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Privileged Access Manager Entitlement Changed or Grant Activated in Google Cloud detection rules

An attacker creates or loosens a Privileged Access Manager entitlement, or gets a grant approved, and receives privileged roles on demand through a path that leaves no standing role binding to review.

Platform
Google Cloud
Severity
High
Log source
Google Cloud Audit Logs
Last updated
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft SentinelIBM QRadar
What an attacker needs
The right to create or update a Privileged Access Manager entitlement, or control of a requester and, where approval is required, of an approver.
Impact
The roles of the entitlement on its organization, folder or project, on demand and repeatedly, with no role binding in the allow policy between grants.
Response
Revoke the active grants, restore or delete the entitlement, and contain the caller, the requester and any approver whose approval looks wrong.
Mitigation
Keep the Privileged Access Manager Admin role to very few identities and require approval by separate approvers on every privileged entitlement.
API methods
*PrivilegedAccessManager.CreateEntitlement*PrivilegedAccessManager.UpdateEntitlement*PrivilegedAccessManager.ApproveGrant*PrivilegedAccessManager.CreateGrant*PrivilegedAccessManager.UpdateSettings
Threat groups
None listed in MITRE ATT&CK for this technique

How the attack works

Privileged Access Manager (PAM) gives just-in-time access in Google Cloud. An administrator creates an entitlement on an organization, a folder or a project. The entitlement names the principals that may request access, up to 30 roles they receive, the maximum duration (at most 7 days), and whether a request needs approval and from whom. A requester then creates a grant against the entitlement. Once the grant is active, PAM adds role bindings with a time condition to the allow policy and removes them when the grant ends. Google states that requesting, approving and denying grants needs no PAM permission at all. Being named in the entitlement is enough.

That makes the entitlement the thing to protect. Whoever can create or update one decides who can obtain which roles and whether anybody has to approve. An attacker with that right adds an identity they control as a requester, removes the approval step, raises the roles or the duration, or creates a new entitlement with an ordinary name. From then on privileged access can be switched on for hours or days at a time, and between grants the allow policy shows no binding for that identity. A compromised approver is the second path, because approving the attacker's own request is all it takes. A request that needs no approval becomes active on its own. PAM writes every one of these steps to the Admin Activity audit log, which is always written, under the service name privilegedaccessmanager.googleapis.com.

What an attacker needs

  • To create, update or delete entitlements, the Privileged Access Manager Admin role together with an IAM administration role on the same resource (privilegedaccessmanager.entitlements.create, privilegedaccessmanager.entitlements.update).
  • To change the PAM settings of a resource, the PAM Settings Admin role (privilegedaccessmanager.settings.update).
  • To obtain access through an existing entitlement, control of a principal that the entitlement names as a requester, and for entitlements with approval also of an approver.

Impact

The roles listed in the entitlement, on the organization, folder or project it belongs to, for as long as each grant lasts and as often as a new grant is requested. Entitlements can carry predefined and custom roles and the Admin, Writer and Reader basic roles. Because the access exists only while a grant is active, a review of the allow policy between grants does not show it.

Detection rules

Privileged Access Manager Entitlement Created or Updated

Detects creation and update of a Privileged Access Manager entitlement in the v1, v1beta and v1alpha APIs (Admin Activity audit log, always written). An entitlement decides which principals can obtain which roles, for how long, and whether a request needs approval, so a new or changed entitlement can open a standing path to privileged roles. Google documents the method names, their permissions and the log type but publishes no example of the entry, so the rule matches on the method name alone and does not see what was changed. Read the entitlement named in protoPayload.resourceName and check its requesters, roles, maximum duration and approval workflow. Google marks both methods as long-running operations, which usually write a start and a completion entry.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceGoogle Cloud Audit Logs
title: Privileged Access Manager Entitlement Created or Updated
id: d2f1bfa9-d238-4f6f-bf61-d5a32d1095a5
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects creation and update of a Privileged Access Manager entitlement in
  the v1, v1beta and v1alpha APIs (Admin Activity audit log, always
  written). An entitlement decides which principals can obtain which roles,
  for how long, and whether a request needs approval, so a new or changed
  entitlement can open a standing path to privileged roles. Google documents
  the method names, their permissions and the log type but publishes no
  example of the entry, so the rule matches on the method name alone and
  does not see what was changed. Read the entitlement named in
  protoPayload.resourceName and check its requesters, roles, maximum duration
  and approval workflow. Google marks both methods as long-running
  operations, which usually write a start and a completion entry.
references:
  - https://docs.cloud.google.com/iam/docs/audit-logging/audit-logging-pam
  - https://docs.cloud.google.com/iam/docs/pam-create-entitlements
  - https://docs.cloud.google.com/iam/docs/pam-view-update-delete-entitlements
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1548.005
logsource:
  product: gcp
  service: gcp.audit
detection:
  selection:
    protoPayload.serviceName: privilegedaccessmanager.googleapis.com
    protoPayload.methodName|endswith:
      - PrivilegedAccessManager.CreateEntitlement
      - PrivilegedAccessManager.UpdateEntitlement
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Planned set-up and maintenance of entitlements by the team that owns privileged access, often through infrastructure-as-code. Exclude that pipeline by principalEmail in a filter_* selection and review every change made by a person.
level: medium

False positives

  • Planned set-up and maintenance of entitlements by the team that owns privileged access, often through infrastructure-as-code. Exclude that pipeline by principalEmail in a filter_* selection and review every change made by a person.

Privileged Access Manager Grant Approved

Detects ApproveGrant calls to Privileged Access Manager in the v1, v1beta and v1alpha APIs (Admin Activity audit log, always written). The approval is the step that turns a pending request into active privileged roles. Google documents that approvers need no PAM permission, only to be named in the entitlement, and that nobody can approve their own request. A compromised approver account is therefore enough to activate another identity's request. The caller in principalEmail is the approver and protoPayload.resourceName names the grant. Every legitimate approval writes the same entry, so the level is low. Google documents the method name and the log type but no example of the entry, so the rule matches on the method name alone.

LevelLowStatusExperimentalLog sourceGoogle Cloud Audit Logs
title: Privileged Access Manager Grant Approved
id: 6e273916-c4eb-41f6-b647-a4dd9ed7ecba
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects ApproveGrant calls to Privileged Access Manager in the v1, v1beta
  and v1alpha APIs (Admin Activity audit log, always written). The approval
  is the step that turns a pending request into active privileged roles.
  Google documents that approvers need no PAM permission, only to be named
  in the entitlement, and that nobody can approve their own request. A
  compromised approver account is therefore enough to activate another
  identity's request. The caller in principalEmail is the approver and
  protoPayload.resourceName names the grant. Every legitimate approval
  writes the same entry, so the level is low. Google documents the method
  name and the log type but no example of the entry, so the rule matches on
  the method name alone.
references:
  - https://docs.cloud.google.com/iam/docs/audit-logging/audit-logging-pam
  - https://docs.cloud.google.com/iam/docs/pam-approve-deny-grants
  - https://docs.cloud.google.com/iam/docs/pam-permissions-and-setup
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1548.005
logsource:
  product: gcp
  service: gcp.audit
detection:
  selection:
    protoPayload.serviceName: privilegedaccessmanager.googleapis.com
    protoPayload.methodName|endswith: PrivilegedAccessManager.ApproveGrant
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Every legitimate approval. Review approvals given by a service account where automated approval is not in use, approvals outside working hours, and approvals that follow the request within seconds.
level: low

False positives

  • Every legitimate approval. Review approvals given by a service account where automated approval is not in use, approvals outside working hours, and approvals that follow the request within seconds.

Privileged Access Manager Grant Requested

Detects CreateGrant calls to Privileged Access Manager in the v1, v1beta and v1alpha APIs (Admin Activity audit log, always written). A grant is a request for the roles of an entitlement. When the entitlement requires no approval the grant becomes active without any further step, so this entry is then the only record of privileged access being switched on. Every legitimate request writes the same entry, so the level is low and the rule is a record to review and to join with other signals. The caller in principalEmail is the requester and protoPayload.resourceName names the entitlement. Google documents the method name and the log type but no example of the entry, so the rule matches on the method name alone.

LevelLowStatusExperimentalLog sourceGoogle Cloud Audit Logs
title: Privileged Access Manager Grant Requested
id: 1c258ff4-4dd0-4d3b-b833-7755966ef27a
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects CreateGrant calls to Privileged Access Manager in the v1, v1beta
  and v1alpha APIs (Admin Activity audit log, always written). A grant is a
  request for the roles of an entitlement. When the entitlement requires no
  approval the grant becomes active without any further step, so this entry
  is then the only record of privileged access being switched on. Every
  legitimate request writes the same entry, so the level is low and the rule
  is a record to review and to join with other signals. The caller in
  principalEmail is the requester and protoPayload.resourceName names the
  entitlement. Google documents the method name and the log type but no
  example of the entry, so the rule matches on the method name alone.
references:
  - https://docs.cloud.google.com/iam/docs/audit-logging/audit-logging-pam
  - https://docs.cloud.google.com/iam/docs/pam-request-temporary-elevated-access
  - https://docs.cloud.google.com/iam/docs/pam-overview
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1548.005
logsource:
  product: gcp
  service: gcp.audit
detection:
  selection:
    protoPayload.serviceName: privilegedaccessmanager.googleapis.com
    protoPayload.methodName|endswith: PrivilegedAccessManager.CreateGrant
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Every legitimate request for temporary access by engineers and on-call staff. Limit the rule to the entitlements that carry the most privileged roles by adding protoPayload.resourceName to the selection, or to requests outside working hours, and review requesters who have not used the entitlement before.
level: low

False positives

  • Every legitimate request for temporary access by engineers and on-call staff. Limit the rule to the entitlements that carry the most privileged roles by adding protoPayload.resourceName to the selection, or to requests outside working hours, and review requesters who have not used the entitlement before.

Privileged Access Manager Settings Updated

Detects UpdateSettings calls to Privileged Access Manager (Admin Activity audit log, always written). Google documents two things these settings control for an organization, folder or project. They decide whether service accounts, agent identities and workload identity pool identities may act as approvers of grants, and they can turn off the email notifications PAM sends about grants. Allowing automated approvers lets a compromised service account approve requests, and turning notifications off hides activations from the people who would notice them. Google lists the method only in the v1alpha and v1beta APIs and describes the feature as a preview. It documents the method name and the log type but no example of the entry, so the rule matches on the method name alone. Read the current settings of the resource named in protoPayload.resourceName.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceGoogle Cloud Audit Logs
title: Privileged Access Manager Settings Updated
id: dafd856f-44e7-4877-9d30-faf8f546f07d
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects UpdateSettings calls to Privileged Access Manager (Admin Activity
  audit log, always written). Google documents two things these settings
  control for an organization, folder or project. They decide whether
  service accounts, agent identities and workload identity pool identities
  may act as approvers of grants, and they can turn off the email
  notifications PAM sends about grants. Allowing automated approvers lets a
  compromised service account approve requests, and turning notifications
  off hides activations from the people who would notice them. Google lists
  the method only in the v1alpha and v1beta APIs and describes the feature
  as a preview. It documents the method name and the log type but no example
  of the entry, so the rule matches on the method name alone. Read the
  current settings of the resource named in protoPayload.resourceName.
references:
  - https://docs.cloud.google.com/iam/docs/audit-logging/audit-logging-pam
  - https://docs.cloud.google.com/iam/docs/pam-configure-settings
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1548.005
logsource:
  product: gcp
  service: gcp.audit
detection:
  selection:
    protoPayload.serviceName: privilegedaccessmanager.googleapis.com
    protoPayload.methodName|endswith: PrivilegedAccessManager.UpdateSettings
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - A planned change by the PAM settings administrator, for example when approvals are automated through a ticket system. Settings changes are rare. Confirm each one with the team that owns privileged access.
level: medium

False positives

  • A planned change by the PAM settings administrator, for example when approvals are automated through a ticket system. Settings changes are rare. Confirm each one with the team that owns privileged access.

Detection logic

Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.

Entitlement created or changed and a grant requested against it soon after

Detection hypothesisSequence of events

An attacker who creates or loosens an entitlement does it to use it. A grant requested against an entitlement within hours of its creation or change, above all by the identity that made the change or by a requester the entitlement did not have before, is the path being opened and used.

  1. A CreateEntitlement or UpdateEntitlement entry from privilegedaccessmanager.googleapis.com. Note the entitlement in protoPayload.resourceName and the caller in protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail.
  2. Within 24 hours a CreateGrant entry whose grant belongs to the same entitlement. Google documents grant names in the form entitlements/ENTITLEMENT_ID/grants/GRANT_ID.
  3. Raise the priority when the caller of both entries is the same, or when no ApproveGrant entry exists for the grant, which means the entitlement needs no approval.

EventsCreateEntitlementUpdateEntitlementCreateGrantApproveGrant

LimitsA team that sets up a new entitlement tests it with a first grant in the same way, so the change record decides. Google publishes no example of these entries, so check how your entries name the entitlement and the grant before joining on them. The 24 hours are a starting point.

Triage

  • Identify the caller (protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail) and the entitlement or grant in protoPayload.resourceName. A grant is named under its entitlement, in the form entitlements/ENTITLEMENT_ID/grants/GRANT_ID.
  • For an entitlement change, read the entitlement as it is now. Check the requesters, the roles, the maximum duration and whether approval is still required, and compare them with what its owner expects.
  • For a grant, check who requested it, the justification, who approved it and whether the requester normally uses that entitlement.
  • Review what the requester did while the grant was active, starting with allow policy changes, service account keys and access to data.
  • Check whether the caller of an entitlement change was itself added as a requester or approver, and whether a grant followed soon after.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Revoke the active grants of the entitlement, then confirm in the allow policy that the time-bound role bindings of those grants are gone.
  2. Restore the entitlement to its approved state, or delete it if nobody owns it. Google documents that an entitlement with active grants cannot be deleted until the grants are revoked.
  3. Contain the identities involved, which are the caller of the entitlement change, the requester and, where an approval looks wrong, the approver.
  4. Review the audit entries of the requester for the time each grant was active, and remove what was created with the granted roles.
  5. Check the other entitlements on the same resource and above it for requesters, approvers and roles nobody approved.

Mitigation

  • Grant the Privileged Access Manager Admin and PAM Settings Admin roles to very few identities, and review who holds them as carefully as the IAM administration roles.
  • Require approval on every entitlement that carries a privileged role, with approvers who are not requesters. Google documents that a principal cannot approve its own request.
  • Where the Security Command Center tier allows it, require more than one approval for the most sensitive entitlements, so that one compromised approver is not enough.
  • Keep the maximum duration short and require a justification, so that every grant has a stated reason to check.
  • Review the entitlements of each organization, folder and project on a schedule, including their requesters, approvers and roles, and delete the ones nobody owns.

Frequently asked questions

Which Privileged Access Manager events does Google Cloud log?

Google lists them on its PAM audit logging page. Creating, updating and deleting an entitlement, creating, approving, denying, revoking and withdrawing a grant, and updating the PAM settings are all Admin Activity entries under `privilegedaccessmanager.googleapis.com`, which are always written. Reading entitlements and grants is a Data Access event, which exists only where those logs are enabled.

Why is a new entitlement a concern when the roles are only granted for a limited time?

Because the entitlement is standing permission to obtain those roles again and again. Each grant lasts at most 7 days, but a requester can ask for a new one whenever the last one ends, and an entitlement without approval activates each request on its own. The allow policy shows a binding only while a grant is active, so the entitlement has to be reviewed, not only the policy.

Can someone approve their own request?

No. Google documents that you cannot approve your own request. An attacker therefore needs either an entitlement that requires no approval or a second identity that the entitlement names as an approver. Entitlements whose requesters and approvers overlap, and entitlements changed to activate access without approvals, are the ones to look at first.

Do the rules read which roles or requesters an entitlement has?

No. Google documents the method names and the log type of these entries but publishes no example of them, so the rules match on the method name and name the entitlement through `protoPayload.resourceName`. What changed has to be read from the entitlement itself. No public incident report describes abuse of Privileged Access Manager at the audit event level.

References

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