How the attack works
A Disaster Recovery Vault is a stand-by copy of the production Vault on another machine, and a Satellite Vault in a Distributed Vaults environment replicates from the Primary Vault in the same way. The DR service on the replica copies the Safe files and folders and the metadata, and CyberArk states that metadata replication takes place after each action in the Vault has been completed. To connect, each replica uses a dedicated DR user: a Vault user whose user type includes the DR interface, with the Backup All Safes and Restore All Safes authorizations and membership of the DR Users group.
Whoever holds such a user, a Vault installation and network access to the Primary Vault has what a replica needs to connect. The copy is not readable by itself: CyberArk describes the contents of a Vault replica made by its backup utility as encrypted, and states that the information stored in a stopped Vault is completely inaccessible without the server key. The keys are therefore the second thing an attacker needs. Since version 11.5 the Vault records the moment a replica registers: code 477 (New DR or Satellite Vault registration succeeded), for which the code table gives the user name in Info1 and the source address in Info2, and code 478 for a registration that failed. CyberArk does not describe the registration beyond these two table rows. A related record is a Safe backup that the Vault refused because the user lacked the authorization: codes 96, 97 and 156 (Backup Safe (Unauthorized)).
What must be collected. The rules read the Vault's audit records forwarded by syslog in CEF format (SIEM integration, configured in DBParm.ini). The CEF header's Device Event Class ID carries the Vault audit action code. SyslogMessageCodeFilter must not exclude codes 96, 97, 156, 477 and 478. By default all codes are sent.
What an attacker needs
- The credentials of a DR user: a Vault user whose type includes the DR interface, with the Backup All Safes and Restore All Safes authorizations, in the DR Users group.
- Network access to the Primary Vault from the machine that registers, from inside a Trusted Network Area of that user.
- To read the replicated data, the Vault's server key as well.
Impact
A copy of the Safes the DR user can replicate, together with the metadata, on a machine outside the control of the PAM team, and kept up to date for as long as the replica stays connected. Together with the server key that is the content of the Vault: every stored password and SSH key. Without the key it is an encrypted copy that waits for the key.
Detection rules
DR or Satellite Vault Registration With the CyberArk Vault Failed
Detects a DR or Satellite Vault that tried to register with the CyberArk Digital Vault and failed (audit action code 478, New DR or Satellite Vault registration failed, written since version 11.5). The code table flags the code in its Alert column, which CyberArk explains as an unauthorized operation, and gives the user name in Info1 and the source address in Info2. No replica was connected, but a machine presented itself as one. An attempt from an address that is not one of your replicas, or with a user that is not one of your DR users, is someone testing whether they can attach a Vault of their own. Look for a successful registration (code 477) from the same address afterwards. The code table gives no reason for the failure, so the rule matches the code alone. deviceEventClassId is the CEF header's Device Event Class ID, which CyberArk's syslog translator fills with the Vault audit action code.
title: DR or Satellite Vault Registration With the CyberArk Vault Failed
id: 18d2aeaa-9adf-4125-bdaa-b169abd21bc5
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a DR or Satellite Vault that tried to register with the CyberArk
Digital Vault and failed (audit action code 478, New DR or Satellite Vault
registration failed, written since version 11.5). The code table flags the
code in its Alert column, which CyberArk explains as an unauthorized
operation, and gives the user name in Info1 and the source address in
Info2. No replica was connected, but a machine presented itself as one. An
attempt from an address that is not one of your replicas, or with a user
that is not one of your DR users, is someone testing whether they can
attach a Vault of their own. Look for a successful registration (code 477)
from the same address afterwards. The code table gives no reason for the
failure, so the rule matches the code alone. deviceEventClassId is the CEF
header's Device Event Class ID, which CyberArk's syslog translator fills
with the Vault audit action code.
references:
- https://docs.cyberark.com/pam-self-hosted/latest/en/content/pasref/vault%20audit%20action%20codes.htm
- https://docs.cyberark.com/pam-self-hosted/latest/en/content/pas%20inst/disaster-recovery-installation.htm
- https://docs.cyberark.com/pam-self-hosted/latest/en/content/pasimp/disaster-recovery-user.htm
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/005/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1555.005
logsource:
product: cyberark
service: vault
detection:
selection:
deviceEventClassId: '478'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- A planned installation in which the DR user was still disabled or its credential file did not match the Vault. CyberArk documents both as reasons why a DR user cannot log on. The address and the user are then the ones of the change record.
level: medium
False positives
- A planned installation in which the DR user was still disabled or its credential file did not match the Vault. CyberArk documents both as reasons why a DR user cannot log on. The address and the user are then the ones of the change record.
New DR or Satellite Vault Registered With the CyberArk Vault
Detects a DR or Satellite Vault registering with the CyberArk Digital Vault (audit action code 477, New DR or Satellite Vault registration succeeded, written since version 11.5). A replica copies the Safe files and the metadata of the Primary Vault and keeps them up to date, so a registration is the moment a new machine starts to receive the Vault's data. Replicas are installed rarely and in planned changes. A registration that matches no change, or that comes from an address that is not one of your DR or Satellite Vaults, means that someone connected a Vault of their own with the credentials of a DR user. The code table gives the user name in Info1 and the source address in Info2, and no description of when the record is written, so the rule matches the code alone. deviceEventClassId is the CEF header's Device Event Class ID, which CyberArk's syslog translator fills with the Vault audit action code.
title: New DR or Satellite Vault Registered With the CyberArk Vault
id: e60e5ac9-24bb-4dc2-9e85-644be31c5ee7
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a DR or Satellite Vault registering with the CyberArk Digital Vault
(audit action code 477, New DR or Satellite Vault registration succeeded,
written since version 11.5). A replica copies the Safe files and the
metadata of the Primary Vault and keeps them up to date, so a registration
is the moment a new machine starts to receive the Vault's data. Replicas
are installed rarely and in planned changes. A registration that matches
no change, or that comes from an address that is not one of your DR or
Satellite Vaults, means that someone connected a Vault of their own with
the credentials of a DR user. The code table gives the user name in Info1
and the source address in Info2, and no description of when the record is
written, so the rule matches the code alone. deviceEventClassId is the CEF
header's Device Event Class ID, which CyberArk's syslog translator fills
with the Vault audit action code.
references:
- https://docs.cyberark.com/pam-self-hosted/latest/en/content/pasref/vault%20audit%20action%20codes.htm
- https://docs.cyberark.com/pam-self-hosted/latest/en/content/pas%20inst/disaster-recovery-installation.htm
- https://docs.cyberark.com/pam-self-hosted/latest/en/content/pasimp/replicating-master-vault-to-satellite-vaults.htm
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/005/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1555.005
logsource:
product: cyberark
service: vault
detection:
selection:
deviceEventClassId: '477'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- The planned installation, rebuild or upgrade of a DR or Satellite Vault. Match the user name and the source address of the record with the change record.
- CyberArk does not document whether a restart, failover or failback of an existing replica writes this code again. If it does in your version, the same address and DR user will repeat, and only new addresses and users need attention.
level: high
False positives
- The planned installation, rebuild or upgrade of a DR or Satellite Vault. Match the user name and the source address of the record with the change record.
- CyberArk does not document whether a restart, failover or failback of an existing replica writes this code again. If it does in your version, the same address and DR user will repeat, and only new addresses and users need attention.
CyberArk Vault Refused a Safe Backup
Detects a backup of a Safe that the CyberArk Digital Vault refused: audit action codes 96, 97 and 156 (Backup Safe (Unauthorized)). The code table flags all three in its Alert column, which CyberArk explains as an unauthorized operation, and gives the network area in Info1 for code 156. The backup utility exports the encrypted Safe files to another computer, and the Vault checks that the user has the Backup All Safes authorization and the backup authorization in the Safe. CyberArk states that the backup operation fails if the user does not have the required authority. A refused backup therefore means that someone ran the backup or replication with a user that is not one of the backup or DR users, which is an attempt to copy Safe data out of the Vault. Refused restores have their own codes, 150 (Restore Safe (Unauthorized)) and 250 (Restore metadata (Unauthorized)), and are not matched. deviceEventClassId is the CEF header's Device Event Class ID, which CyberArk's syslog translator fills with the Vault audit action code.
title: CyberArk Vault Refused a Safe Backup
id: 122fa387-fa09-4067-811c-f9d146124daf
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a backup of a Safe that the CyberArk Digital Vault refused: audit
action codes 96, 97 and 156 (Backup Safe (Unauthorized)). The code table
flags all three in its Alert column, which CyberArk explains as an
unauthorized operation, and gives the network area in Info1 for code 156.
The backup utility exports the encrypted Safe files to another computer,
and the Vault checks that the user has the Backup All Safes authorization
and the backup authorization in the Safe. CyberArk states that the backup
operation fails if the user does not have the required authority. A refused
backup therefore means that someone ran the backup or replication with a
user that is not one of the backup or DR users, which is an attempt to copy
Safe data out of the Vault. Refused restores have their own codes, 150
(Restore Safe (Unauthorized)) and 250 (Restore metadata (Unauthorized)),
and are not matched. deviceEventClassId is the CEF header's Device Event
Class ID, which CyberArk's syslog translator fills with the Vault audit
action code.
references:
- https://docs.cyberark.com/pam-self-hosted/latest/en/content/pasref/vault%20audit%20action%20codes.htm
- https://docs.cyberark.com/pam-self-hosted/latest/en/content/pas%20inst/backup-considerations.htm
- https://docs.cyberark.com/pam-self-hosted/latest/en/content/pas%20inst/using-the-cyberark-backup-process.htm
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/005/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1555.005
logsource:
product: cyberark
service: vault
detection:
selection:
deviceEventClassId:
- '96'
- '97'
- '156'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- A backup job that was moved to a new user before that user received the Backup All Safes authorization, or that includes a Safe from which the backup group was removed. The records then repeat with every run of the job, from the address of the backup server.
level: medium
False positives
- A backup job that was moved to a new user before that user received the Backup All Safes authorization, or that includes a Safe from which the backup group was removed. The records then repeat with every run of the job, from the address of the backup server.
Detection logic
Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.
DR user created, updated or added to DR Users shortly before a new Vault registers
A planned replica uses a DR user that was prepared in a change. A rogue one needs a DR user too, so the registration is preceded by a user being created or updated, or by a member being added to the DR Users group, often by an issuer who does not normally build replicas.
- A user is created or changed: code 180 (Add User), or codes 182 and 211 (Update User, Update User Detailed Information). The code table gives the user name in Info1 of codes 180 and 182.
- Or a member is added to the DR Users group: code 265 (Add Group Member), for which the code table gives the group in Info1 and the user in Info2.
- Within 7 days a Vault registers with that user: code 477 (New DR or Satellite Vault registration succeeded), with the user name in Info1 and the source address in Info2.
- Compare the issuer (
suser) of the first record and the source address of the second with the people and addresses named in the change record for the replica.
Events180182211265477
LimitsA planned installation produces the same sequence, because CyberArk's steps create a new DR user for each additional replica. The detection depends on comparing with a change record. An attacker who takes the credentials of an existing DR user leaves no first step. The 7 days are a starting point.
Safe backup run by a user or from a station outside your backup and DR set
The backup utility exports the Safe files to another computer, and the Vault allows it for users with the Backup All Safes authorization. In normal operation only the backup and DR users run it, from the same few machines. A backup by another user, or from another station, is an export of Vault data that was not planned.
- List the Vault users that run your backups and replication, and the addresses of the machines they run from. CyberArk's predefined ones are the Backup and DR users and the Backup Users and DR Users groups.
- Find backups of Safes: codes 94 and 194 (Backup Safe). Read the issuer (
suser) and the Station of the audit record, which CyberArk's sample CEF translator sends assrc. - Flag every record whose issuer or station is not on your list.
Events94194
LimitsNeeds your own list of backup users and machines, and the key your translator writes for the Station. The code table gives no detail fields for codes 94 and 194, so the Safe has to be read from the Safe field of the record. A backup user whose credentials are used from the backup server itself looks normal.
Triage
- Read the user name and the source address of the record. The code table gives them in Info1 and Info2 of codes 477 and 478. Compare the address with the list of your DR and Satellite Vaults.
- Match the time with a planned installation, upgrade or rebuild of a replica.
- Check the history of the DR user. Look for its creation or update (codes 180, 182 and 211), for the member added to the DR Users group (code 265) and for the issuer of each record.
- Look for logons (code 7) of the same user and for records from the same station, and for backups of Safes (codes 94 and 194) by users other than your backup and DR users.
- Treat a registration from an address that is not one of your replicas as a copy of the Vault leaving the environment, until the owner of the address has explained it.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Disable the DR user that registered and block the source address on the network path to the Vault, so that the replication stops.
- Remove the unknown replica from the architecture. In a Distributed Vaults environment, exclude the Satellite Vault as CyberArk documents for satellites that are no longer part of the architecture.
- Find out whether the server key or a recovery key could have been reached from where they are stored. If that cannot be ruled out, start a password change for every account in the Vault, beginning with Tier 0.
- Reset the passwords of the remaining DR and backup users and create new credential files for them.
- Establish how the credentials of the DR user were obtained, and review the servers and credential files of the existing replicas.
Mitigation
- Use one dedicated DR user for each replica, as CyberArk's installation steps do, keep DR users that are not in use disabled, and delete the DR users of replicas that were retired.
- Give each DR user only the Trusted Network Area of its own replica, so that its credentials cannot be used from another address.
- Keep the server key and the recovery keys away from the data. CyberArk's security fundamentals list as minimal requirements that the Operator key is not stored on the same media as the data and that a hardware security module secures it.
- Leave the Backup All Safes and Restore All Safes authorizations with the predefined backup and DR users and groups, as CyberArk recommends, and do not grant them to individual users.
- Forward the Vault audit to your SIEM and compare every registration with a change record.
Frequently asked questions
What does a DR or Satellite Vault receive from the Primary Vault?
CyberArk describes two streams. Data replication copies the external files, which are the Safe files and Safe folders, according to the settings in the replica's PADR.ini file. Metadata replication is based on exports and binary logs and takes place after each action in the Vault has been completed. Replication from a Primary Vault to a Satellite Vault works in the same way as from a production Vault to a single DR Vault.
Can the holder of a replicated copy read the passwords in it?
Not from the copy alone, as far as CyberArk documents. CyberArk describes the contents of a Vault replica as encrypted and states that the information stored in a stopped Vault is completely inaccessible without the server key. This is why the security fundamentals require that the Operator key is not stored on the same media as the data. A copy in the wrong hands is still a serious loss, because only the key now protects it.
Does every restart or failover of a replica write code 477?
CyberArk does not say. The code table gives the name New DR or Satellite Vault registration succeeded, the user name and source address fields and the version, 11.5, and no description of when the record is written. Register a replica in a test environment, or look at the records of your last DR installation, to learn what your version writes before you set the alert's priority.
Is there a public incident report that describes a rogue replica?
No public incident report describes this at the audit event level. The page rests on what CyberArk documents about DR users, replication and the two registration codes.
References
- MITRE ATT&CK T1555.005: Credentials from Password Stores, Password Managers
- CyberArk Docs: Vault Audit Action Codes
- CyberArk Docs: Install the DR Vault (DR user)
- CyberArk Docs: Install the Satellite Vault
- CyberArk Docs: Replicate the Primary Vault to the Satellite Vaults
- CyberArk Docs: Disaster Recovery Users
- CyberArk Docs: Predefined users and groups (DR Users, Backup Users)
- CyberArk Docs: Backup Considerations (backup and restore permissions)
- CyberArk Docs: Vault server keys
- CyberArk Docs: Exclude a Satellite Vault
- CyberArk Docs: Apply trusted network configurations (Trusted Network Areas)
- CyberArk Docs: Security Fundamentals
- CyberArk Docs: Create a Custom XSL Translator File (audit record fields)