How the attack works
Admin Activity audit logs are always written and cannot be disabled, but most other evidence can be reduced. Data Access audit logs (ADMIN_READ, DATA_READ, DATA_WRITE) are configured in the auditConfigs section of the allow policy of a project, folder or organization, including exempted principals whose access is not logged. Log routing is configured with sinks, exclusion filters and log buckets: changing or deleting a sink stops logs reaching their destination, an exclusion filter drops matching entries, and a bucket's settings decide how long logs are kept. Stored entries can go too: the DeleteLog method deletes all entries of one log in the _Default bucket, the bucket that also holds Data Access audit logs.
Attackers with IAM or logging administration rights use these settings to hide what they do next. Audit configuration changes are SetIamPolicy calls whose policy delta lists auditConfigDeltas; sink, exclusion, bucket and settings changes and log deletions are Admin Activity entries from logging.googleapis.com. If the deleted sink is the one that feeds the SIEM, its own deletion entry may never arrive there.
What an attacker needs
setIamPolicyon the project, folder or organization to change audit configuration, or Logging Admin or Logs Configuration Writer (logging.sinks.update,logging.sinks.delete,logging.exclusions.create,logging.buckets.delete) to change routing, orlogging.logs.delete(part of Logging Admin and of the basic roles Owner and Editor) to delete a log's entries.
Impact
Blind spots for the attacker's later activity: unlogged data reads and writes, or logs that no longer reach the SIEM or are kept for less time.
Detection rules
Data Access Audit Logging Removed or Principal Exempted in Google Cloud
Detects SetIamPolicy calls whose policy delta removes a Data Access audit log type or adds or removes an exempted principal (auditConfigDeltas), at project, folder or organization level (Admin Activity audit log). Removing an exemption, which strengthens logging, also matches.
title: Data Access Audit Logging Removed or Principal Exempted in Google Cloud
id: 2c9971c9-9626-44f5-a2ff-ae7a8ab4d3b4
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects SetIamPolicy calls whose policy delta removes a Data Access audit log
type or adds or removes an exempted principal (auditConfigDeltas), at project,
folder or organization level (Admin Activity audit log). Removing an
exemption, which strengthens logging, also matches.
references:
- https://docs.cloud.google.com/security-command-center/docs/how-to-remediate-security-health-analytics-findings
- https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/configure-data-access
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-10
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685.002
logsource:
product: gcp
service: gcp.audit
detection:
selection:
protoPayload.methodName|endswith: SetIamPolicy
protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta|contains: auditConfigDeltas
selection_weakening:
protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.auditConfigDeltas|contains:
- '"REMOVE"'
- exemptedMember
condition: selection and selection_weakening
falsepositives:
- Cost-driven reductions of Data Access logging approved by the logging owners; record them and exclude the approving pipeline by principalEmail.
- Splunk and QRadar match the values anywhere in the event, so a call that changes audit configuration and also removes a role binding, or whose policy already lists exempted members, can match; check auditConfigDeltas in the event.
level: high
False positives
- Cost-driven reductions of Data Access logging approved by the logging owners; record them and exclude the approving pipeline by principalEmail.
- Splunk and QRadar match the values anywhere in the event, so a call that changes audit configuration and also removes a role binding, or whose policy already lists exempted members, can match; check auditConfigDeltas in the event.
Log Sink, Exclusion, Bucket or Log Changed or Deleted in Google Cloud
Detects Cloud Logging configuration changes that can stop, filter or shorten log retention: sink updates and deletions, new or changed exclusion filters, log bucket updates and deletions, and changes to the default Logging settings. Also detects DeleteLog, which deletes all entries of one log in the _Default bucket (Admin Activity audit log).
title: Log Sink, Exclusion, Bucket or Log Changed or Deleted in Google Cloud
id: 11458cb3-d87b-4052-ae42-c35a7eaf4cf3
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects Cloud Logging configuration changes that can stop, filter or shorten
log retention: sink updates and deletions, new or changed exclusion filters,
log bucket updates and deletions, and changes to the default Logging
settings. Also detects DeleteLog, which deletes all entries of one log in the
_Default bucket (Admin Activity audit log).
references:
- https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit-logging
- https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/routing/overview
- https://docs.cloud.google.com/logging/docs/reference/v2/rest/v2/logs/delete
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-10
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685.002
logsource:
product: gcp
service: gcp.audit
detection:
selection:
protoPayload.serviceName: logging.googleapis.com
protoPayload.methodName:
- google.logging.v2.ConfigServiceV2.UpdateSink
- google.logging.v2.ConfigServiceV2.DeleteSink
- google.logging.v2.ConfigServiceV2.CreateExclusion
- google.logging.v2.ConfigServiceV2.UpdateExclusion
- google.logging.v2.ConfigServiceV2.UpdateBucket
- google.logging.v2.ConfigServiceV2.UpdateBucketAsync
- google.logging.v2.ConfigServiceV2.DeleteBucket
- google.logging.v2.ConfigServiceV2.UpdateSettings
- google.logging.v2.LoggingServiceV2.DeleteLog
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Planned changes to log routing or retention by the platform team or infrastructure-as-code; exclude the pipeline identity by principalEmail and alert on sinks that feed the SIEM regardless of caller.
- Clean-up of application or test logs with DeleteLog; the deleted log is named in protoPayload.resourceName.
level: medium
False positives
- Planned changes to log routing or retention by the platform team or infrastructure-as-code; exclude the pipeline identity by principalEmail and alert on sinks that feed the SIEM regardless of caller.
- Clean-up of application or test logs with DeleteLog; the deleted log is named in protoPayload.resourceName.
Detection logic
Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.
Audit log entries from a project stop reaching the SIEM
A changed or deleted sink, or a new exclusion filter, can stop the very entry that records the change from reaching the SIEM, so the rules on this page never see it. The gap itself is then the evidence: a project whose audit logs arrived every hour sends nothing. The _Required bucket in Cloud Logging still holds the project's Admin Activity entries and shows what changed.
- In the SIEM, count the audit entries received per hour for each project and log, using
logName(for exampleprojects/PROJECT_ID/logs/cloudaudit.googleapis.com%2Factivityand thedata_accesslog). Keep the projects and logs that sent entries in most hours of the past 14 days. - Raise a project when one of those logs sends nothing for 3 hours, or falls below a tenth of its usual hourly count.
- Then read, in Cloud Logging, the
_Requiredbucket of the project and of the folder or organization that holds the sink to the SIEM. Google routes Admin Activity entries there through the_Requiredsink, which cannot be modified or deleted. - Look there for
UpdateSink,DeleteSink,CreateExclusionandUpdateExclusionentries oflogging.googleapis.com, and forSetIamPolicyentries withauditConfigDeltas, just before the gap.
Eventsgoogle.logging.v2.ConfigServiceV2.UpdateSinkgoogle.logging.v2.ConfigServiceV2.DeleteSinkgoogle.logging.v2.ConfigServiceV2.CreateExclusiongoogle.logging.v2.ConfigServiceV2.UpdateExclusion
LimitsQuiet projects at night or at weekends, projects being shut down and outages of the forwarding path (the Pub/Sub subscription or the SIEM input) leave the same gap. An exclusion that drops only some entries, such as those of one principal, barely changes the volume and is not seen this way. The 14 days, 3 hours and the tenth are starting points.
Triage
- For audit configuration changes, read auditConfigDeltas for the service, log type and exempted member that were removed or added.
- For routing changes, identify the sink, exclusion or bucket in protoPayload.resourceName and compare the new filter, destination, disabled state or retention with the previous configuration. For DeleteLog, the resource name is the log whose entries were deleted.
- Confirm with the logging owners, restore the configuration, and review the gap for activity by the caller.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Restore logging before anything else, so that the rest of the response is recorded. Put back the removed Data Access log types, remove the added exemptions in
auditConfigs, and recreate or correct the sink, exclusion filter or bucket setting that was changed, using the last reviewed version of the configuration. - Remove the caller's ability to change logging again. Take away its
setIamPolicy, Logging Admin or Logs Configuration Writer rights on the affected project, folder or organization, and contain the account or service account if it was compromised. - Rebuild the timeline of the gap from the logs the change could not touch. Admin Activity audit logs are always written, so they still show what the caller and any exempted principal changed while Data Access logging or routing was off.
- Treat data that was readable during the gap as possibly read. Data Access reads that were not logged cannot be reconstructed, so decide what to rotate from what the involved identities could reach, not from what the logs show.
- If the sink that feeds the SIEM was changed, confirm after the fix that new entries arrive there, and export the missing period from Cloud Logging where the entries still exist.
Mitigation
- Enable Data Access audit logs at organization level; projects and folders cannot disable logs that a parent enables.
- Forward logs to the SIEM through an aggregated sink at organization or folder level, managed from a separate project, and restrict Logging Admin and Logs Configuration Writer there.
- Alert when the expected log volume from a project or sink stops.
Frequently asked questions
Can an attacker switch off Admin Activity audit logs in Google Cloud?
No. Admin Activity audit logs are always written and cannot be disabled, and the `_Required` sink that routes them to storage cannot be modified or deleted. What an attacker can reduce is the rest, namely Data Access audit logs, the sinks and exclusion filters that forward logs, the retention of log buckets and the stored entries of a log in the `_Default` bucket.
Why did the alert for a deleted log sink never reach our SIEM?
If the deleted or changed sink is the one that forwards logs to the SIEM, the Admin Activity entry that records the change may never be forwarded. The entry is still written in Cloud Logging for the project, folder or organization where the sink was defined. An alert for a project or sink whose expected log volume stops covers this case.
Does the audit configuration rule fire only when logging is weakened?
No. It matches `SetIamPolicy` calls whose `auditConfigDeltas` remove a log type or add or remove an exempted member, so removing an exemption, which strengthens logging, also matches. In Splunk and QRadar the values are matched anywhere in the event, so a call that changes audit configuration and also removes a role binding can match too. Read `auditConfigDeltas` in the event before acting.
How can an identity read data without leaving a Data Access audit log entry?
By being listed as an exempted principal in the `auditConfigs` section of an allow policy. Access by an exempted principal is not logged, which is why an attacker adds an identity they control as an exempted member before reading data. The policy delta of the `SetIamPolicy` call names the service, the log type and the exempted member that were added.