can still complete a deletion, a changed approver group or a new exclusion. That is why an unexpected change is treated as an incident in progress.
Why is an application exclusion on an access policy a risk?
An excluded enterprise application is not subject to the approval requirement of that policy. Whoever holds the application's credentials can change the protected resources without a second administrator. Microsoft caps exclusions at 50 applications per policy and warns that each one is a gap.
What is a legitimate reason for this alert?
Planned maintenance of access policies by the Intune owners, for example the documented recovery from a lockout caused by a role-based access control policy. Confirm the change with the owners, and find the request and its approver in the Multi Admin Approval request list.
What should we test before relying on this rule?
The operation name. Microsoft does not publish the list of operation names in the Intune audit log, and the rule matches the Microsoft Graph resource type OperationApprovalPolicy inside the name, which is inferred. No Microsoft or Splunk sample event shows one, so make a test change to an access policy and confirm the name in your tenant.
References
- MITRE ATT&CK T1484: Domain or Tenant Policy Modification
- Microsoft Learn: Use access policies to require multi admin approval
- Microsoft Learn: Use Multi Admin Approval with the Microsoft Graph API
- CISA: CISA Urges Endpoint Management System Hardening After Cyberattack Against US Organization
- Microsoft Learn: Use audit logs to track and monitor events in Microsoft Intune
- Azure Monitor Logs reference: IntuneAuditLogs