How the attack works
An Azure Logic Apps workflow is a sequence of actions that runs on a trigger. It reaches other systems with what the logic app holds, not with the rights of the person who edits it: a system-assigned or user-assigned managed identity with its Azure roles, and connections to other services that were signed in when the workflow was built. A request-based trigger gets an endpoint URL that, as Microsoft documents, includes a Shared Access Signature. Microsoft tells administrators to protect that key like an account key, because anyone who has a URL with a valid key can call the endpoint. The Logic App Contributor role is described by Microsoft as able to manage workflows but not to change access to them.
This gives three abuses that are each one Azure Resource Manager operation. An attacker with write access changes the definition (Microsoft.Logic/workflows/write), so that the next run performs the attacker's actions with the identity and the connections of the logic app. An attacker who may only run things starts the workflow or one of its triggers by hand (run/action, triggers/run/action). And an attacker who wants a way back retrieves the callback URL of a trigger or the access keys (listCallbackUrl/action, accessKeys/list/action) and can then start the workflow from anywhere without signing in. Write and action operations are recorded in the Azure Activity log with their caller. The log does not hold the workflow definition, and it does not record calls made to the trigger URL, which are in the run history of the workflow.
What an attacker needs
- To change a workflow: Owner, Contributor, Logic App Contributor or a custom role with
Microsoft.Logic/workflows/write. - To retrieve the trigger URL or the access keys: a role with the
listCallbackUrloraccessKeys/listactions on the workflow. To start it through Azure Resource Manager: a role withrun/actionortriggers/run/action. - For a useful result: a logic app whose managed identity or connections reach something valuable, or a request-based trigger that still accepts Shared Access Signature authentication.
Impact
Actions in Azure and in connected services with the roles of the logic app's managed identity and the access of its connections, for example reading secrets, sending mail or changing resources. A changed workflow keeps doing this on every run, and a retrieved trigger URL starts it on demand until the access keys are regenerated. Inputs and outputs of the runs, which can contain secrets, are readable in the run history unless they are secured.
Detection rules
Logic App Trigger Callback URL or Access Keys Listed
Detects a successful retrieval of the callback URL of an Azure Logic Apps workflow or of one of its triggers, or a listing of the access key secrets of a workflow, through Azure Resource Manager. The callback URL of a request-based trigger includes a Shared Access Signature, and Microsoft states that anyone who has a URL with a valid key can call the endpoint, so the caller of this operation can start the workflow later from anywhere with no Microsoft Entra sign-in. The last operation in the list returns the trigger URL of a workflow in a Standard logic app. Tools that display or wire up a trigger URL make the same calls, so use the rule for a baseline of expected callers for each workflow.
title: Logic App Trigger Callback URL or Access Keys Listed
id: a4a9e8ee-78f2-4cbd-aa97-dda9430b30d6
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a successful retrieval of the callback URL of an Azure Logic Apps
workflow or of one of its triggers, or a listing of the access key secrets
of a workflow, through Azure Resource Manager. The callback URL of a
request-based trigger includes a Shared Access Signature, and Microsoft
states that anyone who has a URL with a valid key can call the endpoint, so
the caller of this operation can start the workflow later from anywhere
with no Microsoft Entra sign-in. The last operation in the list returns the
trigger URL of a workflow in a Standard logic app. Tools that display or
wire up a trigger URL make the same calls, so use the rule for a baseline of
expected callers for each workflow.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1648/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/logic-apps/logic-apps-securing-a-logic-app
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/permissions/integration
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/permissions/web-and-mobile
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1648
logsource:
product: azure
service: activitylogs
detection:
selection:
OperationNameValue:
- MICROSOFT.LOGIC/WORKFLOWS/LISTCALLBACKURL/ACTION
- MICROSOFT.LOGIC/WORKFLOWS/TRIGGERS/LISTCALLBACKURL/ACTION
- MICROSOFT.LOGIC/WORKFLOWS/VERSIONS/TRIGGERS/LISTCALLBACKURL/ACTION
- MICROSOFT.LOGIC/WORKFLOWS/ACCESSKEYS/LIST/ACTION
- MICROSOFT.WEB/SITES/HOSTRUNTIME/WEBHOOKS/API/WORKFLOWS/TRIGGERS/LISTCALLBACKURL/ACTION
ActivityStatusValue:
- Success
- Succeeded
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Developers who open a workflow with a request trigger to copy its URL, and deployments that read the URL to configure the system that calls the workflow. Exclude their identities in a filter_ selection by Caller once confirmed.
- Other Azure services and workflows that are set up to call the logic app and read the callback URL during configuration.
level: low
False positives
- Developers who open a workflow with a request trigger to copy its URL, and deployments that read the URL to configure the system that calls the workflow. Exclude their identities in a filter_ selection by Caller once confirmed.
- Other Azure services and workflows that are set up to call the logic app and read the callback URL during configuration.
Logic App Workflow or Trigger Run Through Resource Manager
Detects a successful start of an Azure Logic Apps workflow or of one of its triggers by a caller through Azure Resource Manager (Microsoft.Logic/workflows/run/action, workflows/triggers/run/action and the trigger run operation of Standard logic apps). The run uses the managed identity and the connections of the logic app, not the rights of the caller, so an identity that may only run workflows still makes the logic app act. Runs that the trigger itself starts, for example on a schedule or through the trigger URL, do not pass through this operation and are not matched. Manual runs are normal during development, so baseline the callers for each workflow.
title: Logic App Workflow or Trigger Run Through Resource Manager
id: 7307dd1a-3dd2-4450-99d5-a040d01abac3
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a successful start of an Azure Logic Apps workflow or of one of its
triggers by a caller through Azure Resource Manager
(Microsoft.Logic/workflows/run/action, workflows/triggers/run/action and
the trigger run operation of Standard logic apps). The run uses the managed
identity and the connections of the logic app, not the rights of the
caller, so an identity that may only run workflows still makes the logic
app act. Runs that the trigger itself starts, for example on a schedule or
through the trigger URL, do not pass through this operation and are not
matched. Manual runs are normal during development, so baseline the callers
for each workflow.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1648/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/logic-apps/authenticate-with-managed-identity
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/permissions/integration
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/permissions/web-and-mobile
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1648
logsource:
product: azure
service: activitylogs
detection:
selection:
OperationNameValue:
- MICROSOFT.LOGIC/WORKFLOWS/RUN/ACTION
- MICROSOFT.LOGIC/WORKFLOWS/TRIGGERS/RUN/ACTION
- MICROSOFT.WEB/SITES/HOSTRUNTIME/WEBHOOKS/API/WORKFLOWS/TRIGGERS/RUN/ACTION
ActivityStatusValue:
- Success
- Succeeded
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Developers and operators who start a workflow by hand to test it or to repeat a failed run. Exclude their identities in a filter_ selection by Caller once confirmed.
level: low
False positives
- Developers and operators who start a workflow by hand to test it or to repeat a failed run. Exclude their identities in a filter_ selection by Caller once confirmed.
Logic App Workflow Created or Updated
Detects a successful create or update of an Azure Logic Apps workflow (Microsoft.Logic/workflows/write). A workflow acts with the managed identity and the connections of the logic app, so whoever changes the definition decides what that identity and those connections do on the next run. The Activity log event names the workflow and the caller but does not contain the definition, so compare the workflow with its previous version. The operation belongs to Consumption logic apps. Workflows of Standard logic apps are not written through it and are not seen by this rule.
title: Logic App Workflow Created or Updated
id: 5351339d-facb-45cf-9516-e13311f6fb1f
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a successful create or update of an Azure Logic Apps workflow
(Microsoft.Logic/workflows/write). A workflow acts with the managed
identity and the connections of the logic app, so whoever changes the
definition decides what that identity and those connections do on the next
run. The Activity log event names the workflow and the caller but does not
contain the definition, so compare the workflow with its previous version.
The operation belongs to Consumption logic apps. Workflows of Standard
logic apps are not written through it and are not seen by this rule.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1648/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/logic-apps/logic-apps-securing-a-logic-app
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/logic-apps/authenticate-with-managed-identity
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/permissions/integration
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1648
logsource:
product: azure
service: activitylogs
detection:
selection:
OperationNameValue: MICROSOFT.LOGIC/WORKFLOWS/WRITE
ActivityStatusValue:
- Success
- Succeeded
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Integration developers and deployment pipelines that maintain workflows. Correlate with change records and exclude the pipeline identity in a filter_ selection by Caller once confirmed.
- The event does not say whether the definition, its parameters or only other properties of the resource were changed, so harmless updates match as well.
level: medium
False positives
- Integration developers and deployment pipelines that maintain workflows. Correlate with change records and exclude the pipeline identity in a filter_ selection by Caller once confirmed.
- The event does not say whether the definition, its parameters or only other properties of the resource were changed, so harmless updates match as well.
Detection logic
Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.
Workflow changed and started by the same caller within a short time
Maintenance of a workflow and its runs are usually separate: a pipeline or an engineer saves the definition and the trigger starts it later. A caller that writes a workflow and starts it by hand a few minutes later is using the logic app to perform its own actions with the managed identity and the connections of the logic app.
- In the Azure Activity log, a workflow is written with status Success:
MICROSOFT.LOGIC/WORKFLOWS/WRITE. Keep theCallerand the resource ID of the workflow. - Within 30 minutes the same
Callerstarts the same workflow through Azure Resource Manager:MICROSOFT.LOGIC/WORKFLOWS/RUN/ACTIONorMICROSOFT.LOGIC/WORKFLOWS/TRIGGERS/RUN/ACTION. - From the start time onward, review the Activity log events made by the managed identity of the logic app. Take the object ID of that identity from the logic app, because the log does not link a run to the identity it used.
EventsMICROSOFT.LOGIC/WORKFLOWS/WRITEMICROSOFT.LOGIC/WORKFLOWS/RUN/ACTIONMICROSOFT.LOGIC/WORKFLOWS/TRIGGERS/RUN/ACTION
LimitsDevelopers save and test a workflow in the same session, so the pattern is normal in development subscriptions and for the integration team, whose identities have to be excluded by name. The 30 minutes are a starting point. A workflow that is changed and then started by its own trigger or through its URL does not match.
Triage
- Identify the Caller, the caller's IP address and the workflow from the resource ID, and whether this identity normally maintains or operates this logic app.
- For a change, compare the current definition with the previous version. For Consumption logic apps Azure keeps the version from before each save.
- Find out which managed identity the logic app has, which roles that identity holds and which connections the workflow uses.
- For a retrieved trigger URL, review the run history of the workflow from that time for runs that the usual callers did not start.
- Review the activity of the logic app's managed identity after the event, and look for other changes by the same caller in the resource group.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Disable the workflow, so that neither a changed definition nor a retrieved trigger URL can start it while you work.
- Regenerate the access keys of the workflow, which invalidates the trigger URLs that were retrieved, and give the new URLs to the systems that depend on them.
- Restore the definition from source control, or promote the last known good version for a Consumption logic app, and delete workflows the attacker created.
- Contain the caller. Revoke its sessions, rotate its credentials and remove its role on the logic app until the change is explained.
- Undo what the managed identity and the connections did from the first changed run onward, and sign the connections in again or replace them if they may have been used by the attacker.
- Rotate the secrets that appeared in the inputs and outputs of the affected runs.
Mitigation
- Give the managed identity of each logic app only the roles its workflow needs, scoped as narrowly as possible, and review the connections it holds.
- Limit Owner, Contributor and Logic App Contributor on logic apps, and deploy workflow definitions from source control with review.
- For request-based triggers, restrict inbound calls. Microsoft documents OAuth 2.0 with Microsoft Entra ID as the only way to call a request endpoint, disabling Shared Access Signature authentication, and restricting inbound IP addresses.
- Regenerate the access keys of workflows on a schedule and whenever somebody who knew a trigger URL leaves.
- Secure the inputs and outputs of actions that handle secrets, so that they are not readable in the run history.
Frequently asked questions
Does the Activity log show what was changed in the workflow?
No. The event names the operation, the caller and the workflow in its resource ID, not the definition. Compare the workflow with its previous version. For Consumption logic apps Azure saves the version from before each change, and a previous version can be viewed and promoted over the current one. A definition kept in source control is the better reference.
Does removing the attacker's role stop a trigger URL that was already retrieved?
No. The URL of a request-based trigger includes a Shared Access Signature, and Microsoft states that anyone who has a URL with a valid key can call the endpoint. It works without a Microsoft Entra sign-in until the access keys of the workflow are regenerated, or until the endpoint is restricted to OAuth 2.0 with Microsoft Entra ID.
Are Standard logic apps covered by these rules?
Partly. The rule on trigger URLs includes the operation that returns the trigger URL of a workflow in a Standard logic app. Standard logic apps are hosted on the Azure Functions runtime, and the permissions reference of Microsoft lists no Resource Manager write operation for their workflows, so the rule on workflow changes sees Consumption logic apps only.
Is there a public incident report for this technique?
No public incident report describes this at the audit event level as far as this page's sources go. Microsoft's Azure Threat Research Matrix lists Logic Apps under principal impersonation and under persistence through an HTTP trigger, and Microsoft's documentation describes the signed trigger URL and the roles that manage workflows.
References
- MITRE ATT&CK T1648: Serverless Execution
- Secure access and data for workflows in Azure Logic Apps
- Authenticate access and connections to Azure resources with managed identities in Azure Logic Apps
- Manage logic apps in the Azure portal
- Differences between Standard single-tenant logic apps and Consumption multitenant logic apps
- Azure permissions for Integration
- Azure permissions for Web and Mobile
- Azure Threat Research Matrix
- Azure Activity Log event schema