1. Resources
  2. Detection rules
  3. Brute Force Against Console Sign-In

Brute Force Against Console Sign-In detection rules

An attacker tries passwords for IAM users or the root user on the AWS sign-in page. IAM has no lockout policy for failed sign-ins, so MFA and monitoring carry the defense. CloudTrail shows many failed ConsoleLogin events from one address.

Platform
AWS
Severity
Medium
Log source
AWS CloudTrail
Last updated
MITRE ATT&CK technique
T1110Brute Force
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft Sentinel
What an attacker needs
The account ID or alias and an IAM user name, or the email address of the root user, for an identity that has a console password.
Impact
Console access with the permissions of the IAM user whose password was guessed, or complete control of the account if it was the root user.
Response
If a sign-in succeeded, change the console password of the identity at once, deactivate its access keys until they are replaced, and review every action it took.
Mitigation
Require multifactor authentication for the root user and for every IAM user that has a console password, with phishing-resistant methods where possible.
CloudTrail events
ConsoleLoginCredentialVerification

How the attack works

The AWS Management Console accepts a password for two kinds of identity: an IAM user, identified by the account ID or alias and a user name, and the root user, identified by an email address. An attacker who knows or guesses these identifiers can try passwords on the sign-in page. The attempts take the usual forms: many passwords for one user, a few common passwords across many users, or user name and password pairs taken from breaches of other services.

The IAM password policy controls length, complexity, expiry and reuse of IAM user passwords. AWS states that a lockout policy, which would lock a user after a number of failed sign-in attempts, cannot be created, and recommends combining a strong password policy with multifactor authentication. A correct guess is therefore only stopped by MFA, and repeated guessing is only noticed by whoever watches the sign-in events.

CloudTrail records the sign-in attempts of IAM users and the root user as ConsoleLogin events from signin.amazonaws.com. A failed attempt carries the value Failure in the ConsoleLogin element of the response and the error message "Failed authentication". When the user name does not exist, CloudTrail hides what was typed and records the user name as HIDDEN_DUE_TO_SECURITY_REASONS. One failed sign-in is a typing mistake. The rule on this page is a threshold rule that counts failed sign-ins per source address, and its values are starting points to tune. Another threshold rule counts the failures per IAM user name, which also catches guessing that is spread over many addresses. IAM Identity Center has sign-in events of its own: a wrong password for a user who authenticates at Identity Center is recorded as a CredentialVerification event from signin.amazonaws.com whose serviceEventDetails.CredentialVerification is Failure. A second threshold rule counts those per source address.

What an attacker needs

  • The account ID or alias and an IAM user name, or the email address of the root user.
  • An identity that has a console password. IAM users without a console password cannot be attacked this way.

Impact

Console access with the permissions of the IAM user whose password was guessed, or complete control of the account if it was the root user. With MFA on the identity, the password alone does not complete the sign-in. Without it, one correct guess is a session, from which the attacker can create access keys and further identities to stay in the account.

Detection rules

Many Failed Console Sign-Ins for One IAM User

Counts, per IAM user name, the AWS Management Console sign-ins that failed (ConsoleLogin events with responseElements.ConsoleLogin set to Failure and userIdentity.type IAMUser). Ten or more failures for one user within an hour fit password guessing against that user, including guessing that is spread over many source addresses and therefore stays below the per-address rule of this page. IAM has no lockout policy for failed sign-ins, so the count is where repeated attempts against one user show. CloudTrail names the user in userIdentity.userName; failures with a user name that does not exist carry the placeholder HIDDEN_DUE_TO_SECURITY_REASONS and are left out. The count and the window are starting points to tune.

Fires when one userIdentity.userName has at least 10 matching events within 1 hour.

Threshold ruleLevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceAWS CloudTrail
title: Failed IAM User Console Sign-In (Per-User Base Event)
id: b420ff4d-b59e-4fdf-975c-cb2b874c5cff
name: aws_console_sign_in_failed_iam_user
status: experimental
description: >-
  Base event of the threshold rule in this file. A ConsoleLogin event from
  signin.amazonaws.com whose response element ConsoleLogin holds the value
  Failure and whose identity type is IAMUser, as in the "IAM user,
  unsuccessful sign-in" example of the AWS console sign-in events reference.
  Attempts with a user name that does not exist are left out, because
  CloudTrail records all of them under the same placeholder name.
logsource:
  product: aws
  service: cloudtrail
detection:
  selection:
    eventSource: signin.amazonaws.com
    eventName: ConsoleLogin
    responseElements.ConsoleLogin: Failure
    userIdentity.type: IAMUser
  filter_unknown_user:
    userIdentity.userName: HIDDEN_DUE_TO_SECURITY_REASONS
  condition: selection and not filter_unknown_user
level: low
---
title: Many Failed Console Sign-Ins for One IAM User
id: 9d25660d-daa3-41e9-a7f3-557ea03fd9b3
status: experimental
description: >-
  Counts, per IAM user name, the AWS Management Console sign-ins that failed
  (ConsoleLogin events with responseElements.ConsoleLogin set to Failure and
  userIdentity.type IAMUser). Ten or more failures for one user within an hour
  fit password guessing against that user, including guessing that is spread
  over many source addresses and therefore stays below the per-address rule of
  this page. IAM has no lockout policy for failed sign-ins, so the count is
  where repeated attempts against one user show. CloudTrail names the user in
  userIdentity.userName; failures with a user name that does not exist carry
  the placeholder HIDDEN_DUE_TO_SECURITY_REASONS and are left out. The count
  and the window are starting points to tune.
references:
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudtrail-event-reference-aws-console-sign-in-events.html
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudtrail-event-reference-user-identity.html
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_credentials_passwords_account-policy.html
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.credential-access
  - attack.t1110
correlation:
  type: event_count
  rules:
    - aws_console_sign_in_failed_iam_user
  group-by:
    - userIdentity.userName
  timespan: 1h
  condition:
    gte: 10
falsepositives:
  - A password manager, browser extension or script that keeps submitting an old password for one user after a password change.
  - Logs from several AWS accounts in one place, where two accounts have an IAM user with the same name; their failures add up. Add the account (recipientAccountId) to the grouping where your SIEM maps it.
  - The values of 10 failures and one hour are starting points, not tested limits. Measure how often your users mistype and adjust both.
level: medium

False positives

  • A password manager, browser extension or script that keeps submitting an old password for one user after a password change.
  • Logs from several AWS accounts in one place, where two accounts have an IAM user with the same name; their failures add up. Add the account (recipientAccountId) to the grouping where your SIEM maps it.
  • The values of 10 failures and one hour are starting points, not tested limits. Measure how often your users mistype and adjust both.

Many Failed Console Sign-Ins From One Source Address

Counts, per source IP address, the AWS Management Console sign-ins that failed (ConsoleLogin events with responseElements.ConsoleLogin set to Failure). The count includes IAM users, the root user and attempts with a user name that does not exist, which CloudTrail records with the user name HIDDEN_DUE_TO_SECURITY_REASONS. Ten or more failures from one address within 15 minutes are more than a forgotten password and fit password guessing or spraying against the account. IAM has no lockout policy for failed sign-ins, so this count is the only place where repeated attempts show. The count and the window are starting points to tune. Sign-in events are recorded in different Regions depending on the user type and the endpoint, so the trail has to cover all Regions. Users who sign in through an identity provider enter their password there, and a wrong password at the identity provider does not produce this event.

Fires when one sourceIPAddress has at least 10 matching events within 15 minutes.

Threshold ruleLevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceAWS CloudTrail
title: Failed Console Sign-In (Brute Force Base Event)
id: aac62482-f459-418b-9289-8d7646bc38e6
name: aws_console_sign_in_failed
status: experimental
description: >-
  Base event of the threshold rule in this file. A ConsoleLogin event from
  signin.amazonaws.com whose response element ConsoleLogin holds the value
  Failure, as in the "unsuccessful sign-in" examples of the AWS console
  sign-in events reference.
logsource:
  product: aws
  service: cloudtrail
detection:
  selection:
    eventSource: signin.amazonaws.com
    eventName: ConsoleLogin
    responseElements.ConsoleLogin: Failure
  condition: selection
level: low
---
title: Many Failed Console Sign-Ins From One Source Address
id: be5dd798-3050-4b90-8b3b-265e18621974
status: experimental
description: >-
  Counts, per source IP address, the AWS Management Console sign-ins that
  failed (ConsoleLogin events with responseElements.ConsoleLogin set to
  Failure). The count includes IAM users, the root user and attempts with a
  user name that does not exist, which CloudTrail records with the user name
  HIDDEN_DUE_TO_SECURITY_REASONS. Ten or more failures from one address within
  15 minutes are more than a forgotten password and fit password guessing or
  spraying against the account. IAM has no lockout policy for failed
  sign-ins, so this count is the only place where repeated attempts show. The
  count and the window are starting points to tune. Sign-in events are
  recorded in different Regions depending on the user type and the endpoint,
  so the trail has to cover all Regions. Users who sign in through an identity
  provider enter their password there, and a wrong password at the identity
  provider does not produce this event.
references:
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudtrail-event-reference-aws-console-sign-in-events.html
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudtrail-event-reference-user-identity.html
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_credentials_passwords_account-policy.html
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-15
tags:
  - attack.credential-access
  - attack.t1110
correlation:
  type: event_count
  rules:
    - aws_console_sign_in_failed
  group-by:
    - sourceIPAddress
  timespan: 15m
  condition:
    gte: 10
falsepositives:
  - Several people behind one office or VPN address who mistype their password in the same period, for example after a password expiry. Exclude your own egress addresses or give them a higher count.
  - A password manager, browser extension or automation that keeps submitting an old password for one user.
  - The values of 10 failures and 15 minutes are starting points, not tested limits. Accounts with few IAM users can use a much lower count; measure what is normal for yours and adjust both.
level: medium

False positives

  • Several people behind one office or VPN address who mistype their password in the same period, for example after a password expiry. Exclude your own egress addresses or give them a higher count.
  • A password manager, browser extension or automation that keeps submitting an old password for one user.
  • The values of 10 failures and 15 minutes are starting points, not tested limits. Accounts with few IAM users can use a much lower count; measure what is normal for yours and adjust both.

Many Failed IAM Identity Center Password Verifications From One Source Address

Counts, per source IP address, the IAM Identity Center sign-ins in which the password was wrong. AWS documents that Identity Center writes a CredentialVerification event each time a user attempts to solve a credential challenge, with the result in serviceEventDetails.CredentialVerification and the credential type in additionalEventData.CredentialType, and publishes an example of a failed password verification. Ten or more failures from one address within 15 minutes are more than a forgotten password and fit password guessing or spraying against the access portal. The count and the window are starting points to tune. The rule applies where users enter their password at Identity Center (the Identity Center directory or a connected Active Directory): with an external identity provider a wrong password is rejected there and never reaches this event. The failed events carry no user identity (userIdentity.type is Unknown in AWS's example), so the rule groups by address and cannot count per user.

Fires when one sourceIPAddress has at least 10 matching events within 15 minutes.

Threshold ruleLevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceAWS CloudTrail
title: IAM Identity Center Password Verification Failed (Base Event)
id: 0a6e692d-8af1-42b5-99ce-07c247182fa6
name: aws_identity_center_password_verification_failed
status: experimental
description: >-
  Base event of the threshold rule in this file. A CredentialVerification
  event from signin.amazonaws.com for the credential type PASSWORD whose
  serviceEventDetails.CredentialVerification is Failure, as in AWS's example
  of a failed IAM Identity Center sign-in with an incorrect password.
logsource:
  product: aws
  service: cloudtrail
detection:
  selection:
    eventSource: signin.amazonaws.com
    eventName: CredentialVerification
    additionalEventData.CredentialType: PASSWORD
    serviceEventDetails.CredentialVerification: Failure
  condition: selection
level: low
---
title: Many Failed IAM Identity Center Password Verifications From One Source Address
id: 61af69d7-7040-4476-a1e1-62ca78cf5289
status: experimental
description: >-
  Counts, per source IP address, the IAM Identity Center sign-ins in which
  the password was wrong. AWS documents that Identity Center writes a
  CredentialVerification event each time a user attempts to solve a
  credential challenge, with the result in
  serviceEventDetails.CredentialVerification and the credential type in
  additionalEventData.CredentialType, and publishes an example of a failed
  password verification. Ten or more failures from one address within 15
  minutes are more than a forgotten password and fit password guessing or
  spraying against the access portal. The count and the window are starting
  points to tune. The rule applies where users enter their password at
  Identity Center (the Identity Center directory or a connected Active
  Directory): with an external identity provider a wrong password is
  rejected there and never reaches this event. The failed events carry no
  user identity (userIdentity.type is Unknown in AWS's example), so the
  rule groups by address and cannot count per user.
references:
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/singlesignon/latest/userguide/understanding-sign-in-events.html
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/singlesignon/latest/userguide/sign-in-events-examples.html
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.credential-access
  - attack.t1110
correlation:
  type: event_count
  rules:
    - aws_identity_center_password_verification_failed
  group-by:
    - sourceIPAddress
  timespan: 15m
  condition:
    gte: 10
falsepositives:
  - Several people behind one office or VPN address who mistype their password in the same period, for example after a password expiry. Exclude your own egress addresses or give them a higher count.
  - The values of 10 failures and 15 minutes are starting points, not tested limits. Measure what is normal for your access portal and adjust both.
level: medium

False positives

  • Several people behind one office or VPN address who mistype their password in the same period, for example after a password expiry. Exclude your own egress addresses or give them a higher count.
  • The values of 10 failures and 15 minutes are starting points, not tested limits. Measure what is normal for your access portal and adjust both.

Triage

  • Read who was targeted in the failed events. The identity type separates the root user from IAM users, and the user name shows whether one user or many were tried.
  • Count the events whose user name is HIDDEN_DUE_TO_SECURITY_REASONS. They are attempts with a user name that does not exist, which points to someone guessing names.
  • Identify the source address and the user agent. An address of your own network or VPN with one affected user is usually a forgotten password. An unknown address that tries several users is not.
  • Search for a successful ConsoleLogin from the same address, or for the same users from any new address, during and after the failures, and read whether MFA was used.
  • If a sign-in succeeded, review the CloudTrail activity of that identity from that moment, with priority on new access keys, new users and roles, policy changes and changes to logging.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. If a sign-in succeeded, change the console password of the identity at once, deactivate its access keys until they have been replaced, and review every action it took after the sign-in.
  2. Remove what the attacker created or changed, such as access keys, users, roles, policies and login profiles, and check that logging and security services were not switched off.
  3. If the root user was involved, change its password, check its MFA devices and access keys, verify the contact details of the account and contact AWS Support.
  4. Enforce MFA on every identity that was targeted before it is used again, and remove console passwords that are not needed.
  5. Keep the threshold rule on a lower count for the targeted users for the following weeks, because the attacker now knows that they exist.

Mitigation

  • Require multifactor authentication for the root user and for every IAM user that has a console password, with phishing-resistant methods such as passkeys or security keys where possible.
  • Give human users federated access through an identity provider or IAM Identity Center with temporary credentials, as AWS recommends, so that IAM users with console passwords become the exception.
  • Remove the console password from IAM users that do not sign in to the console, and remove IAM users that are no longer needed.
  • Set an IAM password policy with a long minimum length. It does not limit the number of attempts, so it complements MFA and does not replace it.
  • Record management events in all Regions. The Region of a ConsoleLogin event depends on the user type and the sign-in endpoint, so a trail limited to one Region misses sign-in attempts.

Frequently asked questions

Does AWS lock an IAM user after repeated failed console sign-ins?

The IAM password policy has no setting for it. AWS documentation states that you cannot create a lockout policy that locks a user out of the account after a specified number of failed sign-in attempts, and recommends combining a strong password policy with multifactor authentication. Watching failed ConsoleLogin events is therefore how guessing gets noticed.

Which CloudTrail field shows that a console sign-in failed?

The ConsoleLogin event from signin.amazonaws.com carries the result in responseElements.ConsoleLogin, which holds Failure for a failed attempt and Success for a successful one. A failed attempt also has the error message "Failed authentication". The rules on this page count the events with the value Failure per source address and per IAM user name.

Why does a failed sign-in event show the user name HIDDEN_DUE_TO_SECURITY_REASONS?

CloudTrail writes this value when a console sign-in fails because of an incorrect user name. It does not record the text that was typed, because the text could be sensitive, for example a password entered in the user name field. Several such events from one address suggest that someone is trying user names that do not exist.

In which Region are console sign-in events recorded?

It depends on the user type and the sign-in endpoint. AWS documents that root user sign-ins are recorded in us-east-1, us-east-2 or us-west-2, and that IAM user sign-ins are recorded in us-east-1 or in another Region, depending on the endpoint and the browser state. Collect management events from all Regions so that no sign-in attempt is missed.

References

We respect your privacy

We use cookies to keep this site secure and working properly. With your permission, we also use optional cookies to understand usage and improve the experience. Cookie Policy

You can change your choice at any time.