How the attack works
With soft delete, a deleted key vault and a deleted secret, key or certificate are not destroyed. They stay in a deleted state for the retention period of the vault, 7 to 90 days, and Microsoft documents that an object in that state can only be listed, recovered or purged. Recovery reverses the deletion: the object, or the whole vault with its content, is available again under the same name. Soft delete is on by default for new vaults and cannot be turned off, so every vault has this second life for what was deleted from it.
Teams often delete a secret as the last step of retiring a credential, and delete a vault when a project ends, without revoking each credential at the system that accepts it. An attacker who holds the recover permission lists what is in the deleted state, recovers it and reads it like any other secret. Microsoft Defender for Resource Manager has an alert for this, "Suspicious key vault recovery detected", and describes it as a possible attempt to discover secrets and keys to gain access to sensitive resources or to move laterally. The vault's resource log (category AuditEvent) records the recovery of an object as SecretRecover, KeyRecover or CertificateRecover and the recovery of a vault as VaultRecover. The log exists only when a diagnostic setting on the vault exports it. Through Azure Resource Manager a vault is recovered with a create request whose create mode is recover, so the Azure Activity log shows that step as a write to the vault.
What an attacker needs
- For an object: the recover permission on secrets, keys or certificates in the vault's access policy, or an Azure role that includes the recover data action, such as Key Vault Secrets Officer, Key Vault Crypto Officer, Key Vault Certificates Officer or Key Vault Administrator.
- For a vault: Microsoft names the Key Vault Contributor role as the permission to recover a soft-deleted vault. Owner and Contributor include it.
- An object or a vault that is still inside its retention period and whose credentials were not revoked at their source.
Impact
Access to credentials that were taken out of use but never invalidated: old database passwords, API keys and certificates that the target systems still accept. Because nobody expects a deleted secret to be read, its use is less likely to be noticed. A recovered vault comes back with its content. Microsoft documents that the Azure role assignments of a soft-deleted vault are deleted and that recovery does not restore them, so check who has access to a recovered vault before it is used again.
Detection rules
Deleted Key Vault Secret, Key or Certificate Recovered
Detects the successful recovery of a soft-deleted secret, key or certificate in an Azure key vault (operations SecretRecover, KeyRecover and CertificateRecover in the vault's AuditEvent resource log). Recovery reverses the deletion and puts the object back under its name, so a credential that was deleted but never revoked at its source can be read again. Most recoveries undo an accidental deletion, so compare the caller with the one that deleted the object and look for reads that follow. The log exists only where a diagnostic setting on the vault exports the AuditEvent category.
title: Deleted Key Vault Secret, Key or Certificate Recovered
id: af56337b-d3ff-42e7-a8d1-7a5c06388636
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects the successful recovery of a soft-deleted secret, key or certificate
in an Azure key vault (operations SecretRecover, KeyRecover and
CertificateRecover in the vault's AuditEvent resource log). Recovery
reverses the deletion and puts the object back under its name, so a
credential that was deleted but never revoked at its source can be read
again. Most
recoveries undo an accidental deletion, so compare the caller with the one
that deleted the object and look for reads that follow. The log exists only
where a diagnostic setting on the vault exports the AuditEvent category.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/006/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/key-vault/general/logging
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/key-vault/general/soft-delete-overview
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/key-vault/general/key-vault-recovery
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1555.006
logsource:
product: azure
service: keyvault
detection:
selection:
OperationName:
- SecretRecover
- KeyRecover
- CertificateRecover
ResultType: Success
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- An administrator or a pipeline that undoes an accidental deletion. Match the recovery to a ticket and to the caller that deleted the object.
- Infrastructure-as-code tools that recover a soft-deleted object of the same name before they create it again. Exclude their addresses in a filter_ selection by CallerIpAddress once confirmed.
level: medium
False positives
- An administrator or a pipeline that undoes an accidental deletion. Match the recovery to a ticket and to the caller that deleted the object.
- Infrastructure-as-code tools that recover a soft-deleted object of the same name before they create it again. Exclude their addresses in a filter_ selection by CallerIpAddress once confirmed.
Soft-Deleted Key Vault Recovered
Detects the recovery of a soft-deleted Azure key vault, recorded as the operation VaultRecover in the vault's AuditEvent resource log. A recovered vault returns with the secrets, keys and certificates it held. Microsoft Defender for Resource Manager describes a suspicious vault recovery as a possible attempt to discover secrets and keys. The rule matches on the operation name and the result only. The record reaches a SIEM only if the recovered vault has a diagnostic setting at that moment, and Microsoft's documentation does not say whether a diagnostic setting survives the deletion of its vault, so confirm on a test vault that this record arrives. In the Azure Activity log the same step is a write to the vault, which the rule Azure Key Vault Updated in this library reads.
title: Soft-Deleted Key Vault Recovered
id: 559bf8ca-915f-435d-8cce-ac8576e1c316
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects the recovery of a soft-deleted Azure key vault, recorded as the
operation VaultRecover in the vault's AuditEvent resource log. A recovered
vault returns with the secrets, keys and certificates it held. Microsoft
Defender for Resource Manager describes a suspicious vault
recovery as a possible attempt to discover secrets and keys. The rule
matches on the operation name and the result only. The record reaches a SIEM
only if the recovered vault has a diagnostic setting at that moment, and
Microsoft's documentation does not say whether a diagnostic setting survives
the deletion of its vault, so confirm on a test vault that this record
arrives. In the Azure Activity log the same step is a write to the vault,
which the rule Azure Key Vault Updated in this library reads.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/006/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/key-vault/general/logging
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/key-vault/general/key-vault-recovery
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/alerts-resource-manager
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1555.006
logsource:
product: azure
service: keyvault
detection:
selection:
OperationName: VaultRecover
ResultType: Success
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Recovery of a vault that was deleted by mistake, or that an infrastructure-as-code tool recovers before it deploys a vault of the same name. Match the recovery to a ticket and to the caller that deleted the vault.
level: medium
False positives
- Recovery of a vault that was deleted by mistake, or that an infrastructure-as-code tool recovers before it deploys a vault of the same name. Match the recovery to a ticket and to the caller that deleted the vault.
Detection logic
Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.
Object recovered by a different caller than the one that deleted it
An administrator who deletes a secret by mistake recovers it soon after, from the same place. A recovery that comes from another address or identity, or long after the deletion, is not somebody undoing their own mistake. Microsoft Defender for Resource Manager uses the same idea for vaults: the user recovering the resource is different from the user that deleted it.
- In the Key Vault resource log, take each
SecretRecover,KeyRecoverorCertificateRecoverrecord withResultTypeSuccess. KeepResourceId(the vault),CallerIpAddress, theidentityclaims and the object name fromRequestUri. - Find the earlier
SecretDelete,KeyDeleteorCertificateDeleterecord for the same object in the same vault. - Compare
CallerIpAddressand theidentityclaims of the two records, and the time between them. A different caller, or more than a day between deletion and recovery, is a starting point for review.
EventsSecretDeleteSecretRecoverKeyDeleteKeyRecoverCertificateDeleteCertificateRecover
LimitsA second administrator who repairs a colleague's mistake looks the same, so check for a ticket. The deletion can be older than the log retention of the SIEM, and then there is nothing to compare with. The one day is a starting point.
Deleted secret recovered and read from the same address shortly after
Recovering a secret is only useful to an attacker when the value is read afterwards. A recovery followed by a read of that secret from the same address, with no application using the secret again, is collection and not repair.
- In the Key Vault resource log, find
SecretRecoverwithResultTypeSuccess. KeepResourceId,CallerIpAddressand the secret name fromRequestUri. - Within 60 minutes, find
SecretGetwithResultTypeSuccess in the same vault whoseIdnames the same secret and whoseCallerIpAddressis the same. - Check whether any other address read the secret after the recovery. An application that starts using it again explains the recovery.
EventsSecretRecoverSecretGet
LimitsAn administrator who recovers a secret and checks its value in the portal produces the same two records. The 60 minutes are a starting point. An attacker who reads from a second address is not matched by the address comparison, so also review reads from any new address after a recovery.
Triage
- Identify the vault, the object that was recovered (the object identifier of the record) and the caller. The record carries the caller's IP address and identity claims.
- Find the deletion of the same object or vault. Check who deleted it and when, and whether the recovery is the same person undoing a mistake.
- Check for a change request or an incident that explains the recovery. Recovering after an accidental deletion is the purpose of the feature.
- Look at what the caller did next in the same vault, such as reads of the recovered secret, backups, or a new deletion that hides the recovery.
- Find out whether the credential in the recovered secret is still valid at the system it belongs to.
Response
Once the attack is confirmed:
- Rotate or revoke at its source every credential that was in a recovered secret or in the recovered vault, whether or not a read is visible.
- Remove the recover permission or the role from the caller, revoke its sessions and rotate its credentials.
- Delete the recovered object again once the credential is invalid, and purge it if the vault's purge protection allows.
- For a recovered vault, review its access policies and role assignments before anyone uses it, and delete it again if it was not meant to return.
- Review the logs of the systems whose credentials were recovered for use of those credentials after the recovery.
Mitigation
- Revoke or rotate a credential at its source before you delete its secret. Deleting the secret removes the copy in the vault, not the credential.
- Keep the recover permission and the officer roles to a few identities, assigned through Privileged Identity Management. Applications that only read secrets need Key Vault Secrets User, which cannot recover.
- Limit Key Vault Contributor, Contributor and Owner on the subscriptions that hold deleted vaults.
- Create a diagnostic setting on every vault that sends the
AuditEventcategory to your SIEM, and send the Azure Activity log there as well. - Review the deleted objects of important vaults from time to time, and purge the ones that must never come back, where purge protection allows it.
Frequently asked questions
Why is recovering a deleted secret a security event?
A deleted secret often still holds a valid credential, because the secret was removed from the vault without the password, key or certificate being revoked at the system that accepts it. Recovery makes that credential readable again. Microsoft Defender for Resource Manager treats a suspicious vault recovery as a possible attempt to discover secrets and keys.
Does the Azure Activity log show the recovery of a secret?
No. Recovering a secret, key or certificate is a data-plane operation of the vault and is written to the vault's resource log, category AuditEvent, when a diagnostic setting exports it. The recovery of a whole vault through Azure Resource Manager is a write to the vault and does appear in the Activity log.
Is every recovery malicious?
No. Soft delete exists so that an accidental deletion can be undone, and that is what most recoveries are. The useful questions are who deleted the object, who recovered it, how much time passed and what was read afterwards. A recovery by a different identity, long after the deletion and followed by a read, deserves attention.
Does purge protection stop an attacker from recovering a deleted secret?
No. Purge protection prevents permanent deletion before the retention period has passed. It does not limit recovery, and it keeps deleted objects recoverable for the whole period. The control over recovery is the recover permission, so limit who holds it.
References
- MITRE ATT&CK T1555.006: Cloud Secrets Management Stores
- Azure Key Vault: soft-delete overview
- Azure Key Vault recovery management with soft delete and purge protection
- Azure Key Vault logging
- AZKVAuditLogs table reference
- Alerts for Resource Manager (Microsoft Defender for Cloud)
- Provide access to Key Vault keys, certificates, and secrets with Azure RBAC
- Azure permissions for Security
- Key Vault REST API: Vaults - Create Or Update