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Amazon SNS SMS Settings Probed or Changed detection rules

An attacker with stolen AWS credentials checks whether the account can send text messages through Amazon SNS, raises the spend limit or adds destination numbers, and sends SMS at the owner's cost without a CloudTrail record.

Platform
AWS
Severity
Medium
Log source
AWS CloudTrail
Last updated
Tactic
Impact
Rule formats
Sigmaand queries for: SplunkMicrosoft SentinelIBM QRadar
What an attacker needs
Valid credentials for a principal with SNS permissions, and an account that can send SMS to arbitrary numbers in at least one Region.
Impact
SMS charges on the owner's bill and text messages in the owner's name, sent in a way that leaves no CloudTrail event.
Response
Deactivate the credential that made the calls, set the SMS spend limit and delivery settings back, and review SNS charges in all Regions.
Mitigation
Deny SNS SMS actions where text messages are not used, keep the monthly spend limit low, and log SMS deliveries to CloudWatch Logs.
CloudTrail events
SetSMSAttributesCreateSMSSandboxPhoneNumberVerifySMSSandboxPhoneNumberGetSMSAttributesGetSMSSandboxAccountStatus
Threat groups
None listed in MITRE ATT&CK for this technique

How the attack works

Amazon SNS can send text messages straight to phone numbers, and the account owner pays for each one. That makes SMS sending, like email sending, something a stolen credential with SNS permissions can be turned into money or into phishing messages. Before sending, the attacker has to learn what the account allows. GetSMSSandboxAccountStatus tells whether the account is still in the SMS sandbox in a Region, where messages go only to verified destination numbers, and GetSMSAttributes returns the account's SMS settings. Inside the sandbox, CreateSMSSandboxPhoneNumber and VerifySMSSandboxPhoneNumber add a destination number. SetSMSAttributes changes the defaults for sending: the monthly spend limit, the default message type and sender ID, and the role and sampling rate with which SNS writes delivery logs.

The settings matter because the sending itself is nearly invisible. AWS documents that Publish is a data event for topics and platform endpoints, which a trail does not log by default, and that the resource type for phone numbers is not logged by CloudTrail at all. A message sent directly to a phone number therefore leaves no CloudTrail event. What remains are the management events around it, the delivery logs in CloudWatch Logs if a delivery status role is configured, and the bill. AWS's Threat Technique Catalog describes the related abuse of sign-up and verification forms to generate SMS traffic, and names unexpected billing spikes as the sign to watch.

AWS lists GetSMSAttributes, GetSMSSandboxAccountStatus, SetSMSAttributes, CreateSMSSandboxPhoneNumber and VerifySMSSandboxPhoneNumber among the SNS control plane operations that are logged as CloudTrail management events. Its example records show other operations, so the rule that reads the attribute name does so on the basis of the API reference. No incident report was used for this page.

What an attacker needs

  • Valid credentials for a principal with SNS permissions, often a leaked long-term access key with a broad policy.
  • For messages to arbitrary numbers, an account that is out of the SMS sandbox in at least one Region, and a spend limit that leaves room.

Impact

SMS charges on the owner's bill, up to the monthly spend limit, and text messages sent in the owner's name, which can be phishing. The owner's own messages, such as one-time codes for customers, stop when the spend limit is reached.

Detection rules

Amazon SNS SMS Monthly Spend Limit Changed

Detects SetSMSAttributes calls to Amazon SNS that set the attribute MonthlySpendLimit. AWS describes it as the maximum amount in USD that the account is willing to spend each month to send SMS messages, after which SNS stops sending. It is the only brake on SMS charges, so a change by anyone but the team that owns messaging deserves a look, in particular a raise. AWS lists SetSMSAttributes among the SNS control plane operations that are logged as CloudTrail management events. The attribute is read from requestParameters.attributes.MonthlySpendLimit, which follows the attributes request parameter of the SNS API reference: AWS's example records show other operations, so confirm the field in your own events. Check awsRegion to see where the limit was changed. It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode, because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.

LevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceAWS CloudTrail
title: Amazon SNS SMS Monthly Spend Limit Changed
id: 904634af-6d21-4b49-aa92-72e2cc33248a
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects SetSMSAttributes calls to Amazon SNS that set the attribute
  MonthlySpendLimit. AWS describes it as the maximum amount in USD that the
  account is willing to spend each month to send SMS messages, after which
  SNS stops sending. It is the only brake on SMS charges, so a change by
  anyone but the team that owns messaging deserves a look, in particular a
  raise. AWS lists SetSMSAttributes among the SNS control plane operations
  that are logged as CloudTrail management events. The attribute is read
  from requestParameters.attributes.MonthlySpendLimit, which follows the
  attributes request parameter of the SNS API reference: AWS's example
  records show other operations, so confirm the field in your own events.
  Check awsRegion to see where the limit was changed.
  It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode,
  because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
references:
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/sns/latest/api/API_SetSMSAttributes.html
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/sns/latest/dg/logging-using-cloudtrail.html
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496/004/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.impact
  - attack.t1496.004
logsource:
  product: aws
  service: cloudtrail
detection:
  selection:
    eventSource: sns.amazonaws.com
    eventName: SetSMSAttributes
    requestParameters.attributes.MonthlySpendLimit|exists: true
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - The team that owns SMS notifications when it sets up a Region or adjusts the limit after a limit increase, and infrastructure-as-code runs that apply the same value again. Add those roles to a filter_* selection on userIdentity.arn.
level: medium

False positives

  • The team that owns SMS notifications when it sets up a Region or adjusts the limit after a limit increase, and infrastructure-as-code runs that apply the same value again. Add those roles to a filter_* selection on userIdentity.arn.

Amazon SNS SMS Settings Changed or Sandbox Destination Number Added

Detects SetSMSAttributes, CreateSMSSandboxPhoneNumber and VerifySMSSandboxPhoneNumber calls to Amazon SNS. SetSMSAttributes sets the default settings for sending SMS messages, among them the spend limit, the default message type and sender ID, and the role and sampling rate for delivery logs. CreateSMSSandboxPhoneNumber adds a destination phone number to an account that is in the SMS sandbox, and the verify call completes it, after which messages can be sent to that number. AWS lists all three among the SNS control plane operations that are logged as CloudTrail management events. The rule matches the event names only and its level is low. In an account that does not send text messages every match deserves a look. Where SMS is in use, scope the rule to callers outside the team that owns messaging. It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode, because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.

LevelLowStatusExperimentalLog sourceAWS CloudTrail
title: Amazon SNS SMS Settings Changed or Sandbox Destination Number Added
id: 7367dc39-e152-4723-94d0-3fc04b0385fe
status: experimental
description: >-
  Detects SetSMSAttributes, CreateSMSSandboxPhoneNumber and
  VerifySMSSandboxPhoneNumber calls to Amazon SNS. SetSMSAttributes sets the
  default settings for sending SMS messages, among them the spend limit,
  the default message type and sender ID, and the role and sampling rate
  for delivery logs. CreateSMSSandboxPhoneNumber adds a destination phone
  number to an account that is in the SMS sandbox, and the verify call
  completes it, after which messages can be sent to that number. AWS lists
  all three among the SNS control plane operations that are logged as
  CloudTrail management events. The rule matches the event names only and
  its level is low. In an account that does not send text messages every
  match deserves a look. Where SMS is in use, scope the rule to callers
  outside the team that owns messaging.
  It also matches attempts that failed (errorCode present): check errorCode,
  because an unauthorized attempt is worth seeing.
references:
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/sns/latest/dg/logging-using-cloudtrail.html
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/sns/latest/api/API_SetSMSAttributes.html
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/sns/latest/api/API_CreateSMSSandboxPhoneNumber.html
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496/004/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.impact
  - attack.t1496.004
logsource:
  product: aws
  service: cloudtrail
detection:
  selection:
    eventSource: sns.amazonaws.com
    eventName:
      - SetSMSAttributes
      - CreateSMSSandboxPhoneNumber
      - VerifySMSSandboxPhoneNumber
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Setup and maintenance of SMS notifications by the team that owns them, and developers who verify their own phone number while testing in the sandbox. Add those roles to a filter_* selection on userIdentity.arn.
level: low

False positives

  • Setup and maintenance of SMS notifications by the team that owns them, and developers who verify their own phone number while testing in the sandbox. Add those roles to a filter_* selection on userIdentity.arn.

Amazon SNS SMS Settings Read in Many Regions by One Principal

Counts, per calling principal (userIdentity.arn), in how many different Regions it read the SMS settings or the SMS sandbox status of the account. AWS documents that GetSMSSandboxAccountStatus retrieves the status for the target Region, so someone who looks for a Region where text messages can be sent to any number repeats the call Region by Region. An application reads these values in the one or two Regions it sends from. Calls in three or more Regions within 10 minutes are therefore the pattern of a credential being tested for SMS abuse. AWS lists both calls among the SNS control plane operations that are logged as management events. They are read operations, so the trail has to log Read events. The count and the window are starting points to tune. For role sessions the principal is the session ARN, so one role used with different session names is counted per session.

Fires when one userIdentity.arn has at least 3 different awsRegion values within 10 minutes.

Threshold ruleLevelMediumStatusExperimentalLog sourceAWS CloudTrail
title: Amazon SNS SMS Settings or Sandbox Status Read (Many Regions Base Event)
id: 0352f552-b1bc-48dd-bb9d-815be6a76823
name: aws_sns_sms_settings_read
status: experimental
description: >-
  Base event of the threshold rule in this file. A GetSMSAttributes or
  GetSMSSandboxAccountStatus call to Amazon SNS, including attempts that
  were denied.
logsource:
  product: aws
  service: cloudtrail
detection:
  selection:
    eventSource: sns.amazonaws.com
    eventName:
      - GetSMSAttributes
      - GetSMSSandboxAccountStatus
  condition: selection
level: low
---
title: Amazon SNS SMS Settings Read in Many Regions by One Principal
id: 3f111800-6ef1-4e3f-aaae-88ddc3ed0031
status: experimental
description: >-
  Counts, per calling principal (userIdentity.arn), in how many different
  Regions it read the SMS settings or the SMS sandbox status of the account.
  AWS documents that GetSMSSandboxAccountStatus retrieves the status for
  the target Region, so someone who looks for a Region where text messages
  can be sent to any number repeats the call Region by Region. An
  application reads these values in the one or two Regions it sends from.
  Calls in three or more Regions within 10 minutes are therefore the
  pattern of a credential being tested for SMS abuse. AWS lists both calls
  among the SNS control plane operations that are logged as management
  events. They are read operations, so the trail has to log Read events.
  The count and the window are starting points to tune. For role sessions
  the principal is the session ARN, so one role used with different session
  names is counted per session.
references:
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/sns/latest/dg/logging-using-cloudtrail.html
  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/sns/latest/api/API_GetSMSSandboxAccountStatus.html
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496/004/
author: Forestall
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
  - attack.impact
  - attack.t1496.004
correlation:
  type: value_count
  rules:
    - aws_sns_sms_settings_read
  group-by:
    - userIdentity.arn
  timespan: 10m
  condition:
    field: awsRegion
    gte: 3
falsepositives:
  - Security posture scanners and inventory tools that read service settings in every Region. Exclude the roles they use.
  - The values of 3 Regions and 10 minutes are starting points, not tested limits. Measure what your own tools produce and adjust both.
level: medium

False positives

  • Security posture scanners and inventory tools that read service settings in every Region. Exclude the roles they use.
  • The values of 3 Regions and 10 minutes are starting points, not tested limits. Measure what your own tools produce and adjust both.

Detection logic

Patterns that need more than one event, a baseline or knowledge of your own environment. Each is a hypothesis to build and tune in your SIEM, not a ready rule.

SMS settings read or changed by a principal that has never used SNS for text messages

Detection hypothesisNeeds a baseline

The applications that send text messages are few and known. A principal with no history of SMS calls that reads the sandbox status, changes the spend limit or adds a sandbox number is preparing the account for someone else's traffic.

  1. Keep a record, over at least 30 days, of the principals (userIdentity.arn) that called GetSMSAttributes, GetSMSSandboxAccountStatus or SetSMSAttributes at sns.amazonaws.com.
  2. Alert when a principal that is not in the record makes one of these calls, or calls CreateSMSSandboxPhoneNumber.
  3. Check the SNS charges and, where they exist, the SMS delivery logs of the Region in awsRegion for the following hours.

EventsGetSMSAttributesGetSMSSandboxAccountStatusSetSMSAttributesCreateSMSSandboxPhoneNumber

LimitsA new application that starts to send text messages produces the same first-time events. The 30 days are a starting point. The sends themselves are not in CloudTrail, so the confirmation comes from the bill or the delivery logs.

Triage

  • Identify the caller (userIdentity.arn), its access key, the source IP address and the user agent. Is it an application or a team that sends text messages?
  • Count the Regions in which the principal read the SMS settings or the sandbox status in a short time.
  • For SetSMSAttributes, read which attributes were set and compare the spend limit and the delivery status settings with the previous values.
  • Check the SMS delivery logs in CloudWatch Logs, where they exist, and the SNS charges of the current month in every Region.
  • Look at what else the credential did, starting with the first call after it appeared at a new source address.

Response

Once the attack is confirmed:

  1. Deactivate the access key or revoke the role sessions of the principal that made the calls.
  2. Set the monthly SMS spend limit back, restore the delivery status settings, and remove sandbox destination numbers that nobody in the organization added.
  3. Review the SNS charges and delivery logs of all Regions for messages the organization did not send, and report the abuse to AWS Support.
  4. Find out how the credential was exposed and close that source, then review everything else it did in the account.

Mitigation

  • Deny SNS SMS actions with a service control policy in accounts and Regions that do not send text messages.
  • Set the monthly SMS spend limit to what the account really needs, and allow sns:SetSMSAttributes only to the team that owns messaging.
  • Configure a delivery status role, so that SNS writes a log for SMS deliveries to CloudWatch Logs, and alert on volume there.
  • Set billing alarms for SNS, so that unexpected SMS charges are noticed within hours.
  • Replace long-term access keys with roles and temporary credentials, and keep SNS permissions out of broad policies.

Frequently asked questions

Does CloudTrail show the text messages that were sent?

Not when they go directly to phone numbers. AWS documents that `Publish` is a data event for topics and platform endpoints and that the SNS resource type for phone numbers is not logged by CloudTrail. The sends show in the SMS delivery logs in CloudWatch Logs, if a delivery status role is configured, and on the bill.

What is the SMS sandbox?

AWS places an account that starts to send SMS through SNS in the SMS sandbox. In the sandbox all features work, but messages go only to verified destination phone numbers. The status is retrieved for one Region at a time, which is why someone who searches for a Region where sending works repeats the call in several Regions.

Can an attacker raise the spend limit without anyone at AWS noticing?

Only up to the maximum that AWS allows for the account. AWS documents that the spend limit is set to that maximum by default and that a higher limit needs a limit increase case. An owner who lowered the limit as a guardrail can see it raised again with one `SetSMSAttributes` call, which is what the rule on the spend limit matches.

Which legitimate activity produces these events?

Teams that run SMS notifications or one-time codes read and set these attributes when they set up a Region, and some monitoring tools read them on a schedule. The events are rare in accounts that do not send text messages, and there every one of them deserves a look.

References

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