How the attack works
Where users authenticate at IAM Identity Center itself, Identity Center also decides whether and when they are asked for a second factor. The setting lives in the console under Settings, Authentication, Multi-factor authentication: when to prompt, which device types are allowed, and what happens when a user has no registered device, where the default is to require registration at sign-in. AWS documents that MFA is enabled by default, that a user can have up to eight devices, and that administrators can register and manage MFA devices for users.
Both levers are useful to an attacker who already has administration rights in the management account or the delegated administrator account. Changing the instance configuration removes the second factor for every user at once, so that a password that was phished or reset is enough. Deleting the MFA device of one user does the same for that user, and with the default setting the next sign-in simply asks to register a new device, which the attacker can do. Datadog Security Labs reported an intrusion on 13 May 2025 in which the attacker changed the MFA configuration of the Identity Center instance to allow sign-in without MFA.
These changes are made through console operations that are not part of the public Identity Center API. The Service Authorization Reference lists them as actions: PutMfaDeviceManagementForDirectory and UpdateSSOConfiguration for sso, and DeleteMfaDeviceForUser for the Identity Center directory (sso-directory). AWS states that such console operations can appear in CloudTrail and publishes no example record for them, so the rules on this page match event source and event name only and carry a lower level than the change deserves. The incident report names a request field for the MFA change, which AWS does not document, and the rules do not use it.
What an attacker needs
- Administration rights for IAM Identity Center in the Organizations management account or in the Identity Center delegated administrator account.
- An identity source in which Identity Center performs the authentication. With an external identity provider, MFA is configured and enforced at that provider.
- To make use of the change, the password of an Identity Center user, or the right to reset it.
Impact
Sign-in to the AWS access portal with a password alone, for every user or for the user whose device was removed, and with it every account assignment of those users. Because the setting is rarely looked at, the change can stay for a long time and serves as persistence.
Detection rules
IAM Identity Center MFA or Instance Configuration Changed
Detects PutMfaDeviceManagementForDirectory and UpdateSSOConfiguration operations of IAM Identity Center. The Service Authorization Reference describes the first as putting the MFA device management settings for the directory and the second as updating the configuration for the current instance. They are console operations, not part of the public Identity Center API. AWS states that such operations can appear in CloudTrail and publishes no example record for them, so the rule matches event source and event name only, the names are those of the Service Authorization Reference, and the event does not say what was changed. The level is therefore one step lower than a confirmed removal of MFA would deserve. When the rule fires, open the Authentication settings of Identity Center and compare the MFA configuration with your standard. It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode, because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
title: IAM Identity Center MFA or Instance Configuration Changed
id: c0d73ec8-2d59-4665-862e-95fc50667a17
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects PutMfaDeviceManagementForDirectory and UpdateSSOConfiguration
operations of IAM Identity Center. The Service Authorization Reference
describes the first as putting the MFA device management settings for the
directory and the second as updating the configuration for the current
instance. They are console operations, not part of the public Identity
Center API. AWS states that such operations can appear in CloudTrail and
publishes no example record for them, so the rule matches event source
and event name only, the names are those of the Service Authorization
Reference, and the event does not say what was changed. The level is
therefore one step lower than a confirmed removal of MFA would deserve.
When the rule fires, open the Authentication settings of Identity Center
and compare the MFA configuration with your standard.
It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode,
because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
references:
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/service-authorization/latest/reference/list_iam-identity-center.html
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/singlesignon/latest/userguide/sso-info-in-cloudtrail.html
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/singlesignon/latest/userguide/how-to-configure-mfa-device-enforcement.html
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/006/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.persistence
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1556.006
logsource:
product: aws
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection:
eventSource: sso.amazonaws.com
eventName:
- PutMfaDeviceManagementForDirectory
- UpdateSSOConfiguration
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Planned changes of the Identity Center settings by its administrators, and settings that the console writes when other parts of the configuration page are saved. These are rare, so confirm each event against a change record.
level: medium
False positives
- Planned changes of the Identity Center settings by its administrators, and settings that the console writes when other parts of the configuration page are saved. These are rare, so confirm each event against a change record.
MFA Device Deleted for an IAM Identity Center User
Detects DeleteMfaDeviceForUser operations of the IAM Identity Center directory. The Service Authorization Reference describes the action as deleting an MFA device by device name for a given user. With the default MFA setting, a user without a registered device is asked to register one at the next sign-in after a successful password authentication, so whoever holds the password can then enroll a device of their own. The operation is a console and access portal operation with the event source sso-directory.amazonaws.com. AWS states that such operations can appear in CloudTrail and publishes no example record for this one, so the rule matches event source and event name only and its level is low. Compare the caller with the user whose device was deleted: a user who removes an old device of their own is routine, an administrator or another identity who removes someone's device is not. It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode, because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
title: MFA Device Deleted for an IAM Identity Center User
id: 2f5b5ff6-118c-4fe0-bec3-200422261199
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects DeleteMfaDeviceForUser operations of the IAM Identity Center
directory. The Service Authorization Reference describes the action as
deleting an MFA device by device name for a given user. With the default
MFA setting, a user without a registered device is asked to register one
at the next sign-in after a successful password authentication, so
whoever holds the password can then enroll a device of their own. The
operation is a console and access portal operation with the event source
sso-directory.amazonaws.com. AWS states that such operations can appear
in CloudTrail and publishes no example record for this one, so the rule
matches event source and event name only and its level is low. Compare
the caller with the user whose device was deleted: a user who removes an
old device of their own is routine, an administrator or another identity
who removes someone's device is not.
It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode,
because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
references:
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/service-authorization/latest/reference/list_sso-directory.html
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/singlesignon/latest/userguide/sso-info-in-cloudtrail.html
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/singlesignon/latest/userguide/how-to-configure-mfa-device-enforcement.html
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/006/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.persistence
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1556.006
logsource:
product: aws
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection:
eventSource: sso-directory.amazonaws.com
eventName: DeleteMfaDeviceForUser
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Users who replace a phone or a security key and remove the old device in the access portal, and help desk staff who remove a lost device on request. Check for a matching request, and for the registration of a new device by the same person.
level: low
False positives
- Users who replace a phone or a security key and remove the old device in the access portal, and help desk staff who remove a lost device on request. Check for a matching request, and for the registration of a new device by the same person.
Detection logic
Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.
Password-only sign-ins begin after a change of the MFA configuration
The configuration event does not say what was changed. Its effect does: if users who always passed a second factor start to complete sign-in with a password alone after the change, MFA was weakened.
- A
PutMfaDeviceManagementForDirectoryorUpdateSSOConfigurationevent fromsso.amazonaws.com, or aDeleteMfaDeviceForUserevent fromsso-directory.amazonaws.com. - In the following days,
UserAuthenticationevents fromsignin.amazonaws.comwhoseadditionalEventData.CredentialTypeisPASSWORDonly. - Compare with the week before the change. Alert when such sign-ins appear where there were none, and read the user from
userIdentity.onBehalfOf.userId.
EventsPutMfaDeviceManagementForDirectoryUpdateSSOConfigurationDeleteMfaDeviceForUserUserAuthentication
LimitsIt only works where Identity Center performs the authentication. An attacker who weakens the setting and waits is found only when the first sign-in happens. The comparison week is a starting point.
Triage
- Identify the caller (userIdentity.arn), the account and the source address, and check for an approved change of the MFA settings.
- Open the Authentication settings of Identity Center and compare the MFA configuration with your standard.
- For a deleted device, find the user and check whether the user or the help desk asked for it, and whether a new device was registered soon after from an unfamiliar address.
- Look for password changes of Identity Center users by the same caller, which the directory records as UpdatePassword.
- Look for access portal sign-ins after the change that list only the credential type PASSWORD.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Set the MFA configuration back to your standard, and require MFA at every sign-in.
- Contain the administrator identity that made the change by deactivating its access keys or revoking its role sessions.
- For affected users, remove MFA devices they do not recognize, reset their passwords, and have them register a device again under supervision.
- Identify the users who signed in while the setting was weakened, and review what the roles of their permission sets did in each account.
- Review permission sets, assignments, users and groups for changes made by the same caller.
Mitigation
- Limit Identity Center administration to a small group, and keep access to the management account to as few people as possible.
- If Identity Center is administered from a delegated administrator account, deny the MFA configuration actions there with a service control policy, except for a break-glass role.
- Set MFA to be required at every sign-in, allow only phishing-resistant device types where you can, and review the setting on a schedule.
- Alert on sign-ins that completed with a password only, which show the effect of a weakened setting.
- Use an external identity provider with strong MFA for the workforce if you cannot protect the Identity Center settings well enough.
Frequently asked questions
Why are the levels of these rules lower than the impact suggests?
The rules match event names that come from the Service Authorization Reference, and AWS publishes no example record for these console operations. An event shows that the configuration was written, not what it was changed to. The rules therefore tell you to look at the setting, and their level is one step lower than a confirmed removal of MFA would deserve.
Does this page apply when we use an external identity provider?
Only in part. With an external identity provider the users authenticate there, and the second factor is configured and enforced at the provider, not in Identity Center. The settings on this page matter for the Identity Center directory and for directories in which Identity Center performs the authentication. A change of the identity source itself has a page of its own.
How can I confirm that MFA is really off?
Read the sign-in events. AWS documents that Identity Center writes a `UserAuthentication` event when a user has completed all required challenges, and that it lists the verified credential types. A sign-in that lists only `PASSWORD` was completed without a second factor. The page on console sign-in without MFA has a rule for it.
Why does deleting one user's MFA device matter?
The default setting requires a user without a registered device to register one at sign-in, after a successful password authentication. Someone who holds the password of that user can therefore enroll a device of their own at the next sign-in. Deleting the device turns a known password into full access for that user.
References
- MITRE ATT&CK T1556.006: Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication
- Configure MFA device enforcement (IAM Identity Center)
- Managing access for users in the Identity Center directory
- IAM Identity Center information in CloudTrail
- Service Authorization Reference: AWS IAM Identity Center (sso)
- Service Authorization Reference: AWS IAM Identity Center directory (sso-directory)
- Understanding IAM Identity Center sign-in events
- Datadog Security Labs: Tales from the cloud trenches: The Attacker doth persist too much, methinks