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Live Privileged Session Monitored by Another User in Idira (formerly CyberArk) detection rules

A user who may monitor active sessions opens a copy of an administrator's live privileged session. Depending on one setting they only watch it, or control it like the original user, without any permission on the privileged account.

Platform
Idira (formerly CyberArk)
Severity
Medium
Log source
Idira (formerly CyberArk) Vault audit log
Last updated
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft Sentinel
What an attacker needs
A Vault user in the Auditors group, or with the documented permissions in the account's Safe and the recording Safe, and a live session through PSM.
Impact
The attacker watches an administrator's privileged session or, where the monitoring level is Control, acts in it with the rights of the privileged account.
Response
Terminate the monitored session if it is still active, disable the user who monitored it and review the recording of the monitored period.
Mitigation
Leave the monitoring level at View, keep the Auditors group small and show the monitoring notification on the platforms you use.
Vault event codes
375374
Threat groups
None listed in MITRE ATT&CK for this technique

How the attack works

Privileged Session Manager lets authorized users monitor an active session from their own workstation. CyberArk documents who is authorized: members of the Auditors group, or members of the account's Safe and of the recording Safe with the List accounts and View audit permissions, and Retrieve accounts in the recording Safe. What they can do is one setting, MonitoringLevel. With View they see the session and cannot take part. With Control they participate in the session and control it in the same way as the original user. Monitoring is allowed by default (AllowMonitor is Yes) and the default level is View.

An attacker who holds or creates such a user does not need the privileged account at all. They wait until an administrator opens a session to a domain controller or a hypervisor and join it. With View they see exactly what the administrator does. With Control they act on the target inside a session that the administrator authenticated, without the Use accounts or Retrieve accounts permission. The Vault records the start with code 374 (Monitor Session Start) and the end with code 376 (Monitor Session End). For both, the code table gives the user name in Info1, the recordings Safe in Info2 and the target session file in Info3. A start that failed is code 375 (Monitor Session Start Failed).

What must be collected. The rules read the Vault's audit records forwarded by syslog in CEF format (SIEM integration, configured in DBParm.ini). The CEF header's Device Event Class ID carries the Vault audit action code. SyslogMessageCodeFilter must not exclude codes 374 and 375. By default all codes are sent.

What an attacker needs

  • A Vault user in the Auditors group, or a member of the account's Safe (List accounts, View audit) and of the recording Safe (Retrieve accounts, List accounts, View audit).
  • Active session monitoring allowed for the platform of the account, which is the default.
  • A live session through Privileged Session Manager. To act in it and not only watch, MonitoringLevel must be set to Control.

Impact

With View, everything the administrator sees and does in the session, including data shown on the target and commands typed. With Control, actions on the target system with the rights of the privileged account, performed inside someone else's session and without any permission on the account in the Vault.

Detection rules

CyberArk Live Session Monitoring Start Failed

Detects a failed attempt to monitor an active session of CyberArk Privileged Session Manager (audit action code 375, Monitor Session Start Failed). The code table flags the code in its Alert column, which CyberArk explains as an unauthorized operation, and gives the user name in Info1, the recordings Safe in Info2 and the target session file in Info3. Monitoring needs membership of the Auditors group, or permissions in the account's Safe and the recording Safe, and can be switched off for a platform. A failure means that someone tried to join a live privileged session and was not able to. Look for a successful start (code 374) on the same session file by the same or another user afterwards. The code table gives no reason for the failure, so the rule matches the code alone. deviceEventClassId is the CEF header's Device Event Class ID, which CyberArk's syslog translator fills with the Vault audit action code.

LevelLowStatusExperimentalLog sourceIdira (formerly CyberArk) Vault audit log
title: CyberArk Live Session Monitoring Start Failed
id: c551d8a9-31e6-455b-bb2a-9f22437b658f
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects a failed attempt to monitor an active session of CyberArk
  Privileged Session Manager (audit action code 375, Monitor Session Start
  Failed). The code table flags the code in its Alert column, which CyberArk
  explains as an unauthorized operation, and gives the user name in Info1,
  the recordings Safe in Info2 and the target session file in Info3.
  Monitoring needs membership of the Auditors group, or permissions in the
  account's Safe and the recording Safe, and can be switched off for a
  platform. A failure means that someone tried to join a live privileged
  session and was not able to. Look for a successful start (code 374) on the
  same session file by the same or another user afterwards. The code table
  gives no reason for the failure, so the rule matches the code alone.
  deviceEventClassId is the CEF header's Device Event Class ID, which
  CyberArk's syslog translator fills with the Vault audit action code.
references:
  - https://docs.cyberark.com/pam-self-hosted/latest/en/content/pasref/vault%20audit%20action%20codes.htm
  - https://docs.cyberark.com/pam-self-hosted/latest/en/content/pasimp/configuring-live-session-monitoring.htm
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.lateral-movement
  - attack.t1563
logsource:
  product: cyberark
  service: vault
detection:
  selection:
    deviceEventClassId: '375'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - An auditor who tries to monitor a session that has just ended, or a session on a platform where monitoring is disabled. CyberArk does not document which technical failures write this code, so a connection problem may produce it as well.
level: low

False positives

  • An auditor who tries to monitor a session that has just ended, or a session on a platform where monitoring is disabled. CyberArk does not document which technical failures write this code, so a connection problem may produce it as well.

CyberArk Live Privileged Session Monitored by Another User

Detects a user starting to monitor an active session of CyberArk Privileged Session Manager (audit action code 374, Monitor Session Start). CyberArk documents that members of the Auditors group, and members of the account's Safe and the recording Safe with certain permissions, can open a copy of an active session on their own workstation. With the setting MonitoringLevel at View they watch it. At Control they participate in the session and control it in the same way as the original user, which gives them the target system without any permission on the privileged account. The record does not say which level applied. The code table gives the user name in Info1, the recordings Safe in Info2 and the target session file in Info3, and the end of the monitoring is code 376. deviceEventClassId is the CEF header's Device Event Class ID, which CyberArk's syslog translator fills with the Vault audit action code.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceIdira (formerly CyberArk) Vault audit log
title: CyberArk Live Privileged Session Monitored by Another User
id: 93fe0ce4-a10c-4c34-b9fd-c8586bfb1ac6
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects a user starting to monitor an active session of CyberArk Privileged
  Session Manager (audit action code 374, Monitor Session Start). CyberArk
  documents that members of the Auditors group, and members of the account's
  Safe and the recording Safe with certain permissions, can open a copy of an
  active session on their own workstation. With the setting MonitoringLevel
  at View they watch it. At Control they participate in the session and
  control it in the same way as the original user, which gives them the
  target system without any permission on the privileged account. The record
  does not say which level applied. The code table gives the user name in
  Info1, the recordings Safe in Info2 and the target session file in Info3,
  and the end of the monitoring is code 376. deviceEventClassId is the CEF
  header's Device Event Class ID, which CyberArk's syslog translator fills
  with the Vault audit action code.
references:
  - https://docs.cyberark.com/pam-self-hosted/latest/en/content/pasref/vault%20audit%20action%20codes.htm
  - https://docs.cyberark.com/pam-self-hosted/latest/en/content/pasimp/configuring-live-session-monitoring.htm
  - https://docs.cyberark.com/pam-self-hosted/latest/en/content/pasimp/monitoring-live-sessions.htm
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.lateral-movement
  - attack.t1563
logsource:
  product: cyberark
  service: vault
detection:
  selection:
    deviceEventClassId: '374'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Auditors and security staff who monitor a session during an investigation, a vendor's remote work or a review of a PTA event. Match the monitoring user and the session with the request.
  - Teams that use Control on purpose for support or four-eyes work. Scope the alert to the sessions of Tier 0 accounts, or to monitoring users outside the approved group.
level: medium

False positives

  • Auditors and security staff who monitor a session during an investigation, a vendor's remote work or a review of a PTA event. Match the monitoring user and the session with the request.
  • Teams that use Control on purpose for support or four-eyes work. Scope the alert to the sessions of Tier 0 accounts, or to monitoring users outside the approved group.

Detection logic

Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.

User added to Auditors or to a recording Safe and monitoring a session soon after

Detection hypothesisSequence of events

Monitoring by a long-standing auditor is part of the job. Monitoring by a user who received the right hours earlier is a right that was created for this purpose. The membership change and the monitoring are separate records, and only together do they show a user who was made an auditor in order to join a session.

  1. A member is added to a group: code 265 (Add Group Member), for which the code table gives the group in Info1 and the user in Info2. Keep the records in which the group is Auditors. Or a member is added to a Safe: code 32 (Add Owner), with the user in Info1.
  2. Within 24 hours that user starts to monitor a session: code 374 (Monitor Session Start), for which the code table gives the user name in Info1.
  3. Compare the issuer (suser) of the first record with the monitoring user, and check the membership change against an access request.

Events26532374

LimitsA new auditor who starts work, or an investigator who is given access for one case, produces the same sequence, so the result has to be compared with access requests. A user who inherits the right through a directory group is added by the LDAP synchronization under another code and is not seen. The 24 hours are a starting point.

Triage

  • Read the user who monitored, the recordings Safe and the target session file, which the code table gives in Info1, Info2 and Info3, and the station of the audit record.
  • Identify the monitored session on the monitoring page of the web portal, with the administrator who opened it, the account and the target system.
  • Check whether the monitoring user is one of your auditors and whether the monitoring was requested, for example in an investigation or after a PTA event.
  • Read the current MonitoringLevel. With Control, everything done in the session during the monitoring may have been done by either user.
  • Find out how the user got the right. Look for a member added to the Auditors group (code 265) or to the Safes (code 32) shortly before.
  • Play the recording of the session for the time between code 374 and code 376.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Terminate the monitored session if it is still active, and disable the user who monitored it until the monitoring is explained.
  2. Review the recording of the session for the monitored period. Where MonitoringLevel was Control, treat the changes made on the target in that period as possibly the attacker's and reverse them.
  3. Start a password change for the privileged account of the session and for every credential that was typed or shown in it.
  4. Remove the user from the Auditors group or from the Safes if the membership was not approved, and find out who added it.
  5. Set MonitoringLevel back to View if it was changed.

Mitigation

  • Leave MonitoringLevel at View unless a documented process needs Control, and treat a change of this setting as a security change.
  • Disable active session monitoring on the platforms of Tier 0 accounts if nobody needs it there. CyberArk documents an override of AllowMonitor at platform level.
  • Keep the Auditors group small and review its members and the members of recording Safes on a schedule.
  • Show the monitoring notification on the platforms you use, so that the owner of a session sees that it is being monitored.
  • Forward the Vault audit to your SIEM and alert on every monitored session and on new members of the Auditors group.

Frequently asked questions

Can someone who monitors a session also act in it?

Only when the setting MonitoringLevel is Control. CyberArk documents two values. With View, users can view active sessions from their own workstation but cannot participate. With Control, users can participate in active sessions and control them in the same way as the original user. The default is View. The audit record of the monitoring does not say which level applied, so read the setting.

Does the administrator see that the session is being monitored?

Only if the platform is configured for it. CyberArk documents a notification that can be displayed in the active session when monitoring begins, configured separately for each platform, with a display time that defaults to 5 seconds and can be set to stay on screen. Without it the owner of the session has no sign that a second user joined.

Why is a terminated session not matched by a rule on this page?

The Vault records a terminated session with code 372, but termination is mostly a defensive act. CyberArk documents that Privileged Session Manager can terminate sessions automatically when PTA or another analytics tool notifies it, and that members of the group PSMLiveSessionTerminators can do it by hand. Read code 372 during triage, next to the monitoring records of the same session.

Is there a public incident report that describes this path?

No public incident report describes this at the audit event level. The page rests on what CyberArk documents about active session monitoring, its two levels and the audit codes the Vault writes for it.

References

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