How the attack works
IAM Identity Center lets command-line tools sign in with the OAuth 2.0 device authorization grant. The client asks the Identity Center OIDC service to start a device authorization for the organization's AWS access portal and receives a device code, a user code and a verification address. The user opens the address in a browser, signs in and approves the request, and the client exchanges its device code for an access token with CreateToken. In device code phishing the attacker starts the flow and sends the verification link to a user with a pretext. The user signs in on the genuine AWS page, MFA included, and the token is issued to the client that started the flow, which is the attacker's.
AWS documents that such a token grants access to all AWS account entitlements assigned to the user. With it the attacker calls the AWS access portal API as that user: ListAccounts and ListAccountRoles show the accounts and permission sets, and GetRoleCredentials returns temporary credentials for each of them. CloudTrail records the token exchange as CreateToken with event source sso.amazonaws.com, the user in userIdentity.onBehalfOf.userId and the grant type in requestParameters.grantType, which is urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:device_code for this flow. The start of the flow is not among the OIDC events AWS lists for CloudTrail.
What an attacker needs
- The URL of the organization's AWS access portal, which a client sends when it starts a device authorization.
- A way to reach a user, such as email or chat, while the verification code is valid.
- A user who approves a sign-in request that they did not start.
Impact
An Identity Center access token for the user and, through it, temporary role credentials for every account and permission set assigned to that user. If the user is an administrator in several accounts, one approval gives the attacker administrator access across them. The access lasts for as long as the session and the role credentials obtained from it stay valid.
Detection rules
IAM Identity Center Token Issued Through the Device Code Grant
Detects successful CreateToken events of the IAM Identity Center OIDC service whose requestParameters.grantType is urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:device_code. This is the token exchange at the end of a device authorization flow: a user has approved a sign-in request in a browser, and the client that started the flow receives an access token for that user. AWS publishes an example record of this event with exactly this grant type. The grant is legitimate for command-line tools on hosts without a browser and for AWS CLI versions before 2.22.0, and it is the event a device code phishing attack produces. The rule also requires responseElements.tokenType to be Bearer, as in that example record, so that only an exchange in which a token was issued raises an alert. Identify the user from userIdentity.onBehalfOf.userId and compare sourceIPAddress and userAgent with what that user normally works from.
title: IAM Identity Center Token Issued Through the Device Code Grant
id: 7136bd88-743e-4346-9f9e-1d96355373c7
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects successful CreateToken events of the IAM Identity Center OIDC
service whose requestParameters.grantType is
urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:device_code. This is the token exchange at
the end of a device authorization flow: a user has approved a sign-in
request in a browser, and the client that started the flow receives an
access token for that user. AWS publishes an example record of this event
with exactly this grant type. The grant is legitimate for command-line
tools on hosts without a browser and for AWS CLI versions before 2.22.0,
and it is the event a device code phishing attack produces. The rule
also requires responseElements.tokenType to be Bearer, as in that example
record, so that only an exchange in which a token was issued raises an
alert. Identify the user from
userIdentity.onBehalfOf.userId and compare sourceIPAddress and userAgent
with what that user normally works from.
references:
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/singlesignon/latest/userguide/understanding-sso-entries.html
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/singlesignon/latest/userguide/sso-info-in-cloudtrail.html
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/singlesignon/latest/OIDCAPIReference/API_CreateToken.html
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/userguide/cli-configure-sso.html
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1528
logsource:
product: aws
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection:
eventSource: sso.amazonaws.com
eventName: CreateToken
requestParameters.grantType: 'urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:device_code'
responseElements.tokenType: Bearer
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Users who sign in with the AWS CLI or an IDE toolkit through device authorization, on hosts without a browser, with CLI versions before 2.22.0 or with the --use-device-code option. Move those users to a current CLI, and add the source addresses of build hosts that need the flow to a filter_* selection on sourceIPAddress.
level: medium
False positives
- Users who sign in with the AWS CLI or an IDE toolkit through device authorization, on hosts without a browser, with CLI versions before 2.22.0 or with the --use-device-code option. Move those users to a current CLI, and add the source addresses of build hosts that need the flow to a filter_* selection on sourceIPAddress.
Detection logic
Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.
Role credentials for many accounts fetched right after a device code grant
A person who signs in from a command-line tool works in one or two accounts. An attacker who has just received a token wants everything it reaches, lists the accounts and fetches role credentials for many of them within minutes.
- A
CreateTokenevent fromsso.amazonaws.comwhoserequestParameters.grantTypeisurn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:device_code. Note the user inuserIdentity.onBehalfOf.userIdand thesourceIPAddress. - Within 60 minutes,
ListAccounts,ListAccountRolesandGetRoleCredentialsevents fromsso.amazonaws.comwith the sameuserIdentity.onBehalfOf.userId. - Count the
GetRoleCredentialsevents and alert when there are more than the user normally produces, for example five or more within the hour.
EventsCreateTokenListAccountsListAccountRolesGetRoleCredentials
LimitsAWS publishes no example record of GetRoleCredentials, so the fields that name the account and the role have to be read from your own events. Scripts that loop over all accounts of an administrator look the same. The count and the 60 minutes are starting points.
First device code grant of a user, or a grant from a new address
Most people either never use device authorization or use it from the same host every time. The first device code grant of a user, or one whose token exchange comes from a network the user has not worked from, is the phished flow more often than a new habit.
- Collect the
CreateTokenevents fromsso.amazonaws.comthat carry the device code grant inrequestParameters.grantType, over a few weeks. - Keep, for each
userIdentity.onBehalfOf.userId, thesourceIPAddressanduserAgentvalues that were seen. - Alert on the first device code grant of a user, and on a grant whose source address or user agent is new for that user.
EventsCreateToken
LimitsPeople who work from changing networks produce new addresses all the time, and a new laptop or CLI version changes the user agent. The baseline needs a few weeks of data before it is useful. An attacker who exchanges the token from an address range the user also works from does not stand out.
Triage
- Identify the user from userIdentity.onBehalfOf.userId with the Identity Store (DescribeUser), and ask whether they started a sign-in from a command-line tool at that time.
- Compare sourceIPAddress and userAgent of the CreateToken event with the addresses and tools the user normally works from. In a phished flow the token exchange comes from the attacker's client, not from the user's workstation.
- Look for ListAccounts, ListAccountRoles and GetRoleCredentials events from sso.amazonaws.com for the same user after the token was issued, and note which accounts and roles were reached.
- Check whether your organization still uses device authorization at all, for example on hosts without a browser or with older CLI versions. If it does not, every such grant is suspect.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- End the user's active AWS access portal sessions in the IAM Identity Center console, so that the token can no longer be used to fetch role credentials.
- Block the role sessions that already exist. Role credentials obtained through the portal keep working until they expire, so deny the user by its Identity Store user ID in a service control policy until then.
- Review what the roles did in every account the attacker reached, starting from the
GetRoleCredentialsevents, and remove what was created there, such as users, access keys, roles and trust policy changes. - Reset the user's credentials at the identity source if there is any sign that more than the approval was given away.
- Search for other
CreateTokenevents with the device code grant from the same source address, to find other users who approved the same lure.
Mitigation
- Teach users that an approval page or code they did not request themselves is an attack and must be denied. The AWS CLI opens the approval page itself, so a verification link that arrives by mail or chat is not part of a normal sign-in.
- Keep the AWS CLI at version 2.22.0 or later, where sign-in uses the authorization code flow with PKCE by default and device authorization needs the
--use-device-codeoption. Device code grants then become rare, and each one can be reviewed. - Assign permission sets with least privilege and keep administrator access out of the permission sets people use every day, so that one approved request exposes less.
- Keep the session duration of the AWS access portal and of permission sets short, to limit how long a stolen session can be used.
Frequently asked questions
Does MFA stop device code phishing against IAM Identity Center?
No. The user signs in on the genuine AWS page and completes MFA themselves, and the token is then issued to the client that started the flow, which is the attacker's client. What helps is a user who refuses an approval they did not start, together with the detection of device code grants.
Why does this rule become more useful with a current AWS CLI?
Starting with version 2.22.0 the AWS CLI signs in with the authorization code flow with PKCE by default. Device authorization is used by older versions, or when the `--use-device-code` option is given. Once your users are on a current version, a `CreateToken` event with the device code grant is uncommon and can be checked one by one.
Does CloudTrail show the moment the attacker starts the flow?
Not according to what AWS documents. The list of OIDC events that IAM Identity Center publishes for CloudTrail names `CreateToken` and `CreateTokenWithIAM`. The token exchange is therefore the first event to build on, and it is written when the user has already approved the request.
How do I find out which user a CreateToken event belongs to?
These events carry no user name. They identify the user with `userId` and `identityStoreArn` in the `onBehalfOf` element of `userIdentity`. Look the user ID up in the Identity Store, for example with `DescribeUser`, to get the user name, and accept both `IdentityCenterUser` and `Unknown` as the identity type, as AWS advises.
References
- MITRE ATT&CK T1528: Steal Application Access Token
- Understanding CloudTrail events for IAM Identity Center (CreateToken record)
- IAM Identity Center information in CloudTrail (OIDC and AWS access portal events)
- IAM Identity Center OIDC API Reference: CreateToken
- IAM Identity Center OIDC API Reference: StartDeviceAuthorization
- IAM Identity Center OIDC API Reference: Welcome (what the access token grants)
- CloudTrail use cases for IAM Identity Center (identifying the user)
- Configuring IAM Identity Center authentication with the AWS CLI (PKCE and device authorization)
- IAM Identity Center: Use a Deny policy to revoke active user permissions