How the attack works
With centralized root access, the management account of an AWS organization and the delegated administrator account for IAM can perform a small set of root tasks in member accounts without signing in as root. sts:AssumeRoot returns short-term credentials for the root user of a member account, scoped by a task policy to one of five jobs: auditing the root credentials (IAMAuditRootUserCredentials), allowing password recovery for the root user (IAMCreateRootUserPassword), deleting the root credentials (IAMDeleteRootUserCredentials), and deleting a bucket policy or a queue policy that locks everyone out (S3UnlockBucketPolicy, SQSUnlockQueuePolicy). A session lasts at most 900 seconds.
The feature exists to remove standing root credentials, and it also gives whoever controls those two accounts a path into every member account. An attacker with sts:AssumeRoot there can delete the root password, access keys and MFA of member accounts, which the Threat Technique Catalog for AWS describes as a way to lock administrators out. The attacker can also allow password recovery, so that whoever reads the root mailbox can set a new root password, or delete a resource policy that protected data. CloudTrail records the call as AssumeRoot under sts.amazonaws.com, with the member account in requestParameters.targetPrincipal, the task in requestParameters.taskPolicyArn.arn and the access key of the session in responseElements.credentials.accessKeyId. What the session does is logged in the member account with userIdentity.type Root and that access key.
What an attacker needs
- Centralized root access enabled for the organization (root credentials management, privileged root actions in member accounts, or both).
- Credentials for a principal in the management account or in the delegated administrator account for IAM that is allowed sts:AssumeRoot. Root user credentials cannot make the call.
- If the feature is off, the rights to switch it on from the management account (iam:EnableOrganizationsRootCredentialsManagement, iam:EnableOrganizationsRootSessions and trusted access for IAM).
Impact
Short-term root credentials in any member account, limited to the chosen task. Deleting the root credentials removes the last independent way into an account. Allowing password recovery hands the root user to whoever controls the root mailbox. Deleting a bucket policy or a queue policy removes a resource policy, including one that restricted access to data. Each session is short, but the call can be repeated for every member account.
Detection rules
Centralized Root Access Enabled for the Organization
Detects EnableOrganizationsRootCredentialsManagement and EnableOrganizationsRootSessions calls to IAM. The first lets the management account and the delegated administrator for IAM manage the root user credentials of member accounts, and the second lets them perform privileged tasks in member accounts. Together they are the switch that makes sts:AssumeRoot usable in an organization. An organization that adopts the feature sees the events once. Anywhere else they mean that someone in the management account is opening a path into the member accounts. AWS documents that all IAM actions are logged. The rule matches the event names only. It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode, because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
title: Centralized Root Access Enabled for the Organization
id: c47d8f8e-bafa-4681-b010-a28cbd6a5a6b
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects EnableOrganizationsRootCredentialsManagement and
EnableOrganizationsRootSessions calls to IAM. The first lets the
management account and the delegated administrator for IAM manage the root
user credentials of member accounts, and the second lets them perform
privileged tasks in member accounts. Together they are the switch that
makes sts:AssumeRoot usable in an organization. An organization that
adopts the feature sees the events once. Anywhere else they mean that
someone in the management account is opening a path into the member
accounts. AWS documents that all IAM actions are logged. The rule matches
the event names only.
It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode,
because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
references:
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_root-enable-root-access.html
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_EnableOrganizationsRootSessions.html
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_EnableOrganizationsRootCredentialsManagement.html
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1548.005
logsource:
product: aws
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection:
eventSource: iam.amazonaws.com
eventName:
- EnableOrganizationsRootCredentialsManagement
- EnableOrganizationsRootSessions
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- The one-time adoption of centralized root access by the cloud platform team, which is a planned project with a change record.
level: high
False positives
- The one-time adoption of centralized root access by the cloud platform team, which is a planned project with a change record.
Root Session Assumed for an Organization Member Account
Detects AssumeRoot calls to AWS STS. The call returns short-term root credentials for a member account of the organization and can be made only from the management account or the delegated administrator account for IAM, after centralized root access has been enabled. AWS publishes an example record with the member account in requestParameters.targetPrincipal, the task policy in requestParameters.taskPolicyArn.arn and the access key ID of the session in responseElements.credentials.accessKeyId. Use that access key ID to find what the session did in the member account. The event is logged in the Region of the STS endpoint that was called, because the global endpoint does not support AssumeRoot. It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode, because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
title: Root Session Assumed for an Organization Member Account
id: 9fb5e050-8ec7-407a-ba08-a9d2cc82b38b
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects AssumeRoot calls to AWS STS. The call returns short-term root
credentials for a member account of the organization and can be made only
from the management account or the delegated administrator account for
IAM, after centralized root access has been enabled. AWS publishes an
example record with the member account in requestParameters.targetPrincipal,
the task policy in requestParameters.taskPolicyArn.arn and the access key
ID of the session in responseElements.credentials.accessKeyId. Use that
access key ID to find what the session did in the member account. The
event is logged in the Region of the STS endpoint that was called, because
the global endpoint does not support AssumeRoot.
It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode,
because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
references:
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-track-privileged-tasks.html
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/STS/latest/APIReference/API_AssumeRoot.html
- https://aws-samples.github.io/threat-technique-catalog-for-aws/Techniques/AT1669.html
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/005/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1548.005
logsource:
product: aws
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection:
eventSource: sts.amazonaws.com
eventName: AssumeRoot
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Planned root tasks by the cloud platform or security team, such as the audit of root credentials across the organization or the removal of a bucket policy that locked everyone out. Match each call to a change record. Audits with the IAMAuditRootUserCredentials task can be moved to a filter_* selection on requestParameters.taskPolicyArn.arn once they run on a schedule.
level: medium
False positives
- Planned root tasks by the cloud platform or security team, such as the audit of root credentials across the organization or the removal of a bucket policy that locked everyone out. Match each call to a change record. Audits with the IAMAuditRootUserCredentials task can be moved to a filter_* selection on requestParameters.taskPolicyArn.arn once they run on a schedule.
Root Session Assumed to Recover or Delete Member Account Root Credentials
Detects AssumeRoot calls whose requestParameters.taskPolicyArn.arn ends with IAMCreateRootUserPassword or IAMDeleteRootUserCredentials. These are the two task policies that change the root credentials of a member account. The first allows password recovery, after which whoever reads the root mailbox of the account can set a root password. The second deletes the root password, access keys and signing certificates and deactivates MFA, which removes the last independent way into the account. Check the member account in requestParameters.targetPrincipal and the caller in userIdentity.arn against a change record. It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode, because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
title: Root Session Assumed to Recover or Delete Member Account Root Credentials
id: e99fd00e-4ce4-4f16-87af-13efeb0802a3
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects AssumeRoot calls whose requestParameters.taskPolicyArn.arn ends
with IAMCreateRootUserPassword or IAMDeleteRootUserCredentials. These are
the two task policies that change the root credentials of a member
account. The first allows password recovery, after which whoever reads the
root mailbox of the account can set a root password. The second deletes
the root password, access keys and signing certificates and deactivates
MFA, which removes the last independent way into the account. Check the
member account in requestParameters.targetPrincipal and the caller in
userIdentity.arn against a change record.
It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode,
because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
references:
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-track-privileged-tasks.html
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_root-user-privileged-task.html
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/STS/latest/APIReference/API_AssumeRoot.html
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/005/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1548.005
logsource:
product: aws
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection:
eventSource: sts.amazonaws.com
eventName: AssumeRoot
requestParameters.taskPolicyArn.arn|endswith:
- '/IAMCreateRootUserPassword'
- '/IAMDeleteRootUserCredentials'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- The project that removes root credentials from member accounts after centralized root access was enabled, and a planned recovery of a root user for a task that needs root. Both are rare and have a change record.
level: high
False positives
- The project that removes root credentials from member accounts after centralized root access was enabled, and a planned recovery of a root user for a task that needs root. Both are rare and have a change record.
Detection logic
Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.
Root activity in a member account that no approved AssumeRoot call explains
Where the root credentials of member accounts were deleted, every root action in a member account should trace back to an AssumeRoot call by the break-glass role. A root event without such a call means that root credentials exist again, and a call by another principal means that the path is used outside the process.
- In the management account and the delegated administrator account, collect
AssumeRootevents fromsts.amazonaws.comwithrequestParameters.targetPrincipal,responseElements.credentials.accessKeyIdand the caller inuserIdentity.arn. - In the member accounts, collect the events whose
userIdentity.typeisRootand takeuserIdentity.accessKeyId. - Join the two on the access key ID. Alert on root events in a member account that have no matching
AssumeRootcall, and on matches whose caller is not your break-glass role.
EventsAssumeRoot
LimitsIt needs the CloudTrail events of all member accounts and of the two central accounts in one place. A root sign-in to the console is not part of an AssumeRoot session and always appears as unmatched, which is correct but has to be expected in accounts that still have a root password.
Password recovery allowed for a member account and a root sign-in that follows
Allowing password recovery does not give the caller the root password. It lets whoever reads the root mailbox of the member account set one. A root console sign-in to that account in the days after the session is the moment the root user came back to life.
- An
AssumeRootevent fromsts.amazonaws.comwhoserequestParameters.taskPolicyArn.arnends withIAMCreateRootUserPassword. Note the member account inrequestParameters.targetPrincipal. - Within 7 days, a
ConsoleLoginevent fromsignin.amazonaws.comin that member account whoseuserIdentity.typeisRoot. - Check with the owner of the root mailbox whether they reset the password, and compare the
sourceIPAddressof the sign-in with the addresses your administrators use.
EventsAssumeRootConsoleLogin
LimitsA planned recovery of a root user for a task that needs root produces exactly this pair, so it has to be matched to a change record. The 7 days are a starting point. A sign-in that happens later is shown only by the rules for root user activity.
Triage
- Read requestParameters.targetPrincipal (the member account) and requestParameters.taskPolicyArn.arn (the task), and identify the caller in userIdentity.arn. Check for an approved change that names this account and this task.
- Take responseElements.credentials.accessKeyId and search the CloudTrail events of the member account for that access key ID. They show what the session did, with userIdentity.type Root.
- Count the member accounts the same caller opened sessions for. An audit walks through many accounts, but deletions and recoveries of root credentials in many accounts are a different matter.
- For the events that enable centralized root access, check who enabled it and whether a delegated administrator for IAM was registered around the same time (RegisterDelegatedAdministrator).
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Contain the principal that called
AssumeRoot. Deactivate its access keys or revoke its role sessions in the management account or the delegated administrator account, and removests:AssumeRootfrom identities that do not need it. - For each member account that was visited, list what the root session did from the events that carry the access key ID of the session, and undo it. Put back a bucket policy or a queue policy that was deleted.
- If password recovery was allowed for a member account, find out whether the root password was reset and by whom, and delete the root credentials again once the account is under your control.
- If root credentials were deleted to lock you out, start a root session of your own to allow recovery where you need the root user, and review the roles and users of the account for changes made in the same period.
- Review who can reach the management account and the delegated administrator account, because every session started there.
Mitigation
- Restrict sts:AssumeRoot in the management account and in the delegated administrator account to a break-glass role, and use the
sts:TaskPolicyArncondition key to limit which tasks a role may start. - Choose the delegated administrator account for IAM with care, because for these tasks it has the same reach into member accounts as the management account.
- Keep the mailbox of every member account root user under your control and monitored, because password recovery sends the reset to it.
- Alert on every AssumeRoot call and match it to a change record. The task is in the event, so recovery and deletion of root credentials can be told apart from audits.
Frequently asked questions
Where is the AssumeRoot call logged, and where are the actions of the session?
The call is logged where it was made, in the management account or the delegated administrator account for IAM, and in the Region of the STS endpoint that was used, because the global endpoint does not support `AssumeRoot`. The actions of the session are logged in the member account, with `userIdentity.type` `Root` and the access key ID that the `AssumeRoot` response returned.
Does a denied AssumeRoot attempt show up in the member account?
No. AWS documents that CloudTrail does not log denied AWS STS requests in the target account for privileged sessions initiated through the `AssumeRoot` API. Look for failed calls in the account that made the request.
Can a root session do everything the root user can?
No. Every session is scoped by one of five AWS managed task policies and lasts at most 900 seconds. The tasks are auditing the root credentials, allowing password recovery, deleting the root credentials, and deleting a bucket policy or a queue policy. Some of them are destructive, which is why one rule on this page singles out the two tasks that change root credentials.
Why watch the events that enable centralized root access?
`AssumeRoot` works only after the feature has been enabled for the organization, with `EnableOrganizationsRootCredentialsManagement` and `EnableOrganizationsRootSessions`. An organization that has not chosen to use the feature should not see these events at all, and one that has chosen it sees them once.
References
- MITRE ATT&CK T1548.005: Temporary Elevated Cloud Access
- Track privileged tasks in AWS CloudTrail (AssumeRoot record)
- AWS STS API Reference: AssumeRoot
- Centralize root access for member accounts
- Perform a privileged task on an AWS Organizations member account
- IAM API Reference: EnableOrganizationsRootSessions
- Logging IAM and AWS STS API calls with AWS CloudTrail (denied AssumeRoot requests)
- Threat Technique Catalog for AWS: Assume Root into Organization Member Account (AT1669)