How the attack works
A PingOne worker application is an administrator identity for the management API. When it requests a token with the client credentials grant, PingOne uses the application's own role assignments, so whoever holds its client ID and client secret acts with those roles from anywhere, without an interactive sign-on or MFA. The secret can be viewed and regenerated in the admin console and through the application secret endpoints. A regenerated secret is a new credential; PingOne can keep the previous secret valid for a retention period, so the legitimate integration may keep working and nobody notices.
Ping restricts access to secrets to prevent permission escalation: the API reference says that reading a worker application's secret requires a superset of the application's role assignments. Ping's role documentation also warns that administrators with the Configuration Read Only role can read client secrets, and that this could result in privilege escalation when the application has permissions beyond the administrator's role. PingOne records the operations as SECRET.READ and SECRET.UPDATED audit activities. A third rule reads PREVIOUS_SECRET.USED, the activity Ping's event list describes as Previous Secret Used. After a rotation nobody planned it points to the legitimate integration that never received the new secret, and after a rotation made in response to an incident it shows that the old secret is still in use.
Log source: the rules read PingOne audit activities. Include the Secret event types in the PingOne webhook that feeds the SIEM, or poll the Audit Activities API, for each environment that holds worker applications.
What an attacker needs
- Control of a PingOne user or worker application that can read or update application secrets in the environment (for example Environment Admin, Client Application Developer or Configuration Read Only).
- A target application with valuable role assignments, typically a worker application used by automation.
Impact
API access with the roles of the application: user and credential management with Identity Data Admin, full configuration control with Environment Admin, or control of every environment when the roles are assigned at organization level. The access survives a password reset or removal of the account the attacker started from.
Detection rules
PingOne Application Client Secret Read
Detects the client secret of a PingOne application being read (audit activity SECRET.READ). Reading the secret of a worker application gives the reader the application's administrator roles, which is the step before the credential is used or replaced. Expect routine reads by administrators and deployment tooling; use the rule for review and correlation, and alert on readers outside the group that manages applications.
title: PingOne Application Client Secret Read
id: 355e68ca-9750-412b-a0af-f053e0a2a959
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects the client secret of a PingOne application being read (audit activity
SECRET.READ). Reading the secret of a worker application gives the reader the
application's administrator roles, which is the step before the credential is
used or replaced. Expect routine reads by administrators and deployment
tooling; use the rule for review and correlation, and alert on readers
outside the group that manages applications.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001/
- https://developer.pingidentity.com/pingone-api/platform/reference/audit-reporting-events.html
- https://docs.pingidentity.com/pingone/directory/p1_roles.html
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-11
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1098.001
logsource:
product: pingone
service: audit
detection:
selection:
action.type: SECRET.READ
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Administrators opening an application's configuration to copy the secret into an integration, and infrastructure-as-code tools that read application settings.
level: low
False positives
- Administrators opening an application's configuration to copy the secret into an integration, and infrastructure-as-code tools that read application settings.
PingOne Application Client Secret Regenerated
Detects the client secret of a PingOne application being regenerated or set (audit activity SECRET.UPDATED). On a worker application the new secret is a credential for the administrator roles assigned to the application.
title: PingOne Application Client Secret Regenerated
id: 18d46680-c3fe-417a-a34e-391fe29a7d6c
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects the client secret of a PingOne application being regenerated or set
(audit activity SECRET.UPDATED). On a worker application the new secret is a
credential for the administrator roles assigned to the application.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001/
- https://developer.pingidentity.com/pingone-api/platform/reference/audit-reporting-events.html
- https://developer.pingidentity.com/pingone-api/platform/applications/application-secret/index.html
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-11
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1098.001
logsource:
product: pingone
service: audit
detection:
selection:
action.type: SECRET.UPDATED
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Scheduled secret rotation. Add a filter on actors.user.name or actors.client.name for the identities that perform it, after you have reviewed them.
level: medium
False positives
- Scheduled secret rotation. Add a filter on actors.user.name or actors.client.name for the identities that perform it, after you have reviewed them.
PingOne Application Authenticated With a Previous Client Secret
Detects the audit activity PREVIOUS_SECRET.USED, which Ping's event list describes as Previous Secret Used. When the client secret of an application is replaced, PingOne can keep the previous secret valid for a retention period (Ping's API reference gives a range of 1 minute to 30 days, or 90 days with an extended retention feature), and records when it was last used. The activity tells two things. After a rotation that nobody planned, it points to the legitimate integration, which never received the new secret. After a rotation made in response to an incident, it shows that the old secret is still in use and still accepted. The application is named in the activity's resources, the caller's address in source.ipAddress.
title: PingOne Application Authenticated With a Previous Client Secret
id: 79370ce3-6a16-41dd-8a62-df88b8f1ff24
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects the audit activity PREVIOUS_SECRET.USED, which Ping's event list
describes as Previous Secret Used. When the client secret of an application
is replaced, PingOne can keep the previous secret valid for a retention
period (Ping's API reference gives a range of 1 minute to 30 days, or 90
days with an extended retention feature), and records when it was last used.
The activity tells two things. After a rotation that nobody planned, it
points to the legitimate integration, which never received the new secret.
After a rotation made in response to an incident, it shows that the old
secret is still in use and still accepted. The application is named in the
activity's resources, the caller's address in source.ipAddress.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001/
- https://developer.pingidentity.com/pingone-api/platform/reference/audit-reporting-events.html
- https://developer.pingidentity.com/pingone-api/platform/applications/application-secret/index.html
- https://docs.pingidentity.com/pingone/applications/p1_rotate_client_secret.html
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1098.001
logsource:
product: pingone
service: audit
detection:
selection:
action.type: PREVIOUS_SECRET.USED
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- A planned rotation during which the integration has not yet been moved to the new secret. This is what the retention period is for. Confirm with the application owner that the caller is their integration and that the move is scheduled.
level: low
False positives
- A planned rotation during which the integration has not yet been moved to the new secret. This is what the retention period is for. Confirm with the application owner that the caller is their integration and that the move is scheduled.
Detection logic
Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.
Client secret regenerated while the previous secret stays in use
PingOne can keep the previous secret valid after a new one is set. When the owner rotates a secret, the integration moves to the new one. When someone else regenerates it to obtain a credential, the integration keeps authenticating with the previous secret, because nobody gave it the new one. A regeneration followed by continued use of the previous secret separates the two cases.
- PingOne records
SECRET.UPDATEDfor an application. Keep the application from the activity'sresources.idandresources.name, and the actor fromactors.user.nameoractors.client.name. - After it, PingOne records
PREVIOUS_SECRET.USEDwith the sameresources.id. Keep thesource.ipAddressof each use. - Ask the application owner whether the rotation was theirs. Use of the previous secret from the integration's usual addresses, after a rotation the owner did not make, means the new secret went to someone else.
- List the audit activities of the application, by
actors.client.id, from addresses that are not the integration's. That is where the new secret is in use.
EventsSECRET.UPDATEDPREVIOUS_SECRET.USED
LimitsA planned rotation shows the same two activities until the integration is updated, so the owner's answer decides. A secret that is replaced without a retention period never produces the second activity. Ping documents resources.id on both activities but not that it holds the same value, so confirm the join on one planned rotation.
Triage
- Identify the actor (actors.user.name or actors.client.name) and the application whose secret was read or regenerated.
- List the application's role assignments to understand what the secret gives.
- For a regenerated secret, ask the application owner whether a rotation was planned. For a read, ask the actor why the secret was opened.
- Review audit activities performed by the application (actors.client.id) after the event for new source addresses and for role, user, policy or identity provider changes. If unexplained, regenerate the secret without retaining the previous one.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Replace the secret of every application whose secret the actor read or regenerated, not only the one in the alert, and keep no retention period for the previous secrets. The actor's
SECRET.READandSECRET.UPDATEDactivities list them. - Disable the user or worker application that read or regenerated the secret until the event is explained, and remove the role that gave it access to secrets.
- Reverse what was done with the application's roles after the event, such as new role assignments, user and credential changes, and policy or identity provider changes.
- Confirm with the owner of each integration that the new secret is in use, and watch the application's audit activities for requests from unfamiliar addresses.
Mitigation
- Give each worker application only the roles and the scope it needs, and keep Organization Admin and organization-level Environment Admin off applications.
- Limit the roles that can read secrets (Environment Admin, Client Application Developer, Configuration Read Only) to administrators who need them.
- Prefer the Private Key JWT token endpoint authentication method, so that no shared secret is stored in PingOne or in the integration.
- Regenerate secrets on a schedule and set a short retention period for the previous secret.
Frequently asked questions
Why does the integration keep working after an attacker regenerates the secret?
A regenerated secret is a new credential, and PingOne can keep the previous secret valid for a retention period. The legitimate integration goes on using the old secret while the attacker uses the new one, so nobody notices an outage. Ask the application owner whether a rotation was planned whenever `SECRET.UPDATED` appears.
Is every SECRET.READ activity worth an alert?
No. Administrators open an application's configuration to copy the secret into an integration, and infrastructure-as-code tools read application settings, so reads are routine. The rule is at low level and meant for review and correlation. Alert on readers outside the group that manages applications.
Can a read-only administrator gain privileges through a client secret?
Ping's role documentation warns that administrators with the Configuration Read Only role can read client secrets. This could result in privilege escalation when the application has permissions beyond the administrator's role. Limit the roles that can read secrets, which include Environment Admin, Client Application Developer and Configuration Read Only, to administrators who need them.
Does MFA protect a worker application's access?
No. A worker application requests a token with the client credentials grant, and PingOne then uses the application's own role assignments. Whoever holds the client ID and client secret acts with those roles from anywhere, without an interactive sign-on or MFA. The Private Key JWT authentication method avoids storing a shared secret.
References
- MITRE ATT&CK T1098.001: Additional Cloud Credentials
- PingOne Platform API: Application secret
- PingOne Platform API: Administrator permissions and role assignments
- PingOne: Administrator Roles (Configuration Read Only note)
- PingOne: Rotating the client secret for an application
- PingOne Platform API: Audit reporting events