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Privileged Account Password Retrieved From the Idira (formerly CyberArk) Vault detection rules

A person or script shows, copies or retrieves a stored password or SSH key instead of connecting through Privileged Session Manager. On a Safe that holds Tier 0 accounts, the credential is now outside the Vault.

Platform
Idira (formerly CyberArk)
Severity
High
Log source
Idira (formerly CyberArk) Vault audit log
Last updated
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft Sentinel
What an attacker needs
Membership of the Safe with the Retrieve accounts permission and, where dual control is enforced, an approved request or the Access Safe without confirmation permission.
Impact
The current password or SSH key of the account, which may be a local administrator on one server or a domain, cloud or hypervisor administrator stored in the Safe.
Response
Start a password change for every account the user retrieved, not only the one in the alert, and reset the Vault user's own password and second factor.
Mitigation
Grant Use accounts instead of Retrieve accounts wherever a session through Privileged Session Manager is enough, and enforce dual control on Safes that hold Tier 0 accounts.
Vault event codes
295428

How the attack works

CyberArk is built so that people can use privileged accounts without knowing their passwords: with Use accounts a user connects through Privileged Session Manager and the credential stays in the Vault. Retrieve accounts is the permission that lets a Safe member view and copy the value itself, in the web interface or through the REST API. Once retrieved, the password works from anywhere until the Central Policy Manager changes it, with no session recording and no isolation.

Attackers who take over a Vault user, or who have added themselves to a Safe, go for retrieval because it is the fastest way to turn Vault access into access to the target system. One account that retrieves from many Safes in a short time is the pattern of a credential harvest. A second rule counts the retrievals per issuer and fires when one user reaches 20 within 15 minutes, values that are starting points to tune. It counts audit records and not distinct accounts, because the key that carries the account name differs between translator files.

What must be collected. The rule reads the Vault's audit records forwarded by syslog in CEF format (SIEM integration, configured in DBParm.ini). The CEF header's Device Event Class ID carries the Vault audit action code: 295 is Retrieve password, which is on CyberArk's list of codes recommended for monitoring, and 428 is Retrieve SSH Key. The extension key suser carries the issuer, the Vault user who retrieved the value. Retrievals through a Credential Provider have their own code (319) and are not matched. SyslogMessageCodeFilter must not exclude these codes.

What an attacker needs

  • A Vault user who is a member of the Safe with the Retrieve accounts permission, directly or through a group.
  • Where dual control is enforced, an approved request or the Access Safe without confirmation permission.

Impact

The current password or SSH key of the account. What that reaches depends on the account: a local administrator on one server, or a domain, cloud or hypervisor administrator if such accounts are stored in the Safe.

Detection rules

Many Passwords or SSH Keys Retrieved From the CyberArk Vault by One User

Counts, per issuer, the retrievals of passwords and SSH keys from the CyberArk Digital Vault (audit action codes 295, Retrieve password, and 428, Retrieve SSH Key) by issuers that are not CyberArk components. One Vault user who retrieves 20 or more values within 15 minutes is either a script or report job with that right, or someone who empties the Safes the user can reach. The rule counts audit records, not distinct accounts: the account is named in the File field of the audit record, and the key that carries it differs between translator files, so two retrievals of the same account count twice. The threshold and the window are starting points to tune. Retrievals through a Credential Provider use code 319 and are not counted. deviceEventClassId is the CEF header's Device Event Class ID, which CyberArk's syslog translator fills with the Vault audit action code; suser is the issuer, the Vault user who performed the action.

Fires when one suser has at least 20 matching events within 15 minutes.

Threshold ruleLevelHighStatusExperimentalLog sourceIdira (formerly CyberArk) Vault audit log
title: CyberArk Password or SSH Key Retrieved (Bulk Retrieval Base Event)
id: 9c52d2ae-7e77-4731-b96f-09fc2b4cae14
name: cyberark_password_or_ssh_key_retrieved
status: experimental
description: >-
  Base event of the threshold rule in this file. A password or SSH key
  retrieved from the CyberArk Digital Vault (audit action codes 295, Retrieve
  password, and 428, Retrieve SSH Key) by an issuer whose name does not start
  with the default names of the Central Policy Manager user and the Privileged
  Session Manager application users.
logsource:
  product: cyberark
  service: vault
detection:
  selection:
    deviceEventClassId:
      - '295'
      - '428'
  filter_components:
    suser|startswith:
      - PasswordManager
      - PSMApp_
  condition: selection and not filter_components
level: low
---
title: Many Passwords or SSH Keys Retrieved From the CyberArk Vault by One User
id: 5e32fa97-54c9-4929-b538-26d011858b9d
status: experimental
description: >-
  Counts, per issuer, the retrievals of passwords and SSH keys from the
  CyberArk Digital Vault (audit action codes 295, Retrieve password, and 428,
  Retrieve SSH Key) by issuers that are not CyberArk components. One Vault
  user who retrieves 20 or more values within 15 minutes is either a script
  or report job with that right, or someone who empties the Safes the user
  can reach. The rule counts audit records, not distinct accounts: the account
  is named in the File field of the audit record, and the key that carries it
  differs between translator files, so two retrievals of the same account
  count twice. The threshold and the window are starting points to tune.
  Retrievals through a Credential Provider use code 319 and are not counted.
  deviceEventClassId is the CEF header's Device Event Class ID, which
  CyberArk's syslog translator fills with the Vault audit action code; suser
  is the issuer, the Vault user who performed the action.
references:
  - https://docs.cyberark.com/pam-self-hosted/latest/en/content/pasref/vault%20audit%20action%20codes.htm
  - https://docs.cyberark.com/pam-self-hosted/latest/en/content/pasimp/create-custom-xsl-translator-file.htm
  - https://docs.cyberark.com/pam-self-hosted/latest/en/content/pasimp/safes-add-a-safe-member.htm
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/005/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.credential-access
  - attack.t1555.005
correlation:
  type: event_count
  rules:
    - cyberark_password_or_ssh_key_retrieved
  group-by:
    - suser
  timespan: 15m
  condition:
    gte: 20
falsepositives:
  - Integration and reporting accounts that read many passwords on a schedule through the REST API, and component users with other names than the defaults. Replace the prefixes in filter_components with the exact names of your own component users and give known integrations their own higher count.
  - An administrator who checks or migrates the accounts of a Safe by hand. Compare the alert with a change record.
  - The values of 20 retrievals and 15 minutes are starting points, not tested limits. Measure how many values your busiest operator retrieves in that time and adjust both.
level: high

False positives

  • Integration and reporting accounts that read many passwords on a schedule through the REST API, and component users with other names than the defaults. Replace the prefixes in filter_components with the exact names of your own component users and give known integrations their own higher count.
  • An administrator who checks or migrates the accounts of a Safe by hand. Compare the alert with a change record.
  • The values of 20 retrievals and 15 minutes are starting points, not tested limits. Measure how many values your busiest operator retrieves in that time and adjust both.

CyberArk Password or SSH Key Retrieved by a Non-Component User

Detects a password or SSH key being retrieved from the CyberArk Digital Vault (audit action codes 295, Retrieve password, and 428, Retrieve SSH Key) by an issuer that is not a CyberArk component. The filter covers the default names of the Central Policy Manager user (PasswordManager) and the Privileged Session Manager application users (PSMApp_ followed by the machine name). deviceEventClassId is the CEF header's Device Event Class ID, which CyberArk's syslog translator fills with the Vault audit action code; suser is the issuer, the Vault user who performed the action.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceIdira (formerly CyberArk) Vault audit log
title: CyberArk Password or SSH Key Retrieved by a Non-Component User
id: 2a2907c6-3860-4e6c-a493-8586ec59ec17
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects a password or SSH key being retrieved from the CyberArk Digital
  Vault (audit action codes 295, Retrieve password, and 428, Retrieve SSH Key)
  by an issuer that is not a CyberArk component. The filter covers the default
  names of the Central Policy Manager user (PasswordManager) and the
  Privileged Session Manager application users (PSMApp_ followed by the
  machine name). deviceEventClassId is the CEF header's Device Event Class ID,
  which CyberArk's syslog translator fills with the Vault audit action code;
  suser is the issuer, the Vault user who performed the action.
references:
  - https://docs.cyberark.com/pam-self-hosted/latest/en/content/pasref/vault%20audit%20action%20codes.htm
  - https://docs.cyberark.com/pam-self-hosted/latest/en/content/pasimp/safes-add-a-safe-member.htm
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/005/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-11
tags:
  - attack.credential-access
  - attack.t1555.005
logsource:
  product: cyberark
  service: vault
detection:
  selection:
    deviceEventClassId:
      - '295'
      - '428'
  filter_components:
    suser|startswith:
      - PasswordManager
      - PSMApp_
  condition: selection and not filter_components
falsepositives:
  - Administrators and operators who are allowed to show or copy passwords; scope the alert to the Safes that hold Tier 0 accounts, or alert on volume per user.
  - Component and integration users with other names (renamed CPM users, Credential Provider users, API accounts); replace the prefixes in filter_components with the exact names of your own component users, because a prefix can be imitated by a user created for that purpose.
level: medium

False positives

  • Administrators and operators who are allowed to show or copy passwords; scope the alert to the Safes that hold Tier 0 accounts, or alert on volume per user.
  • Component and integration users with other names (renamed CPM users, Credential Provider users, API accounts); replace the prefixes in filter_components with the exact names of your own component users, because a prefix can be imitated by a user created for that purpose.

Detection logic

Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.

Password retrieved from the Vault and then used for a logon that bypasses the session manager

Detection hypothesisJoins two logsSequence of eventsNeeds your own lists

A privileged account is meant to be used through Privileged Session Manager, where the session is isolated and recorded. A logon to the target system with a retrieved account, from a host that is not a session manager and soon after the retrieval, shows the credential in use outside that control. Neither log shows this alone.

  1. The Vault records code 295 (Retrieve password) or 428 (Retrieve SSH Key) by an issuer that is not a component. Keep the issuer (suser), the account object (the File field of the audit record), the Safe and the Station.
  2. Resolve the account object to the user name and address of the target account. The CAProperties of the audit record carry the account's UserName and Address when your translator forwards them. Otherwise look the object up in the Vault.
  3. In the logon log of the target system, find a logon of that account after the retrieval and before its next password change. On a Windows target this is Security event 4624 with the account in TargetUserName and the source in IpAddress.
  4. Flag the logon when its source address is not one of your Privileged Session Manager servers and not the Central Policy Manager, which logs on to verify passwords. Start with a window of 8 hours.

Events2954284624

LimitsNeeds the logon logs of the target systems in the same SIEM and your own list of session manager and password manager addresses. An operator who is allowed to copy a password and use it directly looks the same, so compare with the reason given for the retrieval. A target that does not log the source address, and a credential used for something other than a logon, are not seen. The 8 hours are a starting point.

Account retrieved by a user who has not retrieved it before, or from an unusual station or hour

Detection hypothesisNeeds a baseline

An operator retrieves the few accounts they work with, from the same workstations and in their working hours. A retrieval of an account the user has never retrieved, from a station the user has not used, or at an hour outside the user's pattern breaks that habit. It finds a harvest that stays below the count of the threshold rule, and a taken-over Vault user working from the attacker's machine.

  1. Build a profile per issuer (suser) from code 295 (Retrieve password) and 428 (Retrieve SSH Key) over the previous 30 days: the accounts retrieved (Safe and File fields of the audit record), the stations (Station field, sent as src by CyberArk's sample CEF translator) and the hours of the day.
  2. For each new retrieval, flag an account, a station or an hour that is not in the issuer's profile.
  3. Raise the priority when two of the three are new at once, when the Safe holds Tier 0 accounts, or when the issuer logged on (code 7) from the same new station shortly before.

Events2954287

LimitsNew staff, new duties, incidents and on-call work all change the profile, and a user with no history makes every retrieval new. The Safe, File and Station fields reach the SIEM under keys that depend on the translator file. Where Privileged Threat Analytics runs, its own findings arrive as codes 460 and 461 and have their own page. The 30 days are a starting point.

Triage

  • Identify the user (suser), the account (file) and the Safe in the audit record, and the station the request came from.
  • Check whether the user normally retrieves this account, the reason given, and any matching approval or ticket.
  • Count the user's retrievals in the last hours across all Safes.
  • If it is not explained, start an immediate password change for the account through the Central Policy Manager, disable the Vault user and review activity on the target system since the retrieval.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Start a password change for every account the user retrieved, not only the one in the alert. List action codes 295 and 428 for that issuer across all Safes and begin with Tier 0 accounts.
  2. Reset the Vault user's own password and second factor before it is enabled again, and end its open sessions.
  3. Remove the path that allowed the retrieval. If the user was recently added to the Safe or given Retrieve accounts, remove that membership and review who granted it.
  4. On each target system, remove what was created with the retrieved credential since the retrieval, such as new accounts, keys or scheduled jobs.
  5. Confirm that the Central Policy Manager completed each change and that the old values no longer work, then watch for further retrievals by the same user or station.

Mitigation

  • Grant Use accounts instead of Retrieve accounts wherever a session through Privileged Session Manager is enough, and configure platforms so that passwords are not shown to end users.
  • For Safes that hold Tier 0 accounts, enforce dual control, exclusive access and one-time passwords in the Master Policy so that a retrieved password needs approval and is changed after use.
  • Require users to give a reason for access and review the reasons.
  • Forward the Vault audit to your SIEM and alert on retrievals from Tier 0 Safes and on one user retrieving many accounts.

Frequently asked questions

Does the rule see credentials fetched through a Credential Provider?

No. Retrievals through a Credential Provider have their own audit action code, 319, which the rule does not match. The rule covers code 295, Retrieve password, and code 428, Retrieve SSH Key, by an issuer that is not a CyberArk component.

Why should the component filter use exact names instead of prefixes?

The rule excludes issuers that start with PasswordManager or PSMApp_, the default names of the Central Policy Manager user and the Privileged Session Manager application users. A prefix can be imitated by a user created for that purpose, and the retrievals of that user would be hidden. Replace the prefixes with the exact names of your own component users.

How long does a retrieved password stay useful to an attacker?

Until the Central Policy Manager changes it. Once retrieved, the password works from anywhere, with no session recording and no isolation. Where the Master Policy enforces one-time passwords or exclusive access, a retrieved password is changed after use. Otherwise start an immediate change when a theft is confirmed.

What separates normal administrator work from a credential harvest?

Volume and place. An operator who is allowed to show or copy passwords normally retrieves the few accounts they work with. One account that retrieves from many Safes in a short time is the pattern of a credential harvest. Scope the alert to the Safes that hold Tier 0 accounts, or alert on the number of retrievals per user.

References

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