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Account Enumeration Through Kerberos detection rules

An attacker asks a domain controller for Kerberos tickets under guessed account names. The answer differs for names that exist, so valid accounts can be listed without credentials. Seen as many 4768 failures with code 0x6 from one source.

Platform
Active Directory
Severity
Medium
Log source
Windows Security event log
Last updated
Tactic
Discovery
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft SentinelIBM QRadar
What an attacker needs
Network access to the Kerberos service of a domain controller and a list of candidate account names, with no domain credentials.
Impact
A verified list of account names, which is the input for password spraying and password guessing and often reveals administrative and service accounts.
Response
Isolate the internal host or close the network path that let an outside system reach a domain controller, then check whether a password attack from the same source followed.
Mitigation
Restrict which networks can reach domain controllers, and make a name alone worthless with an account lockout threshold, blocked weak passwords and multifactor authentication.
Event IDs
47764768

How the attack works

Before an attacker can guess or spray passwords, they need account names. The Kerberos authentication service on a domain controller confirms them to anyone who can reach it on the network. A request for a ticket-granting ticket can be sent for any name, and the domain controller answers a name it does not know with a different error than a name it knows. A name that exists is told that pre-authentication is required, or receives a ticket if the account does not require pre-authentication. By sending a long list of likely names and sorting the answers, the attacker learns which accounts are real. No account and no password in the domain are needed.

The requests for names that exist look like the first step of an ordinary logon. The requests for names that do not exist leave a trace. The domain controller records each one as event 4768 with result code 0x6 (KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN, the user name does not exist), together with the name that was asked for and the client address. One such event is a typing mistake or an account that was deleted. A source that asks for many different unknown names in a short time is working through a list, and Microsoft's monitoring guidance for event 4768 names exactly this pattern as an indicator of account enumeration.

The requests carry no password, so they are not recorded as wrong-password failures (event 4771) and no account lockout follows. That makes enumeration quiet unless failed ticket requests are audited and counted. The first rule on this page is a threshold rule that counts distinct unknown names per source. Its values are starting points to tune. A second threshold rule counts the NTLM counterpart, event 4776 with error code 0xC0000064 (the user name does not exist), per source workstation name, which Microsoft also lists as a possible indicator of account enumeration.

What an attacker needs

  • Network access to the Kerberos service of a domain controller.
  • The name of the domain and a list of candidate account names, usually built from the names of employees and common naming formats.
  • No domain credentials.

Impact

A verified list of account names. It is the input for password spraying and password guessing, and it shows the naming convention of the organization, which often reveals administrative and service accounts. Accounts that do not require pre-authentication identify themselves in the same exchange, which is the starting point of AS-REP roasting. Enumeration compromises nothing on its own, but it is usually the first visible step of an attack on domain credentials.

Detection rules

One Workstation Presented NTLM Authentications for Many Unknown Accounts

Counts, per source workstation name, the distinct account names for which a domain controller logged event 4776 with error code 0xC0000064 (the user name does not exist). Microsoft lists many such events in a short time as a possible indicator of an account enumeration attack. This is the NTLM counterpart of the Kerberos rule on this page: one workstation name that presents 10 or more unknown names within 10 minutes is working through a list. The event holds the workstation name the client reported and no network address, and that name can be empty or false. The threshold and the window are starting points to tune. Requires failure auditing in the subcategory Audit Credential Validation on domain controllers.

Fires when one Workstation has at least 10 different TargetUserName values within 10 minutes.

Threshold ruleLevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceWindows Security event log
title: NTLM Credential Validation for an Unknown Account (Enumeration Base Event)
id: d994f218-569d-43b3-bcdc-d5a0fcb4f9f9
name: ntlm_validation_unknown_account
status: experimental
description: >-
  Base event of the threshold rule in this file. Event 4776 (the computer
  attempted to validate the credentials for an account) with error code
  0xC0000064, which Microsoft documents as a user name that does not exist.
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 4776
    Status: '0xc0000064'  # the event XML writes the code in lowercase
  condition: selection
level: low
---
title: One Workstation Presented NTLM Authentications for Many Unknown Accounts
id: 6d9bbeb0-3d76-4cb3-a7b0-5b590d56ea18
status: experimental
description: >-
  Counts, per source workstation name, the distinct account names for which a
  domain controller logged event 4776 with error code 0xC0000064 (the user name
  does not exist). Microsoft lists many such events in a short time as a
  possible indicator of an account enumeration attack. This is the NTLM
  counterpart of the Kerberos rule on this page: one workstation name that
  presents 10 or more unknown names within 10 minutes is working through a
  list. The event holds the workstation name the client reported and no
  network address, and that name can be empty or false. The threshold and the
  window are starting points to tune. Requires failure auditing in the
  subcategory Audit Credential Validation on domain controllers.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4776
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-credential-validation
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.discovery
  - attack.t1087.002
correlation:
  type: value_count
  rules:
    - ntlm_validation_unknown_account
  group-by:
    - Workstation
  timespan: 10m
  condition:
    field: TargetUserName
    gte: 10
falsepositives:
  - Servers that pass NTLM logons of many users to the domain controller under one workstation name, such as terminal servers, mail and web front ends and RADIUS servers, where users mistype their names. Baseline them and exclude them by Workstation or give them a higher threshold.
  - Applications configured with lists of accounts that no longer exist. They repeat the same names at regular intervals.
  - The values of 10 names and 10 minutes are starting points, not tested limits. Measure how many unknown names normally appear per workstation name and adjust both.
level: medium

False positives

  • Servers that pass NTLM logons of many users to the domain controller under one workstation name, such as terminal servers, mail and web front ends and RADIUS servers, where users mistype their names. Baseline them and exclude them by Workstation or give them a higher threshold.
  • Applications configured with lists of accounts that no longer exist. They repeat the same names at regular intervals.
  • The values of 10 names and 10 minutes are starting points, not tested limits. Measure how many unknown names normally appear per workstation name and adjust both.

One Source Requested Kerberos Tickets for Many Unknown Accounts

Counts, per client address, the distinct account names for which a domain controller logged event 4768 (a Kerberos authentication ticket was requested) with result code 0x6, which Microsoft documents as a user name that does not exist. One source that asks for 10 or more different unknown names within 10 minutes is working through a list of candidate names; Microsoft's monitoring guidance for event 4768 names repeated 0x6 results as an indicator of account enumeration. A single event is a typing mistake or a deleted account. The threshold and the window are starting points to tune against your own baseline. Requires failure auditing in the subcategory Audit Kerberos Authentication Service on domain controllers; collect the event from every domain controller.

Fires when one IpAddress has at least 10 different TargetUserName values within 10 minutes.

Threshold ruleLevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceWindows Security event log
title: Kerberos Ticket Request for an Unknown Account (Enumeration Base Event)
id: 19077bbd-04a2-4760-bb08-9717082b542f
name: kerberos_tgt_request_unknown_account
status: experimental
description: >-
  Base event of the threshold rule in this file. Event 4768 (a Kerberos
  authentication ticket was requested) with result code 0x6,
  KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN, which Microsoft documents as "the username
  doesn't exist".
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 4768
    Status: '0x6'
  condition: selection
level: low
---
title: One Source Requested Kerberos Tickets for Many Unknown Accounts
id: d7c4c504-0541-401e-adf1-d61ae6253e98
status: experimental
description: >-
  Counts, per client address, the distinct account names for which a domain
  controller logged event 4768 (a Kerberos authentication ticket was
  requested) with result code 0x6, which Microsoft documents as a user name
  that does not exist. One source that asks for 10 or more different unknown
  names within 10 minutes is working through a list of candidate names;
  Microsoft's monitoring guidance for event 4768 names repeated 0x6 results as
  an indicator of account enumeration. A single event is a typing mistake or a
  deleted account. The threshold and the window are starting points to tune
  against your own baseline. Requires failure auditing in the subcategory
  Audit Kerberos Authentication Service on domain controllers; collect the
  event from every domain controller.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4768
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-kerberos-authentication-service
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-15
tags:
  - attack.discovery
  - attack.t1087.002
correlation:
  type: value_count
  rules:
    - kerberos_tgt_request_unknown_account
  group-by:
    - IpAddress
  timespan: 10m
  condition:
    field: TargetUserName
    gte: 10
falsepositives:
  - Systems on which many people type a user name, such as terminal servers, VPN gateways and web or mail front ends. Mistyped names from all of their users arrive from one address. Baseline them, then exclude them by IpAddress or give them their own higher threshold.
  - Applications and devices that still hold accounts which were deleted or renamed, for example after a migration or a bulk offboarding. The names repeat from run to run; clean up the configuration.
  - Identity, inventory and vulnerability scanning tools that test whether accounts exist. Exclude their addresses once they are confirmed.
  - The values of 10 names and 10 minutes are starting points, not tested limits. Measure how many unknown names a source normally produces and adjust both.
level: medium

False positives

  • Systems on which many people type a user name, such as terminal servers, VPN gateways and web or mail front ends. Mistyped names from all of their users arrive from one address. Baseline them, then exclude them by IpAddress or give them their own higher threshold.
  • Applications and devices that still hold accounts which were deleted or renamed, for example after a migration or a bulk offboarding. The names repeat from run to run; clean up the configuration.
  • Identity, inventory and vulnerability scanning tools that test whether accounts exist. Exclude their addresses once they are confirmed.
  • The values of 10 names and 10 minutes are starting points, not tested limits. Measure how many unknown names a source normally produces and adjust both.

Triage

  • Read the client address and identify the system behind it. A managed workstation or server, a known scanner and an unknown device lead to very different conclusions.
  • Look at the names that were requested. Dictionary-like lists in one format, in alphabetical order or at a steady rate point to a tool. A few names of former employees or renamed accounts point to stale configuration on a device or application.
  • Check how many requests from the same source succeeded in the same window. Tickets issued without pre-authentication (4768 with status 0x0 and pre-authentication type 0) indicate AS-REP roasting of the accounts that were found.
  • Search for what came next from the same source. Wrong-password failures for many accounts (4771 with failure code 0x18, 4776 with error code 0xC000006A) mean the list is already being used for a password spray.
  • Check for the NTLM counterpart from the same workstation, which is event 4776 with error code 0xC0000064 (the user name does not exist).
  • If the source is an application server, review its configuration for a list of accounts that no longer exist before treating the alert as an attack.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Contain the source. Isolate the internal host or close the network path that let an outside system reach a domain controller.
  2. Find out how the source got that access. An internal source means a machine or a network segment is already in the hands of the attacker and has to be investigated as such.
  3. Assume that the attacker now holds a list of valid account names. Lower the thresholds of the password spraying and password guessing rules for the following weeks and watch privileged and service accounts closely.
  4. Reset the password of any account for which the source obtained a ticket without pre-authentication, and remove that setting from the account.
  5. Check whether a password attack from the same source followed and succeeded. If it did, handle the affected accounts as compromised.

Mitigation

  • Restrict which networks can reach domain controllers. Guest, partner and device networks rarely need to talk to the Kerberos service, and no domain controller should be reachable from the internet.
  • Treat account names as public and make a name alone worthless. Enforce an account lockout threshold, block weak passwords and require multifactor authentication on services that accept domain credentials.
  • Remove the setting "Do not require Kerberos preauthentication" from every account that has it, so that a confirmed name does not also hand out material for offline password cracking.
  • Enable failure auditing for the subcategory Audit Kerberos Authentication Service on every domain controller and collect event 4768 from all of them. Without failure auditing, requests for unknown names leave no event.
  • Create a few decoy accounts with plausible names that nobody uses, and alert on any authentication attempt for them.

Frequently asked questions

Does Kerberos account enumeration lock accounts or cause failed logon events?

The requests do not count as wrong passwords. A request for a name that does not exist has no account behind it, and a request for a name that exists carries no password. The domain controller records the unknown names as event 4768 with result code 0x6. Wrong passwords are recorded differently, as event 4771 with failure code 0x18, and it is those that count toward account lockout.

Which audit setting is needed to see Kerberos account enumeration?

Failure auditing for the subcategory Audit Kerberos Authentication Service on domain controllers. With success auditing only, event 4768 is written for issued tickets and the failed requests for unknown names leave no event. Microsoft recommends both success and failure auditing on domain controllers and notes that the event volume is high.

Why does the rule count distinct account names instead of failed requests?

One device that keeps asking for a deleted account produces many failures for a single name, which is a configuration problem. Enumeration works through a list, so one source asks for many different names that do not exist. Counting distinct names per source separates the two cases with one threshold.

Is a list of valid account names a security problem by itself?

Account names are not secrets, and many can be derived from email addresses. The list matters because of what follows it. It lets an attacker aim password spraying at real accounts only and pick out administrative and service accounts by their names. The defense is to make sure a name is not enough, with lockout, strong passwords and multifactor authentication.

References

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